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Preface
The problem of  free will and determinism has been with me for
over forty years. I started out as a committed determinist, but in cre-
ating a resolution to the problem I have ended up with a view of  the
living and human worlds as being directively and creatively originat-
ive, and far from being wholly deterministic.
My first degree was in physics and my PhD research (Elstob 1975)
included the creation of  a deterministic computer simulation model
of  the rules and influences that seem to govern how ordinary police
detectives in the UK decide upon their activities. However, over the
years following completion of  my PhD and as I became involved in
research and teaching as a lecturer in cybernetics at Brunel University,
I became increasingly dissatisfied with what determinism demands we
accept: that our lives have a closed future and that there is no place
for genuine creativity anywhere in the universe. It was this increasing
dissatisfaction that led me to turn away from determinism and seek a
naturalistic account of  openness and creativity.
Early on I focused on how certain kinds of  systems – particularly
information and meaning processing systems – may give rise to emer-
gent properties that are not reducible solely to the lower-level proper -
ties of  the components that realise the systems (see, for example, El-
stob 1984, 1986, 1988). But deterministic ideas that I was not able to
abandon kept defeating me. Quantum indeterminacy coupled with
chaos theory seemed to provide a way forward but at bottom all that
was on offer was an uncontrollable indeterminacy that made creative
origination and a person's future too much up to chance for my lik -
ing. Then, slowly, it dawned on me that I was looking in the wrong
place: that what I needed to do was not to look for a scientific answer
but rather to come up with an alternative set of  concepts to determ-
inism – concepts that would tell us the future is open, and that the
universe has a place for creativity, and for free will. I realised that
many attempts had been made to do this but that most had had to in -
corporate mysterious and/or extra-natural properties or entities,
while what I wanted was a set of  concepts as naturalistically accept -
able as those underlying determinism yet even simpler and more
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readily believable so that they might eventually come to be adopted in
place of  determinism.
In the 1990s my thinking became increasingly focused on the idea
that the world has a pervasive looseness – that there are gaps within
and between the causal networks of  existence. I eventually began to
understand this looseness in terms of  the independence that seems
to exist between many things. I came to see that if  things are chan -
ging truly independently then this would imply that how they are
changing with respect to one another must entail some indefiniteness
because true, not just apparent, independence of  change means there
can be no determinate relationship that links, governs or describes
how they are changing relative to one another. My development of
this idea led me to a very different metaphysical picture of  the natural
world than that offered by determinism.
“Independence indeterminism” is the name I have given to this
new metaphysical picture – an account of  which I make public for
the first time in this book. I have chosen the term independence in-
determinism because this metaphysics identifies a type of  indeterm-
inism that is a direct consequence of  assuming that true independ-
ence of  change is extremely common. I argue in the book that be-
cause of  the simplicity of  this assumption and because people (in -
cluding scientists) act in the world as if  it were true (and for other
reasons considered later), that we should adopt independence inde-
terminism in place of  determinism.
Although this book has much to say about independence inde-
terminism and its support for belief  in our universe being open and
creative, I have chosen to mainly focus on one application of  this
new metaphysics – namely, how it helps explain free will. I have done
this not only because reflection upon my PhD research led me to be-
come consumed by the possibility of  genuine free will, but also be-
cause I wanted an important and relatively well-contained problem
involving openness and creativity upon which I could focus my think-
ing.
Structuring the argument in a way that the reader may easily follow
has proved difficult, not only because the book presents many new
and unfamiliar ideas that are strongly interrelated but also because I
am trying to achieve two somewhat different aims. On the one hand
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my aim is to introduce independence indeterminism. However, much
of  what I want to say on this matter is not directly relevant to the is-
sue of  free will. But on the other hand, I need to discuss issues re -
lated to free will that are not directly relevant to independence inde -
terminism. The reader will see that I have decided to pursue these
two aims by interleaving discussion on these main topics more or less
equally within some chapters, and by devoting other chapters mainly
to one topic rather than the other. I hope the reader will bear with
this approach – an approach that I believe works better than dividing
the book into to a first part on independence indeterminism, fol -
lowed by a second part on free will.
The book is not a work of  popular philosophy, but nor is it a
highly technical treatise. Nevertheless, because many of  its key ideas
are new, it does require careful and thoughtful reading. However, it is
aimed at quite a wide readership – one that extends considerably bey-
ond, but includes, those participants in the free-will debate.
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1 Setting the Scene
1.1 Introducing Independence Indeterminism
1.1.1 The problem of  free will – whether or not we are capable
of  creative self-determination and can genuinely “make our own
fate” – has remained unresolved for well over 2000 years. In this
book independence indeterminism is used to help resolve this prob-
lem, and in the remainder of  this section this new way of  thinking is
introduced. After clarifying in section 1.2 some ideas used throughout
the book, sections 1.3 and 1.4 provide some background to the prob-
lem of  free will. Section 1.5 introduces the key idea of  creative ori -
gination, and section 1.6 discusses the view of  the human self  that is
adopted in the present work. The chapter ends with an outline of  the
remainder of  the book.
1.1.2 Independence indeterminism is a new but simple natural-
istic metaphysics that is proposed as a replacement for determinism –
which currently is generally (and usually tacitly) assumed to be the
way the world works. This new metaphysics is based on a single as-
sumption: namely, that true independence of  change is extremely
common in the universe. This is something that is believed by (al-
most) everyone in their daily doings, and it underpins the way science
operates. As will be argued, accepting this assumption implies that
the universe has a partly open future and a place for origination (i.e.
for the non-predetermined emergence of  things), and for creativity
(i.e. for the emergence of novel or non-prefigured things). Determinism,
on the other hand, is not a new metaphysics but a very well-estab-
lished one; and one that implies the future is completely predeter -
mined and therefore closed. This means determinism offers no pos-
sibility for anyone to genuinely originate or create anything and so
they cannot truly “make their own fate”. Indeterminism is the denial
of  determinism: it is the idea that some future events are not yet
fixed – that they are not predetermined. However, many people who
believe in indeterminism also believe that all non-predetermined fu-
ture events can only arise as a matter of  pure chance which means –
because no-one can influence pure chance – that with this sort of  in-
determinism people cannot properly “make their own fate”. How-
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ever, as will be argued, under independence indeterminism not all ori -
gination is a matter of  pure chance since this metaphysics has a place
for the “directed origination” of  some future events – and indeed for
the “directed creative origination” of  some things.
1.1.3 With truly independently running changes any of  them
might proceed differently with respect to how the others are running
because, by talking of truly independently running changes, there can
be nothing that links, fixes, governs, or describes how the changes
proceed with respect to one another. This is an absolutely funda-
mental point since it is something wholly incompatible with determ-
inism. As an example, consider three fairly arbitrarily chosen ongoing
changes taking place nearby as I write this: namely, the wind gusting
around the house; what some particular earthworm under the lawn is
doing; and what is happening inside the engine of  a car moving along
the road outside. If  these are truly independently running changes
then how any one of  them proceeds will not be linked to or related in
any determinate way to how the others are proceeding. This is what is
meant by true independence of  change. Determinism presents a very
different view because it does not accept that these changes are run -
ning truly independently, even though they may appear to be doing so.
Rather, according to determinism (as modern philosophers think of
it) there is no true independence of  change anywhere because this
metaphysics takes everything that happens to be part of  one totality
of  change in which the state of  the universe at one instant together
with the laws of  nature fixes (i.e. fully determines) what the state of
the universe will be at the next instant, and so on forever. So, accord-
ing to determinism, the three ongoing changes just mentioned must
be accepted to be proceeding in perfect lockstep, even though this is
not apparent to human observers.
1.1.4 Independence indeterminism understands existence to be
loosely connected, with change generally being compartmentalised
and with many gaps within and between the causal networks that ex-
ist. What this means is that under independence indeterminism most
things are understood to be getting on with their business independ-
ently of  most other things. Science confirms this view in two main
ways. Firstly, science assumes that the experimental findings or obser-
vations it reports may be confirmed, or possibly refuted, by re-estab-
lishing the relevant conditions and then repeating the experiment or
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observation. That is, it is accepted that only certain conditions affect
what will be found, not everything, and that as long as these condi-
tions are re-established the same results will be obtained. Or put an-
other way, it is accepted that scientific findings are independent of
most of  what exists and only depend upon a relatively few aspects of
existence. Secondly, and supporting the point just made, all the laws
of  science that have so far been established refer only to certain as -
pects of  existence, and not to everything. This suggests that whatever
is going on that is not mentioned in the laws runs independently of
(i.e. does not influence) the things that are mentioned.
1.1.5 The view that independence indeterminism provides is
one partly envisaged (but not clearly established) by the philosopher
of  science Karl Popper when he wrote: ‘Our universe is partly causal,
partly probabilistic, and partly open: it is emergent.’ (Popper 1982, p.
130) But even this view – one far less radical than what independence
indeterminism implies – is strongly at odds with the deterministic
view that many people accept without question as being true. For ex-
ample, in his book The Free Will Delusion – How We Settled for the Illu -
sion of  Morality, James Miles writes: ‘If  it all comes down to biology
and environment our behaviour would be said to be deterministic –
would be an inevitable outcome – because biology and the environ-
ment are themselves recognised as deterministic systems.’ (Miles
2015, p. 7) However, under independence indeterminism biology and
the environment are not recognised as deterministic systems, as the
following discussion shows.
1.1.6 Perhaps the most important consequence of  the assump-
tion of  true independence of  change is that interactions between
things that previously were changing (or running) truly independently
of  one another must be understood to be originated interactions –
that is, non-predetermined events. Interactions of  this sort shall be
referred to as “independence interactions”. A simple example will
help to make clear why independence interactions are always origin -
ated events. Imagine the event of  a particular raindrop falling on a
particular place on your head on a particular occasion. Now consider
a period some time before the occurrence of  this event – say, the
period between 5 and 10 seconds earlier – when it would seem reas -
onable to assume that true independence of  change existed between
the motion the raindrop was undergoing and the motion of  your
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head. With truly independently running changes there is nothing link-
ing or governing how the changes are proceeding with respect to one
another, and nothing ensuring they are changing in some sort of  hid-
den lockstep. This means that during the period concerned nothing
exists that determines whether or not the raindrop and your head will
come into future interaction. Which means that the event of  them ac-
tually coming into interaction is originated and not predetermined.
This is true of  all independence interactions: their future occurrence
remains indeterminate as long as the things involved are changing
truly independently of  one another. Of  course, most things that are
changing truly independently of  one another are very unlikely to ever
interact. For instance, referring to the example given above, it is
highly unlikely that the earthworm under the lawn and the engine in
the car will ever interact. Nevertheless, independence interactions do
seem to be very common – as instanced by the very common occur-
rence of  raindrops falling on people’s heads. If  this is accepted, as it
is under independence indeterminism, then this means that very
many future events – i.e. those that are independence interactions –
are originated events. Which means that under this new metaphysics
it is not correct to say that ‘biology and the environment are them-
selves recognised as deterministic systems’ since these two domains
involve a great many independence interactions. Put in more familiar
terms, independence indeterminism takes chance events to be real,
whereas under determinism they are taken to be only apparently real
since they are considered to be the result of  (generally very complex
and dispersed) deterministic processes whose overall operation we
cannot follow.
1.1.7 What independence indeterminism leads to is the conclu-
sion that existence is fundamentally open with a great many future
events yet to be originated. It recognises that causal networks are
common but it argues, unlike determinism, that there are causal gaps
within and between these networks. Additionally, it offers what has
not been available before: namely a thoroughly naturalistic account of
how humans (and animals to a more limited extent, and possibly in
the future some artificial entities such as robots) may self-directively,
and in certain cases creatively, originate important aspects of  their
lives. Independence indeterminism does not deny that order, depend-
ence, interdependence, and causal connectivity are familiar features
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of  existence, and that many happenings run in a more or less determ-
inistic way. For instance, once an independence interaction has actu -
ally occurred, what then ensues often runs in a more or less determ-
inistic way as the things involved interact with one another. For ex -
ample, once a raindrop lands on your head what then happens to the
drop largely unfolds in a more or less deterministic way – a way that
science has gone a considerable way to understanding.
1.1.8 Independence indeterminism is a process metaphysics and
as such it rejects the existence of  unchanging instantaneous states of
the universe, which is a fundamental assumption of  determinism.
The process approach is an unfamiliar way of  thinking because so
many things can be observed that do not appear to be changing.
However, when science looks closely it sees that, below the surface,
nothing is absolutely static. Taking process, or change, to be funda-
mental has a very long history. The philosopher Nicholas Rescher
writes: ‘The Greek theoretician Heraclitus of  Ephesus [535-475 B.C.]
– known even in antiquity as “the obscure” – is universally recog-
nized as the founder of  the process approach.’ Rescher goes on to
say that Heraclitus thought of  Nature as ‘a manifold of  opposed
forces joined in mutual rivalry, interlocked in constant strife and con-
flict.’ (Rescher 1996, p. 9) This view is not adopted by independence
indeterminism, but the key idea of  all process thinking – that change
is the fundamental feature of  existence and that unchanging instant-
aneous states of  existence do not exist – is adopted.
1.1.9 Under independence indeterminism, although all inde-
pendence interactions are originated events it is not accepted that all
such interactions are undirected or chance originations because it re-
cognises that some of  them are directively produced. That is, some
independence interactions are taken to be “directed originations”
produced by the activity of  a “directive system”: a system that adjusts
its actions in the light of  independently occurring events in order to
achieve or maintain some “directed outcome” (e.g. a goal). For in-
stance, in order to achieve their goal of  catching prey, predators must
appropriately adjust their actions in the light of  the evasive actions of
their (partly) independently moving prey. And in order to achieve their
goal of  arriving safely at their desired destination, car drivers must
appropriately adjust their actions to take account of independently
arising and changing road and traffic conditions. And, as a further ex-
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ample, directed independence interactions are involved in all ball-
sports because the players strive to interact with the generally inde-
pendently moving ball in such a manner as to produce certain desired
effects. However, it should not be thought that under independence
indeterminism “directive activity” and directed outcomes may only be
produced by purposive agents because they may also be originated by
completely automatically operating directive systems. For example,
the directive activity of  a thermostatically controlled home heating
system consists of  its switching the heating on and off  in response to
independently varying weather and other conditions in ways that tend
to maintain the directed outcome of  a roughly constant temperature
in the home.
1.1.10 Independence indeterminism is not compatible with de-
terminism. However, determinism is a very long-standing and well-
entrenched metaphysical position so why should people abandon it
and adopt this new view? The main reason for doing so is that once it
becomes clear that two important metaphysical views are fundament-
ally incompatible it seems right that people should try to decide
between them, and pick the stronger one. Usually people appeal to
three principles to help them decide. Firstly, they tend to favour the
metaphysics that accords most strongly with the beliefs they rely
upon in living their everyday and professional lives. Here independ-
ence indeterminism scores over determinism because it would be
very difficult for people to abandon the (generally tacitly held) belief
that most things run independently of  how most other things are
running, whereas it would be less difficult to abandon the rather ab-
stract assumptions upon which determinism (as formally understood
by most contemporary philosophers) is based. Secondly, if  one view
rests on simpler ideas and assumptions than the other then people
tend to favour it. And here again independence indeterminism scores
over determinism since it rests on the single simple idea and assump-
tion that true independence of  change is extremely common in the
universe. In sharp contrast, determinism (as formally understood)
rests on two highly abstract ideas and assumptions: namely, that there
is a definite and unchanging state of  the totality of  existence at each
instant of  time, and that there are fixed laws of  nature that com-
pletely determine how the state of  the totality of  existence at one in-
stant is transformed into the state of  the totality of  existence at the
6
next instant. Thirdly, people tend to favour that view which is most
able to account for the important phenomena that they believe exist
in the world. Here also independence indeterminism does better than
determinism because, among other things, it has a place for directed
(and creative) origination, and for free will, whereas determinism has
no place for these things. Given that independence indeterminism
seems to have more going for it than determinism, it would be appro-
priate to ask why determinism was not replaced by independence in -
determinism years ago? The answer is not clear (but some possible
reasons are mentioned in section 6.1). However, it may be simply that
no-one has previously thought through what the very commonly held
belief  in true independence of  change actually implies.
1.2 Some Clarifications
1.2.1 The term “metaphysics” is being used in the dictionary
sense of  ‘The systematic study or science of  the first principles of
being and of  knowledge; the doctrine of  the essential nature of  and
fundamental relations of  all that is real.’ (Webster’s Dictionary 1998) The
word itself  comes ‘from the Greek for “after natural things”, that is,
what comes after the study of  nature.’ (Concise Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy 2000, entry on ‘metaphysics’). The term “naturalistic meta-
physics” is used to indicate a doctrine based on assumptions beyond
definite empirical confirmation or denial that addresses the essential
relations, properties, and activities of  the natural world – a world
which is seen as forming a ‘single sphere without incursions from
outside by souls or spirits, divine or human, and without having to ac-
commodate strange entities like non-natural values or substantive ab-
stract universals.’ (Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Honderich 1995,
entry on ‘naturalism’). In being such a metaphysics independence in-
determinism competes on an equal footing with naturalistic forms of
determinism.
1.2.2 It has proved difficult to define what free will is. The view
adopted and developed in this book is that it is an ability that allows a
human (or more generally a psychological agent) “to make their own
fate” – not completely and in every respect, but to a significant de -
gree. That humans have this ability is a widely held belief, as is con-
firmed by a study in 1998 by the International Social Survey Programme
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which asked approximately 39,000 people drawn from 34 countries
various questions about religion and related matters, including
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “We each make
our own fate.” Just over 65% agreed or strongly agreed. This suggests
that a majority of  people, at least nowadays, believe that much of  the
course of  their lives is largely up to them to shape and create and is
not something wholly determined by circumstances (past and
present), or by others, or solely through luck or fate.
1.2.3 For us to be able to “make our own fate” we must be self-
directed originators. This is a more demanding requirement than it
may seem because to be originators we must be the first cause of  at
least some of  the things we do. That is, the causal chains (or net-
works of  influence) upon which at least some of  our actions depend
should start within us and not have their roots outside us or in the
past. And the requirement that we be self-directed originators is also
very demanding because it means that our self  must be exerting dir -
ectional influence over the production of  our originated doings in
such a manner that we may legitimately claim that they are our origin-
ations and not purely the result of  indeterministic chance events
arising inside or outside us over which we have no control.
1.2.4 Given its central role in the argument being developed,
more must be said about what “origination” is being taken to mean.
Something (e.g. an object, a property, an event, a process) is taken to
be originated if  at some point prior to its existence (but after the cre-
ation of  the universe) the universe was such that at that point the
later existence of  this something was not necessitated (i.e. predeter-
mined). This definition means that an entity is taken to be originated
if, even in a most indirect and/or far-past way, its existence depends
upon some entity that was itself  originated. However, in addressing
the issue of  free will participants in the debate are mainly interested
in ‘fresh’, or “de novo”, originations and not ‘stale’ ones. That is, the
main interest is in originated things whose existence was not necessit-
ated until relatively shortly before they actually came to be. For in-
stance, participants tend to be interested in decisions that are origin-
ated because of  the decision process itself  being originative rather
than because, say, the factors that led a person to decide as they did
were originated long ago by social and other influences that condi -
tioned the person to decide as they did.
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1.2.5 Self-directed origination is something that many people
don’t accept as being possible. Among such people are those belong -
ing to the following main groups. Firstly, there are those who believe
that God is the only true originator, and that He determines
everything that happens – which means that no natural agent can be
the self-directed originator of  anything, let alone their choices, moral
or otherwise. Secondly, some people believe that the universe runs
wholly deterministically, with no origination taking place anywhere.
Thirdly, even though they may accept that some indeterminacy might
exist within the universe, there are those who think that all natural
agents operate completely deterministically, like a very complex ma-
chine or computer, and that as such everything they do, and
everything that happens to them internally, is completely determined
by their current circumstances and their present internal condition, so
leaving no room for them themselves to actually originate anything.
Fourthly, there are people who believe that quantum indeterministic
events in the brain may lead to the de novo origination of  some men -
tal happenings – such as the formation of  some ideas or the making
of  some decisions – but who argue that these cannot be counted as
self-directed originations because what makes them originations are in-
deterministically arising quantum events that are not under the
agent's control or influence. And fifthly, there are people who think
that fate – whatever its basis and however it works – inexorably fixes
everything that is significant that happens to a person, meaning that
even if  they could self-directively originate some minor aspects of
their lives they could never change any of  the really important events
that fate dictates must occur.
1.2.6 In the past – that is, prior to the present work – one thing
that has made the existence of  free will such a difficult thing for
many people to accept has been the lack of  a naturalistically accept -
able account of  directed origination, and self-directed origination in
particular. This has led many people to believe that this power must
be of  divine or supernatural origin. Such a divine power and what it
gives us has been described by the Renaissance humanist scholar,
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who wrote in his work Oration On the
Dignity of  Man:
We have made thee neither of  heaven nor earth, neither mor-
tal nor immortal, so that with freedom of  choice and with
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honour, as though the maker and moulder of  thyself, thou
mayest fashion thyself  in whatever shape thou shalt prefer.
Thou shalt have the power to degenerate into the lower
forms of  life, which are brutish. Thou shalt have the power
out of  thy soul’s judgement, to be reborn into the highest
forms, which are divine. (Pico dela Mirandola 1486)
But if  God gave us the power of  self-directed origination then He
gave us the power to perform evil as well as good acts, and the ques-
tion then arises why a perfect being should wish to make room for
evil in His universe. This, and other problems, have made free will a
difficult matter for theologians and although several deeply argued
positions have been developed and promulgated none has gained uni -
versal acceptance. However, since the concern of  this book is with
naturalistic accounts of  free will little attention will be given to this
great body of  work.
1.2.7 Science is an obvious place to look for a naturalistic ac -
count of  self-directed origination, but unfortunately, given its present
metaphysical orientation, science cannot provide much help. The
physics that emerged during and after the Renaissance was thor-
oughly deterministic and because of  its huge success the idea of  the
universal application of  determinism became strongly rooted in the
scientific mind. This led to the widely held naturalistic view that the
universe is essentially a giant piece of  very complex clockwork – al -
beit a piece of  clockwork that was, perhaps, set up by God and is
obeying laws given by Him. The dominant position of  determinism
in physical science remained largely intact until the 1920s when
quantum mechanics was developed and microscopic (i.e. atomic and
sub-atomic) indeterminacy came to be firmly established within
mainstream scientific thinking. However, not all physicists accepted
this new view and some – Einstein being the most famous with his
belief  that God does not play dice – worked hard to find a fully de-
terministic account of  the empirical findings of  quantum physics. Al-
though in recent years various alternative accounts have gained sup-
port, the so-called Copenhagen interpretation – that an irreducible in-
determinacy exists within the quantum world – probably still retains
the backing of  the majority of  scientists. And because this is so this is
the view adopted throughout this book, except where stated other-
wise.
10
1.2.8 However, even if  the majority of  present-day scientists ac-
cept that quantum indeterminacy is a fundamental feature of  nature
and so accept that the absolute or all-pervasive determinism of  clas -
sical physics is not correct, most of  them point out that this inde-
terminacy is generally only significant at the atomic and sub-atomic
level of  existence and that it intrudes very little into the macroscopic
level. This means that those scientists who are concerned with mac-
roscopic happenings generally believe they are able to proceed with
their investigations under the assumption that what is going on hap-
pens deterministically. In particular this means that workers in the life
and human sciences generally believe they are dealing with “ad-
equately determined” phenomena. Bob Doyle says ‘Adequate determ-
inism is the kind of  determinism we have in the world. [That is,]
Macroscopic objects are adequately determined in their motions, giv-
ing rise to the appearance of  strict causal determinism’ (Doyle 2011,
p. 392). Various other terms have been used – e.g. “near determin-
ism” (Honderich 1988, p. 8). However, in the present work, the term
“macroscopic determinism” shall be used for the belief  that determ-
inism is very largely true within the macroscopic realm. Belief  in
macroscopic determinism is widely held and in consequence it is
commonly thought that everything that happens in a person’s life
must be deterministically produced. However, using the definition of
origination mentioned earlier and sticking with mainstream scientific
views, it is easy to show that this is unlikely to be the case.
1.2.9 Although, generally speaking, the macroscopic world is
well insulated from the indeterminacy of  the microscopic world,
macroscopic devices have been constructed that amplify certain
quantum indeterministic events in such a way that they give rise to
macroscopic events which must then themselves be counted as ori -
ginations. A relatively familiar example is a Geiger counter, an instru-
ment for measuring the intensity of  radioactivity in a particular loca -
tion. A Geiger counter works by detecting (and then greatly amplify-
ing to produce an audible click and/or the advance of  a counter) the
effects of  the decay of  a single radioactive nucleus – an event that oc-
curs indeterministically, according to the mainstream view. In fact,
many different sorts of  devices have been developed for detecting
and amplifying quantum indeterministic events and, among other
things, such devices may be used to originate streams of  numbers
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that have the property of  being randomly distributed. Such streams
of  truly originated random numbers (that is, truly originated accord -
ing to the mainstream view of  quantum mechanics) have various uses
in science, engineering, industry, and commerce. Indeed, there are
some internet sites (e.g. the HotBits Service) that make such streams
available free of  charge. Consider a situation, therefore, in which
someone uses the output of  one of  these sites as the basis for select-
ing the numbers for their lottery ticket, and let us further suppose
that they happen to be lucky enough to win a large prize. Such a win
is likely to make a big difference to the person’s life and the changes
involved will all count as originated events (according to the defini -
tion of  origination given earlier). However, if  macroscopic determin-
ism is true, then these changes will be stale originations because they
will all derive deterministically from the de novo originations (i.e. the
disintegration of  atomic nuclei) that led to the production of  the ran-
dom numbers which were used by the winner to construct their lot -
tery entry.
1.2.10 This example demonstrates that intrusions of  microscopic
indeterminacy into the macroscopic realm may lead to a vast number
of  subsequent stale macroscopic originations. There is nothing spe -
cial about these stale originations: they behave just like any other
things or happenings of  the same type. This is an important point be-
cause, under independence indeterminism, independence interactions
must be regarded as originated events. However, they are usually not
novel types of  origination. Indeed, many independence interactions
are of  a type that occurs so commonly that it is convenient to think
of  them as being “type-determined originations” relative to the do-
main in which they arise. For example, instances of  raindrops falling
on people’s heads count as type-determined originations because this
type of  independence interaction is almost certain to occur in situ -
ations in which people are out in the rain.
1.3 Standard Positions on Free Will
1.3.1 Free will has been recognised as a problematic concept for
well over two thousand years. Belief  in determinism, in its various
forms, has long been seen as the source of  most of  the trouble since
it has seemed to many people that free will cannot possibly be com-
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patible with a world in which an agent has no power to originate any -
thing. However, random indeterminacy has also long been recognised
as not enough to give people a sort of  free will worth wanting since
they have no control over what it produces.
1.3.2 Quite early in the history of  the debate – according to
Susanne Bobzien (1998), beginning with the work of  Chrissipius
(c280-207 BCE) – a robust attempt was made to argue that determin-
ism is not as much of  a problem as many people thought. The argu -
ment was made that what really matters is not that people have a free
will, but rather that they have the freedom to do what they want, or
will, to do. That is, as long as what a person is doing is what they de-
sire to do then they should not really be bothered if  the source of
their desire lies outside themselves – for instance, that it comes from
their given nature and/or from how they have been conditioned by
society. This position, known as compatibilism (or soft determinism),
has been the dominant one in the free-will debate from early modern
times when naturalistic philosophers started to examine the problem.
Thomas Hobbes is often taken to be the father of  modern compatib -
ilism and in his great work Leviathan (Hobbes 1651), he wrote:
LIBERTY or FREEDOM, signifieth, properly, the absence
of  opposition; by opposition, I mean external impediments
of  motion; and may be applied no less to irrational, and an -
imate creatures, than to rational. For whatsoever is so tied, or
environed, as it cannot move but within a certain space,
which space is determined by the opposition of  some ex-
ternal body we say hath no liberty to go further.
[...]
 And according to this proper, and generally received meaning
of  the word, a FREEMAN, is he, that in those things, which by his
strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will
to do. [...] from the use of  the word free-will, no liberty can be
inferred of  the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of
the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop, in do-
ing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do.
1.3.3 The great strength of  compatibilism is that there appears
to be no logical reason why the universe should not operate fully de -
terministically and in so doing give rise to human behaviour as we
know it in all its physical, biological, social and psychological detail.
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The key point is not to understand determinism too simplistically and
too restrictively. In particular, determinism need not mean that a
‘dominoes-world’ view has to be adopted of  what human persons are
and how they operate and behave. Daniel Dennett, a leading contem-
porary compatibilist, makes this important point clear in his book El-
bow Room – The Varieties of  Free Will Worth Wanting. He writes:
The fear that this chapter [entitled Self-Made Selves] has fo-
cused on is the fear that no naturalistic theory of  the self
could be given that sufficiently distinguished it from a mere
domino in a chain. We do not want to be mere dominoes; we
want to be moral agents. Let us review what has been found
to be special about naturalistically conceived selves. Only
some of  the portions of  the physical universe have the prop -
erty of  being designed to resist their own dissolution, to wage
a local campaign against the inexorable trend of  the Second
Law of  Thermodynamics. And only some of  these portions
have the further property of  being caused to have reliable ex-
pectations about what will happen next, and hence to have
some capacity to control things, including themselves. And
only some of  these have the further capacity of  significant
self-improvement (through learning). And fewer still have the
open-ended capacity (requiring a language of  self-description)
for “radical self-evaluation.” These portions of  the world are
thus loci of  self-control, of  talent, of  decision making. They
have projects, interests, and values they create in the course
of  their own self-evaluation and self-definition. How much
less like a domino could a portion of  the physical world be?
(Dennett 1984, p. 100)
1.3.4 Clearly, the portions of  the world that Dennett describes
in the last few sentences are human persons, or similar beings.
Throughout his book, and in his subsequent writing on free will,
what Dennett is trying to establish is that determinism doesn’t take
away anything that really matters to us, and nor does it directly disal -
low any of  the mental and other capacities that we feel we possess
and which we greatly value. However, what determinism does deny is
that a person can “make their own fate” in the sense of  being able to
self-directively originate important aspects of  their life.
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1.3.5 Strongly opposed to the compatibilists are the incompatib-
ilists. Incompatibilists do not accept that free will is simply a matter
of  an agent being able to freely do what they want to do since they
believe that an agent must also be able to freely originate what they
want to do. Incompatiblists fall into two main groups: the hard de-
terminists or pessimists, and the libertarians. The hard determinists
believe that if  determinism is true then free will cannot exist (and
most of  them also believe that determinism is indeed true so they
don’t believe free will exists at all in the natural universe). An import -
ant subgroup of  the hard determinists deserves to be distinguished.
Members of  this group are sometimes called illusionists because
while they don’t believe we have free will they do believe that we have
an almost immovable illusory belief  in our possessing it – a belief  that,
because it may be genetically and/or socially determined, we cannot
easily abandon even if  rational argument is able to convince us that it
is a false belief.
1.3.6 Libertarians are incompatibilists because, like all incompat-
ibilists, they believe free will cannot be compatible with determinism,
or indeed with undirected indeterminism. But unlike other incompat-
ibilists they have a deep and resolute belief  in the existence of  free
will, which means they believe the natural universe cannot be abso-
lutely deterministic in its operation and must have room for self-dir-
ected origination. Libertarians constitute a large group but because
they have always struggled to find a convincing naturalistic account
of  self-directed origination they have often advocated views that
push the boundaries of  what almost all scientists and many other
people are able to accept. For example, one widely pursued approach
argues for what is known as agent causation. This is the idea that cer-
tain agents possess the power to cause things to happen without this
causal power beings reducible to chains of  causal events within the
agent and its environment. That is, agent-causal powers are seen to be
emergent in the sense of  not being reducible. However, it has been
difficult for those libertarians who subscribe to such a view to find a
convincing naturalistic account of  agent-causation that is compatible
with mainstream scientific thinking. Nevertheless, there have been re-
cent attempts to give naturalistic libertarian accounts of  free will that
are compatible with mainstream scientific thinking, and some of
these are discussed later (see sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5). One serious
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weakness shared by all these attempts is that the de novo originations
that are involved are quantum indeterministic ones, and as such can-
not be influenced or directed by anything, including an agent’s self.
What is needed, and what independence indeterminism is able to
provide, are sources of  de novo origination that arise from the way
the agent actually operates – for instance, that arise as a result of  dir-
ected and non-directed independence interactions among the various
parts of  the agent’s self. What this means is that an agent, in so oper -
ating, will itself  be the originator of  causal chains and so be function -
ing in an agent-causal manner.
1.3.7 Although “The problem of  free will” has been, and still is,
actively debated and worked on, it is important to point out that it is
an invisible problem for most people most of  the time. That is, it is a
problem that has little explicit presence in the lives of  most people.
However, it would be a mistake to say it is therefore a problem of  no
human significance. It would be a mistake because the position that a
person or a community holds on what free will is and whether or not
humans possess it does have an important influence. This has long
been recognised, as the following passage from the entry on ‘free will’
in the Catholic Encyclopedia (1909) makes clear.
The question of  free will, moral liberty, or the liberum arbit -
rum of  the Schoolmen, ranks amongst the three or four most
important philosophical problems of  all time. It ramifies into
ethics, metaphysics, and psychology. The view adopted in re-
sponse to it will determine a man’s position in regard to the
most momentous issues that present themselves to the hu-
man mind. On the one hand, does man possess genuine
moral freedom, power of  real choice, true ability to determ-
ine the course of  his thoughts and volitions, to decide which
motives shall prevail within his mind, to modify and mould
his own character? Or, on the other, are man’s thoughts and
volitions, his character and external actions, all merely the in-
evitable outcome of  his circumstances? Are they inexorably
predetermined in every detail along rigid lines by events of
the past over which he himself  had had no sort of  control?
This is the real import of  the free-will problem.
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1.4 On Defining Free Will
1.4.1 Defining what free will is has proved to be a problem. The
approach adopted in the present work is to link free will to the ability
of  a person, or more generally a psychological agent, to “make their
own fate”, and, as shall be outlined at the end of  this section, to do
so in a self-directed and creatively originative way. But first it is ap-
propriate to briefly consider some of  the things the free-will com-
munity has had to say.
1.4.2 Traditionally, free will has been a topic confined to philo-
sophy. Although belief  in free will is widespread this is a belief  that
during most of  the twentieth century received almost no attention
from psychologists. Indeed, in the introduction to the book Are We
Free: Psychology and Free Will the editors’ note that ‘the term free will
didn’t even merit an entry in a recent eight-volume Encyclopedia of  Psy-
chology [Oxford University Press]; in fact, it didn’t even appear in the
index.’ (Baer, Kaufman, and Baumeister 2008, p. 3)
1.4.3 Perhaps one of  the reasons why scientific psychology has
ignored free will – or rather “had” since in recent years things have
changed – is that it is difficult to define what it is. In everyday life the
term free will is often used to underline the fact that a choice is truly
a person’s own. And among other things, this usually means that it is
expected that the person take responsibility for a choice so made – as
is clear, for example, when, after people have tried to dissuade
someone from taking a particular course of  action, they are told
“Well, just appreciate that you’re doing this of  your own free will.”
1.4.4 The notion that by exercising your free will you are re-
sponsible for what follows has long been one way of  defining what it
is. Michael McKenna (2015), in his entry on ‘compatibilism’ in the au-
thoritative on-line Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, adopts this ap-
proach when he writes: ‘It would be misleading to specify a strict
definition of  free will since in the philosophical work devoted to this
notion there is probably no single concept of  it. [...] [A]s a theory
neutral point of  departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability
of  persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for
moral responsibility.’
1.4.5 Note that this characterisation makes no mention of  self-
directed origination, nor anything similar, and that because of  this it
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may be seen as a compatibilist-friendly definition. On the other hand,
dictionary definitions do tend to emphasise that free will entails some
sort of  originative power. According to the Oxford English Dictionary
free will is: ‘1 Spontaneous will, unconstrained choice (to do or act).
2 The power of  directing one’s own actions without constraint by ne -
cessity or fate.’ Webster’s Dictionary (1998) gives the following definition
of  free will: ‘1 The power of  self-determination regarded as a special
faculty. 2 Philosophical. The doctrine that man is entirely unrestricted in
his ability to choose between good and evil: opposed to determinism.’
And it defines the philosophical term determinism as: ‘The doctrine
that man’s choices, decisions, and actions are decided by antecedent
causes, inherited or environmental, acting upon his character: op-
posed to free will.’
1.4.6 These dictionary definitions indicate that there are two
separate notions embodied in the concept of  free will: that of  “vol -
untariness”, and that of  “non-necessitated self-determination”. The
hard determinist, Ted Honderich (Honderich 1993, p. 5), has argued
that much of  the disagreement about what free will is rests on an un-
willingness of  most participants in the debate to accept that our
everyday use of  this term encompasses both of  these concepts.
1.4.7 The idea of  voluntariness is not particularly problematic
and most participants in the debate accept that to exercise free will
means the agent must be operating voluntarily: that is, operating
while not under undue “constraint, coercion, compulsion, or control”
– to use a shorthand phrase for conditions that are difficult to define
precisely. However, the idea of  non-necessitated self-determination is
problematic since it seems to be incompatible with the natural order:
an order in which it is commonly believed everything either has a
cause; or otherwise is a product of  undirected indeterministically
arising quantum events. The philosopher Alfred Mele, who has writ-
ten extensively on free will, makes clear what is required.
Sometimes you would have made an alternative decision if
things had been a bit different. [...] But this isn’t enough for
the kind of  openness at issue: call it deep openness. What’s
needed is that more than one option was open to you, given
everything as it was at the time – your mood, all your
thoughts and feelings, your brain, your environment, and in-
deed the entire universe and its entire history. Having been
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able to have made a different decision if  things had been a bit
different is one thing; having been able to have made a differ-
ent decision in the absence of  any prior difference is another.
(Mele 2014, p. 2)
Note that Mele is tacitly assuming that the universe has an entirely
definite state at the instant in time in which someone exercises their
free will, something which process philosophies and independence
indeterminism does not accept. Put in the terms Mele uses – which
are in line with the traditional view of  the free-will problem – non-
necessitated self-determination is problematic. Indeed, the Scholastics
attacked this problem head-on and argued that humans possess a
very special power which is known as the Liberty of  Indifference: a
liberty in which the Will, seen as a special faculty, is taken to operate
in complete isolation from any influences external to itself, including
other parts of  a person’s mind-brain.
1.4.8 Here it is necessary to break the flow of  the discussion to
say something about the term “mind-brain” that has just been intro-
duced – a term that will be used frequently in this book. The diction -
ary (Webster’s 1998) tells us that the mind is ‘The aggregate of  all con-
scious and unconscious processes originating in and associated with
the brain [...]’, and that the brain is ‘The enlarged and greatly modi-
fied portion of  the central nervous system contained within the cra -
nium of  vertebrates [...].’ These definitions suggest that the mind is a
processual entity whereas the brain is a structural/material one. Yet
both of  these entities jointly realise the mental life of  a psychological
agent and in recognition of  this use of  the term mind-brain seems
appropriate. With this usage established, discussion of  the Liberty of
Indifference may be resumed.
1.4.9 Writing in the 17th century Philip van Limborch, a friend
of  the British empiricist philosopher John Locke, described the Will
as a special faculty as follows.
The true identity therefore of  the Will consists in an active
Indifference, whereby, having all things requisite for Action, it
may act or not act, and do this rather than that. And this
Liberty is so far essential to the Will, that Man has it not only
in a State of  Innocence; but has it in every State or Condition
whatsoever, the State of  Sin not excepted. (Limborch 1713,
p.141)
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The “Indifferent Will” is the term that shall be adopted for such a
will – a will such that ‘having all things requisite for Action, it may act
or not act, and do this rather than that.’ The key point about an Indif -
ferent Will, if  it exits at all, is that it is a part of  a person that operates
in a way uninfluenced and unconstrained by their history and present
circumstances, and by their self. Here it is appropriate to say some-
thing about what, in the present work, the self  is taken to be.
1.4.10 A self  is understood to be something that is only pos-
sessed by a psychological agent – indeed, the notions of  a psycholo -
gical agent and of  a self  are, in this work, considered to be insepar -
able. Whether or not all psychological agents must be biological be -
ings is an open question, but anything that is to qualify must have
functionally distinguishable and relatively independently operating
parts – parts that collectively may be identified as constituting the en-
tity’s self  – and must include what in human terms may be referred to
as motivational, emotional (affective), and executive parts. According
to the conception adopted here there is no place for an Indifferent
Will – rather, the phenomena that lead some people to infer the exist -
ence of  such a thing are taken to be features of  the way a psycholo-
gical agent’s self  operates. More discussion of  this conception of  the
self  may be found in sections 1.6 and 10.3.
1.4.11 As many commentators have noted, the Indifferent Will is
something that perhaps we don’t want: something we can know only
through its actions after the event; something whose internal workings
cannot be represented in consciousness; and something rather alien
that our self  can never influence or control. R. E. Hobart, in a well-
known paper – ‘Free Will as Involving Determination and Inconceiv-
able Without It’ – puts the matter as follows.
 Indeterminism maintains that we need not be impelled to ac-
tion by our wishes, that our active will need not be determ-
ined by them. Motives “incline without necessitating.” We
choose amongst the ideas of  action before us, but we need
not choose solely according to the attraction of  desire, in
however wide a sense that word be used. Our inmost self
may rise up in its autonomy and moral dignity, independently
of  motives, and register its sovereign decree.
  Now, in so far as this “interposition of  the self ” is undeter -
mined, the act is not its act, it does not issue from any con-
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tinuing self; it is born at the moment, of  nothing, hence it ex-
presses no quality; it bursts into being from no source. The
self  does not register its decree, for the decree is not the
product of  just that “it”. The self  does not rise up in its moral
dignity, for dignity is the quality of  enduring being, influen-
cing its actions, and therefore expressed by them, and that
would be determination. In proportion as an act of  volition
starts of  itself  without cause it is exactly, so far as the free-
dom of  the individual is concerned, as if  it had been thrown
into his mind from without – “suggested” to him – by a
freakish demon (Hobart 1934).
1.4.12 Free will defined in terms of  an Indifferent Will makes an
easy target for ridicule by scientists and others. For example, Patricia
Churchland, a well-known eliminative-materialist philosopher, in a
New Scientist special issue on the ‘Big questions in Science’, writes as
follows on the question, ‘Do we have free will?’.
A rigid philosophical tradition claims that no choice is free
unless it is uncaused; that is, unless the “will” is exercised in-
dependently of  all causal influences – in a causal vacuum. In
some unexplained fashion, the will – a thing that allegedly
stands aloof  from brain-based causality – makes an uncon-
strained choice. The problem is that choices are made by
brains, and brains operate causally; that is, they go from one
state to the next as a function of  antecedent conditions.
Moreover, though brains make decisions, there is no discrete
brain structure or neural network which qualifies as “the will”
let alone a neural structure operating in a causal vacuum. The
unavoidable conclusion is that a philosophy dedicated to un-
caused choice is as unrealistic as a philosophy dedicated to a
flat Earth. (Churchland 2006)
1.4.13 This is a rather unfair attack on many present-day natural -
istically inclined libertarians since they do not seek to explain the ex -
istence of  an Indifferent Will. Rather, they seek to explain the exist -
ence of  processes of  self-directed origination that reflect the influ -
ence of  such factors as the agent’s motivations, emotions, back-
ground, abilities, values, character, and the circumstances within
which they currently find themselves. In the present work, in order to
make the difference between these two views of  originative free will
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clear, the former type shall be referred to as “indifferently originative
free will” and the latter as “self-originative free will”. It is this latter
kind of  free will that is the concern of  this book. And while the main
focus of  the book is on human free will, some of  what will be said
applies to the less complex, and also less free, form of  free will en -
joyed by higher animals.
1.4.14 These various points provide context for the view taken in
this book of  what free will is: namely, that it is the ability of  a person
(or more generally a psychological agent) to “make their own fate” in
a way that requires that they be able to self-directively originate things
in their world. Although instinctive, habitual, and other well-estab-
lished forms of  more or less automatic behaviour are, under inde-
pendence indeterminism, seen to involve self-directed origination,
these sorts of  behaviour involve only type-determined origination –
that is, they only involve types of  origination that are prefigured relative
to the agent and their circumstances at the time. And this means that
many participants in the free-will debate, while accepting that such
self-directed behaviour may satisfy the needs and wants of  the agent,
would not accept that what was going on entailed non-necessitated self-
determination in any strong sense. Free will is often taken to mean
that an agent “could have done otherwise”, and it is generally not
meant that the agent could have done otherwise in only minor ways –
that is, in ways consistent with the agent’s behaviour involving only
type-determined self-directed originations. Rather, what is meant is
that the agent could have done something distinctly different, such as
choosing to do something quite different, or deciding to carry out a
chosen task in a distinctly different way. This suggests (and it is as-
sumed to be so in the view of  free will adopted here) that the de-
cision process involved in such cases – what shall be called the “free-
will process” – is special in that it entails a strong form of  non-neces-
sitated self-determination. Under independence indeterminism this
strong form of  non-necessitated self-determination is assumed to in-
volve a special kind of  originative process – one involving what is re -
ferred to as “creative origination” – and is such that it does not fol -
low a pre-established or prefigured type of  course and is capable of
producing novel (i.e. non-prefigured) outcomes relative to the agent
and domain concerned.
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1.4.15 Additionally, the assumption being adopted in the book is
that free-will processing only arises and continues if  two conditions
hold. Firstly, that the psychological agent concerned is currently act -
ively engaged (consciously, subconsciously, or unconsciously) in try -
ing to resolve some internal conflict and/or indecision regarding
some matter. And secondly, that the agent does not have available, or
does not wish to use, automatic, pre-established or prefigured ways
of  achieving a resolution of  the conflict and/or indecision. If, for
any reason, either of  these conditions ceases to hold then it is as -
sumed that free-will processing – i.e. non-necessitated self-determina-
tion – concerning the matter in question will cease. However, if  the
cessation is not a result of  the conflict being finally resolved then it is
understood that at some point in the future the agent may resume
free-will processing on the same matter. And it is accepted that in
some cases repeated attempts to resolve conflict and/or indecision
within the self  may continue for an extended period, perhaps even
for many years.
1.4.16 In assuming that free-will processing only occurs when an
agent is actively trying to resolve conflict and/or indecision about
some matter, it follows that it will not take place if  the agent’s mind-
brain is occupied with something else (e.g. busy with some activity,
being ‘lost’ in a movie or a book, or socialising with friends), or is in
some condition (e.g. intoxicated, drugged) that prevents or blocks the
conflict/indecision from arousing activity within the agent’s mind-
brain to resolve it. With human persons it seems that one of  the reas -
ons why they engage in such blocking behaviour is to escape from or
avoid having to face up to conflicts within themselves that they can -
not readily resolve.
1.4.17 The existence of  creative origination is a key assumption
of  the approach to explaining free will adopted in this book. Inde -
pendence indeterminism provides a naturalistic basis for the possible
existence of  creative origination but further evidence is needed to
make a good case for it actually existing in the universe. Such evid -
ence is provided in several places throughout the book (section 2.4
and Chapter 8, in particular), but the matter needs to be further dis-
cussed at this early stage.
23
1.5 Introducing Creative Origination
1.5.1 Consider first what non-creative origination is taken to be.
Under independence indeterminism non-creative origination is as-
sumed to be very widespread – the mundane example given of  a rain-
drop falling on your head is a case in point. Any origination (e.g. an
independence interaction, or a quantum indeterministic event) which
is of  a type that is prefigured or immanent within a domain is taken
to be a non-creative origination relative to that domain, and the term
type-determined has been introduced to refer to such originations.
An independence interaction is taken to be of  a prefigured type when
it occurs between types of  things that commonly exist within the do-
main concerned and when it is a result of  these types of  things be -
having according to their well-established natures and ways of  inter -
acting given the conditions that obtain at the time. For instance, un-
der independence indeterminism, chemical reactions may be under-
stood to involve various types of  independence interactions taking
place among the types of  participants involved (e.g. the types of
atoms, molecules, and ions), with the types of  interaction that arise
being an almost invariable consequence of  the particular physical cir-
cumstances (of, for example, temperature, pressure, and the relative
concentrations of  the reactants and products) that exist. It is because
the independence interactions involved and the products produced
are of  prefigured types that what is going on is not considered to in-
volve creatively originative processes. Nevertheless, because, under in-
dependence indeterminism, chemical reactions are understood to be
processes involving innumerable interactions between specific things
that are changing (e.g. thermally vibrating and moving around) largely
independently of  one another prior to their interaction, it is accepted
that they involve independence interactions and hence are taken to be
originative processes, albeit type-determined originative processes.
1.5.2 Consider creative origination. Under independence inde-
terminism and according to present knowledge, this form of  origina-
tion seems to be almost entirely confined to the living and human
realms (however the relatively recent appearance of  artificial intelli-
gence (AI) may lead to the emergence of  a third realm in which cre -
ative origination exists). In these realms many processes run in a non-
creatively originative way, as for example do most biological processes
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and much animal and human behaviour. Nevertheless, it seems that
creative origination does play a key role in these realms. For instance,
under independence indeterminism, evolution by natural selection is
taken to be a creatively originative process because the specific spe-
cies that it gives rise to are considered not to be prefigured. Also, al-
most all learning is understood to be a creatively originative process
because what is learnt is (usually) not prefigured relative to the learner
(although it may be prefigured from a more general point of  view).
1.5.3 In the human realm, creative origination has become very
highly developed and particularly so with the advent of  human civil -
isation, culture, and technology – all of  which are developments that
seem to have depended upon creative origination for their emer-
gence, as well as themselves being sources of  continuing creative ori-
gination. Apart from learning (but intimately connected and inter-
twined with it) is another general kind of  creative origination – “in -
ventiveness” – that plays a major part in human life. Inventiveness
takes various forms, but to illustrate it consider just one form: prob-
lem-solving. The human capacity for problem-solving (both indi-
vidual and collective) is very great compared to animals (and any AI
systems that at present exist). The key feature that makes problem-
solving a creatively originative process (rather than solely a type-de-
termined one) is that at its commencement its course, and whether
the problem-solver achieves a solution or resolution of  the problem,
is not prefigured. To take a simple example: a person may come
across a crossword clue that they cannot readily solve, but by con-
tinuing to work on it, and perhaps by leaving it alone for a while or
sleeping on it, they may eventually be able to get the solution. There
may well be many things in the person’s mind-brain and environment
that may help them achieve a solution, but for creative origination to
occur there must not exist any pre-established or prefigured means by
which they may obtain a solution (or if  there is, they must have de -
cided to avoid making any use of  it). At present, how inventiveness
works is poorly understood. In future a better general understanding
of  how this and other forms of  creative origination take place may
be obtained, but however complete knowledge and understanding of
the overall processes involved may become, the nature of  creatively
originative processes as they are defined here means that such know-
ledge will never enable reliable predictions to be made of  the specific
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ways of  running and the specific outcomes that particular instances
of  creatively originative processing produce. This means, for ex-
ample, that however complete knowledge and understanding of  the
process of  biological evolution may become this will never allow reli -
able prediction of  the specific future species that it will give rise to.
And it means also that no matter how well processes of  human creat-
ive origination may come to be understood this understanding will
never allow reliable prediction of  the specific products of  human cre-
ativity: for instance, the future specific works of  literature and the
arts, the future specific businesses that will be formed, and the future
specific scientific and other theories that will emerge.
1.5.4 Human free-will processing typically involves creatively
originative activity in four areas. Firstly, a person may carry out creat-
ive activity in order to produce (or modify) the alternatives that figure
in the conflict/indecision situation they are confronting. Secondly,
they may work to creatively originate, explore, elaborate, or modify
the reasons (emotional, motivational, rational, etc.) they have for and
against the various alternatives. Thirdly, the various parts of  their self
may engage in creatively originative conflictual, competitive, cooper-
ative interactions with these interactions often being centred on the
alternatives and reasons that are currently in play. And fourthly, a per -
son’s self  and its various parts may undergo creatively originative
change in such a way that the conflict is removed or becomes resolv-
able. Collectively, these four interacting areas of  creatively originative
activity and change may be seen as constituting the “ARCS” of  hu -
man free-will processing, with the capital letters of  the acronym
standing for Alternatives, Reasons, Conflict, and Self-change respect -
ively.
1.5.5 With difficult and prolonged cases of  human free-will
processing significant creative origination in all these four areas may
take place. For example, in trying to decide whether of  not to make a
major career change a person may be involved in many episodes of
internal conflict and interaction among the various parts of  their self
and this may involve creative change in all of  these four areas. For in -
stance, under the Alternatives area of  their creative free-will pro-
cessing activity, a person will likely explore and research the various
alternatives that they consider as possibilities, and in so doing, and in
response to other changes taking place within them and around them,
they may uncover new alternatives, and perhaps also find themselves
rejecting some they previously considered as possibilities. As the per-
son considers and deliberates about alternatives, and in other ways,
they may come to create a better understanding of  what factors are
important in a new career and in making such a big change to their
life, and this activity will constitute the Reasons part of  their creative
free-will processing. Throughout such free-will processing there is
likely to be continuing conflictual, competitive, cooperative and other
interaction among the various parts of  the person’s self. For example,
conflicting motivations may arise – such as the need to provide for
the family, and the need for sufficient income to maintain one’s status
and desired standard of  living conflicting with the need for a more
fulfilling life. And together with these motivational conflicts there are
likely to be a mix of  emotions such as being elated by what the future
may be able to offer on the one hand, and being fearful about not be-
ing able to cope with all the uncertainty and disruption on the other
hand. And together with these sources of  conflict the executive self
may raise rational objections to certain courses of  action. This Con-
flict within the self, and the non-prefigured way in which it proceeds,
will have continuing influence on the other sorts of  creative changes
occurring within the individual. Finally, in addition to the above three
forms of  creative free-will processing it may be the case that the per -
son finds that creatively originated changes are taking place within
their self. For example, it may be that the strength of  some of  their
motivations change over the period of  time they struggle with their
conflict and indecision, and that this change proceeds in a non-pre -
figured way. For example, they may find that as time goes by they
have downgraded the value they put on their financial status and have
upgraded the importance of  having a fulfilling job. This then is creat-
ively originative change involving the person’s Self. Although deep,
difficult, and usually prolonged free-will processing does occur most
free-will processing involves only weak creative origination with a res-
olution of  the conflict or indecision often being fairly rapidly
achieved. Nevertheless, providing the originative process by which
the conflict/indecision was resolved was not wholly type-determined
then it is still taken to be a free-will process. For example, not much
creative origination usually takes place when a person is deciding
what menu items to have when they are out for a meal, but if  they are
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not succumbing to pure habit and have some genuine conflict or in -
decision over what to choose then creative origination is seen to play
some part in the person making their choice.
1.5.6  Creatively originative processes are often influenced by
randomly occurring or non-directed originations. According to the
mainstream view of  science today, de novo origination is very largely
confined to the atomic and sub-atomic levels and is a consequence of
quantum indeterministic events such as the disintegration of  an
atomic nucleus. But under independence indeterminism, de novo ori-
ginations are assumed to be very common at all levels of  existence
because independence interactions are assumed to be very common
at all levels. This means, for instance, that chance independence inter -
actions may result in the random association of  ideas within the
mind-brain of  psychological agents – ideas which may influence pro-
cesses of  creative origination, such as problem-solving. However, if
free-will processes were creatively originative solely because of  such
chance events then only a weak claim could be made that it was the
mind-brain that was the principle source of  the creative origination
involved. Fortunately, one of  the great strengths of  independence in-
determinism is that under this metaphysics, humans (and more gener-
ally psychological agents) may be understood to operate in a creat -
ively originative way that not only makes use of  chance originations
but also of  originations resulting from the directive influences and
directive activities of  the various parts of  the agent’s mind-brain and
self  – including, for example, such directed creative activity as is in-
volved in searching for and researching alternatives.
1.5.7 Another point that needs to be addressed in this brief  in-
troduction to creative origination is why conflictual, competitive, co-
operative interaction is taken to be a creatively originative process.
This sort of  activity is common in the living and human realms and
quite often the types of  outcome that it may produce are prefigured.
For example, with predator/prey interactions the types of  outcome
that may arise are usually prefigured – for instance, that the predator
catches its prey, or the prey escapes. However, as long as the overall
course (rather than merely the detailed course) of  the interaction on
any particular occasion does not consist of  a prefigured sequence of
well-established types of  move and counter-move as, for example,
may be the case with early moves in a game of  chess, or with animals
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in a mating ritual, then what is going on may be taken to be a creat -
ively originative process. And this is so even if, in the type of  situ -
ation considered, there are fairly well-established probabilities at-
tached to the possible types of  outcome.
1.5.8 It might be thought that in assuming that creatively origin-
ative processes exist under independence indeterminism inadequate
justification has been given for why the course such processes follow,
and the outcomes they produce, are not prefigured. After all, macro-
scopic-scale things don’t just pop into existence out of  nothing but
always seem to be the result of  interaction among pre-existing things.
And if  this is the case, and considering a process to be made up of  a
succession of  interactions among pre-existing things, then it would
seem to be true that the course and outcome of  all such macroscopic
processes should be prefigured. This argument not only relies on a ta-
cit assumption (that independence indeterminism does not accept)
that a process may legitimately be thought of  as a succession of  well-
defined states, but it also assumes that what exists in a creative do -
main are well-defined types of  things with well-defined ways of  inter-
acting. However, in creative domains this is not always true. For in -
stance, many of  the specific thoughts, perceptions, memories, imagin-
ings, feelings, motivations, etc. that enter into independence interac-
tion within the mind-brain of  a person engaged in a particular episode
of  free-will processing are likely to have features that effectively make
them unique types of  things with respect to how they may interact
and influence one another within the specific process concerned. For
instance, think of  all the unique factors associated with the specific
alternatives, reasons, and conflicts that may be involved in a person’s
free-will processing as they struggle to decide whether or not to take
up a particular job-offer.
1.6 The Human Self
1.6.1 In everyday life the concept of  the human self  is rarely
subjected to analysis. However, because of  its importance in the free-
will debate – and in particular because of  the approach that is being
adopted in this book – it is something that should be discussed. Un-
fortunately, after millennia of  theorising about “the self ” there is
little agreement about just what it is. A fundamental assumption
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made in the present work is that the human self  is something that
only fully develops as part of  an individual human being’s socialisa-
tion, and in recognition of  this assumption the term “human person”
(or “human”, or “person”), rather than “human being”, is generally
used. According to this view it is human persons that are significantly
different from animals, not human beings.
1.6.2 A further fundamental assumption that is made – one
widely but not universally held – is that the self  is not a single unitary
entity but rather a collective, or loose coalition of  somewhat inde-
pendently operating but nevertheless frequently interacting subsys-
tems and sub-selves. There are several theories of  the self  based on
this view, but here it will suffice to mention just two. In the classical
tradition, Plato saw the Soul (roughly equivalent to the self  as the
term is being used in this book) as being composed of  three parts:
Reason, Spirit, and Appetite. He saw these as relatively independent
sources of  influence on the doings of  a person with the proper con-
dition of  the Soul consisting of  Reason being in control of  Spirit and
Appetite – although he recognized that people did not always achieve
rational control over these other aspects of  their Soul. An example
from a much later period is Freud’s tripartite functional division of
the psyche (or self) into the id, ego, and super-ego. According to this
view the id is understood to be a wholly unconscious part of  the
psyche – ‘a chaos, a cauldron full of  seething excitations [...] it has no
organization, produces no collective will, but only a striving to bring
about the satisfaction of  the instinctual needs [...]’ (Freud 1933). The
ego, which among other things, draws strongly upon the cognitive
and executive functions of  a person, is seen as the most organized
and rational part of  the psyche, with much of  its activity involving
consciousness. The super-ego harbours the standards, values, ideals,
and conscience of  a person, with much of  its content being derived
from parental and social sources and influences. The super-ego is
more organized than the id, to which it stands in opposition. The ego
may be understood as striving to successfully serve (and control) the
demands of  the id and the super-ego while at the same time taking
into account the realities of  the external world and the person’s actual
powers and resources. The ego of  a mature person is usually (but not
always) able to override the demands of  the id and the super-ego.
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1.6.3 In the present work a view of  the human self  is adopted
that follows roughly the same pattern as the above two accounts.
Again, a tripartite division is adopted, namely into “the motivational
self ” (see section 10.5 for more discussion), “the emotional self ” (see
section 10.6), and “the executive self ” (see section 10.7). Unlike in
Freud's account, the motivational self  is taken to be not only har -
bouring primitive biological drives, instincts, and urges but also many
other motivations that have been acquired by a person through the
course of  their life. These acquired motivations include some from
their socialisation, some from the various groups they have belonged
to (and those they currently belong to), some from emotionally
charged and other experiences they have had, and some they have ad-
opted through their own creative processes of  thought and free-will
processing. It is also assumed that the motivational self  includes
many more or less specific ends and purposes constructed or ac -
quired by a person’s executive self. A person’s constructed or acquired
motivations are taken to include such things as their values and stand-
ards; the duties and obligations they have accepted; their aversions
and inclinations; and their life-hopes, projects, goals, and intentions.
The emotional self  is taken to be the source of  many of  the emo-
tions (or affective states) that humans experience and it is understood
that these may directly influence the person’s behaviour. It is also ac-
cepted that the emotional self  may have an indirect influence on be-
haviour through installing within a person’s motivational self  aver -
sions to some types of  things and attractions to others. The executive
self  is taken to be similar to Plato's Reason and Freud's ego and is
understood as being, most of  the time, in charge of  a person’s pur -
posive activity.
1.6.4 It is assumed that a person’s executive self  has a major in-
fluence on how a person shapes their life. It is assumed that most
people live their life within their own unique ‘world’ – a world that
shall be referred to as their “lifestructure” (see section 10.4). It is ac-
cepted, because the evidence supports this, that much of  a person’s
executive activity is concerned with attending to, maintaining, extend-
ing, modifying, abandoning, and creating aspects of  their lifestruc-
ture. And, again because the evidence seems to support this, the view
is taken that many of  the conflicts and states of  indecision (and
therefore occasions for free-will processing) that a human person ex-
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periences are related to their attempts to manage and shape their life-
structure in order to satisfy their motivations in an emotionally ac -
ceptable way. But, as alluded to earlier (1.4.16), as well as accepting
that human persons make positive efforts to improve their life – im-
prove it relative to their own criteria of  what they think counts as
success – it is also accepted that people engage in various activities to
block or blank out negative self-evaluations and escape from, or re-
lieve themselves from, conflicts and negative emotions. For example,
people indulge in alcohol, drugs, and comfort eating; they engage in a
great range of  escapist activities; and some people try to keep them-
selves so fully occupied that they don’t have the time or energy to ac-
knowledge and consider the perceived failures and dissatisfactions of
their life. However, as well as being drawn to blocking and blanking
activities, it seems people often search for and engage in pursuits (e.g.
projects, hobbies, sports, community work) in order to have parts of
their lifestructure that can provide satisfactions that they cannot find
in other parts – for example, in their job or in their home life. Finally,
it is assumed that human persons engage in wide-ranging self-evalu-
ation – more strongly and frequently at some times, and less strongly
and frequently at other times in their lives.
1.6.5 It is apparent from the above that a rather eclectic and
idiosyncratic view of  the self  is being adopted in the present work. It
has been constructed to try to make sense of  the unique nature of
human free will and of  many of  the peculiarities of  human life – pe -
culiarities that make the way humans live their lives, and many of
their preoccupations, very different from those of  any animal.
1.7 Outline of  the Book
1.7.1 Chapter 2 further develops the notion of  independence
indeterminism – the central novel idea of  the book, and one which is
returned to and developed in various ways in later chapters.
1.7.2 Chapter 3 first looks in more detail at determinism and it
is then argued that the law of  cause and effect does not provide a
sound basis for claiming that determinism rules in the universe. This
leads into a discussion of  the contemporary way philosophers think
about determinism. The chapter ends by considering how well inde-
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pendence indeterminism competes with determinism as a funda-
mental metaphysical thesis.
1.7.3 Chapter 4 returns again to independence indeterminism
and considers how it relates to science and current mainstream sci-
entific thinking. In Chapter 5 the other main theme of  the book is
taken up with a discussion of  some of  the important ideas about free
will that have emerged in the last fifty years or so.
1.7.4 The next four chapters are mainly devoted to further dis -
cussion of  independence indeterminism, starting (in Chapter 6) with
a more detailed look at the assumption of  independence of  change.
Chapter 7 goes into more detail about directed origination – discuss -
ing both conceptual and implementation issues. Chapter 8 focuses
further on creative origination. Chapter 9 broadens the discussion
and considers the wider significance of  independence indeterminism,
including how it provides a new perspective on the mind-body prob-
lem, how it accounts for the existence of  non-reducible emergence,
and why it supports naturalism as a metaphysical position but rejects
physicalism.
1.7.5 Chapter 10 attempts to identify the main factors involved
in human free will. Finally (in Chapter 11), in the light of  the preced -
ing chapters and the approach to explaining free will developed in the
book, the question “How free are We?” is considered from various
perspectives.
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2 Independence Indeterminism
2.1 Independence of  Change
2.1.1 As was stated right at the beginning of  this book, the
single primary assumption of  independence indeterminism is that
true independence of  change is extremely common in our uni -
verse. Put slightly differently this assumption asserts that “stretches
of  change” that to some extent run, or proceed, truly independently
of  one another are extremely common. True independence of  run-
ning among stretches of  change means how any one of  them runs is
not tied or related in any definite way to how any of  the others run.
This key point deserves further discussion.
2.1.2 To keep things simple only two stretches of  change will
usually be considered. This does not affect the generality of  the con -
clusions reached. Consider the following example. One stretch of
change is that involved in me typing this sentence, and the other is
that involved in what our cat, Purdy, is doing while I do this. Both of
these are complex stretches of  change that, at least theoretically,
could be decomposed into a network of  shorter stretches of  change.
As mainstream physicists currently understand the world, this decom-
position does not end in a succession of  instantaneously existing and
unchanging states of  the universe, or even in a succession of  instant -
aneous states of  a set of  irreducible fundamental entities. Rather, the
mainstream view sees what is going on as a continuous flux of  inter -
action and change among elementary particles and fields. According
to this view, even things that appear to our senses not to be changing
– rocks, say – are only unchanging at an overall level and not deep
down at the molecular, atomic, and sub-atomic levels. At the top level
of  the two stretches of  change there are the movements of  me and
the cat. At the next level down, there is the activity of  our limbs and
organs; and down further, the activity of  the cells of  which these are
composed. Still further down, there is the activity of  the molecules
and atoms that constitute the cells. And going down still further
mainstream physicists believe that the nucleus of  each atom consists
of  continual interaction among the protons and neutrons that consti -
tute it. Further down still, theories and experiments lead physicists to
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believe that the existence of  each proton and neutron is realised by
continual interaction among elementary particles known as quarks –
an interaction that is mediated by other elementary particles known
as gluons.
2.1.3 Why should it be necessary to assume that some true inde-
pendence of  change exists between my typing activity and the activity
of  our cat? Surely this is obviously the case? After all, don't people
live their lives believing without question that some independence ex -
ists between the way most stretches of  change run? If  they didn’t be -
lieve this how on earth could they go about their daily business
without questioning whether or not the world and all its other go -
ings-on would allow them to do what they wanted to do? If  there
really was no independence then both I and Purdy would be living
our lives in complete lockstep: we would each be playing out wholly
necessary and unalterable roles in the fully pre-determined and com-
pletely definite history of  the universe. And this would be true of  the
networks of  subsidiary activity that are believed to contribute to the
realisation of  these two high-level stretches of  change. This alternat-
ive picture – of  everything that happens occurring in fixed, definite,
and fully predetermined lockstep – is the picture “absolute determin-
ism” paints of  the universe. Note: the term absolute determinism is
introduced to denote the operation of  determinism throughout all
and every part and level of  existence.
2.1.4 No matter how obvious true independence of  change may
seem to be there are no empirical or logical means for determining
whether or not such true independence actually exists. But equally,
there are no empirical or logical means for determining whether ab -
solute determinism is true or false. Both must therefore be regarded
as wholly metaphysical beliefs (see 1.2.1). The reason why there are
no empirical means for determining whether two or more stretches
of  change are running truly independently is because they involve
one-off  happenings that cannot be re-run to see if  how they run may
vary with respect to one another. The best that can be done is to see
whether the types of  change each represents may vary with respect to
one another. For instance, to continue with the example, a reasonably
large set of  pairs of  video recordings could be gathered, with each
pair consisting of  a recording of  me typing a sentence, and a record -
ing of  what our cat Purdy was doing at the same time. This set of
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pairs could then be examined to see if  complete correlation existed
between my activity and Purdy’s activity. For example, it might be
found that for every different word I typed Purdy had a specific kind
of  movement. But even without actually performing such an investig-
ation our knowledge of  typing and cats tells us that we would not
find such complete correlation. Nor, indeed, would even very com-
plex relations be found that established the existence of  full correla-
tion. All the evidence is that there is no complete correlation between
the typing of  sentences and the activity of  cats, which of  course in -
dicates that some independence exists between these types of  change.
However, this does not prove that when I type a particular sentence,
and Purdy carries out some particular activity that these two uniquely
dated and located stretches of  change run independently of  one an-
other. It does not prove this because, in considering the history of
the universe as a whole, it may be – as indeed absolute determinists
argue – that it was determined at the creation of  the universe (or for
eternity if  the universe has no beginning) that these two specific
stretches of  change would arise together and run in complete lock-
step. And if  this is in fact the case then the stretches of  change do
not run truly independently even if  they appear to do so.
2.1.5 Given that there are no empirical means by which to def-
initely establish whether two or more specific stretches of  change are,
to some extent, running truly independently of  one another, it is nev -
ertheless very commonly assumed that true independence of  change
does exists. And generally this is assumed to be the case when it is be-
lieved that three conditions are met:
(i) that stretches of  change of  the types concerned are not
completely causally linked;
(ii) that no third party is fully determining how such types of
stretches of  change jointly run; and
(iii) that such types of  change do not run in a perfectly syn-
chronised way.
2.1.6 To clarify, consider the application of  these three condi-
tions to a specific example – one involving what seems to be an inde-
pendence interaction, and is similar to the raindrop-landing-on-your-
head example introduced in 1.1.6. The example concerns a particular
leaf  floating down a particular stream at a particular time and a par -
ticular raindrop falling through the air nearby which later collides
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with the leaf. Even if  they have never consciously observed such an
occurrence, it is easy for most people to imagine what is involved.
Accepting that most people would not usually consciously carry out
any of  the following reasoning it is worth trying to spell out why they
would tacitly accept that the above three conditions are met in the
case being considered. As far as the first condition is concerned,
most people’s past experience tells them that the changes that leaves
experience in such situations – for example, flowing more or less
steadily downstream, swirling around for a moment in an eddy, or be-
ing caught in a branch that has fallen into the stream – do not seem
to be reflected in correlated changes occurring to falling raindrops
(whether they are nearby or not) and this therefore leads them to
think no significant causal linkages exist. Furthermore, science knows
of  no causal linkage between these types of  stretches of  change
other than an extremely weak and negligible gravitational attraction.
As regards the second condition, people’s knowledge and experience
of  the world generally leads them to believe that there is no third
party that is fully determining the way these two types of  stretches of
change run. (Some religious people think otherwise since they see
God as fully determining everything that happens.) Nevertheless,
most people do accept that in many situations there are third party
influences at work that do affect the running of  the various stretches
of  change involved. For instance, it is generally accepted that both
gravity and the wind affect the falling of  raindrops and the move-
ment of  leaves down streams. However, there seems to be little evid-
ence that these third-party influences produce full correlation
between the two motions. Regarding the third condition, there is no
evidence that leaves floating down streams and raindrops falling
through the air change in a perfectly synchronised manner (even
though for short periods they may roughly do so). This means that
people generally believe the third condition is upheld as well. Because
these three conditions are, usually tacitly, understood to be satisfied
most people would accept that the raindrop and the leaf  were, prior
to their collision, changing truly independently of  one another.
2.1.7 Given what has just been said it appears there are good
grounds for thinking that the raindrop striking the leaf  was an inde-
pendence interaction and therefore an originated event. Nevertheless,
it is worth spelling out in some detail how his conclusion may be
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reached. According to the above reasoning, there is sufficient evid-
ence to believe that the raindrop and the leaf, prior to their collision,
were not in causal interaction and that there was no third party de-
termining how each was changing. It cannot be known for sure
whether or not these two stretches of  change were running in hidden
lockstep, but there is no evidence for this. Hence, since it appears the
three conditions given above have been met, it is reasonable to as-
sume that the raindrop and the leaf  were undergoing change truly in-
dependently of  one another prior to their collision. This means that
no determinate relationship existed that fully tied together, linked,
governed, or described how these stretches of  change were running
relative to one another. Which in turn means that their future interac-
tion was indeterminate since how a raindrop and a leaf  are changing
relative to one another affects whether or not they will interact.
2.1.8 At this point it is helpful to introduce an idea and termin-
ology that shall be used throughout the book. Rather than talking of
how one stretch of  change runs relative to another it is often more
accurate to use the general concept of  “joint-change”. Joint-change is
change composed of  several relatively separate changes taking place
together but considered as a single kind of  change distinct from the
component changes of  which it is constituted. For example, a person
striding briskly along manifests joint-change composed of  the relat-
ively separate movements of  their arms and hands, their legs and feet,
and their torso and head – with perhaps their hair waving about in re -
sponse to these movements (and perhaps also the wind). Although
these relatively separate changes may be apparent as such to an ob-
server, what is also apparent is the joint-change they produce –
namely, the change representing a person striding briskly along. Of
course, with a person striding along most of  the component changes
of  the joint-change are not running wholly and truly independently
of  one another – for instance, the person’s legs and arms generally
move in a more or less coordinated way; and the movements of  their
torso and their head are mainly related to the motion of  their legs
and arms. Nevertheless, at least at a detailed level, there is a good deal
of  independence of  movement among these various parts of  the
person’s body. There are many instances of  joint-change of  this sort
that we recognise by its having an identifiable holistic character. For
example, the joint-change composed of  the sounds produced by the
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separate instruments and voices of  an orchestra or band is perceived
by us as a coherent whole. However not all joint-change is composed
of  related or connected changes. For instance, recall the example in
1.1.3 of  three (assumed to be) truly independently running changes –
namely, gusts of  wind around my house, what an earthworm was do-
ing under the lawn at the same time, and what an engine in a car
passing by in the road was doing. We can just about imagine (but not
actually directly perceive) the joint-change composed of  these three
independently running changes, and it seems reasonable to assume
that this particular joint-change did actually exist – at least in some
sense of  exist. But although this may be so, this sort of  joint-change
doesn’t seem to have any role or presence in existence. Rather its
presence seems to be entirely passive. That is, it doesn’t seem to influ-
ence or affect anything, or contribute to a system’s behaviour, and so
it seems to be something of  a non-entity, or a “no-thing”, or what
shall be referred to as a “passive existent”. And for the same reasons,
the joint-change composed of  a raindrop falling and a leaf  moving
down a stream also seems to be a passive existent. What adds to the
ephemeral and almost non-real nature of  such joint-change is that, in
being composed of  truly independently running changes, such joint-
change runs indeterminately, and to acknowledge this it shall be re-
ferred to as “indeterminately changing joint-change”.
2.1.9 Some interactions that appear to be independence interac-
tions turn out, upon closer examination, not to be. For example, con-
sider two billiard balls moving on an apparent collision course on a
billiard table. It might be thought that their motions are independent
because there is no significant causal interaction between them, and
no third party is governing their ongoing joint motion. However as
long as each ball is moving in a time-determinate manner (i.e. as a de -
terminate function of  time – see 3.3.3) in all ways relevant to whether
or not they interact, then in these respects the two balls will be mov-
ing in synchrony and the third condition for believing independence
of  change exists – i.e. non-synchronicity of  change – will not be met.
Hence, such interactions do not qualify as independence interactions.
2.1.10 However, although all factors that affect whether two or
more things interact may be varying in a time-determinate way, if
other factors involving the things are varying independently then this
may introduce indeterminacy in how change in the things develops
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after interaction actually occurs. To continue with the example, the
thermal motion of  the molecules in the two billiard balls will be
changing independently (according to the above criteria and line with
what mainstream physicists believe) and although this will not (signi -
ficantly) affect the time-determinacy and therefore the synchrony of
the translational motion of  the balls it might, in some ways, influence
the exact course of  change that occurs within the balls during and
immediately after their actual collision and make the details of  what
follows at the microscopic level more or less indeterminate. What is
being highlighted here is a general point: determinacy of  the occur-
rence of  an interaction does not necessarily mean determinacy in
what follows. Nevertheless, as already noted (see 1.1.7), many inde-
pendence interactions, once they occur, often do produce change that
follows a fairly deterministic course. For example, the way billiard
balls respond to a collision at the macroscopic level is (very largely)
deterministic – it is only at the microscopic level that the response
may be somewhat indeterministic.
2.1.11 Stretches of  change that run in a time-determinate rela-
tionship to one another are usually open to independence interac-
tions occurring that can disrupt their synchrony of  change. So, to go
further with the billiard ball example, the two balls may be heading
for a predictable collision but while they are moving towards one an -
other a light bulb above the billiard table may shatter (apparently in -
dependently of  what the balls are doing) and produce debris that par-
ticipates in independence interactions with the balls so destroying the
time-determinacy and synchrony of  their change. This illustrates a
general principle: namely that no guarantee exists that disruptive in-
dependence interactions will not occur during time-determinate
change.
2.2 Undirected Independence Interactions
2.2.1 The vast majority of  independence interactions are undir -
ected and so may be taken to be a matter of  chance. The independ-
ence interaction considered earlier of  a particular raindrop colliding
with a particular leaf  floating down a particular stream on a particular
occasion is taken to be an undirected, or chance, independence inter-
action. However, the landing of  raindrops on leaves is an entirely ex -
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pected type of  independence interaction in the circumstances con-
cerned. That is, under independence indeterminism, it is not regarded
as a matter of  chance that in a rainstorm taking place over a stream
with leaves floating down it that some raindrops will fall on some of
the floating leaves. Indeed, some types of  independence interaction
are so common within specific kinds of  domain that they are almost
certain to happen, and to indicate that this is so the term “type-de-
termined independence interactions” will be used. For instance, the
interaction of  a particular photon of  light from the sun with a partic -
ular chlorophyll molecules in a particular leaf  of  a particular plant
will, according to independence indeterminism, be an originated
event. But such types of  event are certain to occur in domains where
sunlight is falling on the leaves of  plants so they are taken to be type-
determined independence interactions, and since they are originated
events they are type-determined originations (see 1.2.10).
2.2.2 According to independence indeterminism, undirected in-
dependence interactions are occurring all the time, with the vast ma-
jority – but certainly not all of  them – having little significance. For
example, electromagnetic radiation of  all forms (e.g. radio waves, mi-
crowaves, infra-red light, visible light, ultra violet light, x-rays, and
gamma rays) are constantly entering into (mostly) chance independ-
ence interactions with matter. The consequences of  these chance in-
dependence interactions vary greatly. Most entail only local effects
but some may produce effects that have wider significance as, for in-
stance, do the photons of  visible light that fall upon the retina of  a
person's eye and contribute to their visual perception of  the world
around them. A great many chance independence interactions are
between material objects. For instance, air molecules are in constant
independence interaction not only with one another but with atoms
and molecules belonging to objects of  all sorts. And when people
walk about they are, at the molecular-level, entering into chance inde-
pendence interactions with the surfaces upon which they tread – and
of  course the same is true of  the molecular-level independence inter -
actions between the feet of  animals and the ground upon which they
move, and the tyres of  vehicles and the road or surface they travel
over. However this does not mean that people, animals, and vehicles
move around in an undirected way – only that the particular molecu-
lar-level interactions taking place are chance independence interac -
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tions. Turning again to chemistry, under independence indetermin-
ism, this may be understood to be the field of  science concerned
with what molecular formations and transformations are likely to oc-
cur when certain types of  atoms and molecules interact under certain
types of  conditions. Many chemical couplings and de-couplings are
initiated by independence interactions between atoms, molecules, and
ions and therefore must (under independence indeterminism) be con-
sidered to be originations. However, because these interactions arise
in a statistically regular way, chemists are often able to establish stat -
istically valid deterministic laws to describe chemical behaviour. Many
biological chemical processes – and some human produced ones –
are carefully orchestrated and regulated to ensure that certain types
of  independence interaction, and therefore certain types of  chemical
couplings and de-couplings, occur in specific sequences. But this con-
trol and regulation does not operate at the level of  individual inde-
pendence interactions, which remain chance originations.
2.2.3 Human life is full of  undirected, or chance, independence
interactions. Many of  these – as, for example, with photons of  light
interacting with cells in our retinas, molecules of  air interacting with
our ear drums, and aromatic chemicals interacting with certain tissues
in our noses – provide the raw input for our perception of  the world.
For example, as we walk through a busy shopping mall we perceive,
with the aid of  our various senses, the presence of  all sorts of  differ-
ent things and happenings within the mall. Most of  these perceptions
are fleeting and do not trigger action or conscious thought, but some
perceptions do lead to significant consequences, such as those in-
volved in facilitating our safe (and polite) movement through the
mall, those that allow us to identify shops and items of  interest to us,
and those that help us recognise friends and acquaintances. However,
although we may be moving more or less purposively through the
mall, much of  what we perceive from moment to moment will largely
be a matter of  chance independence interactions. For example, what
particular people we happen to pass is largely a consequence of  a
great number of  chance independence interactions: chance interac -
tions that affected precisely when each of  these people (and we
ourselves) set out for the mall, chance interactions that occurred on
our journeys to it, and chance interactions that influenced how each
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of  us worked our ways through the mall so that we happened to pass
one another just when, where, and how we did.
2.2.4 Although the vast majority of  chance independence inter-
actions that humans experience have no long-term significance, some
do. Indeed, the lives of  many people have been affected in major
ways by chance independence interactions. For example, some people
have met their partner largely as a consequence of  a chance inde-
pendence interaction, or a series of  such interactions. And some
chance independence interactions – such as being struck by lightning,
or being involved in a bad accident – may have very significant con-
sequences. An example of  a rather extraordinary case of  a chance in-
dependence interaction of  this sort is described by Mark Twain in his
book Life on the Mississippi. He writes about a resident’s report of  life
in Vicksburg during its siege and bombardment in the American Civil
War. This is what the resident told Twain:
‘Coming out of  church, one morning, we had an accident –
the only one that happened around me on a Sunday. I was
just having a hearty handshake with a friend I hadn’t seen for
a while, and saying “Drop into our cave tonight after bom-
bardment [the residents had dug caves to protect themselves];
we’ve got hold of  a pint of  prime wh– .” Whisky, I was going
to say, you know, but a shell interrupted. A chunk of  it cut
the man’s arm off, and left it dangling in my hand (Twain,
1883).
In human history also, quite extraordinary sequences of  chance inde -
pendence interactions have sometimes had considerable significance
– one of  the most famous cases being the series of  chance events
that led to the assassination of  Archduke Franz Ferdinand, an event
that some historians suggest triggered a series of  other events that
led to the start of  the First World War.
2.3 Directed Origination
2.3.1 Although the vast majority of  independence interactions
are a matter of  chance not all of  them are. For example, when a dog
catches a rabbit this event is an independence interaction since prior
to the catch the dog and the rabbit are moving and operating partly
independently of  one another (at least according to the criteria of  in-
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dependence of  change outlined above – see 2.1.5), but it is generally
not thought that the catch is a chance interaction. Similarly, when a
tennis player’s racquet makes contact with the ball this is rarely
thought of  as a chance independence interaction. Here are a few
more examples. When a bird lands on the branch of  a tree it does not
do so by chance. When an animal treks to a waterhole to quench its
thirst its arrival is not a matter of  chance. And when an automobile is
assembled the parts that constitute it do not come together by
chance.
2.3.2 In the cases just mentioned the non-chance independence
interactions are produced by the directive activity of  a directive sys-
tem (see 1.1.9). Very often the non-chance independence interactions
involved in such activity are of  a familiar type relative to the domain
concerned and to this extent they are type-determined independence
interactions. And in being type-determined it is easy to think that the
associated directive activity must run in a type-deterministic way. This
does frequently occur but it is not necessarily the case as creative ori-
gination may be used by some directive systems.
2.3.3 To develop the way the production of  non-chance inde -
pendence interactions, directed origination, directive activity, and re -
lated concepts are understood according to independence indeterm-
inism it is worthwhile further discussing the examples just mentioned.
When a dog catches a rabbit after chasing it, it is generally assumed
that during the chase both the dog and the rabbit had their own par -
ticular goal: for the dog, the capture of  the rabbit, and for the rabbit
avoidance of  such capture. In other words, it is usually believed that
the dog was trying to bring about a certain type of  independence in -
teraction, and the rabbit was trying to prevent such a type of  inde-
pendence interaction occurring. Each animal may be understood to
be operating as a particular type of  directive system during the chase
– the dog as a prey-chasing directive system, and the rabbit as a pred-
ator-escaping directive system. Of  course, dogs and rabbits, like all
purposive higher animals, are capable of  many different forms of  dir-
ective activity, and are able to choose among these. Whether higher
animals make such choices by exercising their free will – that is, by
not only doing so voluntarily but also in a non-necessitated self-de-
termined way – is an open question, but it is assumed in the present
work that in some situations some animals may resolve internal con-
44
flict and indecision in a weakly creative way involving a struggle
between competing or conflicting motivations as, for example, may
occur when an animal is torn between continuing to pursue some
goal or abandoning its pursuit.
2.3.4 A defining feature of  a directive system is that the actions
produced by it tend to be so matched to the varied and varying con-
ditions of  the situation within which the actions take place that a par -
ticular type of  directed outcome tends to be produced. The directed
outcomes that directive system work to produce are usually referred
to as “objectives” or “goals”, however in the present work use of  the
term goal shall be restricted to refer to the directed outcomes that
purposive agents such as higher animals and humans seek to bring
about. According to independence indeterminism, a directed out-
come will be an originated event if  the varied and varying conditions
arise and change independently of  the directive system's actions. This
is assumed to be so in the dog/rabbit chase, which means the capture
of  the rabbit by the dog is an originated event. However, because this
outcome was not solely a matter of  chance but a consequence of  dir-
ective activity it was a directed origination. Although the rabbit failed to
achieve its goal – avoidance of  capture – this does not mean no evid-
ence exists for believing it was carrying out goal-directed activity.
However, the evidence that does exist only makes sense when related
to knowledge of  what goal-directed activity in a such a kind of  chase
generally looks like. Whether all directive activity has objective fea-
tures that distinguish it from other forms of  activity is not clear.
However, some interesting work (Weir and Wale, 2011) suggests that
at least in some cases there are such objective features.
2.3.5 The second example is similar to the situation just dis-
cussed in that there are two opposing purposive agents (tennis play-
ers) with incompatible goals: each wants to win, but both can't. The
independence interaction consisting of  a tennis player’s racquet strik -
ing a tennis ball is not generally considered to be a chance event be -
cause it is recognised that the motion of  the racquet has usually been
guided by the directive activity of  the player concerned – activity con-
trolled by the player in an effort to strike the ball in such a manner
that it is likely to be sent to the other side of  the court so that it is
not “out”, and that if  it is “in” that it lands in such a way that the op-
posing player is unable to make a valid return of  play, or is only able
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to make a weak return. To achieve this objective, it is necessary for
the player to carry out activity (e.g. involving coordinated movements
such as running, twisting their body, moving their arm and wrist) that
takes account of  their current position, the independent motion of
the ball, and the objective they have in mind. Again, this is a case of
directed origination.
2.3.6 When a bird lands on a branch it is producing a directed
independence interaction, usually one brought about while the bird is
carrying out some other larger-scale directive activity – for example,
searching for food, or surveying and checking its territory, or seeking
material to build a nest. It is a directed outcome because the bird
must appropriately adjust its flight and orientation to the particular
independently arising and changing circumstances it is operating un-
der – circumstances that include its current motion, the (possibly
slightly changing) position of  the branch on which it is aiming to
land, the position of  branches and foliage that may block its passage
to its target landing site, and the wind conditions.
2.3.7 With the fourth example knowledge is being used by an
animal to guide its actions so that it may get to a location where it be -
lieves it should be able to enter into directive activity (drinking) to
satisfy a more or less pressing need (for water) that the animal be -
lieves it cannot adequately satisfy in its present location. Again, this is
an example of  goal-directed behaviour. Typically, the animal uses its
(usually learned) knowledge of  where the waterhole is relative to its
present location, and its knowledge of  what the terrain is like
between where it currently is and the waterhole, to set a rough course
to follow. However, the animal cannot expect to achieve its objective
by following its planned course blindly: it must be able to deal appro -
priately with unexpected circumstances – such as when encountering
a predator, or when finding its route blocked in some way. Again, the
activity of  the animal is such that it is appropriately adjusted to inde-
pendently arising and changing circumstances in such a way that its
directed outcome, or goal in this case, tends to be achieved. And be-
cause this is so its behaviour is goal-directed.
2.3.8 The final example concerns the directed independence in-
teractions involved in the assembly of  an automobile. Almost all of
these are type-determined independence interactions since they are
the product either of  machine-based directive systems operating ac-
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cording to pre-set rules, or the result of  human operators behaving in
more or less routine ways. That is, in both cases, the independence in-
teractions are of  a prefigured type in the domain concerned. How-
ever, although some operations involved in the assembly process may
be carried out by blindly executing a sequence of  actions most re-
quire actions that must be matched to the particular circumstances
that obtain so that slight variations (e.g. in the position or orientation
of  things) may be taken into account to ensure that the desired as -
sembly sub-objective is met. This means that automobile assembly
must, under independence indeterminism, be viewed as a process in-
volving directed origination. If  a human person is the directive sys-
tem doing the assembly then they will be operating in a purposive
manner because they have awareness of  what they are doing and
what they are trying to achieve, and are capable of  deciding to stop
what they are currently doing, or of  deciding to vary their activity. If
a fully automated system is doing the assembly it is debatable whether
it is operating purposively because purposiveness is not attributed to
most machines. But if  the whole assembly process taking place in the
plant is being monitored and controlled by an artificially intelligent
executive system then such a system will almost certainly have some-
thing akin to an awareness of  what it is doing and trying to achieve
overall, and what the various assembly and other processes taking
place in the plant should be doing and are actually doing. In which
case it may be appropriate to say that such an “executive directive sys-
tem” is acting in a purposive manner, and therefore may be regarded
as a purposive system. (The issue of  what makes an entity purposive,
or purposeful, is a large one and will not be pursued fully in the
present work. Ackoff  and Emery in their book On Purposeful Systems
define a purposeful system as: ‘[O]ne that can change its goals in con-
stant environmental conditions; it selects goals as well as the means
by which to pursue them. It thus displays will. Human beings are the
most familiar examples of  such systems.’ (Ackoff  and Emery 1972, p.
31).)
2.3.9 Generalising from these examples it may be said that dir-
ective activity is such that it tends to bring about and/or maintain a
particular type of  condition (a directed outcome, objective, or goal)
by appropriately matching its actions to independently arising and
changing circumstance – circumstances that are not in themselves
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conducive to the occurrence of  the directed outcome and may in
some cases be such as to positively oppose or disrupt its occurrence.
2.3.10 The examples of  directed origination just discussed all
concern the achievement of  some condition, but there is an important
and large class of  directive systems whose objective is to maintain
some condition relatively constant. Homeostasis, as such condition-
keeping directive activity is referred to within biology, plays a vital
role in enabling living organisms to remain alive and function effect-
ively. For example, mammals have a thermo-regulative system – a dir-
ective system – for maintaining their core body temperature at a fairly
constant level in spite of  variations in such things as the degree to
which they are exerting themselves, and the external temperature.
And, considering condition-keeping directive activity more generally,
as people grow up and during their lives, they usually acquire various
condition-keeping abilities and skills – such as being able to keep
their balance when walking, or when riding a bike or a horse. They
also acquire, with a greater or lesser degree of  success, other less ob -
vious condition-keeping skills, such as being able to keep on the
roadway when driving and being able to maintain a safe relationship
with other vehicles; such as being able to maintain generally good re-
lations with neighbours, colleagues, etc.; such as being able to main-
tain a desired weight and level of  fitness; and such as being able to
maintain their financial position in good order.
2.3.11 Turning to the world of  engineered artefacts, there are
many examples of  condition-keeping directive systems. For instance,
speed governors for engines have long existed and are used to main-
tain a fairly constant output-speed in spite of  varying demands on the
engine. Another similar case is automatic gain (amplification) control
which is built into radios, cellphones, etc. to maintain a constant
volume of  sound output in spite of  variations in the strength of  the
received signal. More complex artificial directive systems designed to
maintain a given condition exist – for example, auto-pilots have the
objective of  keeping an aircraft or a boat on a pre-set course in spite
of  independently varying wind, weather, and other conditions.
2.3.12 According to independence indeterminism all directed
outcomes are originations. They are understood to be originations
because they are seen to be the result of  a directive system taking ap-
propriate action in the face of  independently arising and changing
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circumstances, disruptions and disturbances. However, in some cases,
a directed outcome will be an originated event because two or more
directive systems work directively, but largely independently, to bring
it about. As an example, consider a situation in which two friends
have agreed to meet up at a specific place at a particular time on a
given future date. Suppose, as would usually be the case, that the
friends act fairly independently of  one another in their efforts to
make the meeting. If  they do actually manage to meet as agreed, most
people would not think this event was solely a matter of  chance be -
cause they would recognise that both of  the friends were acting dir-
ectively to be at the agreed place at the time in question. But in such a
case there is no single directive system coordinating and controlling
the meeting-up. Rather, the directed outcome is the result of  two in-
dependently operating directive systems each with their own object-
ive, which, if  their individual objectives are met, will result in the
overall directed outcome being achieved. Many directed outcomes in-
volve directed origination of  this cooperatively produced sort.
2.4 Directive Systems and Creative Origination
2.4.1 Some introductory remarks about creative origination have
already been made (see section 1.5), and the topic will be treated
more widely in Chapter 8. In this section the five examples that have
just been discussed will be further considered to provide an overview
of  the sort of  role creative origination typically plays in the emer-
gence and operation of  directive systems.
2.4.2 The first example was of  a dog chasing and catching a
rabbit. This is a case of  conflictual and/or competitive interaction in-
volving two relatively independently acting purposive agents. Because
the chase involves independence interactions and therefore origina -
tion, there can be (under independence indeterminism) nothing in ex-
istence at the commencement of  the chase that fully determines the
particular details of  how the chase will play out. However, given that
such chases usually involve familiar moves and interactions on the
part of  the dog and the rabbit it seems there isn't much creative origin-
ation involved. Certainly, a good case may be made for creative ori-
gination being involved in the biological evolution of  the dog’s and
the rabbit’s innate skills, but this creative origination occurred in the
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past. Similarly, although the animals' directive activity during the
chase may depend to some extent upon what they have learned, it is
not generally believed that this learning was all creatively originated
during the actual chase itself; rather it is generally thought that most
of  it was creatively originated in the past. However, both the dog and
the rabbit are likely to have some capacity to invent novel moves and
tactics as the chase is taking place, in which case on some occasions
some creative origination would be involved. Additionally, the dog
may experience some motivational conflict between continuing with
the chase or abandoning it, and some (weak) creative origination may
be involved in its resolving this conflict.
2.4.3  It may be helpful at this point to consider a form of  com -
petitive interaction that does not involve any origination. Imagine a
game of  noughts and crosses (tic-tac-toe) played by two computers
each using an algorithm certain to produce either a win or a draw. Let
us suppose that the computer that starts a game is selected randomly
and its mark is placed at random on one of  the blank squares in the
3x3 grid. Once this has happened the game would proceed entirely
deterministically as each program in turn executed its algorithm to
determine where to place its mark. This is a (marginally) competitive
situation involving two opposing directive systems but with the setup
being such that any game follows a course that is predetermined once
the initial random selection of  first-player and first-move has oc-
curred. And because the course of  the game is predetermined once
these initial conditions are set, it would be correct to say that the run
of  the game is not originated, and certainly not creatively originated.
How does this situation differ from that of  a dog chasing a rabbit?
Firstly, the computers executing their algorithms are not purposive
systems: they have no awareness of  what they are doing, and they
cannot choose between a range of  different directive activities.
Secondly, the game takes place in a closed and very limited ‘world’ in
which no external events or conditions, other than the state of  the
nine-square grid, need be taken into account. This is not the case in a
dog/rabbit chase: the chase may take place in a variety of  different
environments most of  which are open to various events arising dur-
ing the chase (such as the intervention of  other animals or humans)
that may influence how the dog and the rabbit behave. And thirdly,
whereas the noughts-and-crosses game runs deterministically (at least
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from a functional point of  view) the dog/rabbit chase does not since
it involves many independence interactions, including those occurring
within the mind-brains of  the dog and the rabbit.
2.4.4 The second example concerned a tennis player hitting a
ball with their racquet. A tennis match is an example of  a competitive
struggle and, for the reasons that apply to dog/rabbit chases but
more so, it involves some creative origination. However, only a partic-
ular small part of  a tennis match is being considered: that of  a tennis
player striking a tennis ball with their racquet. The question of  where
the player's ability to do this comes from is generally answered by say-
ing that biological evolution has played a major part; but it is usually
accepted that learning has also played an important part. However, is
any creative origination involved in the actual performance of  a
stroke? A lot of  the time there probably isn’t because the player is ex -
ercising well-honed skills in a more or less automatic way. But looked
at in detail this may not always be the case. Even in a match a player
may show some inventiveness in at least a few of  their strokes. That
is, rather than relying solely upon well-ingrained types of  responses a
player may sometimes creatively construct their stroke. However,
more usually it is in training and practice that a player may purpos -
ively set out to be creative; perhaps with such goals in mind as aiming
to correct a weakness in a certain type of  stroke, or to enhance the
effectiveness of  a stroke, or to learn a new stroke.
2.4.5 Tennis, to be played well, requires a good deal of  discip-
lined and thoughtful learning – self-directed learning, in other words
– and much practice. The learning is thoughtful because the player
must analyse their play and attempt to identify what features of  it
need to be changed (possibly even eradicated), or improved, and what
new skills need to be acquired. This is a process whose success is of -
ten greatly enhanced with the assistance of  a coach. The sort of
learning required for high-performance play does not happen auto-
matically, or simply through uncritical playing of  tennis. An expert
tennis player not only has to learn how to play the game better, but
they also need to learn how to organise themselves in such a way that
they are able to carry out this learning in an effective manner. This
“learning to learn” how to become a highly skilled tennis player in-
volves many things, including learning how to sustain motivation,
learning how to overcome problems and difficulties, learning how to
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maintain a sufficient level of  disciplined and focused practice, learn-
ing how to recover psychologically from setbacks during play, and
learning how to analyse their play in order to identify reasons for
their successes, mistakes and failures. What is going on with this
learning is a creative process of  some significance. It entails the
player bringing into existence and appropriately integrating structures,
procedures, and processes within themselves which were not pre-
figured to arise when they started. This lack of  inbuilt or instinctive
guidance, or prefigurement, is one reason why a good coach may be
so helpful. And it also illustrates why certain kinds of  creative origin -
ation cannot be carried out with much success by an agent on their
own but requires the cooperative directive activity of  other agents.
The theory and practice of  what has been called “self-organised
learning” and “leaning conversations” has been developed by Laurie
Thomas and Sheila Harri-Augstein over many years and their work
makes clear the creatively originative nature of  what is involved – see,
for example, (Thomas and Harrie-Augstein 1985), and (Harrie-Aug-
stein and Thomas 1991).
2.4.6 The third example concerned the directive activity in-
volved in a bird landing on a branch. The ability of  a bird to carry
out this sort of  activity seems to be largely innate and therefore it
may be assumed it was creatively developed through biological evolu-
tion. Nevertheless, probably a little practice in the use of  this innate
ability is also required before a bird becomes fully competent in exer-
cising it. However, it appears that no creative origination is involved
in executing this directive activity once the bird has become fully
skilled in its use. But this might not always be so because under cer-
tain tricky conditions a bird may not have readily available all that it
needs to be able to deal with the situation and so it may have to be in-
ventive to some extent. In this case some creative origination would
be involved.
2.4.7 The fourth example concerned the use of  knowledge by
an animal to get to a waterhole. Providing the journey to the water -
hole does not present unfamiliar problems, not much creative origin-
ation would need to be involved. But if  an unfamiliar problem was
encountered, such as the animal's chosen route being blocked by a
major landslide that required a large detour, then some creative ori -
gination might be needed: for instance in the animal's search for an
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alternative route, or in overcoming conflict within its self  about
whether to continue with its plan or completely abandon it and try
some different approach to obtaining water.
2.4.8 However, there is a wider question: Does the acquisition
of  knowledge involve creative origination? To be able to answer in
the affirmative, the acquisition of  the knowledge should not be pre-
figured within the agent prior to its coming to possess it. This is very
often the case because what knowledge an agent acquires is situation-
specific – for example, knowledge about how to get to a particular
waterhole depends upon the specifics of  the terrain concerned. But
there is another related question: Do agents have a genetic (or de-
signed-in) predisposition to acquire certain types of  knowledge? If
they do then there seems to be some degree of  prefigurement in-
volved. Human persons tend to differ greatly from animals in this re-
spect since although, like animals, humans are predisposed to acquire
certain types of  knowledge – e.g. about their surroundings, about
members of  their social group, and about their mother tongue –
there is a great deal of  knowledge that humans have which they had
no innate predisposition to acquire. For example, humans have no in-
nate predisposition to acquire the particular factual knowledge they
learn at school, or the particular job-specific knowledge they learn as
part of  their employment, or the vast range of  the particular social,
economic, political, religious, and cultural knowledge that is related to
their specific lifestructure. Although much human knowledge is ab-
sorbed in an almost unconscious way in a process that seems to in-
volve only weak creative origination, there are other kinds of  human
knowledge acquisition that involve a stronger more purposefully dir-
ected kind of  creative origination. For example, the knowledge ac-
quisition processes involved in academic and professional learning, or
the learning of  a craft or trade, or the learning of  difficult new skills.
2.4.9 The final example concerned the directed independence
interactions associated with the assembly of  an automobile. Not
much creative origination is involved in the bringing together of  spe-
cific parts since almost all such assembly operations are either auto-
mated or carried out by a human using well-established procedures.
Of  course, the automatic processes and the machinery that realises
them, and the associated human-based assembly procedures, have to
be designed and design almost always involves creative origination.
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Furthermore, the operatives need to learn the assembly procedures
they carry out and this will involve some degree of  creative origina-
tion. And sometimes a human operative will need to solve problems
– for example, the non-arrival of  needed parts, mis-assembly at a pre-
ceding stage, or breakdown of  a power-tool – and this may require
some creative origination.
2.4.10 Looking at the production of  motor cars more generally, it
is apparent that a vast web of  directive activities is involved – a web
that is deeply embedded within and supported by modern technolo-
gical civilisation. An automobile assembly plant with its supporting
facilities is a creatively originated entity. Nowadays it is not created
from scratch since automobile assembly plants currently exist quite
widely and knowledge of  these helps guide and inform much of  the
design, planning, and construction of  new ones. Nevertheless, some
decisions specific to the construction of  any particular automobile
plant have to be made in a creative rather than in a routine way.
2.5 Independence Indeterminism Helps With Other 
Problems
2.5.1 A central concern of  the present work is with how inde-
pendence indeterminism helps resolve the problem of  free will.
However it is not surprising that such a radically new naturalistic
metaphysics may also help resolve some other long-standing philo-
sophical disputes since it provides a very different interpretation of
the nature or our universe than that which is currently generally held.
In this section it is indicated how independence indeterminism may
be able to do this in a couple of  cases. In Chapter 9 the significance
of  independence indeterminism is discussed more fully.
2.5.2 Closely linked to the problem of  free will is what is known
as the mind-body problem. On one side of  this dispute are those
who believe that the mind is no more than the activity of  biological
matter (mainly neurological matter). On the other side are those who
believe mind is something more than this.
2.5.3 As already noted (1.4.8), the mind is generally understood
to be a processual entity and the brain a material/structural one. In
line with what is commonly accepted, “mind-processes” (i.e. the pro-
cesses that constitute mind) will be taken to require a brain for their
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realisation, but with the proviso that many of  these processes also re -
quire that the brain be in appropriate interaction with a suitable envir -
onment. Such “input/output dependent mind-processes” (IOD
mind-processes) as they shall be referred to, typically consist of  a
“process core” interacting with a set of  “process peripherals” which
are themselves interacting with an environment. For example, the
mind-processes associated with reading a book, watching a movie, or
having a conversation require that the brain (the process core) be in
appropriate interaction with the agent’s sensory/motor systems (the
process peripherals) and that these systems be in interaction with a
suitable environment – one that contains a book, movie, and co-con-
versant respectively. The is an obvious point but it is an important
one – and it is one that is not emphasised in many discussions of  the
mind-body problem.
2.5.4 The next point is a direct consequence of  adopting inde-
pendence indeterminism. Quite apart from whether or not independ-
ence interactions occur within the brain during mind-processes, they
certainly occur between a psychological agent and their environment
during input/output dependent mind-processes. And in this case
such mind-processes must follow an originated course – that is, a
course that cannot be wholly reduced to the properties of  an agent’s
body and its environment because some of  the changes involved
arise through independence interactions, which are interactions
whose occurrence is not wholly reducible to anything pre-existing
prior to their occurrence.
2.5.5 Another important point that follows from adopting inde-
pendence indeterminism is that it makes no sense to talk of  the brain
as a whole as operating as a deterministic system because there is
general agreement that the activity of  the mind-brain is composed of
many interacting, but also partly independently operating, parts, sub-
systems, and sub-processes, which implies that independence interac-
tions are common within the mind-brain meaning its activity follows
an originated course. This goes against what many scientists and oth-
ers assume to be the case – for example, recall Patricia Churchland’s
words quoted above (see 1.4.12): ‘brains operate causally; that is, they
go from one state to the next as a function of  antecedent conditions’.
Note that under independence indeterminism there can be no de-
terminate relationships governing the joint-change that the independ-
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ently running parts, subsystems, and sub-processes of  the mind-brain
undergo.
2.5.6 Although the above points are valid according to inde-
pendence indeterminism, it might be that even though mind-brain
processes follow an originated course they always run in a fully type-
determined way. In which case it would be true that the general way in
which all particular instances of  mind-brain activity ran would be fixed
– i.e. type-determined or prefigured. However, given the assumption
that psychological agents are, to a greater or lesser extent, capable of
creative origination, and that when so operating their mind-brain pro-
cesses do not follow a wholly prefigured or type-determined course,
then this conclusion would not be true. That is, such agents when op-
erating in a creatively originative manner would produce originations
that transcend what was prefigured in their bodies and their environ-
ments.
2.5.7 What has just been said does not resolve the mind-body
problem since there are important matters that have not been
touched upon, such as the existence in humans (and possibly some
animals) of  conscious subjective experience (see 10.2.4). But the fact
that independence indeterminism has a place for directed origination,
creative origination, and self-directed origination (including self-direc-
ted creative origination) does bring an important new dimension to the
debate.
2.5.8 The second long-standing dispute that independence inde-
terminism helps resolve is that between reductionists and emergent -
ists. Reductionists hold that the world consists of  nothing but funda-
mental simple entities and the activities and interactions these engage
in. An entity may be taken to be fundamental if  it has irreducible
properties and behaviours; and it may be taken it to be simple if  it
possesses no parts. Reductionists deny fundamental existence to all
complex entities (i.e. entities composed of  parts). This means, for in-
stance, that they deny fundamental existence to entities such as protons
and neutrons, atomic nuclei, atoms, molecules, stars and planets, bio-
logical cells and living organisms, and all artefacts, since they see all
the properties and behaviours of  such entities as wholly reducible (in
principle) to interaction among fundamental simple entities such as
the elementary particles and fields that physics currently identifies.
Furthermore, some reductionists are also absolute determinists so
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they see the emergence of  all complex entities to be wholly pre-
figured and to be the result of  what fundamental simple entities actu -
ally exist, how these are distributed and arranged, and how they inter-
act and how they come and go from existence. However, those re-
ductionists who accept that quantum indeterminacy exists do have a
place for origination, but not for creative origination because all
quantum indeterministic events are understood to be type-determ-
ined occurrences which arise with definite probabilities.
2.5.9 In opposition to reductionists, emergentists do not believe
that existence consists solely of  the distribution and activity of  fun-
damental simple entities. They believe that some complex entities
have properties and behaviours that cannot be reduced and so must
be taken to be fundamental in their own right. But the difficulty that
emergentists have faced is in finding a convincing naturalistic explan-
ation for why the properties of  a complex entity cannot, in principle,
be reduced to the properties of  its parts and how these interact.
However, by using independence indeterminism, emergentists are
able to provide such an explanation. To see this, consider those entit -
ies whose identities are realised (in part at least) by independence in-
teractions taking place among their parts. Many such entities – e.g.
neutrons and protons, atomic nuclei, atoms, and molecules – realise
their continuing existence and identity through wholly type-determ-
ined independence interactions among their parts and so to this ex -
tent have a continuing existence that is reducible at the type level. But
there are other complex entities that do not run internally in a wholly
type-determined way because their continuing existence involves
some creative origination. The realm of  life – if  it may be considered
to be an entity – is perhaps the most striking example of  this. Within
this realm, and particularly within the human realm, there are many
entities whose continuing existence (and identity) depends to some
extent on the entity carrying out creative origination. For example,
higher animals (and to a much greater extent, humans) rely for their
continuing existence on learning and inventiveness. And entities such
as ecosystems depend for their continuing existence not only upon
numerous independence interactions among many different organ-
isms and physical entities but also on the creative capacity of  organ-
isms to adapt to changing circumstances. Human social entities – e.g.
business firms, clubs and societies, schools and universities, and polit-
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ical parties – also depend for their continuing existence upon being
able to creatively respond to changing circumstance. Under independ-
ence indeterminism it is accepted that all of  these entities are irredu -
cible – and irreducible in a very strong sense because of  the non-pre-
figurement of  some aspects of  what they do and what they may be -
come.
2.5.10 Only two long-standing philosophical disputes have been
discussed here, but it should be clear from what has been said that it
is origination (chance origination, directed origination, and creative
origination) that provides the vital new ingredient. Once origination
takes centre stage, it must be accepted that the future can never be
fully accounted for by the past and the present, even though in cer-
tain respects it may be possible to become fairly sure about some of
the general features the future will possess.
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3 Determinism
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 The idea of  determinism takes several forms, but “natural-
istic absolute determinism” is our main concern. Often however, the
term absolute determinism will be used, or sometimes just “determ-
inism” on its own when no confusion is likely to arise. Non-natural-
istic forms of  absolute determinism, such as theistic determinism,
will not be considered. However, what is known as logical determin-
ism occupies a middle ground and something should be said about it
before going further.
3.1.2 Aristotle drew attention to the key logical principle that
every proposition is either true or false, and that no third value, such
as “indeterminate”, is possible. Although this bivalence view of  the
truth-value of  propositions presents no obvious problem when the
truth-value is determined by past or present existence this is not the
case for propositions referring to future existence, as Aristotle real-
ised. In discussing the issue, Aristotle asks us to consider the proposi-
tion: “There will be a sea battle in the bay tomorrow.” According to
the principle of  the excluded middle, this proposition must be either
true or false. And since one view of  logic is that the truth-value of  a
proposition (considered as a Platonic entity, rather than a potentially
fallible human construction) is a timeless property, it must today be
either true or false that there will be a sea battle in the bay tomorrow.
And since, arguably, all future events may be described by proposi-
tions, there must be a true proposition already existing for every fu -
ture event – which means the future must be fixed.
3.1.3 Logical determinism seems to have a strong hold on
people once they understand the argument. However, under inde-
pendence indeterminism many aspects of  the future are not yet de-
termined because they depend upon what will get originated. And if
this is the case then it doesn’t make sense to say of  something that
has no certainty of  either existing or not existing that it’s existence
must now be either true or false. Under a metaphysics that supports
absolute determinism it does make sense to say this because everything
that has existence (whether in the past, present, or future) is fixed
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once an absolutely deterministic universe has come into existence.
Hence logical determinism is compatible with absolute determinism.
But arguing for absolute determinism on the basis of  the validity of
logical determinism only works if  every aspect of  existence can be
expressed in terms of  propositions, and if  the Platonic view of  pro -
positions is accepted, and these are both contentious matters – in-
deed, they are at least as contentious as the arguments in support of
absolute determinism itself.
3.1.4 The idea of  absolute determinism has become formally
clarified only in the last fifty years or so. Prior to this, two other ideas
that seemed to imply absolute determinism were (and to a great ex-
tent still are) used instead of  this more formal account. These two
ideas are the principle of  sufficient reason, and the law of  cause and
effect. With regard to the first idea, Leibniz wrote: ‘There can be
found no fact that is true or existent, or any true proposition, without
there being a sufficient reason for its being so and not otherwise, al -
though we cannot know these reasons in most cases.’ (Honderich,
1995, entry on ‘Sufficient reason, principle of ’.) The second idea –
one that has been elevated to the status of  law – is that every effect
has a cause. While the principle of  sufficient reason and the law of
cause and effect do seem to provide an informal basis for absolute
determinism, it has proved difficult to state these ideas rigourously.
This has meant that libertarians have not been able to fully drive
home the point that under absolute determinism every detail of
everyone’s life is completely fixed and predetermined, and has been
so fixed and predetermined for ever. However, relatively recent work
on formalising what absolute determinism is and what it implies has
given libertarians a new confidence as it has forced compatibilists to
acknowledge just how much this form of  determinism limits what
free will may be taken to be. But before discussing this newish work it
will be helpful to consider some earlier ideas about determinism, and
also make an argument for rejecting cause and effect as an adequate
basis for absolute determinism.
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3.2 Ideas about Determinism
3.2.1 The idea of  absolute determinism has ancient roots. Plut-
arch (c 46-120) writing about the pre-Socratic philosophers noted
that:
Thales says that necessity is omnipotent, and that it exerciseth
an empire over every thing. Pythagoras, that the world is in-
vested by necessity. Parmenides and Democritus, that there is
nothing in the world but what is necessary, and that this same
necessity is otherwise called fate, justice, providence, and the
architect of  the world (Plutarch).
3.2.2 The ancients were greatly concerned that Fate had an iron
rule over our lives and that no matter what we did, including self-dir-
ectively originating and executing plans and actions, Fate would al-
ways manage to so arrange events that our fated future was sure to
occur. Later, with the advent of  the ancient Greek atomists – Leucip -
pus and Democritus (5th Century BCE) in particular – a naturalistic
cosmological theory was proposed that was thoroughly deterministic.
For example, Leucippus, in the sole surviving piece of  text attribut-
able to him, states that ‘Nothing happens at random, but everything
from a rational principal and of  necessity.’ Epicurus (c341-270 BCE)
adopted, extended, and systematised the work of  the atomists and
was the first thinker to fully appreciate the consequences of  absolute
determinism for free will. Only fragments of  Epicurus’s writing exist,
but his ideas were taken up and described in De rerum natura (On the
Nature of  Things) by the Roman poet Lucretius (c.95-52 BCE). Lu-
cretius writes on Epicurus’s ideas as follows.
When the atoms are travelling straight down through empty
space by their own weight, at quite indeterminate times and
places they swerve ever so little from their course, just so
much that you can call it a change of  direction. If  it were not
for this swerve, everything would fall downwards like rain-
drops through the abyss of  space. No collision would take
place and no impact of  atom on atom would be created.
Thus nature would never have created anything.
3.2.3 Lucretius goes on to explain how these causeless swerves
offer an escape from the all-pervasive and unbroken chains of  cause
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and effect that Greek atomism otherwise entails, and he sees this as
providing a basis for free will.
Again, if  all movement is always interconnected, the new
arising from the old in a determinate order – if  the atoms
never swerve so as to originate some new movement that will
snap the bonds of  fate, the everlasting sequence of  cause and
effect – what is the source of  free will possessed by living
things throughout the earth? What, I repeat, is the source of
the will-power snatched from the fates, whereby we follow
the path alone which we are severally led by pleasure,
swerving from our course at no time or place but at the bid-
ding of  our own hearts? There is no doubt that on these oc -
casions the will of  the individual originates the movements
that trickle through his limbs. [...] So you may see the begin -
ning of  movement is generated by the heart; starting from
voluntary action of  the mind, it is then transmitted through-
out the body and the limbs. (Lucretius, pp. 67-68)
Unfortunately, Lucretius does not say how ‘voluntary actions of  the
mind’ are produced. If  they are produced by random swerves then
this does not help. And it doesn’t help if  they are produced determin -
istically. What is required is non-necessitated self-directed determina-
tion and Lucretius does not say how, or if  at all, Epicurus explained
this.
3.2.4 The idea of  absolute determinism finds expression in liter-
ature. For example in the Rubaiyat of  Omar Khayyam (Fitzgerald 1936)
we find the following stanzas:
For let Philosopher and Doctor preach
Of  what they will, and what they will not – each
Is but one Link in an eternal Chain
That none can slip, nor break, nor over-reach.
And that inverted bowl we call The Sky,
Whereunder crawling coop’d we live and die,
Lift not your hands to It for help – for It
As impotently rolls on as you or I.
With Earth’s first Clay They did the Last Man knead,
And there of  the Last Harvest sow’d the Seed:
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And the first Morning of  Creation wrote
What the Last Dawn of  Reckoning shall read.
3.2.5 William James, in a well-known passage, has described ab-
solute determinism in the following way.
Those parts of  the universe already laid down, appoint and
decree what other parts shall be. The future has no ambigu-
ous possibilities hidden in its womb: the part we call the
present is compatible with only one totality. Any other future
complement than the one fixed from eternity is impossible.
The whole is in each and every part, and welds it with the rest
into an absolute unity, an iron block, in which there can be no
equivocation or shadow of  turning. (James 1923, p. 150)
3.2.6 Writing somewhat earlier than James – in another well-
known passage – the mathematician, scientist and philosopher Pierre-
Simon Laplace states the idea of  absolute determinism from a sci-
entific point of  view as follows. 
We ought then to regard the present state of  the universe as
the effect of  its antecedent state and as the cause of  the state
that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all the forces acting
in nature at a given instant, as well as the momentary posi-
tions of  all things in the universe, would be able to compre -
hend in one single formula the motions of  the largest bodies
as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided that its in-
tellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis;
to it nothing would be uncertain, the future as well as the past
would be present to its eyes. (Laplace 1820)
In this passage, Laplace uses a formulation of  absolute determinism
– one that has gained favour among philosophers in recent times – in
which he sees the instantaneous total state of  the universe together
with the laws of  nature as fully determining the next instantaneous
total state of  the universe, and so on for ever. Note that Laplace is
apparently entirely comfortable with the idea of  there being a wholly
definite instantaneous total state of  the universe – an idea that makes
no sense from the point of  view of  process metaphysics and inde-
pendence indeterminism (see 1.1.8).
3.2.7  Those who believe in the truth of  absolute determinism
must also believe (or at least accept as a necessary logical con -
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sequence of  that belief) that each person’s life – including their own –
follows a course that was fully determined prior to their birth. La-
mont highlights just what this means as follows.
In A Mummer’s Tale by Anatole France, Dr Socrates upholds
the determinist viewpoint when he urges that M. Chevalier
was not to be blamed for his suicide, because it was preor-
dained from eternity. Says the eloquent Dr. Socrates: “To call
upon a poor wretch to answer for his actions! Why, even
when the solar system was still no more that a pale nebula,
forming, in the ether, a fragile halo, whose circumference was
a thousand times greater than the orbit of  Neptune, we had
all of  us, for ages past, been fully conditioned, determined
and irrevocably destined, and your responsibility, my respons-
ibility, Chevalier’s and that of  all men, had been, not mitig -
ated, but abolished beforehand. All our movements, the result
of  previous movements of  matter, are subject to laws which
govern the cosmic forces, and human mechanism is merely a
particular instance of  the universal mechanism.” (Lamont
1967, pp. 23-24)
3.2.8 The principle of  sufficient reason and the law of  cause
and effect lack solid backing, even though they both have strong intu-
itive appeal. The law of  cause and effect has most often been put for-
ward as the main reason for believing in absolute determinism. But,
as will now be argued, it does not provide an adequate basis for such
a belief.
3.3 Cause and Effect is Not a Basis For Absolute 
Determinism
3.3.1 Cause and effect applied universally has often been taken
to imply absolute determinism. For example, Karl Popper writes that:
One of  the simplest and most plausible arguments in favour
of  determinism is this: we can always ask, of every event, why
it happened; and to every such why-question we can always
obtain, in principle, a reply which enlightens us. Thus every
event is ‘caused’; and this seems to mean that it must be de-
termined, in advance, by the events which constitute its cause.
(Popper 1982, p. 9)
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This informal statement may be slightly tightened as follows.
(1) Every event (past, present, and future) has a cause which
precedes it and necessitates its occurrence.
(2) Every cause is an event.
(3) Therefore every event is the necessary outcome of  an un-
broken chain of  causes stretching back forever, or to some
special non-caused creation-event that brought the uni-
verse into being.
3.3.2 This argument has attracted a lot of  criticism. Mainstream
practice takes an event to be: ‘roughly, a happening, occurrence, or
episode’ (Honderich 1995, entry on ‘event’). This way of  character -
ising an event excludes unchanging states from being events. How-
ever, even though events are currently the leading candidate for what
causes and effects are, their ontological basis cannot be regarded as
wholly settled. Jaegwon Kim comments as follows. 
Any discussion of  causation must presuppose an ontological
framework of  entities among which causal relations are to
hold, and also an accompanying logical and semantic frame-
work in which these entities can be talked about. We often
take events as causes and also as effects; but entities of  other
sorts (if  indeed they are ‘other sorts’), such as conditionals,
states, phenomena, processes and sometimes facts, are also pressed
into service when we engage in causal talk, although with
these there is some controversy as to their suitability as terms
of  causal relations. (Kim 1971).
3.3.3 In ordinary thinking about cause and effect, states or con-
ditions are often thought of  as causes (as they are often thought of
as effects). For example, we say things such as “Of  course, it was the
state of  his mind at the time that caused him to take his own life”; or,
“The condition of  the engine was sure to cause a breakdown sooner
or later.” The idea of  states or conditions being causes is supported
by our knowledge that many processes proceed from one state or
condition to the next in an orderly manner, and it is easy to think of
each present state or condition as being the cause of  the next one in
the process. Some machines run in this way, and many biological pro-
cesses pass through a regular sequence of  states or conditions. Also,
many social processes – such as applying for a job or obtaining a pro-
fessional qualification – pass through a succession of  fairly well-
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defined states. What is characteristic of  such processes is that they all
seem to run in a condition-determinate way – that is, they manifest
“condition-determinate change”. However, it seems no natural pro-
cess manifests perfect “time-determinate change” although there are
many that do so approximately and some processes (e.g. atomic
clocks, see 6.6.3) do so very closely. These two important concepts
shall be defined as follows.
Condition-determinate Change
A thing or situation is changing in a condition-determinate
way if  its next condition, or state, is fixed by its present con -
dition together with any input it receives while in this condi-
tion.
Time-determinate Change
A thing or situation is changing in a time-determinate way
over a period if  its condition at any stage is a determinate
function of  the time that has passed since the commence-
ment of  the period.
3.3.4 To clarify these ideas, consider a few examples. The life-
cycle of  an annual flowering plant is condition-determinate but it is
not time-determinate. The cycle is condition-determinate because it
goes through a definite sequence of  conditions: germination of  the
seed, growth of  the plant, flowering, pollination, seed dispersal,
death. But it is not time-determinate because these conditions do not
occur at predetermined times relative to when the seed was planted.
Rather they occur at times that vary from one year to the next de -
pending upon factors such as the weather and the particular location
of  the plant. An ordinary wind-up clock changes in a condition-de-
terminate way but, unlike a plant, it also changes in a (nearly) time-de-
terminate way. Similarly, the motions of  the planets in our solar sys -
tem are both condition-determinate and (nearly) time-determinate. A
dog chasing a rabbit is an example of  a process that runs in neither a
condition-determinate nor time-determinate way. It does not run in a
condition-determinate way because how the chase evolves (the partic-
ular sequence of  conditions it goes through) is not predetermined,
and it is not time-determinate because the times of  occurrence of  the
various conditions or states that arise are not fixed at its outset. Most
open human social interactions (e.g. conversations, competitive
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sports, wars, and market-based commerce) generally run in neither a
condition-determinate nor time-determinate manner.
3.3.5 All instances of  cause and effect are instances of  condi -
tion-determinate change because each particular cause determines a
particular effect. However, because the time between a cause and its
effect is rarely mentioned, it cannot be presumed that all instances of
cause and effect are instances of  time-determinate change. And
without cause and effect being able to guarantee time determinacy of
change it cannot provide a basis for absolute determinism. This fol-
lows because there can be no guarantee of  future synchrony between
separate chains of  cause and effect that are not running in a time-de-
terminate fashion, which means that any future interaction between
such chains will, in general, not arise in a determinate way. 
3.3.6 Consider now the notion of  a cause and its effect. There
seem to be two conceptions of  what a cause and an effect may be,
quite apart from whether they are events or something else. On the
one hand, these two terms might be referring to what shall be called a
“full cause” and a “full effect”. But, on the other hand, they might be
referring to what shall be called a “conspicuous cause” and a “con-
spicuous effect.” In everyday talk the latter sense is generally meant,
as for example with statements such as: “It was the ice on the road
that caused the crash”, or “It was the spark that caused the explo-
sion.” When talking in this way it is usually tacitly accepted that the
conspicuous cause alone – “the ice on the road”, “the spark”, in the
examples – was insufficient for the effect to occur, and yet rarely is any
attention paid to the other factors comprising the full cause. Similarly,
when talking of  the effect “the crash”, or the effect “the explosion”
generally what is meant are only those events that are significant and
more or less conspicuous, and not those events produced by the
cause-and-effect happening that are not obvious or are considered in-
significant. For example, the full effect of  a crash between two cars
not only consists of  damage to the cars, people involved, etc. but also
includes a change in the spatial relationship between these things and
everything else in the universe. It seems, therefore, that adequate sense
cannot be made of  the notions of  cause and effect without using the
ideas of  full causes and full effects, but these are very difficult things
to pin down since it seems possible that they may include very sub-
stantial parts of  existence. Little attention seems to have been given
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to trying to rigorously define what constitutes a conspicuous effect,
but some work has been done on clarifying what is meant by a con-
spicuous cause.
3.3.7 J. L. Mackie refers to conspicuous causes as INUS condi-
tions. That is, something that is an insufficient but necessary part of  a
condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the effect. He in-
troduces the idea as follows: ‘Suppose that a fire has broken out in a
certain house, but has been extinguished before the house has been
completely destroyed. Experts investigate the cause of  the fire, and
they conclude that it was caused by an electrical short-circuit at a cer-
tain place.’ (Mackie 1965, (1975, p.15)). Mackie points out that the ex-
perts are not saying that the short-circuit was a necessary condition
for the house catching fire at this time (other events, such as the
overturning of  a lighted oil-stove, could have produced the same out-
come). And the experts are not saying the short-circuit was a suffi -
cient condition for the fire since other conditions were also required
to be present (for instance, flammable material in the close vicinity of
where the short-circuit occurred, and the presence of  oxygen to sup-
port combustion). Furthermore, for the fire to take hold there had to
be an absence of  certain conditions (such as an efficient automatic
sprinkler system, or a person in the vicinity of  the short-circuit who
would have quickly put the fire out). Mackie writes: ‘Far from being a
condition both necessary and sufficient for the fire, the short-circuit
was, and is known to the experts to have been, neither necessary nor
sufficient for it’ (Mackie 1965 (1975 pp. 15-16)). And it is also known
that the full cause involving the specific short-circuit while being suf-
ficient for the house catching fire was not necessary for the occur-
rence of  this outcome because it could have been produced in other
ways by some other full cause. Hence the short-circuit was an insuffi-
cient but necessary part of  a condition which was itself unnecessary
but sufficient for the house catching fire – an INUS condition.
3.3.8 It is not INUS conditions but full causes that are referred
to in the causality formulation of  absolute determinism given above.
But even with this clarification the formulation has several further
weaknesses. One of  these follows from the Eighteenth century philo-
sopher David Hume’s criticism of  the idea of  causality. Hume con-
vincingly argued that there is no empirical justification for asserting
that a cause necessitates its effect, since it is just past experience that
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leads people to believe that, in the future, a particular type of  cause
will produce a particular type of  effect. Hume argued that observed
constant conjunction does not imply necessity of  conjunction: things might
happen differently in the future to how they happened in the past.
Of  course, it may simply be asserted that a full cause is such that it
does necessitate its full effect, but then a metaphysical rather than an
empirical assertion is being made. And furthermore, there still re-
mains the difficult problem of  being able to specify what constitutes
the full-cause and the full effect that are necessarily linked together
when these are likely to involve large parts of  existence.
3.3.9 The point noted earlier (3.3.5) about the law of  cause and
effect not specifying the time-determinacy of  the change involved –
that is, in not specifying what the temporal gap is between cause and
effect – needs further consideration because it undermines the case
for this law being adequate to ensure absolute determinism. In dis -
cussing the short-circuit example it was noted that the house would
not have caught fire had, for instance, an effective sprinkler system
been able to put the fire out before it spread. The action of  the
sprinkler comes within the temporal gap between the occurrence of
the full cause involving the short-circuit, and the conspicuous effect,
which is the house catching fire. In general, if  there is any finite tem-
poral gap between a cause and its effect then there is the possibility
of  something happening within the gap that breaks the cause-effect
link. And that the concept of  cause and effect requires there to be a
temporal gap has been argued forcefully by some philosophers. For
example, Bertrand Russell, writes as follows.
[...] if  the cause is a process involving change within itself, we
shall require (if  causality is universal) causal relations between
its earlier and later parts; moreover, it would seem that only
the later parts can be relevant to the effect, since the earlier
parts are not contiguous to the effect, and therefore (by the
definition) cannot influence the effect. Thus we shall be led
to diminish the duration of  the cause without limit, and how-
ever much we may diminish it, there will still remain an earlier
part which might be altered without altering the effect, so that
the true cause, as defined, will not have been reached, for it
will be observed that the definition excludes plurality of
causes. If, on the other hand, the cause is purely static, in-
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volving no change within itself, then, in the first place, no
such cause is to be found in Nature, and in the second place,
it seems strange – too strange to be accepted, in spite of  bare
logical possibility – that the cause, after existing placidly for
some time, should suddenly explode into the effect, which
might just as well have done so at any earlier time, or have
gone on unchanged without producing its effect. This di-
lemma, therefore, is fatal to the view that cause and effect can
be contiguous in time; if  there are causes and effects, they
must be separated by a finite time-interval [...]. (Russell 1918,
p. 175)
3.3.10 If  there must be some temporal gap between a cause and
its effect, then an effect cannot be a necessary consequence of  a cause
because, in principle, some effect-destroying intervention may arise
within the temporal gap. One way to avoid this problem is to take the
complete state of  the universe at one instantaneous moment to be
the full cause of  its total state at the next instantaneous moment, with
instantaneous moments being so closely packed that there is no gap
between any adjacent pair of  them. But this is a Laplacian-like total-
state formulation of  determinism and not a cause-and-effect one.
3.3.11 Consider finally the conclusion to the causality argument
for absolute determinism given above – namely, that: ‘every event is
the necessary outcome of  an unbroken chain of  causes stretching
back forever, or to some special non-caused “creation-event” that
brought the universe into being.’ This is perhaps the most disturbing
aspect of  the cause-and-effect argument for absolute determinism
because if  there is a need to accept the occurrence of  a special non-
caused creation-event that originates the universe, why not allow
many origination events to occur? If  it is maintained that no creation-
event has ever occurred then it must be concluded that the universe
has existed for eternity. This is a perfectly acceptable metaphysical
proposition, but not one that seems to gain much support from cur-
rent mainstream scientific thinking.
3.3.12 Given the above arguments it seems that cause and effect
is not an adequate basis for absolute determinism, and without an ad-
equate basis the metaphysical thesis of  absolute determinism will
have little force. Hence, if  the age-old problem of  free will and de-
terminism is to retain its hold on people then what is needed is a
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stronger basis for determinism than what reasoning from cause and
effect can provide.
3.4 Absolute Determinism Defined Without Cause and 
Effect
3.4.1 Many English-speaking philosophers during the early and
middle decades of  the twentieth century accepted that compatibilism
had resolved the problem of  free will and determinism. Then, in the
1970s, a number of  philosophers began to develop a robust and
formal view of  absolute determinism that did not make use of  the
notion of  cause and effect. This work came to be known as the “The
Consequence Argument” because it established the full force of  the
consequences of  absolute determinism. According to Tomis Kapitan
(2002, p. 128) the Consequence Argument (also known as the Incom-
patibility Argument, and the Unavoidability Argument) was ‘inde -
pendently developed in the 1970s by David Wiggings, Peter van In-
wagen, James Lamb, and Carl Ginet.’ These writers were not the first
to point out the severe consequences of  absolute determinism – Wil -
liam James’s writing (see 3.2.5), for instance, had made quite clear
what it implies. However, many philosophers seemed to have been
able to avoid facing the full force of  these consequences because, as
argued in the previous section, the idea of  cause and effect could not
provide a solid argument for absolute determinism, which is the form
of  determinism that has such unwelcome consequence for any sort
of  free will really worth wanting.
3.4.2 The Consequence Argument makes use of  two key ideas.
The first idea is to express the thesis of  absolute determinism in lo -
gical terms without making use of  the notion of  cause and effect.
The second idea is to propose, justify, and then make use of  some
version of  the very general principle of  inference that if  something is
unavoidable – that is, cannot be changed by any natural being or pro-
cess – then so are its consequences unavoidable. Not only does this
principle seem to be intuitively valid, but it is also very similar to the
widely accepted rule of  modal logic that whatever is a consequence
of  a necessity is itself  a necessity.
3.4.3 The incompatibilist philosopher, Peter van Inwagen, has
been a consistent and strong advocate of  the Consequence Argu -
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ment, and it is his work, as reported in his book An Essay on Free Will
that shall be considered here. In this book, van Inwagen presents
three closely-argued formal versions of  the Consequence Argument,
and although it is recognised that none of  these arguments may be
wholly sound (see Kapitan 2002) they are nevertheless presented suf-
ficiently rigorously to require that they be taken seriously by those,
such as compatibilists, who seem to wish to deny the full con-
sequences of  absolute determinism. It is not within the scope of  the
present work to discuss Van Inwagen’s formal versions of  the Con-
sequence Argument, or the detailed technical discussion in the literat -
ure about them, but it is worth summarising some of  the key points
he makes. He states the argument informally as follows.
If  determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of
the laws of  nature and events in the remote past. But it is
neither up to us what went on before we were born, and
neither is it up to us what the laws of  nature are. Therefore,
the consequences of  these things (including our present acts)
are not up to us. (Inwagen 1983, p. 16)
3.4.4 In developing his formal versions van Inwagen enters into
a full and careful discussion of  the various concepts and issues that
must be considered if  a convincing case is to be made. One of  his
most important contributions is to give a definition of  (absolute) de-
terminism in terms of  propositional logic. He writes: 
We may now define ‘determinism’. We shall apply this term to
the conjunction of  these two theses:
For every instant of  time, there is a proposition that
expresses the state of  the world at that instant;
I f p and q are any propositions that express the state
of  the world at some instants, then the conjunction
of  p and the laws of  nature entails q.
This definition seems to me to capture at least one thesis that
could properly be called ‘determinism’. Determinism is, intu -
itively, the thesis that, given the past and the laws of  nature,
there is only one possible future. And this definition certainly
has that consequence. (p. 65)
van Inwagen recognises that his definition means that the future de-
termines a unique past. This aspect of  the definition does not disturb
van Inwagen, but he accepts that it may not be acceptable to others
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(e.g. those who believe in the “arrow of  time” – see section 9.8). He
points out that by including a suitable “later than” clause determinism
of  the past may be excluded, and that this change will not affect the
Consequence Argument. He is particularly pleased that ‘the horrible
little word “cause” does not appear in this definition.’
3.4.5 Van Inwagen is clear that ‘Determinism is about proposi -
tions, but the free-will thesis is a thesis about agents’, and that this
mean the free-will thesis needs to be restated in appropriate terms.
Van Inwagen does this by arguing that an agent with free will is such
that it is ‘able to render false’ some propositions. He recognizes that
there are many propositions that no natural agent can render false –
for example, no natural agent can render false the proposition “Mag-
nets attract iron.” But he argues that there are other propositions that
many people would assume could be rendered false if  an agent had
free will and the desire to do so. Van Inwagen gives as an example the
proposition “I have never read The Teachings of  Don Juan.” It is gener-
ally assumed that providing he has originative free will then it is
within van Inwagen’s power to render this proposition false by actu -
ally reading the The Teachings of  Don Juan. However, if  van Inwagen
does not have originative free will then it will not actually be up to
him whether or not he renders the proposition false but entirely a
matter of  what the state of  the world in the distant past and the laws
of  nature have determined will be the case.
3.4.6 The Consequence Argument achieved a new status of
philosophical respectability for just how incompatible absolute de-
terminism is with originative free will. And this considerably un-
settled many compatibilists. However they have responded strongly,
doing so in two main ways. Firstly, by seeking to find logical flaws in
the argument – an approach that is highly technical but which re-
mains a live topic in the specialist literature. And secondly, by con-
tinuing to challenge libertarians to find a natural form of  self-directed
origination when only the existence of  purely chance origination
seems to have any scientifically acceptable basis.
3.4.7 It is important to understand that the Consequence Argu-
ment rests on metaphysical assumptions and that as such these can-
not be empirically confirmed or denied. Nevertheless science is seri -
ously at odds with the assumptions of  the Consequence Argument
on two major counts. Firstly, the mainstream interpretation of
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quantum theory asserts that indeterminism is a real feature of  the mi-
croscopic world and this means that absolute determinism cannot be
true because the present instantaneous total state of  the universe to-
gether with the laws of  nature does not fully determine all
atomic/sub-atomic happenings. However, it cannot be said that sci-
ence definitely rejects the Consequence Argument because in recent
years new deterministic interpretations of  quantum physics have
gained ground so it would be incorrect to say that there is no doubt
among physicists that indeterminism is real. (The article ‘No Dice’ by
Mark Buchanan – New Scientist, 22 March 2008 – describes some at-
tempts to establish a fully deterministic account of  the quantum
world.)
3.4.8 The second major way in which the assumptions of  the
Consequence Argument are at odds with mainstream science con-
cerns the concept of  the universe having an instantaneous state at
each moment of  time. There are two serious problems with this as
far as mainstream science is concerned. The first is that Einstein’s
special theory of  relativity establishes that no empirical meaning can
be given to there being a universe-wide “now”, which means this idea
must be taken to be a metaphysical one. The second problem is that
most statements of  absolute determinism – van Inwagen’s for ex-
ample – are based on the idea of  the state of  the world at an instant.
But a truly instantaneous state cannot be identified empirically. One
reason for this, according to mainstream thinking, is that time is un-
derstood to change continuously – indeed, many of  the current
mathematical formulations of  the key theories of  physics are based
on this assumption. But just as there is always a real number between
any two real numbers, there is always an instantaneous state between
any two instantaneous states. However some physicists suggest that
time may be quantised at an incredibly small scale – the so-called
Planck time scale, which is of  the order of  10 -43 seconds – which
would mean that no change is continuous. However even if  this were
the case, it seems highly unlikely that all quantised change throughout
the universe would take place in lockstep, which is what would be re -
quired if  there is to be a definite immediate predecessor and suc -
cessor state for every discrete total state of  the universe. A further
reason why truly instantaneous states cannot be identified empirically
is that all observations and measurements require that something (e.g.
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a sense organ, or an instrument) changes its condition, and since no
change can take place in a true instant, no instantaneous measure -
ment of  anything is possible. These reasons mean that the idea of  the
universe proceeding through a series of  instantaneous total states
must also be regarded as a purely metaphysical one.
3.4.9 The points just made suggest that science can offer little
support for absolute determinism as long as it is formulated in the
way van Inwagen outlines. Alternative formulations are possible. For
example, one that some cosmologists favour is based on the view that
the big bang initiated a quantum state encompassing the entire uni-
verse and that the time evolution of  this state is completely described
by a single time-determinate wave function – a wave function that
never “collapses” (or perhaps only collapses when our universe
ceases to be). At present there are two main problems with this idea.
Firstly, there is no widely accepted theory of  quantum gravity – that
is, a quantum theory that encompasses gravity. And secondly, there is
no evidence that such a single time-determinate quantum wave func-
tion exists.
3.4.10 Although absolute determinism as formulated by van In-
wagen and others in expounding the Consequences Argument is able
to gain little support from mainstream science this does not mean
that it is necessarily a false concept, merely that it is a metaphysical
one.
3.5 Quantum Entanglement and Absolute Determinism
3.5.1 Although, as just discussed, there is little evidence from
science that absolute determinism is true there is a feature of
quantum mechanics – known as entanglement – that might possibly
support the truth of  absolute determinism. Quantum mechanics un-
der the Copenhagen interpretation is an indeterministic theory in two
ways. Firstly, it takes the quantum properties (e.g. position, mo-
mentum, spin, and polarisation) of  a particle (e.g. an electron or a
photon) as not having a determinate value until some interaction with
the particle – known as a “measurement” – produces a single definite
value. Secondly, the theory is only able to specify the probability with
which a measurement will produce a particular value, which means
individual measurements produce their results indeterministically.
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Quantum entanglement, says that certain processes of  generation or
interaction involving quantum particles result in one or more of  the
properties of  the particles becoming dependent upon one another so
that a measurement, and therefore the fixing, of  such a property for
one particle instantly results in a correlated fixing of  this property for
the other entangled particles, no matter how widely separated the
particles may be when the measurement is made.
3.5.2 Quantum entanglement seems to imply what Einstein re-
ferred to as “spooky action at a distance” – that is, the transfer of  in -
fluence or information between particles taking place faster than the
speed of  light, which, according to the theory of  relativity, cannot
happen. Einstein was not prepared to accept this implication of
quantum mechanics as understood by the Copenhagen school, and
he argued that there must be hidden variables of  which quantum
mechanics was not taking account. However, this difference of  opin -
ion – which came to a head in the 1930s – remained a matter of
competing thought experiments and theoretical arguments because
physicists could not see a way of  performing experiments that would
resolve the issue.
3.5.3 This impasse remained until 1964 when John Stewart Bell
devised a way by which experiments might be performed that would
be capable of  deciding the issue. It is not appropriate here to go into
the details of  his argument, but what he established was an experi-
mental method capable of  showing that no theory based on hidden
variables that are only able to influence one another at or below the
speed of  light can ever produce all the experimentally confirmable
predictions of  quantum mechanics formulated according to the
Copenhagen interpretation. Or put another way, Bell’s method is able
to determine whether or not there are quantum phenomena that im-
ply the existence of  “spooky action at a distance”.
3.5.4 Since the publication of  Bell's work several experiments
have been performed based on his method. Although these experi-
ments tended to confirm that no sub-luminal hidden-variable theory
can account for the results produced, none of  these experiments was
entirely free of  loopholes. However, in August 2015 the results of  ex -
periments – performed by Ronald Henson and colleagues at Delft
University of  Technology, The Netherlands – were reported that
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seemed to show that all loopholes had been closed and that spooky
action at a distance is real (Henson 2015).
3.5.5 Loophole-free empirical confirmation of  apparent spooky
action at a distance together with solid empirical evidence that no in -
fluence or information can be transmitted faster than the speed of
light points to a clear inconsistency among empirical findings. Inter-
estingly, this inconsistency would not exist if  absolute determinism
were true of  our universe. Bell himself  recognised this and spoke of
it in a 1985 BBC Radio interview when he said:
There is a way to escape the inference of  superluminal speeds
and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute de-
terminism in the universe, the complete absence of  free will.
[If  we] [s]uppose the world is super-deterministic, with not
just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clock-
work, but with our behavior, including our belief  that we are
free to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely pre -
determined, including the 'decision' by the experimenter to
carry out one set of  measurements rather than another, [then]
the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster-than-
light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been car -
ried out on particle B, because the universe including particle
A, already 'knows' what that measurement, and its outcome
will be (Bell, 1985).
3.5.6 However, present-day mainstream thinking in physics does
not support the existence of  absolute determinism because it has a
place for quantum indeterminacy. Nevertheless, there is a non-main-
stream view of  quantum physics that does away with this indetermin -
acy – a view that when Bell came across it stimulated him to develop
his 1964 theorem.
3.5.7 In 1927 De Broglie – who had earlier postulated that ma-
terial particles have a wave-like quality, something that is now an em-
pirically established feature of  quantum physics – developed a com-
pletely deterministic theory to account for quantum phenomena. He
introduced the idea of  “pilot waves” which fully determine the posi -
tion and trajectory of  particles, and which in conjunction with the
Schrodinger wave equation, allowed most of  the empirical findings
of  quantum physics to be explained. For reasons that are not alto -
gether clear (for further information see Turner, M.) few physicists
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took up pilot wave theory until David Bohm did so in 1952. Pilot
wave theory remains highly contentious. Possibly one reason for this
is that pilot waves, and the definite positions and trajectories of  the
particles that pilot waves determine, are not observable. Another pos-
sible reason is that the variables that define a pilot wave's influence
on the position and trajectory of  a particle have values that, in the
limit, may depend upon the condition of  the entire universe. For
these, and other reasons, pilot wave theory has not attracted much
mainstream attention or support. However, analogues involving small
oil drops being moved about on the surface of  water by ripples, and
theoretical work that supports non-localism within the quantum
realm, have led to a recent upsurge in interest in such theories.
3.6 Independence Indeterminism v Absolute 
Determinism
3.6.1 Given that absolute determinism is a naturalistic meta-
physical thesis, it is open to being replaced, without prejudice, by an -
other naturalistic metaphysical thesis. But up to now no alternative
has managed to gain anything like as much support. Perhaps one
reason why determinism (as a loosely understood notion rather than
as a formally stated metaphysical concept) is so readily accepted is be-
cause the macroscopic world seems to most people, and to scientists
who investigate it, to behave deterministically almost all of  the time.
Independence indeterminism does not accept this common view and
asserts instead that the macroscopic world is constantly undergoing
indeterministically occurring change because of  independence inter-
actions. However, if  independence indeterminism is to gain wide-
spread acceptance then there must be a sea-change in the way most
people understand how the world behaves, and although this may be
difficult to achieve it does not seem to be impossible, as shall now be
indicated.
3.6.2 Perhaps the first question that needs to be considered is
why macroscopic determinism seems to be so widely accepted. Hu-
mans, and many animals, can often visually track the change that in-
dependently changing things are undergoing, and with this informa-
tion (and experience and knowledge) often anticipate the likely occur-
rence of  near-future independence interactions. These anticipations
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are not always correct – particularly when something unexpected in -
tervenes – but much of  the time they are, or at least they are correct
enough for practical purposes. This capacity to anticipate the likely
occurrence of  near-future independence interactions is vital to the
success of  carrying out many forms of  directive activity. Driving a
car safely is an obvious example, but there are many other more
mundane examples such as being able to catch a ball, and being able
to walk around without bumping into other moving things. But there
are further reasons for the widespread belief  in macroscopic determ-
inism. One of  these is that many independence interactions are type-
determined and so seem to be a deterministic consequence of  the
nature of  the domain in which they occur. However, when people
think like this, what they tend to forget is that each independence in-
teraction is a uniquely dated and located event for which they can al-
most never predict all the details – for instance, details such as the
precise time and location of  the interaction, and the precise and com-
plete condition of  the things involved when the interaction occurs.
Once it is accepted that all this detail must necessarily be fully pre-de -
termined under absolute determinism it can be seen that the ability to
predict independence interactions is not perfect. Furthermore, Leib-
niz's principle – that everything has a reason for being – seems to
have a strong grip on the thinking of  many people and this also sup-
ports belief  in absolute determinism. And even though the law of
cause and effect does not provide a sound basis for absolute determ-
inism (see section 3.3), it is easy for people to think that it does.
3.6.3 In order to see how independence indeterminism might
be able to undermine the commonly held belief  in determinism it is
useful to consider independence interactions only, and not examine what
may be referred to as “dependence interactions” – interactions
between things that are in a relationship of dependence or interdependence
as, for example, are the bodies of  the solar system. Consider again
the earlier example of  a raindrop striking a leaf  floating down a
stream (see 2.1.6). Very shortly before the raindrop hits the leaf  (well
less than a second) it may be fairly certain to an observer that the in -
teraction will occur. Human sensory and mind-brain processes oper -
ate insufficiently fast for a person to actually make such a prediction
in real-time but a high-speed film played back in slow-motion may al -
low a prediction to be made. It is very unlikely that a prediction of  all
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the details of  the interaction could be made, for instance precisely
where and how the raindrop strikes the leaf  and the precise condition
of  the raindrop and the leaf  when this occurs. But fairly good and
fairly reliable predictions might possibly be made in this way. How-
ever, what about making successful predictions of  independence in-
teractions that are in the far-future and not the near-future? Sticking
with the raindrop and leaf  example, five minutes before the particular
raindrop and leaf  entered into independence interaction there will be
no chance of  predicting this event. Indeed, it wouldn't be known
where to point the camera. Could reliable predictions be made five
seconds before a collision? Even this seems unlikely. What about pre-
dicting the occurrence of  the collision before the solar system was
formed? This seems to be a ridiculous question to ask. But why? If
absolute determinism is correct then the raindrop/leaf  interaction
was just as fixed then as when its occurrence was, say, a tenth of  a
second away.
3.6.4 What is being highlighted here is that the belief  that de-
terminism applies to independence interactions is based on an ability
to anticipate near-future independence interactions, not far-future
ones. The truth is humans (scientists included) have no reliable suc -
cess in predicting particular far-future independence interactions, al-
though they might do quite well predicting the far-future occurrence
of  certain types of  independence interactions. However, it is evidence
of  successful and reliable prediction of particular far-future independ-
ence interactions that is required if  absolute determinism is to be
supported by empirical findings rather than being a bald metaphysical
assumption. Of  course, the argument is made by absolute determin-
ists that this failure is a result of  not being able to obtain the vast
amount of  information about the world that would be needed to
make successful far-future predictions and is not a result of  an inher-
ent indeterminacy of  joint-change among apparently independently
running stretches of  change. But this is not the point. Independence
indeterminism does not deny that far-future independence interac-
tions are a product of  very complex sequences of  dependence and
independence interactions. What it denies is that these sequences are
fully predetermined because it concludes – based on its single
primary assumption that true independence of  change is extremely
common in the universe – that independence interactions arise inde-
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terministically, which is something absolute determinism denies. The
key difference between the two metaphysical views is that absolute
determinists believe that independently changing things change in
lockstep whereas independence indeterminists (i.e. those people who
accept independence indeterminism) do not believe this because they
believe there is no determinate relationship that fully governs or de -
scribes how independently changing things jointly change.
3.6.5 What has just been said may be summarised in the follow-
ing way. Just prior to the occurrence of  an independence interaction,
determinism often seems to be true, and independence indetermin-
ism often seems to be false. However, when an independence interac-
tion is in the far-future it is, in practice, impossible to identify exactly
what exists in the present that necessitates its later occurrence and so
determinism seems to be false, and independence indeterminism
seems to be true.
3.6.6 Belief  in independence indeterminism does not demand a
change to most people’s everyday understanding of  how the world
works. For instance, they may go on making more or less accurate
and useful near-future predictions of  some types of  independence in-
teractions and have good reason to believe that these will be success-
ful most of  the time. People already know they are not successful all
of  the time, and most people explain these failures not by doubting
that determinism rules in the world but by believing that interfering
causes intervened which they were unable to observe or predict and
take into account. The fact that people are often able to make suc-
cessful near-future predictions of  independence interactions is a con-
sequence of  two conditions holding. Firstly, that no interfering influ -
ences arise that disrupt the change the things are undergoing during
the short period before their interaction. And secondly, that the
things are changing (in ways that affect whether interaction occurs
between them) in a roughly time-determinate manner over this same
short period. The first condition is often met – but not always. The
second condition is also often met (at least sufficiently not to affect
anything but the details of  the interaction), and when it is met inde-
pendence is lost because the things are changing in lockstep and so
their future interaction ceases to be an independence interaction. Science
is often able to deal with dependence interactions by using deterministic
descriptions and laws, and with type-determined independence interac-
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tions by using statistical descriptions and laws. This means that inde-
pendence indeterminism does not contradict the empirical findings
of  science. However, it does contradict some of  the fundamental
metaphysical, and often tacitly held, beliefs of  scientists.
3.6.7 Finally, mention must be made of  another reason for pre-
ferring independence indeterminism to determinism: namely, that be-
lief  in independence indeterminism is compatible with two com-
monly held beliefs while belief  in determinism is not. One of  these
beliefs is that humans possess free will, and the other belief  is that
change take place truly independently of  almost everything in exist -
ence except for the (usually) few things that are involved. This means
that those people who believe in determinism yet operate as if  they
accepted these two beliefs must be living some sort of  lie, or at least
be operating under some sort of  illusion. Hence, because independ -
ence indeterminism avoids this, it seems it should to be preferred to
absolute determinism.
3.6.8 Although widespread acceptance of  independence inde-
terminism is not going to happen overnight there seem to be no ob-
vious reasons why it should not be accepted over the longer term. Its
picture of  the world is not of  a unity (the picture that absolute de-
terminism presents) but of  a non-unity – of  a world of  separated and
more or less independent happenings and doings. And it is also a pic -
ture of  a world with an irreducible indefiniteness or looseness to the
way it proceeds or runs – a world with many gaps within and between
the causal networks of  existence. To some people this may seem to
be a deeply dispiriting picture, but independence indeterminism does
have the great virtue of  presenting a world that allows new things to
come into being through new connectivities and causal networks be-
coming originated, and through some of  these becoming originated
not along prefigured lines but in a truly creative way – and in some
cases in a directively creative way.
3.6.9 Humans have an immense creative potential, a potential
which less capable agents lack and which has enabled the emergence
and continuing development of  the “realm of  civilization” – a realm
that, for example, has brought into existence things such as the com-
puter being used to write this, and the economic and regulatory sys-
tems that have been created that enable and govern its manufacture,
distribution, and sale. And perhaps when people more widely recog-
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nise the extraordinary powers of  true creative origination that hu-
mans individually and collectively possess they shall come to accept
independence indeterminism because it has a place for such powers,
whereas determinism does not.
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4 Science and Independence Indeterminism
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Independence indeterminism takes independence interac-
tions to be indeterministically arising events. It might be thought that
scientists would have no objection to this view because the laws of
science are either about things engaged in dependence interactions –
that is, in relationships of dependence and not independence – or about
the statistical properties of  type-determined independence interac -
tions occurring among certain types of  things in certain kinds of  do -
main. However this is not the case because scientists currently have a
strong attachment to a macroscopic deterministic view of  the world.
This is a deeply held view, as shall be illustrated by considering two
pieces of  writing. Further examples need not be given since the views
expressed are widely held and commonly encountered in science, and
indeed elsewhere in the modern world. The first piece is by James
Peterson, a scientist who is much concerned with the modelling of
independence interactions but who feels that such events are in fact
fully determined even though, for pragmatic reasons, he accepts that
it makes sense to assume that they arise indeterministically, or non-
deterministically to use his term – a term used mainly in computer
science. The second piece is by Earnest Nagel, a respected philo -
sopher of  science, and it represents his view on chance and inde -
pendence interactions – a view that is thoroughly in line with main -
stream scientific thinking. It will become clear how dependent on
purely metaphysical assumptions the views presented are. 
4.1.2 Following this discussion are four further sections. The
first of  these considers whether two well-established areas of  science
– quantum theory and deterministic chaos theory – can together
show that macroscopic indeterminacy is common, and the conclu-
sion is reached that they can’t. The next section discusses two ways in
which science accepts determinism: in its deterministic sub-state laws,
and in system determinism. This is followed by introducing a new
way of  understanding what a system is that works well for systems
composed of  loosely coupled components which may be realised in
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multiple ways. The final section continues the discussion on how
compatible independence indeterminism is with science.
4.2 Peterson on the Modelling of  Independence 
Interactions
4.2.1 The first piece of  writing to be discussed comes from
James Peterson’s book Petri Net Theory and the Modeling of  Systems. Petri
nets were invented in 1939 by thirteen-year-old Carl Adam Petri, and
later developed in his PhD thesis. Petri nets, which are formal math-
ematical structures, have found many applications – for example, in
concurrent programming and software design, in workflow manage-
ment, and in discrete process control. Peterson writes: ‘Petri nets
were designed for and are used mainly for modeling. Many systems, es-
pecially those with independent components, can be modeled by a
Petri net. The systems may be of  many different kinds: computer
hardware, computer software, physical systems, social systems, and so
on.’ (Peterson 1981, p. 31) Peterson goes on to give some examples,
and then writes ‘These examples illustrate several points about Petri
nets and the systems which they can model. One is the inherent paral-
lelism or concurrency.’ (p. 35) He explains that a Petri net “execution” –
any particular run of  events that a particular Petri net allows – exhib-
its nondeterminism when more than one transition is possible at a
given moment, and he suggests this is like what seems to happen in
the real-world when things are happening concurrently (and, by tacit
assumption, often independently). After making these points he says:
The questions involved with these concepts can get quite
philosophical in nature. For example, I, personally tend to-
wards a deterministic view of  the universe, and there is no
randomness. Randomness is merely a result of  incomplete
knowledge of  the state of  the universe and its individual
transitions. In this sense, the selection of  one of  a set of  en-
abled transitions to fire is determined in the modeled system
[i.e. in the real world], [but] not in the model simply because
the model does not represent the complete information about
the system. (p. 37)
4.2.2 The reason why this latter comment is such an interesting
example of  a scientist’s belief  in macroscopic determinism is that it
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comes from a specialist who is actually working with an important
method for modelling and investigating the behaviour of  systems in-
volving independently changing things – systems of  a sort that
Peterson himself  recognizes are common in the world. Nevertheless,
it would seem Peterson cannot bring himself  to accept that inde -
pendence interactions might be indeterministically arising events.
4.2.3 Peterson’s metaphysical predilection for macroscopic de-
terminism is widely shared among scientists and many other people.
It is very widely believed that were it possible to identify all the
factors at work in any given macroscopic situation – that is, were it
possible to access the “complete picture” – then, in principle, it
would be possible to predict the future course of  all that was to hap-
pen in the situation. And this would be so even though some of  the
happenings involved interactions among things that were prior to
their interaction apparently changing independently of  one another.
Most scientists subscribe to this view so they believe, for example,
that although the outcome of  flipping a coin may appear to be a mat-
ter of  chance this is not actually so since if  all the factors influencing
the coin’s motion were known it would be possible – given a com-
plete understanding of  physics – to predict the coin’s course in the
minutest detail and know beforehand which side would be showing
when the coin came to rest. Similarly, most scientists believe that ex -
actly where a steel ball launched into a spinning roulette wheel will
come to rest is fully determined by the initial conditions of  the situ-
ation and the laws of  nature. In other words, although scientists ac -
cept that what appear to be independence interactions are involved in
the change going on in such situations, most scientists do not see
these interactions as arising indeterministically. Rather, they see them
as fully determined, and fully determined in a way that would be ob-
vious if  knowledge of  all the factors involved and the relevant laws
of  nature were available. This is just the view of  independence inter-
actions for which Nagel argues.
4.3 Nagel on the Determinacy of  Independence 
Interactions
4.3.1 Ernest Nagel in his book The Structure of  Science has a sec-
tion entitled ‘Chance and Indeterminism’ in which he seeks to estab-
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lish that the idea of  a chance event is compatible with its being
caused or determined (Nagel 1961, pp. 324-335). He distinguishes
between and discusses several meanings of  the word chance but here
it is only the meaning that is associated with the interaction of  inde -
pendent causal chains that shall be discussed.
4.3.2 In considering this meaning of  chance, Nagel introduces a
familiar kind of  example. ‘Suppose [...] that a man leaves his home in
order to purchase some tobacco, but that on the way he is felled by a
brick displaced from the roof  of  a building.’ Nagel goes on to say:
‘The man’s misfortune is then said to be a chance occurrence not be -
cause it is “uncaused” (indeed, the description of  the event indicates
the cause), but because it occurs at the “juncture” of  two independ-
ent causal sequences, one that terminates in the man’s being beside
the building at a given time, and the other that terminates in the
brick’s motion at that time.’ He then adds: ‘These causal series are
said to be “independent” in the sense that the events in one do not
determine the events in the other: had the brick not fallen the man
would have proceeded on his journey to the tobacconist, and had the
man not been at a particular spot the brick would have struck the
ground. Accordingly, the man’s injury is alleged to be fortuitous or
accidental, since however complete may be our knowledge of  the cir -
cumstances leading to the man’s journey or of  the conditions making
for the brick’s passage, neither body of  knowledge by itself  suffices
to foretell the accident.’ What is needed in order to predict the acci -
dent is full knowledge of  the time-determinate joint-change of  the man
and the brick. But according to independence indeterminism no such
knowledge is possible because no determinate relationship exists
between stretches of  change that are running truly independently. In
believing that such a determinate relationship does actually exist
(even if  it can never be known what it is), Nagel is tacitly assuming
that determinism holds for the situation – that is, he is adopting a
particular metaphysical view.
4.3.3 Nagel appreciates that an appeal to common sense is not
sufficient to establish that what are apparently independence interac-
tions are actually fully caused or determined events. Nagel writes:
‘The notion needing special attention is that associated with the
phrase “independent causal chains”’. He acknowledges that the image
of  each causal line being ‘determined by the “inherent” character of
87
the line’ is a common one. But he rejects this image as naive, saying
‘there are an indefinite number of  distinct causal determinants for the
occurrence of  any specific event. Accordingly, if  the image of  a line
or chain is adopted for describing the causal relations of  events, an
event is more appropriately described as being the common intersec-
tion of  an indefinite (if  not infinite) number of  lines. But if  this
more complex image is employed, it no longer is even apparently
clear just what we are to understand by “independent causal lines”,
since now every event is the node of  very many causal influences.’
However, it seems that Nagel does not feel this is a wholly adequate
way of  dealing with the issue. He goes on to write: ‘Greater clarity
concerning the sense of  “chance” under discussion can be obtained
if  we reformulate the distinction in terms of  relations between state-
ments rather than events or happenings.’ Interestingly, this approach is
akin to that of  van Inwagen’s who argued for his thesis of  determin -
ism in terms of  propositions about such things as the total state of
the universe and the laws of  nature rather than in terms of  these
things directly (see 3.4.4).
4.3.4 The statements Nagel uses to describe what is going on
are expressed in the standard propositional and mathematical lan-
guage of  macroscopic physics, and draw upon the deterministic as-
sumptions that are part of  that field. By proceeding in this way – i.e.
with an inbuilt assumption of  fully time-determinate change in-
volving the two independent causal sequences – it comes as no sur-
prise that Nagel is able to show that apparent independence interac -
tions of  the sort being considered are fully determined and are there -
fore not instances of  true chance. Nagel feels no need to justify why
it should be possible, at least in principle, to produce a complete
time-determinate prediction of  such a complex sequence of  happen -
ings as is involved in a man going out to buy tobacco: he simply takes
it for granted, as many physicists do, that it must be possible to do
this even though this has never been achieved in practice. What he is
revealing here, but not explicitly acknowledging, is his attachment to a
deterministic view of  nature, and one that is based on metaphysical
assumptions rather than empirical findings.
4.3.5 It is apparent that Nagel, in common with many others,
rejects what independence indeterminism assumes – namely that an
interaction between independently running causal chains is an origin -
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ated event and, when there is no directive activity involved, a purely
chance originated event. It appears that few people have thoroughly
explored the conceptual consequences of  assuming that apparently
independent causal chain do in fact run truly independently and not
in time-determinate lockstep. Some thinkers get close to doing so.
For instance, the nineteenth century French mathematician, philo-
sopher, and early contributor to mathematical economics, Antoine
Augustin Cournot, in his book Exposition of  the Theory of  Chance and
Probabilities asserted that: ‘Events caused by combinations of  encoun-
ters of  phenomena belonging to independent series, are those which
we call fortuitous or resulting from randomness.’ (Cournot 1835
(2013), §40). But rather than developing the wide-ranging conceptual
consequence of  this assertion, Cournot mainly turned his attention to
the mathematics of  probability and its various applications.
4.3.6 In the 1960s, when Nagel published his book, his discus-
sion of  chance would satisfy most scientists because it was thought
that the intrusion of  quantum indeterminacy into the macroscopic
realm could very largely be ignored. However, this view has now
changed.
4.4 From Quantum Indeterminacy to Macro-
Indeterminacy ?
4.4.1 Scientists’ belief  in macroscopic determinism has been un-
dermined in recent decades by the rise of  deterministic chaos theory
and the study of  complex systems. The idea is that certain indeterm-
inistically arising quantum events might produce macro-level inde-
terminacy by seeding systems which possess chaotic dynamics with
tiny variations in initial conditions. It has been established that many
systems whose behaviour is non-linear have modes of  operation in
which vanishingly small differences in initial conditions lead to large
and non-systematically (i.e. chaotically) varying differences in long-
term behaviour. (A non-linear system is one in which equal incre -
ments or decrements in the input do not lead to equal increments or
decrements in the output.) 
4.4.2 Fields of  study in which chaotic behaviour is known to
occur include the dynamics of  the solar system (e.g. irregular motion
of  Saturn’s moon Hyperion); fluid flow (e.g. turbulence); chemical re-
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actions (e.g. catalytic processes); ecological systems (e.g. population
dynamics); weather systems (e.g. their long-term dynamics); physiolo-
gical systems (e.g. neurons, the dynamics of  the heart); and engin-
eered systems (e.g. electrical circuits, mechanical systems, feedback
systems).
4.4.3 Deterministic chaos theory has its roots in classical dy-
namics and even in Newton's time it was realised that dynamical sys -
tems involving many interacting bodies (the solar system, for ex-
ample) could show very unstable behaviour. Much later (at the end of
the nineteenth century) Henri Poincare investigated the inherent in-
stabilities of  celestial mechanics and he is considered to be the father
of  modern deterministic chaos theory. However for several decades
his work was largely regarded as a curiosity and it was not until the
1940s with mathematical investigation into the stability of  systems,
and other work, that deterministic chaos theory began to take off.
One major breakthrough came in the early 1960s when Edward
Lorenz, in developing highly simplified models of  the dynamics of
global weather systems, produced computer simulations which
showed chaotic behaviour under certain parameter settings. He no-
ticed that when restarting a certain computer simulation part-way
through using rounded numerical values (obtained from a printout
and not from the greater-precision values stored in the registers and
memory of  the running simulation program) that the re-started simu-
lation produced a trajectory and outcome significantly different from
what was produced when the simulation was left to run uninterrup-
ted. Further investigation revealed that the long-run behaviour of  the
simulation was sensitive to vanishingly small variations in initial con-
ditions – which meant that when rounded values were entered on re-
starting rather than full-precision values, the slight variations made a
big difference. And this was true even though the simulation was run-
ning entirely deterministically. Lorenz’s mathematical model was ex-
tremely simple but it seemed to be capturing the main qualitative fea-
tures of  the global weather system, and this seemed to suggest that
the real weather system was also sensitive to vanishingly small vari-
ations in initial conditions. To emphasise the possible chaotic nature
of  weather systems and the limits to weather forecasting this might
impose, Lorenz wrote a paper in 1972 for the American Association
for the Advancement of  Science with the rather provocative title:
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‘Predictability: Does the Flap of  a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil set off  a
Tornado in Texas?’ (Lorenz 1972). This was where the popular term
for deterministic chaos – the “butterfly effect” – comes from.
4.4.4 Although there is little doubt that chaotic behaviour is
common within the macroscopic realm, it is not clear whether
quantum indeterministic events (such as the decay of  radioactive nuc-
lei) are able to provide variations in initial conditions sufficient to
make a difference in the long-run behaviour of  macroscopic systems.
Robert Bishop writes: ‘[...] although the abstract sensitivity arguments
do correctly lead to the conclusion that the smallest of  effects can be
amplified, applying such arguments to concrete physical systems
shows that the amplification process may be severely constrained. For
example, investigating the role of  quantum effects in the process of
friction in sliding surfaces indicates quantum effects can be amplified
by chaos to produce a difference in macroscopic behaviour, provided
that the effects are large enough to break molecular bonds and are
amplified quickly enough.’ (Bishop 2002, p. 120) It seems that on
present evidence indeterministically produced quantum events rarely
trigger macroscopic chaos. However, recall (1.2.9) that by using a
device such as a Geiger counter, quantum indeterministic events can
be arranged to give rise to indeterministically arising macroscopic
events.
4.5 On Sub-state and System Determinism
4.5.1 Given that mainstream science is able to offer little sup-
port for the existence of  absolute determinism, are there forms of
determinism that it can support? The answer is a clear yes in that sci-
ence has no problem with the existence of  what shall be referred to
as “sub-state determinism”. Indeed, most of  the classical equations
of  physics are deterministic in this sense since they assert either that
certain definite relationships hold between particular types of  quant -
ities, or that certain quantities change in a time-determinate way. For
example, Einstein’s famous equation E=mc2 asserts that a determin-
ate relationship exists between the total energy, E, associated with a
mass, m, (with c being the velocity of  light in a vacuum, which is
taken to be a constant of  nature). However, this law of  physics – like
all laws of  science as we have them at present – deals only with as -
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pects, or sub-states, of  existence, not with everything. An example of
a sub-state time-determinate equation is Newton’s law of  motion which
says that the rate of  change of  the momentum of  a body is propor-
tional to the net force applied to it. And once again this is a statement
about certain sub-states of  existence, not about the whole of  exist-
ence.
4.5.2 Quantum physics also has its sub-state determinate equa-
tions. In this realm matter appears to have both wave and particle
properties. The Schrodinger wave function – which is an entirely
time-determinate equation – describes how the wave (rather than the
particle) properties of  a quantum system change in time. This equa-
tion does not specify when or where a quantum system will lose its
wave properties and assume a particle identity, but the square of  the
amplitude of  the Schrodinger wave at each point in space at each mo-
ment of  time is proportional to the probability of  a particle arising at
that point should what is known as “the collapse of  the wave func -
tion” (i.e. transition of  the system from having a wave identity to a
particle identity) occur at that moment.
4.5.3 These examples are of  laws concerning sub-states, or as-
pects, of  existence – not the whole of  existence. This means that
such laws are based on the tacit assumption that true independence
of  change exists between the set of  sub-states that a law ties together
and other sub-states of  existence that are not mentioned in the law.
And it is also tacitly assumed that investigators (e.g. scientists) are free
to manipulate a particular set of  such sub-states to examine the valid -
ity/invalidity of  such a law without being constrained in what they do
(and when and where they do it) by exactly what else is going on in
existence. That these beliefs are held – albeit usually tacitly – gives
strong support to the assumption of  independence of  change. How-
ever, in real-life situations, rather than experimental ones, the specific
sub-states or aspects of  existence that are referred to in a law are of-
ten influenced in complex ways so making it difficult to discover the
laws in the first place. For example, while Newton’s laws of  motion
and gravitational attraction assert that a feather and a stone fall at the
same rate in the same gravitational field, their motion only manifests
this if  they fall in a vacuum – if  they fall in air, then the force of  air
resistance on the feather (as a fraction of  the gravitational force on it)
is much greater than the corresponding fraction of  the force of  air
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resistance on the stone and this imbalance destroys their equal rate of
fall.
4.5.4 Another form of  determinism that is compatible with in -
dependence indeterminism is what shall be referred to as “system de-
terminism”. Certain systems, from a functional point of  view, operate
entirely deterministically. The operation of  some such systems may
be represented by adopting what is known as the finite state machine
approach. A finite state machine is a form of  abstract model. Three
“alphabets” are defined: the set of inputs (e.g. symbols, signals, or
events) to which the system is responsive; the set of outputs that the
system produces that may affect its environment or other systems to
which it is connected; and the set of internal states that the system may
assume. A bathroom pull-switch for operating an electric light is,
functionally, a very simple system which may be described in these
terms. It has one input: a pull on the cord; two outputs: electric
power available on its output terminals, no electric power available on
its output terminals; and two internal states: switch closed, switch
open. The possible transitions, or changes, the system may undergo
are given by listing, for every combination of  input and internal state,
the effect this combination has on the internal state of  the system,
and on the output. So, for a properly operating pull-switch, we have:
Input to
System
Present In-
ternal State
New State Output
Pull cord Switch open Switch closed Power on output ter-
minals
Pull cord Switched
closed
Switch open No power on output
terminals
The simplifying assumption has been made that power is constantly
available to the switch, but this could be treated as another aspect of
the input to the system rather than treating it as a constant feature, in
which case a more complex finite state machine model would be re -
quired.
4.5.5 Once systems with many inputs, outputs, and internal
states are considered, things can get very complex. Fortunately it is
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sometimes possible to decompose a complex system into a set of  in-
teractions between simpler sub-systems so making description of  the
overall system’s operation more straightforward than would otherwise
be the case.
4.5.6 Although, according to the mainstream scientific view, de-
terministic physical systems do exist, care must be taken to spell out
what is meant by this. There are two main ways of  considering a
physical system: from a material perspective, and from a functional
perspective. So far, a pull-switch system has been considered from a
functional perspective, but if  a material perspective were taken then
much larger alphabets of  inputs, outputs, and internal states would
need to be specified and a vastly more complex transition table would
need to be given. For instance, from a material perspective pull-cord
inputs will vary considerably both in strength and direction of  pull;
the switch will go through a whole series of  changes in internal state
as its parts move and interact to make or break the circuit; and the
output power will not instantly change but will take a short, but
measurable, time to settle to its new condition. As the level of  phys -
ical detail taken into account is increased, so an increasingly complex
system description will be needed to accommodate this added in-
formation. Indeed, once the level is reached where quantum effects
become important, quantum indeterminacies will destroy the determ-
inism apparent when the system is considered in less detailed terms.
Hence, from a material perspective, and assuming quantum indeterm-
inacy is a real feature of  the microscopic world, it is not possible to
give a completely deterministic account of  the behaviour of  a mater-
ial system. However from a functional perspective this can sometimes
be done because much of  the material detail (including microscopic
detail) that realises the system’s functionality doesn’t matter much.
For example, from a functional point of  view, one pull switch is
much like another even though they may be constructed according to
somewhat different designs, and be made of  somewhat different ma-
terials. Indeed, many of  the material properties of  a system are not
relevant at all to the existence of  its functional properties – for ex-
ample, the colours of  the components of  a pull-switch are generally
irrelevant to its functionality.
4.5.7 A general conclusion that may be drawn is that functional
determinacy (functional condition-determinacy rather than functional
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time-determinacy) is quite common but that material determinacy,
once the full details are considered, is not. However, much that hap-
pens in the world depends upon functional behaviour and how such
behaviours connect together into networks of  functionally significant
happenings – networks that usually have a constancy of  function that
is not necessarily reflected in a corresponding constancy of  their ma-
terial realisation. For example, what is important to a person about a
pull-switch in a bathroom is that they can pull it and get the room il -
luminated, and with this functional condition achieved, can then carry
out various functionally significant behaviours that are important to
them. Exactly what sort of  pull switch there is in the bathroom, and
exactly what sort of  light-source it switches electrical power to, and
exactly what provides the electrical power are matters that are irrelev-
ant to the person as long as the switch does what they want.
4.6 Beyond Systems to RENOIRs
4.6.1 As just noted, many functional systems may be materially
realised in a variety of  different ways – that is, their functionality is
what is known as “multiply realisable”. Furthermore, some functional
systems may have their functionality realised by a varying ‘cast’ of
‘actors’ or participants. Many human systems – e.g. businesses,
schools, sports teams, committees, political parties – are like this. So -
cial processes – human and animal – typically involve conflictual,
competitive, and cooperative interaction among the participants.
While such forms of  interaction sometimes run in a creatively origin -
ative way, very often they run in a fairly type-determined way. For in -
stance, many social behaviours of  animals are like this – see, for ex-
ample, Tinbergen’s work on the courting ritual of  the three-spined
stickleback (1953, p. 10). But so also are many human social pro -
cesses: think of  how many of  the processes within and between busi-
nesses may be understood as interactions between functionally
defined roles which allow little room for creative origination. But hu -
man social processes are certainly not devoid of  creative origination –
indeed, they often provide the context within which creative origina-
tion arises and thrives. And even with functionally defined roles and
interactions within businesses and human organisations, the individu-
ality of  the particular persons filling such roles cannot necessarily be
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ignored – think of  how important the individuality of  the leader of
an organisation may be, or how a personality clash may disrupt the
smooth-running of  a work-place.
4.6.2 As soon as functionality and process are emphasised
rather than materiality and static structure the vocabulary commonly
available is found wanting. The trouble is that although some entities
(e.g businesses, organisations, ecosystems) have a more or less defin-
ite and continuing functional identity it is often not possible to link
this identity to a specific single continuing material presence. In ad -
opting naturalism, it is not doubted that the identity of  such entities
is always realised in some non-spooky way, nevertheless it is generally
accepted that their continuing identity is realised by a changing cast
of  participants and hence a changing materiality, which means that
accounting for them in terms of  a fixed material structure is not ap-
propriate. What seems to persist with the continuing existence of
such entities is a network of  influence relations: a network that may
be realised by a changing set of  material components or participants.
To mark this different point of  view the acronym RENOIR – Relat-
ively Enduring Network Of Influence Relations – shall be intro-
duced.
4.6.3  To get a firmer idea about RENOIRs, consider a few ex-
amples. An extended family is usually something with a relatively en-
during existence. However, its membership changes over time as ba-
bies are born, and as members die. A family also changes because its
members age, form (and dissolve) partnerships with other people,
and move their location of  residence. But in spite of  all this change
something tends to endure, and what this seems to be is a network of
relationships – relationships of  actual and potential influence existing
among the members of  the family. These relationships may change,
but they still remain relationships belonging to the entity that is the
family in question. A living cell may also be understood to be realised
and sustained by relatively enduring networks of  influence relations,
with the specific things (e.g. the particular molecules, and physical
structures) that realise these influence relations constantly changing.
Similarly, an ecosystem may be understood to be realised and sus-
tained by relatively enduring networks of  influence relations among
living things and the physical structures and processes of  the envir -
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onment concerned, with the particular living things involved under-
going constant turnover.
4.6.4 One important feature of  some RENOIRs is their ability
to maintain their continuing existence even when some aspects of
their functionality are temporarily absent through lacking an appro-
priate current material realisation – for example, think of  an organ-
isation temporarily without a CEO, or a firm that has lost a manufac -
turing facility through fire. Such RENOIRs – or complex adaptive
systems as they are sometimes referred to – are resilient, adaptable,
and capable of  learning and invention and it is these capabilities that
generally allows them to produce appropriate material replacements
for missing functionality. It is these and other creative capabilities,
coupled with the many non-creative but directively originative capab-
ilities that such entities possess, that generally allows them to survive
in the face of  major changes to their environment, and major disrup-
tions to their functioning. 
4.6.5 A RENOIR may be realised in an entirely structurally de-
termined way, and in this case it is usually appropriate to think of  the
entity in terms of  its physical structure. For example, although a
wind-up clock may be understood functionally as a relatively enduring
network of  influence relations it is often more meaningful to relate
the network of  influence relations to the physical nature and struc-
ture of  the parts of  the clock and how they interact and affect one
another. Similarly with a radio, an automobile engine, a computer, or
a mobile phone. All of  these functionally deterministic systems have
their influence relations realised by a relatively fixed set of  structurally
related physical parts and interactions among them. But entities such
as a living cell or a human organisation cannot be so characterised be-
cause there is a constant turnover of  the specific material realising the
entity, and also no fixed physical structure of  spatio-temporal rela-
tionships among the more or less freely moving material participants
(e.g. biomolecules, or persons respectively) that realise the network.
Furthermore, while the participants of  such RENOIRs are not actu-
ally taking part in the influence relations that realise a particular
RENOIR they are generally free to operate independently – including
interacting in other ways such as participating in other RENOIRs.
For example, a particular molecule in a cell may participate in differ -
ent chemical pathways at different times, or may participate in a
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chemical reaction that has nothing to do with the functional opera-
tion of  the cell. Similarly, in a human organisation, the people in -
volved in realising and sustaining its operation generally do not spend
all their time doing so – they have many other activities that they get
involved in (e.g. chatting to their colleagues about non-work matters),
and they participate in many other RENOIRs that, for instance, are
associated with other aspects of  their lifestructure such as their famil-
ies, their clubs, and the religious groups they belong to.
4.6.6 The large degree of  independence or looseness that often
exists among the participants of  a RENOIR means that many of  the
interactions that give rise to the network of  influences relations that
define and realise it are independence interactions. For instance, inde-
pendence interactions arise whenever a participant stops whatever
activity they are involved in and enters into an interaction relevant to
realising the RENOIR – as, for example, happens when an employee
starts work. Also, many of  the influence relations that define a REN -
OIR are realised through independence interactions between parti-
cipants rather than through permanent structural relationships. For
example, in a cell chemical reactions that realise relevant influence re -
lations in the life of  the cell arise because of  independence interac -
tions among the relatively freely moving reactants, and not, as for in-
stance is the case with a piece of  clockwork, because the participants
are in a relatively fixed structural relationship. And nowadays in many
human organisations the influence relations important for its func-
tioning are realised by means of  remote communication – e.g. by mo-
bile phone, or email – in which the spatial relationship between the
communicants is relatively unimportant. According to independence
indeterminism, when the influence relations of  a RENOIR are real -
ised through independence interactions, the behaviour of  the REN-
OIR is intrinsically indeterministic (although in many cases it will be
strongly type-determined). By “intrinsically indeterministic” is meant
that the indeterminism comes from within the RENOIR rather than
solely from independence interactions between the RENOIR and its
environment.
4.6.7 The reason for introducing the concept of  a RENOIR is
that the operation and behaviour of  psychological agents, and hu -
mans in particular, is much more readily understood using this idea
than the idea of  a system as being a material/structural entity. And
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this is particularly true when independence indeterminism is adopted
as the naturalistic metaphysics of  choice rather than determinism.
The concept of  a RENOIR is implicitly understood by many people
but it is rarely given the sort of  explicit attention that it has been
given here. And, to the author's knowledge, this concept does not
have a single word by which it may be referred to, hence the intro-
duction of  the acronym RENOIR. Note that the concept of  a REN-
OIR is simply one way of  thinking about what a system is, and be -
cause the word system is much more widely understood than REN-
OIR (which is as yet unknown outside this book), it is this word that
shall most frequently be used even when it would perhaps be more
useful to think of  the entity as a RENOIR.
4.7 Independence Indeterminism is Compatible With 
Science
4.7.1 As has already been discussed there are forms of  determ-
inism that are an established part of  science (specifically, sub-state de-
terminism and system determinism) which are compatible with inde-
pendence indeterminism. Are there forms of  determinism recognised
by scientists that are incompatible with independence indeterminism?
Absolute determinism is not, but then mainstream scientists who ac-
cept the existence of  quantum indeterminism do not accept absolute
determinism. What about macroscopic determinism? The generally
accepted view within science is that because quantum indeterminacy
plays a minor role in the macroscopic realm, this realm operates al -
most wholly deterministically which means that macroscopic determ-
inism is incompatible with independence indeterminism which as-
sumes that true independence of  change is extremely common
within the macroscopic ream and that indeterminately arising inde-
pendence interactions are very common. This means that independ-
ence indeterminism is seriously at odds with current mainstream
thinking in science. However, were independence indeterminism to
become generally accepted by scientists (and its primary assumption
already is implicitly accepted), then would this actually make much dif-
ference to science? It is likely that it would not because science is, on
the one hand, mainly concerned with dependence interactions – which it
is often able to deal with using its deterministic methods – and on the
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other hand with type-determined independence interactions, which it is
often able to deal with using statistical and probabilistic methods.
4.7.2 Nevertheless, the metaphysical position of  most present-
day scientists has no place for the existence of  indeterminately arising
independence interactions. Indeed, most scientists would accept Na-
gel’s view that independence interactions (or, in Nagel’s terms, inter -
action among previously independently running causal chains) are de-
terministically arising occurrences, and that this would be obvious if
access to the “complete picture” were available. However this view is
not backed up by what science is able to establish empirically, as may
be appreciated by further consideration of  Nagel’s example of  a fall -
ing brick striking a man as he walks to the tobacconist.
4.7.3 Presently available expertise might just about allow a de-
terministic simulation model to be constructed capable of  predicting
some aspects of  the motion of  a man as he walked down a street to-
wards a tobacconist. But walking is a voluntary activity that may be
interrupted, or changed, by the mind-brain activity of  the person do -
ing the walking. For instance, a man, while walking towards a tobac-
conist, may suddenly remember that he has forgotten to bring any
money with him and may turn about and head back home. Or, as an-
other example, he may meet a friend on the way and decide to stop
and have a brief  chat. Given that many influences may affect the
walking-behaviour of  a person, it is quite beyond present-day science
to provide a consistently reliable time-determinate model capable of
predicting specific instances of  non-constrained human walking be-
haviour. However, science is capable of  producing a model for mak-
ing (nearly) time-determinate predictions of  the motion of  a brick
while it falls from a building once the conditions of  its dislodgement
are known. But science seems quite incapable of  developing a model
for predicting exactly when a particular brick will become dislodged
and fall from a particular building.
4.7.4 What is needed for a correct prediction of  the independ-
ence interaction of  the brick striking the man is information about
everything relevant that is going on in the universe at the time of
making the prediction, coupled with knowledge of  a set of  time-de-
terminate laws of  nature that would allow a correct prediction to be
made. Suppose that the prediction is made when the man leaves his
house and that his walk to the tobacconist takes five minutes. Ac-
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cording to a fundamental assumption of  the theory of  relativity –
which states that no influence can travel faster than the speed of  light
in vacuum – a sphere must be considered that is centred on the street
in question and which has a radius equal to the distance light travels
during five minutes. This would be a sphere with a radius of  about 90
million kilometres (light travelling at about 300,000 kilometres a
second for 300 seconds), and the state of  everything in it relevant to
the possible future interaction of  the brick and the man would have
to be known. However, science is incapable of  obtaining a truly in -
stantaneous description of  anything (see 3.4.8), and even if  it could it
is nowhere near having knowledge of  a set of  time-determinate laws
sufficient to allow a correct prediction to be made. Indeed, it may be
that quantum indeterminacies mean that no set of  strictly time-de-
terminate laws can do the job.
4.7.5 It seems, therefore, that Nagel’s view that macroscopic in-
dependence interactions are never indeterministic occurrences simply
cannot be verified by what science can do. Hence, without damaging
the empirical findings of  science, nothing would be lost by scientists
abandoning the belief  that macroscopic independence interactions
are deterministically produced events and accepting the belief  that
they arise indeterministically. Of  course, this latter belief  can no
more be empirically confirmed or denied than can the former. Never-
theless, abandoning belief  in macroscopic determinism would be a
big change to the way scientists thought about the metaphysical basis
of  existence and would take some getting used to.
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5 More on Free Will
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 This chapter considers some of  the significant contribu-
tions to the free-will debate made over the last fifty years or so. The
treatment is by no means comprehensive, but it does address some
of  the ideas that represent relatively new and significant approaches
to old problems.
5.1.2 The first piece of  work considered concerns findings and
views that suggest that the conscious sense people have of  having
freely willed an action is an illusion. Following discussion of  this
work, which seems to assume a deterministic view of  mind-brain
functioning, consideration is give to some recent approaches to de-
veloping scientifically credible accounts of  self-originative free will –
approaches, however, that all suffer from the weakness of  relying
solely on quantum indeterminacy as the source of  the de novo ori-
gination in the free-will process. Next, a paper by Peter Strawson is
discussed in which he argues that the possession of  reactive attitudes
by humans (such as resentment and gratitude) undermines the im-
portance of  the free-will dispute because whichever way it turns out
it is unlikely to have much bearing on how people actually react to
one another. Following this, the work of  Harry Frankfurt on higher-
order desires is considered – work in which he argues that one im -
portant thing that makes humans different from animals is that
people care about the desires they actually have and that they some-
times desire to alter these desires. The issue of  free will has long been
closely associated with whether or not humans are full moral agents
and so relatively recent work on this matter is considered next. This
then leads on to a discussion of  a question central to the free-will de-
bate: Could we have done otherwise than what we actually did?
5.2 Conscious Free Will
5.2.1 In recent years, the term conscious free will has been used
to label the conscious feeling people usually have that they have freely
willed what they do. It has long been argued that this feeling gives us
evidence that humans do in fact possess free will, but it has also long
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been argued that it does no such thing. In the last few decades a good
deal of  experimental research seems to support this latter view. And
some participants in this research, and others, have drawn the conclu-
sion that if  the conscious sense of  having freely willed an action is an
illusion then it must be that people don’t have free will at all. How-
ever this conclusion does not necessarily follow since it is reasonable
to assume that subconsciously and unconsciously running parts of  a
person’s self  play an important role in the self-directed origination of
their decisions and doings, and just because they may not be con-
scious of  how these parts operate, run, and interact this does not
mean they don’t belong to the person’s self. Nevertheless, these re-
cent findings and ideas about conscious free will make some import -
ant points.
5.2.2 Among several contemporary workers, Daniel Wegner in
his book The Illusion of  Conscious Free Will  stands out as someone who
has made a particularly strong case against conscious free will, so it is
this book that shall be used as the basis of  the discussion. 
5.2.3 Wegner adopts a scientific approach to whether belief  in
conscious free will is an illusion. The experimental work he has done
and the various scientific findings he draws upon in making his case
lead him to the conclusion that by the time a person is consciously
aware of  making a choice, unconscious processes have already made
it for them. He therefore reasons that the belief  that humans have
free will is an illusion. He argues that while people have a “self-ex-
planation mechanism” that, normally, makes them feel that it is their
conscious thinking that determines what they do, it is actually other
neurophysiological processes that are responsible.
5.2.4 Wegner draws upon a good deal of  psychological and
neuroscientific evidence to establish a number of  facts. He notes
well-known neurophysiological conditions such as alien hand syn-
drome (in which a person experiences one of  their hands operating
as if  it had a mind of  its own); automatism (in which a person has no
conscious awareness of  performing an action); illusions of  control
(when a person feels they are controlling something which in fact
they are not controlling); and phantom limb syndrome (sensing the
presence of, and consciously willed movement of, an amputated
limb). He also mentions work on direct stimulation of  the brain’s mo-
tor centres which enables an experimenter to produce, say, smooth
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hand movements in a conscious subject independently of  the subject
willing such movement to happen. When this is done the subject will
disown the movement, recognizing it as something they did not con-
sciously will. However, stimulation of  other areas of  the brain may
result in movement accompanied by a conscious experience of  own-
ership of  the action, leading the subject to construct some more or
less rational explanation for why the movement occurred as it did.
5.2.5 In support of  his argument, Wegner uses experimental
work that establishes two important results. First, that voluntary
movements are regularly preceded by unconscious brain activity (in-
dicated by a “readiness potential” that may be detected by using an
EEG – an electroencephalograph machine). And second, that con-
scious awareness of  wanting, choosing, or willing such a movement
occurs a significant time after the occurrence of  the readiness poten-
tial. The former finding was established in the 1960s and the latter by
Benjamin Libet and his colleagues in the 1980s.
5.2.6 In the Libet experiments – the results and implications of
which have come to have an important place in the free-will debate –
subjects were asked to make voluntary wrist flexions at some mo-
ment of  their own choosing and without prior planning. The re-
searchers found that the following sequence of  events occurred.
First, about 0.55 seconds before muscle movement actually begins, a
readiness potential is detected in the subjects. Next, at about 0.2
seconds before actual movement, the subjects report conscious
awareness of  wanting or choosing to flex their wrist. This means that
“conscious will” arises about 0.35 seconds after the readiness potential
indicates that subjects are going to move their wrist. Finally, at about
0.08 seconds before the subjects actually begins to move their wrist
they report conscious awareness of  the wrist starting to move. With
planned movements the readiness potential is detected much earlier –
perhaps two or more seconds before the actual movement. (Wegner
2002, pp. 50-55)
5.2.7 Libet’s results suggest that when a person makes a volun-
tary movement the decision to make the movement is not something
that belongs to their consciousness but rather is done unconsciously,
and that only after it has been so done does it become expressed in
consciousness in such a way that it feels to the person that they con -
sciously willed the action. Wegner points out that since readiness po -
104
tentials are prior to and regularly associated with the performance of
voluntary movement, it may reasonably be assumed that the uncon-
scious processes producing the readiness potentials are also involved
in determining the conscious experience of  choosing, or wanting, or
willing to do the act. He says: ‘It seems that conscious wanting is not
the beginning of  the process of  making voluntary movement. The
position of  conscious will in the time line suggests perhaps that the
experience of  will is a link in a causal chain leading to action, but in
fact it might not even be that. It might be a loose end – one of  those
things, like action, that is caused by prior brain and mental events.’ (p.
55)
5.2.8 Although Libet's experiments, and other investigations,
seem to establish beyond scientific doubt that non-conscious pro-
cesses determine a person’s actions prior to them becoming con-
sciously aware of  deciding to perform them, this is a conclusion that
has not gone unchallenged. For instance, Alfred Mele has been a
strong critic of  this view and has written a short book entitled Free –
why science hasn't disproved free will in which he exposes several weak-
nesses and loopholes in Libet's work (Mele 2014).
5.2.9 Nowhere in his book does Wegner consider that the pro-
cesses whereby an action is produced may be originative, and might
indeed be self-directively originative – indeed, “indeterminism” is not
included in the index. He seems simply to tacitly accept, as do most
scientists, that everything involved in producing choice and action
must be fully determined. Further, his work is based on the tacit as-
sumption that people don’t possess free will, and since he recognises
that typically people consciously believe that they do possess it, he
sees his task as that of  providing a scientifically supported case for
showing that this belief  is illusory. In spite of  this being his position,
many libertarians would accept the importance of  much of  what
Wegner says about the nature of  conscious will. For instance, towards
the end of  the book he writes:
[...] Conscious will can be understood as part of  an account-
ing system. Its regular appearance in actions of  all kinds
serves as an aid to remembering what we are doing and what
we have done. This in turn allows us to deserve things. [...]
We must remember what we have done if  we are going to
want to claim that our actions have earned us anything (or
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prevented us from deserving something nasty). [...] The au-
thorship emotion is one of  the things people intuitively be-
lieve that they would miss if  it were gone. It would not be
particularly satisfying to go through life causing things – say,
making scientific discoveries, winning sports, creating social
harmony, helping people, or even digging nice big holes in the
yard – if  we had no personal recognition of  these achieve -
ments. (pp. 327-329)
And in the same vein he later writes:
Illusory or not, conscious will is the person’s guide to his or
her own moral responsibility for action. If  you think you
willed an act, your ownership of  the act is established in your
own mind. You will feel guilty if  the act is bad, and worthy if
the act is good. The function of  conscious will is not to be
absolutely correct but to be a compass. It tells us where we
are and prompts us to feel the emotions appropriate to the
morality of  the actions we find ourselves doing. Guilt, pride,
and other moral emotions would not grip us at all if  we didn’t
feel we had willed our actions. (Wegner, p. 341)
5.2.10 For Wegner, it seems that consciousness plays a minor role
in the actual production of  human choices and actions; for him, its ma-
jor function is to make people aware of  what it is they have chosen or
willed to do. However, he supports this conclusion by largely consid -
ering experiments in which the subjects are explicitly requested to try
not to consciously decide to act, but to do so spontaneously and uncon-
sciously. And the experimental setups that are used generally do not
introduce any significant conflict within the subjects about what to
do. This means that the findings of  such experiments have little to
say about the nature of  the prolonged and difficult decision-making
that faces most people from time to time, and in which self-originat-
ive free will of  the sort explored in this book is understood to have a
significant role. Furthermore, like many neuroscientists and others,
Wegner has all too readily identified free will as necessarily being a
conscious process and not one in which unconscious and subcon-
scious influences and processes play fundamental roles. Nevertheless,
Wegner has made a significant contribution to the free-will debate.
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5.3 Bob Doyle’s Cogito Model of  the Free-Will Process
5.3.1 Wegner does not see indeterminacy as playing a significant
role in the production of  human actions since, like most scientists, he
believes macroscopic determinism dominates throughout all stages
of  the processes involved. However, as the work of  Bob Doyle illus -
trates, a scientifically plausible case for origination being involved in
the free-will process may be made.
5.3.2 Bob Doyle has devoted much of  his time to developing
what he refers to as “The new information philosophy”, a major part
of  which is deeply concerned with the problem of  free will – see his
book Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy. His website, www.informa-
tionphilosopher.com, offers ready access to much of  his work.
5.3.3 In common with several writers on free will, Doyle offers
a two-stage model of  the free-will process. In the first stage, which
involves the production and modification of  alternative possibilities
for choice or action, indeterminism may play a significant role. How-
ever, the second stage – which is concerned with evaluating and
choosing among these alternatives – Doyle sees as being adequately
determined: that is, sufficiently determined for a person to be re-
sponsible for what they choose to do. Daniel Dennett has suggested
that indeterminism may also play a role in producing the reasons for
and against the alternatives being considered in a decision situation
(Dennett 1978, pp. 286-299). Doyle writes about his two-stage Cogito
model (from the Latin co-agitare, to shake together) by saying it ‘loc-
ates randomness (either ancient chance or modern quantum inde-
terminacy) in the mind, in a way that breaks the causal chain of  phys -
ical determinism, while doing no harm to responsibility.’ (Doyle 2011,
p. 187) He notes (p. 66) that elements of  the model have been pro-
posed by various philosophers – see his ‘Two-Stage Models of  Free
Will’ (Doyle 2011, Chapter 12), for a detailed account. Doyle rejects
the idea of  the indeterminacy inherent in a decision process being
such that it occurs at the point of  final decision. In other words, he
rejects the traditional idea that a decision remains entirely open right
up until the instant it is finally decided by an act of  free will. Rather,
he argues that the indeterminacy exists – as noise – during the pro-
cess by which alternative possibilities are formed and modified. He
writes: ‘The mind, like all biological systems, has evolved in the pres -
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ence of  constant noise and is able to ignore that noise, unless the
noise provides a significant competitive advantage, which it clearly
does as the basis for freedom and creativity.’ (Doyle 2011, p. 188)
5.3.4 Doyle sees the origination of  alternative possibilities
through noise as being based on a person’s perceptions of  the ex -
ternal world, their communicative interactions with others, and by
their “Micro Mind” generating associations between thoughts. Doyle
writes:
Imagine a Micro Mind with a randomly assembled “agenda”
of  possible things to say or do. These are drawn from our
memory of  past thoughts and actions, but randomly varied by
unpredictable negations, associations of  a part of  one idea
with a part or all of  another, and by substitutions of  words,
images, feelings, actions drawn from our experience. In in-
formation communication terms there is cross-talk and noise
in neural circuitry. […] [N]ew experience is likely to be stored
in neural pathways alongside closely related past experiences.
And a fresh experience, or active thinking about an experi-
ence that presents a decision problem, is likely to activate
nearby brain circuits, ones that have strong associations with
our current circumstances. These are likely to begin firing
randomly, to provide unpredictable raw material for action-
able possibilities. […] [T]he randomness of  the Micro Mind is
simply the result of  ever-present noise, both thermal and
quantum noise, that is inherent in any information storage
and communication system. [...] The Cogito model is not a
mechanism. It is a process, and information philosophy is a
process philosophy. (pp. 190-192) 
5.3.5 Doyle contrasts the indeterminacy of  the Micro Mind
with the determinacy of  the Macro Mind: that part of  the mind-brain
responsible for evaluating alternatives and determining what the
agent’s choices and doings shall be, and a system that in its operation
generally succeeds in suppressing the ever-present indeterminacy due
to noise that exists within the neural circuitry that realises it. However
Doyle rejects the idea of  a clear separation between indeterministic
and deterministic parts of  the free-will process because he sees de -
cision-making as a complex re-entrant process involving generating
and modifying possibilities, evaluating them, and tentatively deciding
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before a firm or actioned decision arises. In his view this is an origin-
ative process but one with an overall determinism adequate to ensure
that the final decision is something for which the agent, rather than
random indeterminacy, is responsible.
5.3.6 One major weakness of  Doyle's account of  the free-will
process is that the only de novo sources of  origination are noise and
quantum indeterminacy, and these sorts of  indeterminacies are not
open to control or influence. Given this, it may be argued that all that
is really required is randomness, not true origination. On this view, a
deterministic source of  randomness (such as a deterministic al -
gorithm for generating pseudo-random numbers) is capable of  pro-
ducing all that an indeterministic source can produce. However this is
not an altogether fair criticism because the problem of  free will and
determinism is not that determinism cannot, in principle, explain the
manifest behaviours associated with what are believed to be instances
of  the exercise of  free will, because it can. Indeed, if  it couldn’t then
compatibilism would fail as a viable thesis. Rather, the weakness of
determinism is that it must deny that any sort of  self-directively ori-
ginative activity is possible, including that involved in resolving con -
flicts and indecisions within the self  and the mind-brain of  a psycho-
logical agent, which in the present work is taken to be what the free-
will process entails.
5.3.7 A second major weakness of  Doyle’s model – one that
follows from all de novo origination being a result of  noise and
quantum indeterminacy – is that there is no place for the processes
of  the self  as such to be de novo originative and creative. This is pos -
sible under independence indeterminism which means it is able to
provide a richer basis for explaining human free will than can ac -
counts based on random and uncontrollable indeterminism alone.
5.4 Criterial Causation – Peter Tse's Account of  
Free Will
5.4.1 Although Bob Doyle's model of  the micro-mind has a sci-
entifically plausible basis it lacks detail and does not identify specific
neural-level structures and processes that would provide randomly
originated yet contextually appropriate alternative possibilities. Peter
Ulric Tse in his book The Neural Basis of  Free Will: Criterial Causation
109
overcomes this weakness by providing a detailed research-backed ac-
count of  just how such contextually appropriate origination, and
other mind-brain activity supporting free will, may be produced by
neural processes. Tse is a cognitive neuroscientist who has carried our
detailed laboratory research into vision, attention and consciousness.
However, he also has a deep interest in the neural bases of  human
creativity, free will, and symbolic processing. At the centre of  his ap-
proach is the idea of  “criterial causation”. This is not a new idea – al -
though the term seems to be new – but Tse has refined the concept
and given a precise account of  how it may operate within the mind-
brain.
5.4.2 Criterial causation occurs when a system sets up the cri-
teria, and the corresponding decoders, for what patterns of  informa-
tion it will respond to. Typically, these are patterns that in the absence
of  such a system have no causal effect. With most patterns, although
the events and structures that instantiate the various parts of  the pat-
tern individually may have causal effect, the spatial, temporal and
other relationships among them that define the pattern or criteria often
do not: rather, it takes the presence of  a system (or decoder in a sys-
tem) that is responsive to these pattern-relationships to provide such
an effect. A couple of  further points are important. Firstly, a pattern
may be realised in many physically different ways, and may be quite
loosely defined in terms of  the events and relationships that consti-
tute an instantiation of  it – for example, think of  the very many pos -
sible hand-written instantiations that may be made of  a given word.
Secondly, a pattern exists within a field – or a context, ground, or en-
vironment – in which many events, structures, and spatio-temporal
relationships may exist other than those that are part of  the pattern.
This means a pattern-responsive system needs to be able to discrim-
inate between events and relationships that belong to the pattern and
those that do not. For example, to recognise a particular face in a
crowd a person must filter out all the non-face features of  the scene
and also apply criteria relevant to the face they seek to recognise in
order to identify it. However, concentrating on patterns is actually
starting at the wrong end since many patterns – specifically those that
have no causal effect in the absence of  systems responsive to their
presence – don't properly exist in their own right. Rather, in the ab -
sence of  systems capable of  giving them causal effect, such patterns
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are passive existents (see 2.1.8). Mind-brains possess an extraordinar-
ily large number and range of  highly interconnected and dynamically
alterable criteria-responsive subsystems and it is through the con-
struction, use, and dynamic combining and re-combining of  these
that animals (and humans) are able to carry out complex forms of
criteria-sensitive directive activity. For example, think of  a squirrel
rapidly traversing branches and jumping between trees and the com-
plex and continual pattern-responsive processing that this entails. Or,
as another example, think of  the patterns that a player in a football
game needs to be sensitive to in order to play well. And it should be
noted, although this is not the main focus of  Tse's book, that just as
there are pattern-responsive systems there are also pattern-producing
systems. For example, a person who hand-writes a message is produ-
cing a spatial pattern of  marks; and in speaking they are producing a
temporal pattern of  sounds. Pattern-producing and pattern-respons-
ive systems are the basis of  information processing systems, and a
mind-brain contains a great many of  them.
5.4.3 There is nothing particularly contentious about what has
just been said because determinists don't find anything in it that is in -
compatible with their world view. Nevertheless, determinists would
not accept that criterial causation could ever be an originative pro-
cess, whereas independence indeterminists, and others like Peter Tse,
would argue that it can be, and indeed often is. To develop this point
and see how criterial causation might figure in everyday decision-
making consider an example: the directive activity involved in a car
safely crossing a busy road junction. A directive system able to drive a
car safely through traffic must be appropriately sensitive to its situ-
ation – i.e. responsive to happenings in its environment while taking
into account the car’s present state. In order to safely cross a busy
road junction such a directive system will need to have criterial de-
coders able to identify “safe-to-cross” patterns of  road-junction
activity so that it is able to carry out “junction-crossing” behaviour
when it detects it is safe to do so. The safe-to-cross pattern may be
instantiated in a great many different ways and the criterial decoders
for identifying the presence of  this pattern should be able to cor -
rectly recognise these varied instantiations.
5.4.4 In order to highlight the possible place of  free will in this
junction-crossing example consider two distinctly different sorts of
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directive system that are (generally) able to drive a car safely across
busy road junctions: namely, a skilled human driver, and a fully-auto-
mated system as found in self-driving cars. It shall be assumed that a
human driver possesses self-originative free will but that a self-driving
car does not. This assumption is made on the basis of  two beliefs.
Firstly, that a human person, even when operating to realise a particu -
lar sort of  familiar directive activity such as driving a car, does not
have to follow pre-established procedures. This does not mean that
humans never operate in pre-established and habitual ways because
they very often do, rather it means that it is not necessary that they
do so. In contrast to this a fully automated car-driving system, whilst
it may have some capacity to improve its performance through learn-
ing, does operate by necessarily following pre-established procedures
and rules which it cannot override. Secondly, it is assumed that a nor-
mal human has many motivations other than those concerned with
driving a car, and that these may give rise to conflict within the per -
son of  a sort that they sometimes cannot resolve by pre-established
means and which may then arouse free-will processing within them.
For instance, conflict about what to do may arise within a driver who
is rushing to get to a hospital with their seriously sick child but who
finds themselves held up from being able to safely cross a busy junc-
tion by the volume of  traffic. In contrast to human car-drivers, it is
assumed that a self-driving car has no objectives other than those
concerned with safely driving the car to its user-assigned destination,
and as a result (and because of  how it is designed) it does not experi-
ence unresolvable conflicts because it always has pre-established
means for deciding what to do. Given these assumptions, consider
now how criterial causation may figure in these two ways of  realising
a car-driving directive system.
5.4.5  According to independence indeterminism, but not de -
terminism, specific instantiations of  safe-to-cross patterns must be
taken to be originated because they consist of  joint-change com-
posed of  partly independently moving vehicles and other road users.
This means that any response to such an originated pattern will itself
be originated. But if  the response is type-determined – as will always
be the case with a fully automated car-driving system – then, accord-
ing to the view of  free will that has been adopted (1.4.14), no free-
will processing will be involved in its production. However, with a
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human person there is room for free-will processing, as may be
shown by continuing to develop and discuss the example of  conflict
just mentioned.
5.4.6 Suppose the driver who is rushing to get their seriously
sick child to a hospital finds that their delay at the busy junction be-
comes quite extended, and that this leads them to contemplate taking
a riskier approach to crossing the junction than they normally would.
And let us suppose that in considering what to do they experience
conflict – for instance, with thoughts about the consequences of
causing an accident conflicting with thoughts about the need to get to
the hospital as soon as possible. Assume that the driver has no pre-
established means for resolving this conflict and that in consequence
they engage in free-will processing in an effort to create a resolution.
What sort of  things may happen during this free-will process? Noth -
ing can be said for sure because it is assumed to be a creatively origin-
ative process, but perhaps the driver’s rising frustration leads them to
think of  a course of  action such as switching on the hazard lights,
sounding the horn, and edging-out into the traffic. However, in evalu-
ating this plan the driver may become conscious of  new dangers and
perhaps experience new conflicts about whether or not to proceed
with it.
5.4.7 It seems that criterial causation plays an important part in
the process just outlined. For instance, rather than having a criterial
detector for safe-to-cross patterns of  traffic activity the driver will
need ones that can recognise degrees of  riskiness in crossing. And in
trying to think of  alternatives to a risky crossing, the driver will need
criterial decoders that reject extreme options. For example, the option
of  getting out of  the car and walking away to have a cup of  coffee is
very unlikely to receive any serious consideration, which suggests that
criterial decoders will reject, suppress, or simply not respond to such
alternatives, or operate in such a manner as to suppress their produc-
tion altogether. Furthermore, it seems likely that in an unfamiliar situ-
ation of  the sort considered that some criterial decoders will need to
be originated on the fly to suit the particular circumstances. For in-
stance, in contemplating taking a particular sort of  serious risk in
crossing the junction, criterial decoders will need to be originated that
trigger thoughts about what may go wrong and what undesired con-
sequences may follow from such an action.
113
5.4.8 One way of  making sense of  what might be going on in
such a situation is to think of  the person's mind-brain as, among
other things, consisting of  a large network of  more or less well-estab-
lished but flexibly responsive criterial decoders that are linked to a
person's motivational, emotional, and executive selves and which seek
to detect the presence of  certain patterns of  mind-brain activity –
activity, for instance, emanating from processes of  perception,
memory recall, imagination, reasoning, and from the contents of
consciousness – that are important to these parts of  the self. For in -
stance, thought of  making a risky crossing of  the junction may stimu-
late – through relevant criterial decoders – such motivations as want-
ing to avoid physical injury and pain to oneself, to one's child, and to
other road-users; wanting to avoid damage to the car; wanting to
avoid prosecution for dangerous driving and loss of  one's licence;
and wanting to avoid any further delay in getting the child to hospital.
And accompanying the activation of  these motivations may be stimu-
lation of  various associated emotions.
5.4.9 As time goes by without being able to cross safely, or de-
cide on an alternative to just continuing to wait, the driver is likely to
become increasingly stressed and this may lead to them to think of
ways to deal with this. For example, the driver may decide to try to
de-stress themselves – perhaps by using techniques they are familiar
with, such as taking deep breaths and trying mindfulness or calming
exercises. However, according to the view of  free will that is being
adopted in this book, no matter what course of  action is ultimately
carried out, for it to be produced by the driver carrying out free-will
processing requires that it should not have arisen wholly through
automatic or pre-established means but that some creative origination
must have been involved.
5.4.10 Independence indeterminism explains the creativeness of
the sort of  free-will processing just discussed as being based on
chance and directed independence interactions among various parts
and processes of  the person’s mind-brain. For instance: independ-
ence interactions among the person’s activated motivations and emo-
tions, the condition of  their executive self, and the products and pro-
cesses of  their perceptual systems, imagination, memory, reasoning,
and consciousness. However, this explanation – one based on inde-
pendence indeterminism – is not available to those who do not know
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of  this new metaphysics (or do not accept it) and so, as long as they
accept that free will involves self-directed creative origination, they
must look elsewhere for creativeness in the free-will process. As
already discussed, Bob Doyle offers one scientifically credible ac-
count of  how this may be achieved, and Peter Tse provides another
partially similar account that makes use of  his concept of  criterial de-
coders.
5.4.11 Tse writes on this matter as follows.
Criterial decoders potentially interact with the uncertainty,
noise, indeterminism, and randomness introduced by particle-
level causality in at least two interesting ways. First, they clean
up this noise by reducing a great variety of  potentially noisy
inputs into a single output, such as the firing of  a neuron.
Second they permit the “harnessing” of  noise or randomness
for the generation of  novel information. By setting up criter -
ial decoders in advance that convert many types of  input into
one type of  output, systems that instantiate criterial causal
chains effectively take control of  randomness and use it to
generate outcomes that are caused by the system, rather than
outcomes that are determined by randomness per se. Yet
these non-arbitrary outcomes are not predictable and could
have turned out otherwise. Because solutions are not prede-
termined and can vary, yet still satisfy a given finite set of  cri -
teria, and because outcomes that satisfy lower level criteria
can be compared, modified, and rejected in an open-ended
fashion at the level of  executive consideration of  what has
been generated by lower level systems, genuine novelty can
result. This novelty is not itself  random, because it meets the
criteria that were preset. But a particular solution was not pre-
determined either. Criterial causality therefore offers a middle
path between determinism and randomness. (Tse 2013, p.
131)
5.4.12 Although Tse recognises that this account is similar to a
two-stage one in that indeterministic randomness is used to generate
novelty at the alternatives or options level, he maintains that it is fun-
damentally different because it does not involve a division between a
first stage in which multiple and possibly novel ideas are generated,
and a second stage in which selection among these is made determin-
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istically. Rather, he proposes a three-stage model involving cycles of
activity taking place at various levels and over various time-spans
within the mind-brain. The first stage in a cycle involves the setting
or re-setting of  criteria – in a neuron, or a neural circuit, or in an even
larger neural system – on the basis of  what preceding criteria have
been met, and other factors such as the current purposes of  the
agent. The second stage involves the emergence of  inherently vari-
able (and to some extent indeterministically generated) inputs to the
criterial decoders. The third stage consists in the inputs either meet -
ing the criteria – so resulting in effects that influence future criteria-
setting and action – or not meeting them (which may also influence
what happens next). 
5.4.13 Tse sees randomness playing a role in the first two stages
but not substantially in the third. He sees quantum indeterminacy as
the de novo source of  this randomness, although, like Doyle, he ac-
cepts that this often expresses itself  as noise of  one sort or another.
Drawing upon substantial research evidence, Tse argues that a partic-
ular molecular-level neuronal mechanism plays a key role. He writes:
NMDA (N-methyl-D-aspartate) receptors [at synapses – the
sites that informationally link one neuron to another] likely
play a role in the magnification of  microscopic randomness
operative at the level of  the behavior of  a single magnesium
ion to the level of  spike timing. It is remarkable that this mo-
lecular device can play a role in physically realizing so many
of  the fundamental properties of  information processing in
neuronal circuits: rapid synaptic plasticity, amplification of
microscopic randomness to randomness at the level of  timing
in neural circuits, bursting, LTP and LTD [long-term potenti -
ation of  synaptic weights, and long-term depression of  syn-
aptic weights, respectively], as well as information processing
via bursting and synchronous bursting. (p. 96)
5.4.14 Tse points out that an agent cannot control what happens
once criteria have been set and when no time remains for re-setting
them. But what an agent can control, by appropriately setting criteria,
is what patterns of  events, among the multifarious happenings that
may emerge in the future, will make a difference to it. That is, agents
that operate as self-setting pattern-responsive systems have the inher-
ent freedom of  determining some aspects of  their future.
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5.4.15 The greatest strength of  Tse’s account is that it is solidly
grounded in detailed scientific research, and that it is focused on cri -
terial causation. Tse describes, sometimes in considerable detail, how
particular systems and functions relevant to realising self-originative
free will may be physically realised within the mind-brain. The serious
weakness in Tse's account is that, at bottom, the only source of  de
novo origination is quantum indeterminacy, which is something over
which an agent has no influence or control. But what Tse does show
– through his idea of  criterial causation and the way an agent has
control over setting and re-setting criteria – is that such uncontrolled
randomness need not deprive an agent of  control over their choices
and actions, and may provide them with a means of  creatively origin-
ating novel ways of  dealing with various aspects of  their life.
5.5 Ultimate Responsibility – Kane’s Account of  
Free Will
5.5.1 Robert Kane is perhaps the leading naturalistic libertarian
of  the day. Kane is a strong supporter of  what he describes as the
traditional view of  free will: ‘The power of  agents to be the ultimate
creators (or originators) and sustainers of  their own ends and pur -
poses.’ (Kane 1996, p. 4) Kane recognises that free will requires that
an agent who exercises it must have been able to have done other-
wise. But he argues – following a line of  reasoning initiated by Aris-
totle – that to be ultimately responsible for its actions an agent must be
ultimately responsible for those aspects of  its self  that led it to do
what it did. Kane acknowledges that ultimate responsibility (UR) is a
difficult concept to pin-down, nevertheless he proposes the following
formal definition.
An agent is ultimately responsible for some (event or state) E's
occurring, only if  (R) the agent is personally responsible for
E's occurring in a sense which entails that something the
agent voluntarily (or willingly) did or omitted, and for which
the agent could have voluntarily done otherwise, either was,
or causally contributed to, E's occurrence and made a differ-
ence to whether or not E occurred; and (U) for every X and
Y (where X and Y represent occurrences of  events and/or
states), if  the agent is personally responsible for X, and if  Y is
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an arche (or sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X,
then the agent must also be personally responsible for Y. (p.
35)
5.5.2 The responsibility condition (R) has been widely discussed
and is sometimes taken to be the central issue in the free-will debate.
Showing how it may be naturalistically realised does not seem to be
impossible – Doyle and Tse, for example, have indicated how it may
be achieved. However it has been quite widely argued that the ul -
timacy condition (U) cannot be naturalistically satisfied. The problem,
as Kane states it, is this: ‘If  our characters and our motives (together
with background conditions) provide an explanation for our actions
[...] then we must, according to the U condition, be responsible for
forming our character and motives by earlier actions, and so on indef-
initely.’ (p. 37) In other words, fulfilment of  the ultimacy condition
implies that a natural agent must be able to realise an infinite regress,
which is not possible. This impossibility has been recognised by sev-
eral philosophers, and some of  them have railed against the injustice
of  attributing ultimate responsibility to humans. For example,
Friedrich Nietzche strongly objected to the view promulgated by
some religions (Catholicism, for example) that God has endowed hu-
mans with a special faculty of  will which makes them ultimately re-
sponsible for their morally significant choices and actions. He con-
demned such teaching as ‘the most infamous of  the arts of  the theo-
logian for making mankind “accountable”’ and declared that ‘Chris-
tianity is a Hangman’s metaphysics.’ (Nietzsche 1889 (1968, p. 53))
Elsewhere Nietzche writes:
The causa sui [cause of  itself] is the best self-contradiction that
has been conceived so far; it is a sort of  rape and perversion
of  logic. But the extravagant pride of  man has managed to
entangle itself  profoundly and frightfully with just this non-
sense. The desire for “freedom of  the will” in the superlative
metaphysical sense, which still holds sway, unfortunately, in
the minds of  the half-educated; the desire to bear the entire
and ultimate responsibility for one’s actions oneself, and to
absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and society in-
volves nothing less than to be precisely the causa sui and, with
more than Baron Munchausen’s audacity, to pull oneself  up
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into existence by the hair, out of  the swamps of  nothingness.
(Nietzsche 1886).
5.5.3 In recent times the case for the impossibility of  ultimate
moral responsibility has been strongly stated by Galen Strawson who
summarises what he calls the “The Basic Argument” as follows. ‘(1)
Nothing can be causa sui – nothing can be the cause of  itself. (2) In
order to be truly morally responsible for one’s actions one would
have to be causa sui, at least in certain crucial mental respects. (3)
Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible.’ (G. Strawson
1994, (2003, p 212)). Given the importance of  the infinite regress
problem to what Kane is arguing for it is worth spelling it out in a
way that connects it with his approach.
5.5.4 To be ultimately responsible for its current doings – call
them CD – an agent must be ultimately responsible for those aspects
– call them s0 – of  its current self  that were decisive in the produc-
tion of  CD. (If  those aspects of  an agent's current self  that were de-
cisive in producing CD had their origin outside the agent – for ex-
ample, in the agent's inherited biological makeup or socialisation –
then the agent would not be ultimately responsible for CD.) Accord -
ing to the ultimacy condition, if  the agent is indeed ultimately re -
sponsible for s0, then it must have been ultimately responsible for the
actions (including mind-brain activity) it performed that were neces-
sary for the production of  s0. Call these actions SFA:s0 (short for
self-forming actions producing s0). Now, in order to be ultimately re-
sponsible for SFA:s0 the agent must have been ultimately responsible
for those aspects of  its self  – call them s-1 – that were decisive in the
production of  SFA:s0. However, in order to maintain ultimate re -
sponsibility for CD it is also necessary for the agent to have been ulti-
mately responsible for those self-forming actions which played a de-
cisive role in the production of  s-1 – self-forming actions which may
be labelled SFA:s-1. And in order to continue to maintain ultimate re -
sponsibility for CD it is further necessary for the agent to have been
ultimately responsible for those parts of  its self  (call them s-2) which
played a decisive role in the production of  SFA:s-1. And logically this
cycle has no end and so must continue in an infinite regress.
5.5.5 Kane addresses this problem by arguing that by carrying
out what he calls self-forming willings (SFWs) an agent is able to cre -
ate changes to its self  for which it is ultimately responsible. Kane
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suggests that the process of  carrying out self-forming willings may
involve quantum indeterministic events occurring within the mind-
brain of  an agent which get amplified by chaotic dynamics that arise
when the agent is in a condition of  conflict over what to do, and is
making an effort to resolve this conflict. He suggests that on such oc-
casions, and in times of  soul-searching, the outcomes that arise are
strongly influenced by various conflicting and competing parts of  the
agent's self, but that they are not completely determined by these in -
fluences because quantum indeterminacies occurring within the
mind-brain constantly affect what is going on. Peter Tse's detailed ex -
amination of  possible mind-brain mechanisms may help in identify-
ing some of  what is involved in such an originative process. However,
Tse's book was published after the work discussed here so Kane
could not call upon it, but he does point to other scientific evidence
that is consistent with the process he describes.
5.5.6 Kane acknowledges that his idea will raise objections and
he discusses at length, and attempts to rebut, what he sees as the
main ones. However, what he is unable to do is suggest anything
other than quantum indeterminacy as the de novo source of  origina-
tion in the process, and so he lays himself  open to the criticism that a
fully deterministic source of  randomness in place of  the quantum in -
determinacy would make no difference to the process he is describing
but would undermine the creatively originative nature of  self-forming
willings upon which his ultimacy argument rests. Furthermore,
quantum indeterministic events cannot be controlled or influenced by
the agent or anything else, so it may be argued that an agent cannot
be held responsible if  such events play a major part in creating its ac -
tions. Kane counters this latter line of  criticism by explaining – in a
similar way to Doyle and Tse – that the quantum indeterminacies are
so intimately fused with macroscopic brain processes that the origina-
tions involved properly belong to the agent as such and not to the
quantum processes alone. He writes:
As long as effort is being made and the will is in tension, the
micro indeterminacies are being fed upward to the neural net
as a whole, which is continually reorganizing in response to
micro indeterminacies and is in turn influencing individual
neurons. There is an ongoing mutual feedback from the net
to its parts and back, and this continuing process taken as a
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whole is the experienced effort. One does not merely have in -
determinism or chance (at the micro level) followed by a de-
terminate effort, or a determinate effort followed by indeterm-
inism or chance. Rather, the indeterminism and the effort are
“fused”: the indeterminacy is a property of  the effort and the
effort is indeterminate. (p. 151) 
5.5.7 “Fusion-indeterminacy”, as this process shall be called
(Kane talks of  it as “The Fusion Principle”), seems to be a naturalist-
ically feasible creatively originative process, and one that so intimately
involves the self  that it may said to be a self-based creatively originat-
ive process. However, the fact that uncontrollable and randomly oc-
curring quantum events are the only source of  de novo origination
occurring during the process rather weakens the role of  the self  in
the specifically originative aspects of  the process. However, quantum
indeterminacy does provide a form of  origination that is (according
to mainstream ideas) entirely uninfluenced by anything and so would
provide the ultimacy that Kane seeks. But Kane cannot have his cake
and eat it: if  an agent’s self-forming willings arise in a way uninflu -
enced by anything then the agent can hardly be held responsible for
what follows from them. Kane of  course accepts this and this is why
he introduces fusion-indeterminacy as a way of  involving an agent’s
self  in the creation of  its self-forming willings. But in doing this it
seems he must give up any claim to providing an account of ultimate
moral responsibility because all natural psychological agents start with
a mind-brain possessing features that are given (by biological inherit-
ance or socialisation, say) and not created solely by the agent them-
selves. Were Kane’s approach to incorporate independence indeterm -
inism then it would yield a richer account of  the free-will process
than that which fusion indeterminacy based on quantum indetermin-
acy alone is able to provide – an account that would be able to give
the self, and independence interactions (both undirected and direc-
ted) among its various relatively independently operating parts, an ex -
plicit role in the creatively originative processes involved. But inde-
pendence indeterminism would not provide a basis for ultimate moral
responsibility because it accepts that many factors not of  a person’s
own creation play a part (directly or indirectly) in the production of
their morally significant choices and actions.
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5.5.8 Although ultimate responsibility for an action is a solid the-
oretical basis for attributing moral responsibility, everyday moral
practices do not seem to require it, as discussed next.
5.6 Moral Responsibility and Reactive Attitudes
5.6.1 Peter Strawson in his highly influential paper ‘Freedom
and Resentment’ pursues a project of  reconciliation between what he
calls the optimists (compatibilists) who believe determinism is com-
patible with moral responsibility, and the pessimists (incompatibilists)
who believe it is not.
5.6.2 At the centre of  Strawson’s argument is his belief  that hu-
man moral life is based on “reactive attitudes” – attitudes and reac-
tions such as resentment, hurt pride, gratitude, forgiveness, and love.
These attitudes and reactions are highly dependent on how a person
interprets what is going on. For instance, if  a person feels that
someone's failure to acknowledge them on a particular occasion was
an understandable oversight, then they are likely to feel quite differ-
ently about this than if  they interpret what happened as a snub.
Strawson distinguishes reactive attitudes from what he calls “objective
attitudes”. For Strawson objective attitudes arise when there are
grounds for viewing an individual as ‘psychologically abnormal – or
as morally undeveloped’. Strawson suggests the objective attitude is
indicated with the use of  expressions such as ‘“He is only a child”,
“He’s a hopeless schizophrenic”, “His mind has been systematically
perverted”, “That’s purely compulsive behaviour on his part”.’
Strawson says that ‘To adopt the objective attitude to another human
being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of  social policy; as a subject
for what, in a wide range of  sense, might be called treatment; as
something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary ac-
count, of; to be managed, or handled or cured or trained; perhaps
simply to be avoided [...]’ Strawson argues that to adopt a wholly ob-
jective attitude towards a person precludes adopting any reactive atti -
tudes towards them (Strawson P. 1962, (2003 pp. 78-79))
5.6.3 Having established the distinction he wants to make
between reactive and objective attitudes, Strawson poses the question:
‘What effect would, or should, the acceptance of  the truth of  a gen-
eral thesis of  determinism have upon these reactive attitudes? More
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specifically, would, or should, the acceptance of  the truth of  the
thesis lead to the decay or the repudiation of  all such attitudes?
Would, or should, it mean the end of  gratitude, resentment, and for-
giveness; of  all reciprocated adult loves; of  all the essentially personal
antagonisms?’ (p. 80. 2003). It is quite reasonable to pose this ques -
tion since were people generally to believe, completely whole -
heartedly, that absolute determinism ruled every aspect of  person’s
life it might seem logical that they would then adopt an objective-like
attitude towards one another on the basis that no one can help doing
what they do. Widespread adoption of  such an objective-like attitude
would not mean that people would view one another as abnormal,
but it almost certainly would mean profound changes to human inter-
personal interaction, and to various practices such as retributive pun-
ishment, that currently are typically part of  human moral life.
5.6.4 Strawson accepts the theoretical possibility of  the wide-
spread adoption of  such an objective-like attitude but he firmly re -
jects the practical likelihood of  this coming about. He argues: ‘The
human commitment to participation in ordinary inter-personal rela -
tionships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to
take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might
so change our world that, in it, there were no longer any such things
as inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them; and
being involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally under -
stand them precisely is being exposed to the range of  reactive atti-
tudes and feelings that is in question.’ (p. 81. 2003).
5.6.5 Strawson believes that it is our reactive attitudes that are
the basis of  our moral life and that it is because, in their different
ways, compatibilists and incompatibilists don’t sufficiently acknow-
ledge this that they are unable to reconcile their positions. He sees
compatibilists as typically justifying practices of  moral condemnation
and punishment on the basis that they are important in regulating be-
haviour in socially desirable ways. And he sees incompatiblists as typ -
ically rejecting this view and wanting a deeper and fundamentally
fairer basis for such practices – a basis if  not rooted in persons being
ultimately responsible for their actions, at least rooted in them being
the self-directed originative source of  their doings. Strawson argues
that both sides would benefit from a more rounded appreciation of
the fact that we possess reactive attitudes. Strawson is, however, crit-
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ical of  what, in the final sentence of  his paper, he refers to as ‘the ob-
scure and panicky metaphysics of  libertarianism.’ (p. 93. 2003) 
5.6.6 Strawson's paper has attracted a great deal of  attention
and a strong following, but as far as human moral life goes people do
not live it solely on the basis of  ingrained human reactive attitudes.
For example, many judicial systems base sentencing upon dispassion-
ate appraisals rather than reactive attitudes. In general, society has
moved away from justice based on lynch mobs, on vigilante groups,
and on overly retributive punishment. Reactive attitudes certainly play
a part in human moral life, but only a part.
5.6.7 Although Strawson is arguing for a reconciliation between
compatiblists and incompatibilists, he was writing at a time when
most English-speaking philosophers favoured a deterministic view of
human life rather than an originative one. Given this, and given the
central importance, from a traditional point of  view, of  seeing free
will as a necessary basis for moral responsibility, it is not surprising
that much work was done aimed at showing that determinism allows
a kind of  freedom of  the will that is worth having and which can
prove adequate as a basis for human moral life. One important con-
tribution of  this sort – which is discussed next – was published nine
years after Strawson’s paper and argued that people have a special
sort of  control over their wills that does not seem to be possessed by
animals and is such that it may give humans what is required for
moral responsibility.
5.7 Free Will and Higher-Order Desires
5.7.1 Harry Frankfurt, in his paper ‘Freedom of  the Will and
the Concept of  a Person’, argues that our possession of  “higher-or-
der desires” is essential to humans having free will, being persons,
and being full moral agents. A first-order desire, on its own or in a
coalition of  supporting desires, is potentially able to move a person
to have a particular will – that is, a first-order desire is able to move a
person to act in some specific way. A second-order desire is poten-
tially able to move a person to have, or not have, some one or more
first-order desires. Hence, second-order (and higher-order) desires in-
fluence and direct a person’s possession and activation of  first-order
(or higher-order) desires.
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5.7.2 To take an example, consider a person with a strong first-
order desire for food that leads them to eat to excess. Suppose that,
because of  their overeating, they have become unhappy with their
weight and in consequence have formed the wish – a second-order
desire – to no longer desire excessive amounts of  food. This is a
higher-order desire because it is a desire to desire differently, and it is
of  the second order because it is directed at changing a first-order de-
sire that the person possesses – namely, their desire for eating. How-
ever, it is not only by forming higher-order desires that people are
able to control their behaviour: very often they control their beha-
viour by forming new first-order desires aimed at defeating other, un-
welcome, first-order desires. For instance, an excessive eater may ad-
opt the resolution that in future they will not eat to excess. Their
hope in adopting this resolution is that when they are in a situation
that stirs their desire to overeat this new resolution will kick in with
such strength that it wins out over their desire to eat. In this case they
are trying to change their behaviour not by a desire to no longer de -
sire to eat to excess, but by defeating this first-order desire with a
stronger first-order desire.
5.7.3 The mere possession of  a second-order desire does not
mean it will be effective – it may fail to change the first-order desire,
or desires, at which it is directed. For example, suppose the excessive
eater being considered has in fact adopted the above second-order
desire and is now at a dinner party where they have just enjoyed a
generous first helping of  a delicious dessert. Suppose they are now
offered a second helping and that they come to the decision to refuse
this offer, and they act accordingly. If  their decision to decline the of-
fer had resulted from them no longer desiring to eat more food, then
their second order desire would have been effective because the first-
order desire at which it was directed would have changed in an appro-
priate way. But suppose that in fact they had come to their decision
not because this second-order desire was effective but because they
had a stronger first-order desire: namely a desire not to look greedy
among their fellow diners. In this case, although the end result was
what would have been produced had the second-order desire actually
been effective, the person may well feel a sense of  failure in not hav -
ing succeeded in satisfying their second-order desire to not actually
feel any first-order desire for another helping.
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5.7.4 To illustrate the notion of  higher-order desires more fully,
suppose the person finds that their second-order desire to desire only
moderate amounts of  food has got out of  hand and they are now
hardly desiring food at all and are dangerously under-eating. In such a
situation they might now develop the third-order desire to control
this second order desire so that they come to have a moderate and
reasonable desire for food.
5.7.5 What this extended example has aimed to show is the
complex nature of  human desires and the ways they may interact to
produce volition and action. Frankfurt argues that the possession of
higher-order desires means that humans care about what desires they
possess and the volitions they form. He classifies all volitional beings
that don’t care about what desires they have as “wantons”. Frankfurt
takes animals, and very young children to be wantons; and he accepts
that some adults may be wantons. He says: ‘Nothing in the concept
of  a wanton implies he cannot deliberate concerning how to do what
he wants to do. What distinguishes the rational wanton from other ra-
tional agents is that he is not concerned with the desirability of  his
desires themselves. He ignores the question of  what his will is to be.
Not only does he pursue whatever course of  action he is most
strongly inclined to pursue, but does not care which of  his inclina -
tions is the strongest.’ (Frankfurt 1971, (2003, pp. 327-328))
5.7.6 Having established these concepts Frankfurt then goes on
to argue for the soundness of  his main thesis, which is: ‘[T]hat it is
only because a person has volitions of  the second [or higher] order
that he is capable both of  enjoying and lacking freedom of  the will.’
Frankfurt sees human persons as ‘a type of  entity to whom freedom
of  the will may be a problem.’ He asks: ‘Just what kind of  freedom is
freedom of  the will?’ And he answers by saying that enjoying free-
dom of  the will means (1) being free to do what one wants to do, and
(2) being free to will as one wants to will. With regard to (2) Frank -
furt continues: ‘It is in securing the conformity of  the will to his
second-order volitions, then, that a person exercises freedom of  the
will. And it is in the discrepancy between his will and his second-or-
der volitions, or in his awareness that their coincidence is not his own
doing but a happy chance, that a person who does not have this free-
dom feels the lack (2003, pp. 331-332). The first of  these two aspects
of  the freedom of  the will is uncontentious. But the second is not,
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because it implies an infinite regress, for it may be asked: What de-
termines what one wants to will? and answer: Another want. But
what determines that want? presumably, yet another want. And so on
endlessly.
5.7.7 Frankfurt argues that what is needed to end this infinite
regress are higher-order desires with which a person may ultimately
identify themselves and in so doing halt the regress. If  such desires can
be found then, since higher-order desires are formed by the rational
and evaluative efforts of  a person and are not inherited desires, it may
be argued that they belong to the human person (in contrast to the
human being – see 1.6.1) more strongly than do their genetically
given biological desires. Frankfurt recognises that people may theor-
etically keep developing ever higher-order motivations with which to
identify themselves. He argues that ‘nothing except common sense
and, perhaps, a saving fatigue prevents an individual from obsessively
refusing to identify himself  with any of  his desires until he forms a
desire of  the next higher order.’ He goes on to conclude: ‘The tend-
ency to generate such a series of  acts of  forming desires, which
would be the case of  humanization run wild, also leads towards the
destruction of  a person’. Perhaps realizing this argument for dealing
with the infinite regress is somewhat weak, he continues: ‘It is pos-
sible, however, to terminate such a series of  acts without cutting it
off  arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself decisively with one of
his first-order desires, this commitment “resounds” throughout the
potentially endless array of  higher orders.’ (2003, p. 332) But this
raises the question: What leads a person to identify themselves decis-
ively with one of  their first-order desires? Is this an act of  an Indiffer -
ent Will? Is it determined by such things as the person’s genes or their
upbringing? Or, is it a matter of  chance? Without making clear his
answer to this key question Frankfurt is far from having resolved the
problem of  free will. Nevertheless, Frankfurt makes several import-
ant points, and his work deserves to be valued and taken into account
by all those interested in understanding the nature of  human free will.
5.7.8 Frankfurt, and many who have followed his lead, are com-
patibilists and therefore do not accept that the formation of  higher-
order desires can be a self-directively originative process. However, if
it could be established that having the ability to form and act on
higher-order desires was in itself  a sufficient condition for a person
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to possess moral responsibility then compatibilism would have over -
come one of  its major weaknesses. However, there is a key moral
principle that has nothing to do with whether or not people are able
to form or act on higher-order desires – a principle that is discussed
next.
5.8 Compatibilism and a Fundamental Moral 
Principle: PAP
5.8.1 Although self-originative free will seems to offer the best
basis for human persons having what is required to make them full
moral agents, it should not be forgotten that this form of  free will re-
mains, relative to compatibilism, the weaker contender in the free-will
debate. Indifferently originative free will, or the Liberty of  Indiffer -
ence (see 1.4.7/13), was for many centuries the leading contender.
However, with the rise of  science, this kind of  free will increasingly
came to be seen as existing outside the natural order. In recent dec-
ades, models of  the sort discussed above based on quantum inde-
terminacy have made self-originative free will seem to be a scientific
possibility, but they are all open to the criticism that the de-novo ori-
gination is based on quantum indeterministic events and that these
are beyond the control or influence of  the agent. Although the three
accounts that have been discussed – Doyle's two-stage model, Tse's
criterial causation view, and Kane’s fusion-indeterminacy account –
go far in countering this criticism they don’t altogether defeat it. And
this is perhaps one of  the key reasons why at present compatibilism
remains the dominant position in the debate.
5.8.2 However, compatibilism, being based on an acceptance of
macroscopic determinism if  not absolute determinism, suffers from a
major problem when attempting to provide an adequate basis for hu-
man moral life: namely, that to be consistent it cannot accept that
true alternative possibilities exist. And this means it cannot reconcile
itself  with a fundamental moral principle, the principle that:
People should only hold a person morally responsible for what they do if
they could have done otherwise.
5.8.3 This principle, which is often referred to as the Principle
of  Alternate (or Alternative) Possibilities (or PAP), is accepted by
most compatibilists. For example, the logical positivist and compatib-
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ilist philosopher A.J. Ayer writes: ‘When I am said to have done
something of  my own free will it is implied that I could have acted
otherwise; and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted
otherwise that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have
done. For a man is not thought to be morally responsible for an ac-
tion that was not in his power to avoid’. (Ayer 1954) And in a similar
vein the compatibilist (or “reconcilist”) philosopher Bruce Aune
writes: ‘According to both libertarians and reconcilers, people can
reasonably be held responsible only for things they freely do or for
things that are foreseeable consequences of  what they freely do. An
action for which we are morally responsible is one for which we are
appropriately blamed, and if  it is seriously wrong, even punished; but
it is clearly immoral (as well as decidedly stupid) to punish people for
things they cannot help doing’. (Aune 1986, pp. 196-197)
5.8.4 Under absolute determinism, once everything is taken into
account, a person never has it in their power to avoid what they do;
and what they do they cannot help doing. This means that absolute
determinism is not compatible with PAP. However, there are related
moral principles that are compatible, and one obvious example is the
moral principle that says: It is acceptable to punish people if  to do so is likely
to deter them from doing wrong in the future. But, as Ayer and Aune make
clear, the principle of  alternate possibilities is a highly important prin -
ciple and one that would make a good deal of  difference to human
life were it to be entirely abandoned. This means that compatibilists
must, in some way or another, come to terms with it. Many ap-
proaches have been attempted, and some of  the more important
ones are discussed next.
5.9 Attempts to Deal with Alternate Possibilities
5.9.1 One major approach that compatibilists have pursued in
attempting to come to terms with PAP is to reinterpret what is un-
derstood when it is said that a person “could have done otherwise.”
This so-called conditional analysis approach was given particular at -
tention by one of  the founders of  analytical philosophy, G.E. Moore,
in his book Ethics. He proposed a specific interpretation of  “could
have done otherwise” that, he argued, was not only the interpretation
that most people normally assumed when they used or encountered
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the phrase but was one that was compatible with determinism. He
wrote: ‘[W]e proposed [in Chapter 1], purely for the sake of  brevity,
to say that an agent could have done a given action, which he didn’t do,
wherever it is true that he could have done it, if he had chosen; and
similarly by what he can do, or what is possible, we have always meant
merely what is possible, if he chooses.’ (Moore 1912, Ch. 6 third para-
graph) Moore is well aware of  the hard determinist view that in one
very strong sense of  what “could” means we can never do otherwise
than what we actually do. But he insists that in everyday usage there is
a weaker meaning which is that a person could have done otherwise
had they chosen to do so and providing that they had the ability and
resources to do so.
5.9.2 Another way to achieve a definitive understanding of  the
meaning of  “could have done otherwise” may lie in analysing the
meaning of  the words and phrases involved. J. L. Austin, a leader of
linguistic philosophy, adopted just this approach in the 1950s. In his
well-known paper ‘Ifs and Cans’ (Austin 1956) Austin provides a
thorough analysis of  Moore’s argument that “S could have done oth-
erwise” is equivalent to “S should (would) have done otherwise if  he
had chosen (to do otherwise).” Austin convincingly demonstrates that
“if ” and “can” are words with a large and subtly different range of
meanings, and he succeeds in casting doubt on Moore’s interpreta-
tion, but he does not succeed in providing a definitive meaning of
“could have done otherwise.” Analysis of  this key phrase has contin-
ued with detailed points being made on both sides, but no widely
agreed meaning has become established.
5.9.3 A quite different approach appeared in a paper by Harry
Frankfurt published two years before his one on higher-order desires
discussed above, in which he sought to establish that alternative pos -
sibilities are not actually required for moral responsibility. Frankfurt,
opens his paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’ by
noting the important role that the Principle of  Alternate Possibilities
(PAP) has played in the free-will debate, and the fact that almost no
one has challenged this principle – a principle that he himself  be -
lieves to be false. He starts the defence of  his view by arguing that
coercion does not necessarily mean that the agent to whom it is ap-
plied is not morally responsible for doing what was demanded since
they may themselves have already decided to act in just the same way
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and did so not because of  coercion but on the basis of  their own
freely made decision. The point Frankfurt is making is that although
coercion may mean that the agent to whom it is applied could not
have done otherwise, there are situations – such as the one just de-
scribed – in which an agent could still be morally responsible. How -
ever Frankfurt recognises that this argument is inadequate as it stands
since coercion does not necessitate in the way that determinism does
– indeed, it is potentially open to an agent to resist coercion and do
other than what is demanded of  them. Frankfurt therefore intro -
duces a scenario which he feels does properly establish his view that
alternate possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility.
5.9.4 The scenario is as follows. 
Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to per-
form a certain action. Black is prepared to go to considerable
lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing his
hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make
up his mind what to do, and he does nothing unless it is clear
to him (Black is an excellent judge of  such things) that Jones
is going to decide to do something other than what he wants
him to do. If  it does become clear that Jones is going to de -
cide to do something else, Black takes effective steps to en-
sure that Jones, decides to do, and that he does do, what he
wants him to do. Whatever Jones’s initial preferences and in-
clinations, then, Black will have his way. (Frankfurt 1969,
(2003 pp. 172-173))
5.9.5 After discussing various ways – through coercion, giving
him a potion, hypnotising him, for instance – in which Black may get
Jones to do as he wants, Frankfurt suggests a more reliable means by
which to ensure that Jones could not have done otherwise. He writes:
‘[L]et Black manipulate the minute processes of  Jones’s brain and
nervous system in some more direct way, so that causal forces run-
ning in and out of  his synapses and along the poor man’s nerves de-
termine that he chooses to act and that he does act in the one way
and not the other.’ (2003, p. 173) Frankfurt maintains that with such a
setup – made stronger if  required by allowing Black to be replaced by
a machine, and, although he does not explicitly say this, by giving the
machine the power to monitor all of  Jones’s relevant brain processes
– it seems it is theoretically possible to ensure that under no circum-
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stances can Jones do otherwise than Black wishes. Frankfurt contin -
ues:
Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because
Jones, for reasons of  his own, decides to perform and does
perform the very action Black wants him to perform. In that
case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral
responsibility for what he does as he would have borne if
Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure that he do it.
It would be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones, for his action,
or to withhold the praise to which it would normally entitle
him, on the basis of  the fact the he could not have done oth -
erwise. (p. 173. 2003).
5.9.6 Frankfurt’s argument has attracted a lot of  criticism (as
well as a lot of  followers). From a libertarian perspective, it is clear
that Frankfurt makes at least two unacceptable assumptions, and that
therefore his argument fails. The first of  these is Frankfurt’s assump-
tion that Jones must be morally responsible for his decisions and ac-
tions because ‘Jones, for reasons of  his own, decides to perform and
does perform the very action Black wants him to perform.’ But, for
libertarians, simply deciding for “reasons of  his own” does not make
a person morally responsible for what he does because, if  absolute
determinism is true, the “reasons of  his own” will have been fully
predetermined to arise on the occasion in question before the person
was born, and so he cannot be truly morally responsible for possess -
ing them and acting on the basis of  them. From a libertarian per -
spective, if  Jones is to be morally responsible then he must be the
self-directed creative originator of  “the reasons of  his own” that lead
him to do what he does, and this means he might have produced dif -
ferent reasons since creatively originative processes do not have a
predetermined or type-determined outcome. Hence, for libertarians,
Frankfurt has not shown that alternative possibilities are not required.
5.9.7 The second major assumption that Frankfurt makes and
which cannot hold if  Jones is exercising originative free will is that
Black can always predict what Jones is going to choose before he does
so. It is necessary for Black be able to do this so that he may, if  re -
quired, be able to intervene to get Jones to do what he wants if  he
can see Jones is going to choose to do something different. In a fully
deterministic world it may be possible (at least in principle) for Black
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to always be able to make such a prediction, but with a creatively ori-
ginative process this is not possible. Hence what Frankfurt proposes
is not realisable once it is accepted that free will entails a creatively
originative process. And if  it is argued that Black may wait until Jones
has, in a libertarian way, decided what he is to do before he inter -
venes, then the voluntariness condition for being morally responsible
will not be met because Jones will not be doing what he had already
freely chosen to do.
5.10 More Views on Moral Responsibility and 
Compatibilism
5.10.1 In fairly recent times, ancient views of  what is required for
moral responsibility have been resurrected. Socrates (470-399 BCE)
wrote nothing and the main record of  his thought comes from the
extensive writings of  Plato (c.428-347 BCE), his student. One of  So-
crates’s best-known views is that no one does wrong, or fails to “hit
the mark”, voluntarily but does so through lack of  knowledge and
wisdom. This view has been summed up in the dictum attributed to
him that “Knowledge is virtue”. The point Socrates is making is that
were a person to reason clearly and correctly about doing wrong they
would never voluntarily choose to do so. Of  course, Socrates accepts
that many people have insufficient knowledge, wisdom, and reason-
ing skill, or are unable to control their passions, and so often fail to
avoid doing wrong. Plato was not happy to see moral codes and prin-
ciples as merely of  human devising and so sought an absolute source
for them. Plato introduced the concept of  a non-material realm of
Forms and Ideas – Forms find imperfect expression in the entities of
the natural world, and Ideas in the imperfect concepts that humans
develop. In this higher realm, the Good is supreme. According to
Plato, humans are special in that they are born with a Rational soul
that has had some sort of  acquaintance with the Realm of  Forms and
Ideas. It is their power of  Reason and their (imperfect) access to
Ideas – such as those that constitute what the Greeks saw as cardinal
virtues: Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice – that qualify hu-
mans as moral agents.
5.10.2 In recent decades, several philosophers have returned to
the classical and medieval position of  regarding right action to be a
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matter of  true appreciation of  the Good. For instance, Garry Watson
and Susan Wolf, working independently, have adopted this approach
and provided contemporary accounts of  what it is that makes a per -
son morally responsible.
5.10.3 Watson writes: ‘The problem of  free action arises because
what one desires [in the sense of  what Appetite or Passion demand]
may not be what one values [in the sense of  what Reason determines
as Good such as steadfastness, integrity, and even-handedness], and
what one most values may not be what one is finally moved to get.’
Just as Frankfurt argues that guidance of  human volitions and actions
by higher-order desires gives people a degree of  responsibility for
their doings that they would not have if  they only had first-order de-
sires, so, Watson argues, possession of  and guidance by values gives
human persons a degree of  responsibility that they would not have
were they driven only by appetites and passions. Watson suggests that
the existence and persistence of  appetites and passions is independ-
ent of  a person’s judgement of  the Good, and that it is because of
this independence that a conflict between valuing and desiring is pos -
sible. (Watson 1975, (2003 pp. 343-344)) For Watson, a key require-
ment is that ‘The free agent has the capacity to translate his values
into action; his actions flow from his evaluational system.’ He goes
on to say: ‘One’s evaluational system may be said to constitute one’s
standpoint, the point of  view from which one judges the world. The
important feature of  one’s evaluational system is that one cannot co-
herently dissociate oneself  from it in its entirety. [...] one cannot disso-
ciate oneself  from all normative judgements without forfeiting all
standpoints and therewith one’s identity as an agent.’ (2003, p. 347)
This has resonances with Frankfurt’s belief  in a person decisively
identifying with certain first-order desires and by so doing stabilising
their identity as an agent. But the open question that remains un-
answered by Watson is: To what extent is a person’s evaluational sys-
tem produced or changed by the person’s own self-directed creative
processes? If  a person’s evaluational system, and all that it does, is a
deterministic consequence of  the condition of  the world before they
were born then this greatly diminishes the person’s responsibility for
their possession of  it.
5.10.4 Susan Wolf  has looked to classical thinking for a slightly
different approach to seeing human persons as sufficiently special
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that they may be counted as full moral agents. She proposes what she
calls the “Reason View”. In her book Freedom Within Reason she
writes: ‘According to the Reason View, a person’s status as a respons-
ible agent rests not only on her ability to make her behavior conform
to her deepest values but also on her ability to form, assess, and re-
vise these values on the basis of  a recognition and appreciation of
what I have called the True and the Good.’ (Wolf  1990, p. 117) Wolf
uses the term “the True” for a person’s capacity to see and appreciate
the world correctly in factual terms, and she uses the term “the
Good” for their ability to use their faculty of  reason to determine
what is valuable and what is worthless in the world and in their own
lives. She rejects, in favour of  a naturalistic account, Plato’s view that
the Good finds proper expression only in the realm of  Ideas and that
human persons, through their faculty of  Reason, have some sort of
special access to that realm. However, she does believe that values
have an objective existence and that a natural faculty of  reason can
access them. Yet she also recognizes there are cultural differences in
values and so, to some extent, she accepts relativism. Her position on
the relationship between the Reason View and determinism is fairly
represented by the following extract from her book.
[W]hile the Reason View acknowledges what any plausible ac -
count of  freedom and responsibility must acknowledge – that
part of  freedom and responsibility consists in an individual’s
ability to govern her behaviour in accordance with her deep-
est values – its originality lies in the claim that the other part
of  freedom and responsibility lies in the agent’s ability to
form or revise her deepest values in light of  the truth. Thus,
it analyzes what fear of  determinism remains, after the recog-
nition that determinism is compatible with the ability to gov-
ern one’s own actions by one’s values, as the fear that determ-
inism implies a form of  blindness to all or part of  the truth.
In other words, it analyzes what fear of  determinism is left as
the fear (as it happens, unjustified) that determinism implies
that all values are a product of  indoctrination, or, perhaps,
that the distinction between indoctrination and reasoned con-
viction cannot be intelligibly applied. (pp. 140-141)
5.10.5 It is not the fear of  “a form of  blindness to all or part of
the truth” that libertarians find most unacceptable about determin-
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ism, but rather that it means how a person forms their “deepest val-
ues” and whether they are able to “form or revise [their] deepest values
in light of  the truth” is ultimately not up to them at all but has been
predetermined since before they were born. Determinism means that
no one – indeed, no natural thing at all – ever has any power of  self-
directed origination; in other words, under determinism nothing in a
person’s life is truly up to them. At bottom it is this that libertarians
cannot accept about determinism, and not that determinism may be
compatible with the publicly observable valuational, reasoning, and
executive behaviours of  a person. Yet compatibilists have continued
to press the point that our extraordinary powers of  self-evaluation
and executive control give us all that is required for a free will worth
wanting. Daniel Dennett is a major proponent of  this line of  think -
ing.
5.10.6 Dennett argues that the nature of  human mentality gives
people a form of  compatibilist free will worth wanting. The following
statement, taken from his book Elbow Room: The Varieties of  Free Will
Worth Wanting, expresses his position.
Among the questions facing a sophisticated self-controlling
agent are: could I revise my basic projects and goals in such a
way as to improve my chances of  satisfaction? Are there
grand strategies or policies that are better than my current
ones? Is there a style of  operation that would suit my goals
better than my current style? Will my current policies lead me
into tight quarters with little room to manoeuvre and great
risk of  disaster? What should my general policy regarding risk
be? What kind of  an agent do I want to be or become? [...]
There are in general no “book” answers to these questions
and so, as in the mid-game in chess, one must abandon the
book openings and strike boldly out into the territory of
risky, heuristic reasoning. (Dennett 1984, p. 86)
5.10.7 Dennett is at pains to point out that people should not
think of  what happens to them as merely a matter of  luck. Rather, he
argues, a person’s executive and directive abilities give them both the
power to avoid things happening to them that they don’t want to hap-
pen, and the power to make things happen that they do want to hap-
pen. Indeed, in his later book, Freedom Evolves (Dennet 2003, p. 56), he
goes further than this and challenges the idea that determinism
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means that what happens to us is inevitable. His approach is to resur-
rect the obsolete word evitable – which means avoidable, according
to the Oxford English Dictionary. He then uses this word, and its
close relative “inevitable” (meaning not avoidable), in the following
logical argument:
In some deterministic worlds there are avoiders avoiding
harms.
Therefore in some deterministic worlds some things are
avoided.
Whatever is avoided is avoidable or evitable.
Therefore in some deterministic worlds not everything is in -
evitable.
Therefore determinism does not imply inevitability.
5.10.8 The trouble with this argument is that within an absolutely
deterministic world it does not work. When talking about directive
behaviour it is often meaningful to talk about the behaviour being
directed at avoiding certain events, conditions, or states of  affairs,
where “avoiding” is used in its dictionary sense of  something, usually
an agent of  some sort, “keeping away from, or at a distance from”, or
“shunning” certain things. For example, prey-animals tend to avoid
their predators, and have various means for achieving this. Clearly
Dennett is latching on to just this fact. However, once the totality of
happening that is going on in the universe is taken into account then,
in an absolutely deterministic world, this totality of  happening can’t
be said to be “avoiding”, or “keeping away from, or at a distance
from”, or “shunning” anything at all. The reason for this is that, in
such a world, the totality of  happening is consistent with only a single
future, and this means that the universe cannot be said to be operat-
ing in such a manner that it is avoiding anything – and in particular it
can’t be said to be avoiding certain sorts of  possible future without
endowing the universe with a some sort of  purposefulness. However,
in a universe in which origination is commonplace the “totality of
happening” does not wholly fix the future, and if  such a universe
contains appropriate kinds of  directive systems (prey-animals, for ex-
ample), then it may legitimately be said that those systems are indeed
working to avoid certain sorts of  future coming into existence.
Hence, it is independence indeterminism that properly supports Den-
nett's argument, not determinism.
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5.10.9 Libertarians are unconvinced by the many accounts of
moral responsibility that compatibilists have produced. They are un-
convinced because, in their view, none of  these accounts establish
that a person could, in an absolute rather than in a conditional sense,
have done otherwise than they actually did. Nevertheless, most natur-
alistic libertarians would accept that what compatiblists have achieved
are many insightful understandings and helpful descriptions of  the
hugely complex social and mind-brain processes that are involved in
the production of  morally significant human doings. However, in at-
tempting to establish a basis for full moral responsibility, libertarians
have their own difficulties because in their efforts to give a natural -
istic account of  being able to “do otherwise” they have had to rely on
quantum indeterminacy as the source of  de novo origination, and
quantum indeterministic origination is not open to influence or con-
trol by anything, let alone a person. What is minimally required is a
place in the universe for directed origination, and creative self-direc -
ted origination – a place that independence indeterminism is able to
provide. Given, then, its central importance in helping to resolve the
problem of  free will, and also of  moral responsibility, over the next
three chapters this new naturalistic metaphysics is further discussed
and developed in order to better establish it as a credible and worthy
replacement for determinism.
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6 The Assumption of  Independence of  
Change
6.1 Why so Long Coming up with Independence 
Indeterminism?
6.1.1 The assumption that true independence of  change is ex-
tremely common in the universe is the single primary assumption
upon which independence indeterminism is based. It is not a com -
plex assumption and it appears to be tacitly accepted by almost every -
one. However, it does deserve further discussion simply because of
its central role in this new metaphysics. In what follows, an effort has
been made to avoid repeating points that have already been raised
and discussed, but some repetition is unavoidable.
6.1.2 There seems to be nothing about the assumption of  inde-
pendence of  change that could not have been thought of  as soon as
people started to develop naturalistic metaphysical theses – that is, at
least from the time of  the early ancient Greek philosophers. So, be-
fore embarking on further discussion of  this concept, it is worth
briefly considering why it has taken so long for this idea to become
the basis of  a metaphysical thesis.
6.1.3 All humans – scientists included – hold implicit metaphys-
ical assumptions about the nature of  existence. For example, almost
all scientists are realists. That is, they hold the metaphysical assump-
tion that there is a real world that corresponds, in more or less sys -
tematic ways, to the perceptions, and conscious thoughts and under-
standings that humans collectively and individually have about what
exists. On the other hand metaphysical idealists (of  which there are
many, but few of  whom are scientists) reject this realist view and hold
the assumption that human consciousness is but part of  a universal
consciousness, or Mind or Spirit, and that it is this that is the only
true reality.
6.1.4 One implicit metaphysical assumption that is shared by
most realists and idealists is that existence is a unity – that is, a wholly
integrated entity with everything related to everything else. Perhaps
one reason why this view is so widely held is that human conscious-
ness appears to consists of  a more or less unified and coherent
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‘world’ and not (generally) of  a hotch-potch of  unrelated sensations,
perceptions, recollections, feelings, and thoughts. For example, when
a person walks down a street they ‘see’ (or rather, are conscious of) a
world of  physical objects and activities related to one another in
space and time. However, considering this apparent wholeness from
the perspective of  the multitude of  inanimate non-conscious things
in it, all these things ‘see’ are those things they interact with: they
don’t ‘see’ all the things whose change is making no difference to
them. It is as if  consciousness “connects up the dots” to make a
whole – a whole that does not actually exist in the absence of  the
consciousness. It is, perhaps, because of  the ‘world’ or ‘unity’ that hu -
man consciousness produces that people feel that existence must in
actuality be unified as well. And this would perhaps explain why many
people intuitively feel that the real world cannot be disjointed, non-
unified and full of  independence of  happening and with many gaps
within and between the causal networks of  existence. Determinism,
unlike independence indeterminism, is compatible with the real world
being unified so it is perhaps not surprising that this metaphysics
seems to many people to be true, particularly when it is coupled with
a belief  in the law of  cause and effect – a belief  which makes it seem
reasonable that all interactions, even between apparently independ -
ently changing things, are fully caused. Hence, it may be that since a
metaphysics based on independence and non-unity has little appeal, it
has not previously been taken seriously.
6.1.5 There is one further point worth making again (see section
3.6 for earlier discussion) because it supports the belief  that determ-
inism applies to the coming into being of  what are apparently inde -
pendence interactions. Human have a well-developed ability to anti-
cipate some near-future independence interactions, and this encourages
them to believe that, if  they had all the relevant information, far-fu -
ture interactions would also be predictable. But the evidence is that
humans have no reliable ability to make far-future predictions of  inde-
pendence interactions. However, rather than taking this as evidence
to support independence indeterminism, most people seem to see
this failure as a consequence of  people not having sufficient know-
ledge and data. Independence indeterminism does not deny that far-
future independence interactions are a product of  very complex se-
quences of  dependence and independence interactions. What it
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denies is that these sequences are all fully predetermined because it
concludes – based on its single primary assumption that true inde-
pendence of  change exists in our universe – that independence inter -
actions arise indeterministically, which is something absolute determ-
inism denies. The key difference between the two views is that abso-
lute determinists believe that apparently independently changing
things are – if  only the “big picture” was available – actually changing
in lockstep whereas independence indeterminists do not believe this.
Rather, they believe there is nothing in existence that fully links, gov -
erns, or describes how independently changing things jointly change.
6.1.6 What has just been said may be summarised in the follow-
ing way. Just prior to the occurrence of  an independence interaction,
determinism often seems to be true, and independence indetermin-
ism often seems to be false. However, when an independence interac-
tion is in the far-future it is, in practice, impossible to identify exactly
what exists in the present that necessitates its later occurrence and so
determinism seems to be false, and independence indeterminism
seems to be true.
6.1.7 That independence indeterminism should have taken so
long to emerge remains something of  a puzzle. However, the main
business of  this chapter is to further discuss the assumption of  inde -
pendence of  change, and to that end the assumption shall be slighted
modified to state that stretches of  change that to some extent run
truly independently of  one another are extremely common in
our universe.
6.2 Clarification of  Terms and Concepts
6.2.1 Nothing out of  the ordinary is implied or meant by the
phrase “stretches of  change”. However it is important to appreciate
that in using this phrase particular instances of  stretches of  change are
being referred to, not types of  stretches of  change. So, for example, a
period of  flight of  a particular bird on a particular occasion would
constitute a particular instance of  a stretch of  change. However, this
would also be a particular instance – or token – of  the general type
of  change, “bird-flight”. The type/token distinction used here is well-
established within semiotics and philosophy.
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6.2.2 “Stretches of  change that to some extent run truly inde-
pendently of  one another” are such that how each stretch of  change
runs is not completely fixed by how the other stretches of  change run.
What is important is that there is some independence of  running, not
complete independence. For example, when I take our dog Nellie for a
walk using a long (7 metre) spring-loaded extendible leash she has a
good deal of  independence of  movement and action relative to me,
but not complete independence, and because of  this partial inde -
pendence between what she does and what I do, our respective beha -
viours may be assumed to be two “stretches of  change that to some
extent run truly independently of  one another.” If  complete inde-
pendence of  change were required then this would be something that
would be difficult to justify since all forms of  mass/energy exert
some (however slight) gravitational influence over one another. On
the other hand, partial independence of  change seems to be very
common. And because most things appear to have very little influ -
ence on most other things, it seems obvious – to both scientists and
lay people – that independence of  change is extremely common. Fur-
thermore, partial independence of  change is common even when
things are in some sort of  interaction. For example, although the
translational motion of  the Earth is highly constrained by its gravita -
tional relationship with the sun, the moon, and the other planets,
most of  its geological activity – e.g. earthquakes, volcanoes, tectonic
plate movements – runs in ways that are largely independent of  this
dependency relationship. Similarly, the continuous activity within the
nucleus of  an atom runs largely independently of  the activity of  the
electrons bound in shells around its nucleus. And in a human organ -
isation, although some of  the activity of  its participants contributes
to realising and sustaining the operation and continuing existence of
the organisation not all of  their activity does. These examples illus -
trate an important general point: namely, that the constituents of  a
system and the participants in a RENOIR generally maintain a good
deal of  independence from one another while at the same time giving
up some independence to make their contribution to the realisation
of  the higher-level entity. Indeed, it is for this reason that as well as
being able to say that a system is more than the sum of  its parts be-
cause it has properties its parts don’t have, it is also correct to say that
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a system is less than the sum of  its parts because not all the properties
and activity of  its parts participate in realising the system.
6.2.3 The assumption of  independence of  change refers to how
stretches of  change “run”. This term is used to emphasise that it is
not stretches of  change considered as static blocks that is being re -
ferred to but stretches of  change that are “ongoing”, “in process”,
“proceeding”, or “evolving.” Were stretches of  change taken to be
static blocks then the process view of  nature that is adopted by inde -
pendence indeterminism would be denied. And were stretches of
change to be described as “unfolding” (rather than “evolving”) then
again the process way of  thinking would be denied since “unfolding”
implies that what is to come already pre-exists in some sense. Accept-
ing the assumption of  true independence of  change becomes more
difficult if  these familiar ways of  thinking are used and that is why
they are generally avoided in the present work.
6.2.4 Concurrently running stretches of  change are usually what
are of  interest, but the assumption of  independence of  change ap -
plies equally to non-concurrently running stretches. For example, not
only may the independence of  what persons A and B are doing over
the same period of  time be considered, but also, say, the independ-
ence of  what person A is doing today relative to what person B was
doing yesterday. It should be clear from what has been said about ab-
solute determinism that under this metaphysics not only are all con-
current changes in a fixed relationship to one another but so are all
changes – including those separated in time by a considerable period.
This follows because under absolute determinism the history of  the
universe is seen as a predetermined totality brought into existence at
the point the universe is created, or as having been eternally fixed if
the universe had no point of  creation.
6.2.5 As well as causal independence existing, it is important not to
forget that there also exist many particular dated and located
stretches of  change which seem to be in relationships of  causal de-
pendence. For instance, the sun and planets of  the solar system are in
tight relationships of  gravitational interdependence, and this means
that their motions are fairly well synchronised – well enough syn-
chronised to allow accurate predictions to be made about such things
as eclipses. However, this particular network of  influence relations
only determines the gross translational motion of  the planets and the
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sun, and it does not determine everything that is happening in or on
these bodies. This exemplifies an important point: there may be (very
near) synchronicity between some of  the types of  change that two or
more things are undergoing, while there is no synchronicity between
other types of  change. For example, although at the level of  overall
motion the cogs and the hands of  a mechanical clock manifest
stretches of  change that run in a synchronised manner, no such syn-
chrony exists between the vibrational motion of  the atoms and mo-
lecules that constitute the parts of  the clock. Examples to support
this general point are common: for instance, the behaviours of  the
players in the same section of  an orchestra – e.g. the violin players –
may show a fair degree of  synchronisation at an overall level but not
at a detailed level, and not in terms of  their thoughts and other in -
ternal processes. Similarly, while the flight-path of  birds moving in
formation is fairly well synchronised at the gross level, it is not at the
detailed level.
6.2.6 It worth emphasising that the assumption of  independ-
ence of  change refers to stretches of  change that are running in a
truly causally independent manner, and are truly non-synchronised.
Stretches of  change that only appear to be meeting these criteria but
do not actually do so are excluded. For example, some of  the activit-
ies of  the actors in a play or a movie may appear to be taking place
more or less independently of  one another but in fact they are not
because, at the overall level, all these activities have been scripted to
happen just as they do. And it is of  course possible for people to be
mistaken about the physical world. For example, it requires careful
observation and accurate records, and appropriate analysis of  these
records, to establish that the planets (the “wanderers”) do not move
independently of  one another. However, given that people can only
work on the basis of  what they believe to be the case, it must be ac -
cepted that they might be mistaken about some of  the stretches of
change that they currently think are running truly independently.
6.2.7 Although not much discussion has been given to this, it
should not be forgotten that stretches of  change may lack independ-
ence not because they are influencing one another directly but be-
cause they are subject to some third-party influence. Such third-party
causal influence is common: for instance, the behaviour of  individual
plants and animals is affected by the third-party influence of  the
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changing seasons, and this often results in a good deal of  correlation
and some synchronisation among the changes and behaviours plants
and animals undergo during the year.
6.3 Type and Token Independence of  Change
6.3.1 Most of  the time people act in the world as if  the assump-
tion of  independence of  change were true: that is, they act as if  what
they do is truly independent of  the doings and activity of  most other
things. For instance, I am currently acting under the tacit assumption
that my typing activity is going on truly independently of  the vast
majority of  other stretches of  change that happen to be taking place
at the same time. For example, truly independently of  what is going
on in the seas around Britain; truly independently of  what my wife
Jill is doing; truly independently of  what the people in my local town
of  Chesham three miles away are doing; and truly independently of
the motion of  the leaves on the trees in the wood next to our house.
6.3.2 Although most people in their thoughts and daily activities
implicitly accept the truth of  the assumption of  independence of
change it is not possible to obtain logical or empirical proof  that this
assumption is correct, and it is for this reason that it must be taken to
be a metaphysical belief. The reason it cannot be proved by logical
reasoning is because its truth is a contingent matter: it depends on
whether or not humans happen to live in a world in which it is true;
or, alternatively, happen to live in a world in which it is false – with
both such worlds being logically possible. And the reason why no
empirical evidence for its truth can be obtained is because it refers to
particular instances of  change – to uniquely dated and located stretches of
change and not to types of  change – and these cannot be re-run to see
if  they may run differently with respect to one another because it is
not possible to re-run the history of  the universe.
6.3.3 The phrase “dated and located” has been used without
discussion because its meaning seems to be clear. However, according
to mainstream physics, its meaning is not clear – indeed, it seems to
have no empirically definable meaning. The theory of  special relativ-
ity asserts that the time of  occurrence of  an event is relative to the
frame of  reference of  the observer, and that there is no evidence for
a universal frame of  reference. That is, the theory tells us that no em -
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pirical methods exist for establishing a single moment of  “now” for
the universe as a whole. This means that it is technically incorrect to
talk of  uniquely dated and located stretches of  change and that we
should be referring to events with a unique placing in four-dimen-
sional space-time. However, bearing this clarification in mind, this
convenient phrase shall continue to be used.
6.3.4 Given that every stretch of  change is a uniquely dated and
located happening, it might seem that since the universe will have
only one history (whatever that may turn out to be), it is necessarily
true that every particular stretch of  change belonging to the history
must exist in a completely fixed relationship to every other particular
stretch of  change, including future ones. In an absolutely determin-
istic universe this is true, but in a universe in which the future is yet to
be originated it is not. To give an example to clarify this, consider the
quantum indeterministic generation of  a random sequence of  num-
bers. Up to any given point, a definite sequence of  numbers will have
been generated, and each of  these numbers will be in a fixed relation-
ship in the sequence to every other one. But no such fixed relation-
ship exists between the numbers so far generated and those yet to be
generated because, according to mainstream thinking, what these fu-
ture numbers are remains indeterminate until they actually arise as a
result of  the occurrence of  quantum indeterministic events such as
the disintegration of  atomic nuclei.
6.3.5 It is easy to think that true independence of  change does
actually exist because it seems to be so widely apparent. However, in
thinking like this care is not being taken to distinguish between token
independence of  change and type independence of  change. Using this distinc-
tion, it would be more accurate to say that  true token independence of
change is assumed to be extremely common in our universe – i.e. that
specific dated and located stretches of  change that to some extent
run truly independently of  one another are assumed to be extremely
common. However, the simpler statement of  the assumption of  in-
dependence of  change (that true independence of  change is ex-
tremely common) will generally be used, with it being understood
that it is the more accurate version that is being referred to.
6.3.6 Although it is not possible to provide empirical evidence
to support the assumption of token independence of  change (because
the history of  the universe cannot be re-run), it is possible to do so
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for type independence of  change – indeed, how this might be done in
the case of  my typing activity and the simultaneous activity of  our cat
Purdy was discussed earlier (see 2.1.4). However, two things are im-
plied by type independence of  change. Firstly, that a given type of
change may take place concurrently with many different types of
stretches of  change. And secondly, given two (or more) types of  con-
currently running stretches of  change there will be little or no correl -
ation between the details of  how each type runs on particular occa-
sions. It was this second aspect to which attention was drawn earlier,
but the example did not establish the first sort of  evidence for type
independence of  change, so to remedy this consider a similar ima -
gined investigation of  a kind that would show both sorts of  evidence
and allow some other points to be made.
6.3.7 This second imagined investigation concerns two types of
stretches of  change: type-A consisting of  the motion of  the pendu -
lum of  a very accurate clock, and type-B consisting of  stretches of
human voice sounds of  different subtypes such as “singing”, “speak-
ing”, “whispering”, “shouting”. In the experiment, measurements
would be made (perhaps based on high-speed video recordings) of
100 stretches of  change of  the motion of  the pendulum – with each
particular dated and located stretch consisting of, say, 10 swings, with
the bob starting from the same position each time. Concurrently with
making these measurements, high fidelity recordings of  the voice
sounds of  a cooperating person would also be made – voice sounds
that for a single dated and located stretch are all of  the same subtype
but with the subtype and content of  each such stretch being ran-
domly selected by the investigator. If  this investigation were actually
conducted it would be expected to show that the details of  the video
recordings of  the 100 stretches of  pendulum motion would be very
similar to one another – perhaps, as recordings, even identical. But the
details of  the recordings of  the particular dated and located stretches
of  voice sounds would not be expected to show the same degree of
similarity, although the degree of  similarity between stretches of  the
same subtype would probably be greater than between stretches be-
longing to different subtypes.
6.3.8 The presumed results of  the investigation could be used
to illustrate and confirm the existence of  evidence for both forms of
type independence of  change noted above. Firstly, it would be clear
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that one type of  stretch of  change – “pendulum swings” – may co-
exist with a variety of  different types of  stretches of  change, namely
the various subtypes of  voice sounds (“singing”, “speaking”, “whis -
pering”, “shouting”). And secondly, it would be clear from comparing
the pairs of  simultaneous recordings that there was little or no correl-
ation between the details of  the recordings of  the pendulum swings
and the details of  the recordings of  the voice sounds for any particu-
lar subtype. So, for example, the details of  cases of  stretches of
change of  type “pendulum swings” occurring concurrently with de-
tails of  stretches of  change of  type “speaking” would show little or
no correlation. For instance, there would be little or no correlation
between the bob reaching the extremities of  its swing and what spec -
trum of  sound frequencies existed at the same time. Such an investig-
ation would demonstrate evidence for the existence of type independ-
ence of  change (in both its forms), but it would not demonstrate
token independence of  change. However, some people might be in -
clined to think otherwise since they might suppose that because the
details of  the 100 stretches of  change involving the pendulum were
so similar, they must in fact be identical tokens of  the type of  change
“pendulum swings”. If  this was indeed the case, then evidence for
token independence of  change would have been demonstrated since
the same token of  one type of  change would have been found to
arise with different tokens of  another type of  change. But the 100
stretches of  change “pendulum swings” are not actually identical,
even though the video recordings may be, because each is a differ-
ently dated (and located, once the rotation of  the Earth, etc. is taken
into account) stretch of  change. And were all the change going on in
each swing – including the particular thermal motions of  the atoms
and molecules of  the pendulum – taken in to account then it would
be quite clear that the swings were not identical.
6.3.9 Evidence for type independence of  change is extremely
common. And it is all too easy to point to such evidence to persuade
people that the assumption of  (token) independence of  change is
true. Indeed, this has been done in giving the examples of  independ-
ence of  change mentioned a little earlier when it was suggested that
my typing activity was going on truly independently of  what was go-
ing on in the sea around Britain; truly independently of  what my wife
Jill was doing; truly independently of  what the people in my local
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town of  Chesham three miles away were doing; and truly independ-
ently of  the motion of  the leaves on the trees in the wood next to
our house. What was being tacitly appealed to was the solid evidence
that exists that the details of  such types of  change are not correlated.
However this does not provide evidence that particular dated and loc-
ated stretches of  change run truly independently of  one another – to
provide evidence for this would require performing experiments on
the history of  the universe, which can’t be done.
6.4 Type Independence of  Change and Absolute 
Determinism
6.4.1 In a universe in which absolute determinism rules there
can be no true independencies of  any sort – token, type, or whatever.
However, in such a universe empirical evidence may be gathered that
would seem to suggest that true type independence of  change does
exist. The purpose of  this section is to illustrate and discuss this
point. To begin with, the notion of  “laws of  nature” needs to be cla -
rified.
6.4.2 The first part of  van Inwagen’s argument (see 3.4.4) im-
plies that the present instantaneous total state of  the universe and the
laws of  nature fully determine the next total instantaneous state, and
so on for all subsequent states. What form may such laws of  nature
take? One possibility is that there is only one law of  nature: a single
law that specifies how every instantaneous total state of  the universe
changes into its immediately succeeding total state. For example, con-
sider an extremely simple universe with only four instantaneous total
states: a, b, c, d. The law of  nature for such a universe might be: . . . a
> b > c > d > a . . . That is, a law that states that if  “a” is the present
instantaneous total state then its immediate successor instantaneous
total state is “b”, and that if  “b” is the present instantaneous total
state then its immediate successor instantaneous total-state is “c”, and
so on, endlessly. Different sequences of  these four total states are
possible (e.g. c > b > d > a > c) and each of  these would represent a
differently running universe.
6.4.3 Is there a sense in which such a universe – a universe with
a single law that defines how total states change – may contain evid-
ence for independently changing types of  stretches of  change? The
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general answer must be “No” because such a law has no necessary
place for separate sub-states within total states, and therefore no
place for separate types of  change involving such substates. However,
if  the laws of  nature are such that they do refer to sub-states of  exist-
ence, as the laws of  nature so far established for the real universe do,
then different types of  stretches of  change may occur, hence it is this
kind of  universe that shall be discussed.
6.4.4 The imaginary universe to be considered may be thought
of  as like a very large (idealised) billiard table with a number of  balls
in motion upon it. The table has no pockets, its cloth offers no resist -
ance to the balls, the cushions are perfectly elastic, and the balls col-
lide with one another and the cushions without any loss of  energy.
What changes from instant to instant in this universe are the posi-
tions of  the billiard balls. At what shall be taken as time-zero, imagine
that about 1000 balls are in various kinds of  motion. The sub-state
laws (which are modelled on Newton’s laws of  motion) are as fol-
lows, and each is a fully time-determinate law. (1) A ball at rest or in
uniform motion remains at rest or in uniform motion unless it is in
collision with one or more other balls or with a cushion. (2) When
balls collide their momentum (i.e. the product of  their mass and their
velocity) will be changed in a fully determinate way that depends
upon their positions and momentums at the moment of  contact. (3)
The total magnitude of  the momentum of  the balls involved in a col-
lision remains constant throughout the process. (4) When a ball col -
lides with a cushion it is reflected with no loss of  speed but with the
angle of  reflection being equal to the angle of  incidence (and with
the directional component of  its momentum normal to the cushion
being exactly reversed). These are sub-state laws in that the refer to
individual balls, to subsets of  balls (e.g. those involved in a collision),
and to parts of  the cushion. They do not refer to the total state of
this billiard-ball universe. The laws are also type-based in that they
specify conditions that are true of  certain types of  changes and attrib-
utes rather than being true only of particular instances of  these. For
example: law (1) refers to the type of  change, “uniform motion”, a
type of  motion which individual balls may possess in different quant -
ities at different times; and law (2) refers to types of  attribute – “mo-
mentum” and “position” – which individual balls may possess with
different values at different times.
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6.4.5 Given these laws, and the initial positions and mo-
mentums of  the balls at time-zero, the position and momentum of  all
the balls at every subsequent instant of  time is fixed. That is, this is a
universe in which change is entirely governed by time-determinate
sub-state laws and in which, therefore, absolute determinism is true.
Hence, all instances of  stretches of  change that occur in this universe
are in a completely fixed relationship to one another – they run in
perfect lockstep, even though this may not be apparent to an ob -
server. This means that no true independence exists between any par-
ticular instances of  stretches of  change that arise in this universe. And
it also means there can be no true independence of  change between
the occurrence of  stretches of  different types of  change. Neverthe-
less, there remains evidence, of  the sort discussed above, for there be-
ing type independence of  change, as shall now be indicated.
6.4.6 Many different types of  stretches of  change may be
defined in this universe, such as: “balls in collision”, “ball in cushion
reflection”, “ball in uniform motion”, “stationary ball”, “ball moving
roughly parallel with a long side”, “two balls heading towards one an -
other”, and so on. Now there is going to be a lot of  evidence that
one type of  change may occur concurrently with different types of
stretches of  change. For example, observation of  the occurrence of  a
stretch of  change of  the type “ball in uniform motion” is not suffi -
cient for an observer to fix what other types of  stretches of  change
may also be observed as occurring at the same time (even though this
must be fixed in such a universe). So, for instance, on one occasion
“ball in uniform motion” may be observed accompanied by the type
of  change “balls in collision” and on another occasion by the type of
change “ball in cushion reflection”. But with about 1000 balls moving
on the table there are going to be many co-occurring types of  change
accompanying any observation of, say, the type of  change “ball in
uniform motion”, thus satisfying the first requirement of  evidence
for type independence of  change. And as far as satisfying the second
requirement, there is going to be little of  no correlation between the
details of  different instances of  particular types of  change that are
observed to be running concurrently. For example, there is going to
be little of  no correlation in the details of  various instances of  “ball
in uniform motion” and the details of  various instances of  “ball in
cushion reflection”.
151
6.4.7 If  nothing is known about this universe being wholly
ruled by absolute determinism, and if  its nature is known only
through what has been observed, then it may seem that not only is
there type independence of  change but that there is token independ-
ence of  change as well. However, once it is known that a universe is
operating according to absolute determinism then it is also known
that there can be no independencies at all – whether token independ-
ence of  change or type independence of  change. So, returning to the
imaginary billiard-ball world, where it is known that absolute determ-
inism reigns, it follows – for instance – that the occurrence of  a spe-
cific ball undergoing uniform motion at a particular time is not doing
so truly independently of  the simultaneous occurrence of  another
specific ball undergoing a particular cushion reflection because these
two particular dated and located concurrent stretches of  change were
predetermined to occur exactly as and when they did ever since time-
zero. And although the evidence suggests that type-independence of
change is true for this universe, this is not actually the case because
every occurrence of  a given type of  change bears a fixed relationship
to every occurrence of  all other types of  change. Which means that
although there may be ample evidence, as in the real world, for there
being true type independence of  change, this does not actually prove
that there is such independence. What this emphasises is that meta -
physical matters are being dealt with that cannot be resolved empiric-
ally or logically.
6.4.8 Support for absolute determinism reigning in the real
world requires, at the very least, evidence that all human-identified
laws of  nature are time-determinate laws. Many of  the laws of  clas-
sical physics, and also some quantum-based ones, are time-determin-
ate, but not all of  them are. In particular, quantum-indeterministic
change (so-called “collapse of  the wave function”) is not time-de-
terminate since when such change will occur is indeterminate. Com-
pared to physics the biological and human sciences have very few
time-determinate laws, and it seems these cannot be reduced to time-
determinate ones. Indeed, according to independence indeterminism
this reduction is not possible because what happens in such domains
depends greatly upon independence interactions – interactions which,
by being indeterminately arising occurrences, do not happen accord-
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ing to a time-determinate schedule. Hence, there is little evidence that
the real world is ruled by absolute determinism.
6.5 Identifying Likely Cases of  Independence of  
Change
6.5.1 It has been argued that however intuitively reasonable it
may be to say that there are truly independently running stretches of
change in the universe, it can never be proved by logical or empirical
means that this is so. It is this that makes independence indetermin -
ism as much a metaphysical thesis as absolute determinism. However,
if  the primary assumption of  independence indeterminism is accep-
ted without further discussion then it is accepted that there are a very
great many instances of  independence of  change in the universe.
And this being the case, it would be helpful to have some criteria for
distinguishing between likely and unlikely instances of  such change.
This matter has already been discussed in Chapter 2 (see 2.1.5) and
there it was noted that in practice people tend to assume that inde-
pendence of  change exists when they (usually tacitly) believe that
three conditions are jointly met:
(i) that the stretches of  change of  the types concerned are
not completely causally linked;
(ii) that no third party is fully determining how such types of
stretches of  change jointly run; and
(iii) that such types of  change do not run in a perfectly syn-
chronised way.
6.5.2 Very little can be empirically established about particular
instances, or tokens of  types, of  stretches of  change other than
through recognising they have features of  certain types. Specifically, it
cannot be established whether or not a cause and effect relationship
exists between particular instances of  stretches of  change: all that can
be established is evidence that the types of  change involved do or do
not have causal connections. Similarly for there being third party in -
fluence at work: all that can be established is evidence for whether or
not such types of  change are or are not subject to having their joint-
change determined by certain types of  third-party influence. And the
same holds for synchronicity: it is only evidence for the presence or
absence of  synchronicity between types of  change that can be estab-
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lished. This is why the three conditions are stated in type-based terms
and make no reference to particulars other than them being of  cer-
tain types. So, for instance, in discussing the raindrop and the leaf  ex -
ample (see 2.1.6), type-based evidence was used to support assump-
tion (i) that causal independence of  change exists between falling
raindrops and leaves moving down a stream. And the absence of
type-based evidence of  third party influences determining the joint-
change of  raindrops and the leaves was used to support assumption
(ii). And type-based evidence was also used to support assumption
(iii) that there is little synchronicity between such types of  change.
Absolute determinists, although for practical purposes they accept
these type-based conclusions, believe that were the “complete pic -
ture” available then all apparently independently running stretches of
change would be seen to be taking place in completely predetermined
lockstep, and there would be no true independence of  change of  any
sort – something William James was well aware of  when he wrote
that determinists believe that ‘[t]he whole is in each and every part,
and welds it with the rest into an absolute unity, an iron block, in
which there can be no equivocation or shadow of  turning.’ (see 3.2.5)
6.5.3 The non-synchronicity condition deserves further discus-
sion. Experience of  the world leads most people to believe that the
vast majority of  stretches of  change do not run in synchrony unless
they are appropriately causally linked, or a third party is ensuring that
they do so. Just by observing two (or more) specific dated and located
stretches of  change, and without drawing on any evidence about the
types of  change involved, it is not possible to determine whether they
are, or are not, running in synchrony. However, very often there is
relevant evidence of  the ways in which such types of  change run, and
this knowledge will often lead people to believe that specific instances
of  such types of  change do not run in perfect unison. However,
there do exist types of  change that seem as if  they are running in
synchrony even when there is no apparent causal connection between
them or third party ensuring this. For example, the swings of  two
causally disconnected pendulums of  identical design and near
identical construction set to swing in the same locality will, for
shortish periods at least, run in very near synchrony. How may such
stretches of  change be shown not to be running in perfect synchrony?
Over a short period, and without accurate observation of  all the de-
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tail of  what is going on, this may be difficult. But over a long period,
obvious differences may begin to appear: for instance, two swinging
pendulums may get progressively out of  step and this would indicate
that they are not running in perfect synchrony. But if  the changes
(e.g. the swings of  the pendulums) are in widely separated locations
so that they cannot be observed together then how may it be dis-
covered that they are not running in synchrony? One way of  doing
this is by using clocks.
6.5.4 Perfect clocks are devices, or purely natural phenomena,
that although running in causally independent ways and with no
third-party intervention, keep in perfect step with one another – that
is, they change in perfect unison or synchronicity. No perfect clocks
exist, but if  they did then they could be used to determine the syn-
chronicity or non-synchronicity of  stretches of  change which are not
jointly observable. For example, the synchronicity or non-synchron-
icity of  two pendulums in widely separated parts of  the world could
be found by timing the swings of  each using a perfect clock local to
each pendulum: if  the timings for the pendulums agreed then this
would provide evidence for them running in perfect synchrony. But
if  the clocks were not perfect, then this method would not give reli-
able results. Given the importance of  clocks to the matters being
considered, and particularly because they provide cases of  natural
changes that run in an almost time-determinate manner, they deserve
to be discussed in their own right.
6.6 Some Notes on Clocks
6.6.1 According to currently available empirical evidence there
are some – but, relatively speaking, few – long-lasting stretches of
change that run in very near synchronisation but which, as far as can
be determined, are causally independent of  one another and involve
no third-party coordination. One reason for the lack of  such cases is
that there seem to be (relatively speaking) very few long-lasting
stretches of  change that run in an extremely regular manner. Celestial
phenomena provide most of  the cases. For example, the motion of
the Earth relative to stars is very regular but, in the modern world,
not regular enough to provide an adequate world standard of  time –
indeed, leap-seconds occasionally have to be added to keep our most
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precise time standards in line with less regularly changing celestial
time. But quite apart from this weakness, celestial time provides a
highly inconvenient clock – one, in particular, that cannot at all easily
be used to measure short intervals of  time. There are however some
celestial phenomena that could, at least in principle, be so used. The
best known of  these are pulsars. These were discovered in the 1960s
and are rapidly rotating neutron stars. They emit a narrow beam of
radio-frequency electromagnetic radiation which sweeps across space
rather like a lighthouse beam, and when such beams happen to be in
line with the Earth, their sweep results in a brief  illumination which
can be detected by radio telescopes. These pulses arise with a period
of  recurrence of  a few milliseconds to a few seconds, and with a reg-
ularity of  the order of  1 part in a billion. Since there are many pulsars
in the universe, they provide a large collection of  (apparently) causally
independent long-lasting stretches of  cyclic change which show a
high degree of  synchronisation. Nevertheless, the synchronisation is
not perfect, and furthermore very elaborate (and expensive) equip-
ment is required to detect them.
6.6.2 The creation of  readily available and highly regularly-run-
ning stretches of  change that people may use as practical time-meas-
uring devices has long been an objective within the realm of  civiliza -
tion. The daily motion of  the Sun has often been used as the basis of
such devices – sundials are a familiar example – but they only work
when the sun is out and they cannot “tell the time” very precisely.
Water clocks were developed by the Ancient Egyptians, and were
widely used by the Ancient Greeks – but they, like candle clocks, are
not very regular. Escapement clocks first appear in ancient times and
typically used water to drive the escapement mechanism. Later, the
Arabs constructed water clocks incorporating gears and weights. The
crown wheel (or verge) escapement was invented in the 14th century
and led to all-mechanical clocks, including spring-driven pocket
watches. Recognition, by Galileo, that the swing of  a pendulum
(through a small arc) was very regular, led (in the 18th century) to the
first highly accurate clocks.
6.6.3 A step change in the time-keeping precision of  clocks
arose in the 1920s with the development of  electronic quartz clocks –
which obtain their precision from the highly regular piezo-electric os-
cillation of  quartz crystals. The next large advance came in the 1950s
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when atomic clocks were introduced. These devices use the highly
stable frequencies of  the electromagnetic radiation emitted from
atoms that undergo certain very specific energy transitions. Atomic
clocks currently form the basis of  international time standards, of
which there are several.
6.6.4 Clocks accurate to a fraction of  a billionth of  a second are
vital components of  many modern technologies such as telecommu-
nications, the internet, global satellite-based navigation, modern as -
tronomy, and interplanetary space exploration. At these accuracies
procedures must be adopted to correct for deviations due to relativ-
istic effects. For example, the atomic clocks aboard the satellites of
global positioning systems run about 1 part in 10 10 slower because of
their speed relative to ground-based atomic clocks, and about 5 parts
in 1010 faster because of  the lower gravity at the heights at which they
operate compared to the surface of  the Earth. Without correcting for
these relativistic time-distorting effects satellite navigation systems
would be useless because errors in position of  many metres would be
inevitable.
6.6.5 Relativistic slowing and speeding applies to every kinds of
physical change. The effect is extremely small – except in the pres-
ence of  very high gravitational fields, and/or where relative speeds
approaching those of  light in vacuum (about 3x108 meters a second)
are involved. Some indication of  how even very slight relativistic in-
fluences can affect the rate at which change takes place is given by the
fact that the most accurate atomic clocks are so regular that raising
such a clock by just one meter in the Earth’s gravitational field is suf -
ficient to produce a measurable speeding up of  the rate at which it
runs – a speeding up that is a consequence of  the very slightly weaker
field within which it then operates.
6.6.6 Enough about the assumption of  independence of  change
has now been said to provide a basis for moving on and further con-
sidering two very important consequences of  adopting independence
indeterminism: namely, that it has a place for directed origination,
which is discussed in the next chapter, and for creative origination,
which is considered in more detail in Chapter 8.
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7 More on Directed Origination
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 The idea of  directed origination was introduced in
Chapter 2 (see sections 2.3 and 2.4). In this chapter the aim is to de -
velop and add to the ideas mentioned there. Throughout the discus-
sion, the assumption of  independence of  change is taken to be true.
The chapter begins with several sections relevant to the conceptual
basis of  directed origination. It then continues by considering some
common methods for implementing directed origination. The
chapter ends by introducing the notion of  executive controlling
agents, and it is suggested that most of  the time human persons op-
erate as self-evaluating executive controlling agents – or SEECing
agents.
7.2 Some Key Concepts and an Unfamiliar Terminology
7.2.1 Unfortunately, although the topic being discussed, has re-
ceived a good deal of  attention during the past 100 years or so, and
although it is still an active field of  research and thinking, it does not
have an agreed set of  clearly defined concepts, nor does it have a
settled vocabulary. Given this, a set of  concepts, and a vocabulary to
go with them, will be introduced that is somewhat non-standard.
Nevertheless, the ideas and intuitions that shall be drawn upon are
common within the field. A good account of  many of  these ideas
and intuitions, and a review of  much of  the early development of  the
field, may be found in Andrew Woodfield's book, Teleology (Woodfield
1976). And Michael Weir’s book Goal Directed Behaviour (Weir 1984)
presents a novel approach to explaining goal-directedness based on
the concept of  path rather than state.
7.2.2 In what follows it will be helpful to have available a con -
crete example, and the one that shall be used – that of  a particular
lion chasing and catching a particular antelope at a particular time and
place – is similar to the dog-chasing-rabbit example that was dis-
cussed briefly in section 2.3. Prior to such a chase there is likely to be
a good deal of  true independence between the activities of  the lion
and the antelope and this means that the event of  them coming into
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initial interaction (e.g. seeing one another) is likely to be mainly a
chance independence interaction. Once the chase begins chance play
less of  a role but it does not disappear. Throughout the chase both
animals retain a good deal of  independence of  action because each is
an autonomous agent, but they will influence one another. Each an -
imal will also be influenced by factors common to them both – such
as the nature of  the terrain, the vegetation, and the presence of  other
animals – but each will tend to react to these influences somewhat
differently. Given these independencies, during the chase each animal
will enter into many independence interactions – e.g. with one an-
other, with other animals, and with the environment. This means that
the eventual capture of  the antelope by the lion will be a de novo ori -
ginated event.
7.2.3 The first new term to be introduced is “directed happen-
ing”. This term shall be used to indicate that some happening appears
to embody “directedness”, and that the situation being considered
seems to manifest such happenings. Directedness is a quality that
people readily attribute to many happenings, indeed, perhaps they at-
tribute directedness rather too readily – for example, some people
may read into certain purely chance events the workings of  Fate; or
they may see divine intervention behind all that goes on in the uni-
verse. This suggests that care must be taken in attributing directed-
ness to a happening.
7.2.4 Unfortunately it does not seem possible to give a simple
and universally acceptable definition of  what it is about a happening
that gives it the quality of  directedness. So instead a cluster of  con -
cepts which jointly seem to allow this quality to be captured shall be
introduced. A directed happening will be taken to be a stretch of
change which appears to manifest one or more directed outcomes. By
a directed outcome is meant (1) a non-chance outcome whose exist-
ence requires there to be a system, known as a directive system, oper-
ating in an appropriate environment, that (2) is so matching its ac-
tions to independently arising and/or changing circumstances that
the outcome tends to be produced, and (3) the outcome tends to be
produced even though the circumstances alone do not tend to give
rise to it, and they may often be such that they interfere with, disturb,
or oppose its occurrence. The term directive activity is used to refer
to that activity of  a directive system that is relevant to the system’s
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production of  directed outcomes. Some directive entities are better
understood as RENOIRs, but for simplicity throughout the present
discussions the term system will generally be used.
7.2.5 While the presence of  directive activity and directed out-
comes may often be inferred by an intelligent agent such as a person,
their presence cannot be objectively identified by observing or meas -
uring features of  a single particular stretch of  change taken in isola-
tion. The reason for this is that identification of  the above three con-
ditions for the presence of  directive activity and directed outcomes
has to make use of  complex type-based knowledge which may only
be obtained by observing and analysing several cases of  more or less
similar behaviour. For instance, an event can only be identified as
non-chance by taking it to be a member of  a class of  events that col -
lectively seem to possess the characteristic of  being non-chance (i.e.
not randomly arising) events. Similarly, it is only possible to infer
whether actions are indeed being matched to independently arising
and/or changing circumstances by relating particular instances of  ac-
tions to a set of  similar actions for which, as a set, this seems to be
true. And whether the circumstance alone do not tend to give rise to
the outcome (and whether something may be interfering with or dis-
turbing its occurrence), may only be determined for a set of  similar
stretches of  change and not for a single stretch of  change considered
in isolation. For cases of  a familiar type it may be relatively easy to ar-
rive at an uncontentious conclusion regarding fulfilment of  the above
conditions and therefore of  the existence of  directive activity and dir-
ected outcomes. However when dealing with a novel one-off  case,
achieving a conclusion may be a good deal more difficult. Neverthe -
less, because humans have a very wide familiarity with directive activ -
ity, it is often possible for a group of  observers to reach agreement
that directedness is present.
7.2.6 Assuming the lion/antelope example being considered is
typical then conditions (1) to (3) for the presence of  directed happen -
ing may be assumed to hold, as the following reasoning shows.
Clearly, a specific dated and located stretch of  change is being con-
sidered, but because it is typical it may be taken to belong to a large
class of  similar stretches of  change and so general type-based know-
ledge relevant to this class may be used. The most obvious candidate
for being a directed outcome is the capture of  the antelope by the
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lion, and type-based knowledge suggests this event is not a matter of
chance and that it requires that there be a directive system – a lion –
operating in an appropriate environment (one in which the lion can
conduct a chase and which contains animals capable of  being chased
and caught). Hence, it seems condition (1) is met. It might be that the
actions the lion takes during the chase are not matched to independ-
ently arising and/or changing circumstances (such as the movement
of  the antelope, or of  changing terrain), but that they arise as a mat-
ter of  chance, or a consequence of  blindly executing a pre-set se -
quence of  movements. However, type-based knowledge gained from
observing several such chase episodes suggests that in the present
typical case the lion’s actions are (mainly) matched, by the lion, to the
current independently arising circumstances of  the chase in such a
way that capture of  the antelope results. Hence, it seems condition
(2) is met. Finally, again from understanding obtained from observing
several such chase episodes, there is no reason to believe that the cir -
cumstances under which the lion is operating are such that by them-
selves they delivered the antelope into the lion's grasp without any ef -
fort on the lion's part. Rather, it is clear that the lion must take appro -
priate action in order for this event to occur. Hence, it seems condi-
tion (3) is met. It is not essential that the latter part of  condition (3)
be met for directed happening to exist but many cases of  directive
activity do involve opponents or competitors. The present case is one
since the antelope behaves in such a way that what it does tends to
“interfere with, disturb, or oppose” the occurrence of  the directed
outcome of  the lion catching the antelope. Since all three conditions
have been found to be met in the lion/antelope episode being con -
sidered, it may be taken to involve directed happening.
7.2.7 At this stage a couple of  points of  clarification are
needed. Firstly, by the circumstances associated with a directed hap-
pening is meant things (including events, etc.) that influence, directly
or indirectly, the coming into existence of  the type of  directed out -
come in question. The things that exert influence may be divided into
those in the agent’s environment, and those concerning the agent it -
self. With respect to the lion/antelope example, the environmental
circumstances in which the directive activity of  the lion takes place
include the partly independently occurring activities of  the antelope,
the activity of  other animals, the terrain, and the visibility conditions.
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Those things concerning the agent itself  that are taken to be part of
its circumstances include its current physical and mind-body state, its
current activity, and its placement within its environment.
7.2.8 Secondly, directive activity does not guarantee the produc-
tion of  the directed outcome(s) it tends to produce. However, it is of -
ten possible to identify the existence of  directive activity even when a
directed outcome is not achieved. For example, although the success
rate of  a single lion catching its prey is quite low – somewhat less
than 20% – it is generally easy to identify that prey-chasing directive
activity is taking place even when the lion fails to catch its prey. 
7.2.9 The terms directed happening and directed outcome do
not commonly appear in the literature. The terms goal-directed beha-
viour, goal-oriented behaviour, and goal, objective, and aim are much
more commonly used. The term directive activity has been used in
the past – for example, see The Directiveness of  Organic Activities by E. S.
Russell (1945) – but it is not in common use today. The term direct-
ive system is also little used, with other terms such as goal-directed
system, goal-seeking system, end-directed system, and control system
being in more common use. Unfortunately, in common usage the
word goal – ‘A point towards which effort or movement is directed;
the objective point or terminus that one is striving to reach; the end
aimed at: the goal of  one’s ambition.’ (Webster’s Dictionary 1998) – is
too strongly associated with purposive activity for it to be used as a
general term when referring to directedness since non-purposive dir-
ective systems (such as a thermostatically controlled home heating
system) show directedness.
7.3 Directive Systems Originate their Directed 
Outcomes
7.3.1 Most determinists would accept that directedness is a fea-
ture of  much of  the happening that takes place in the living and hu-
man worlds, but they would not regard it as entailing the origination of
the associated directed outcomes. However, independence indeterm-
inists most certainly would. In order to establish this conclusion, it is
necessary to consider what is entailed in the production of  different
kinds of  directed outcome.
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7.3.2 Directed outcomes in which the directive system produ-
cing them is an autonomous agent – as is the case with a lion produ-
cing the directed outcome of  capturing an antelope – are quite
straightforwardly de novo originated outcomes. The following reas-
oning shows this to be so. To produce a directed outcome a directive
system must match its actions to independently arising and/or chan-
ging environmental circumstances in such a way that the directed out-
come tends to result. By definition, an autonomous agent (such as a lion
or an antelope) is taken to be able to commence, cease, and direct
(some of) its actions independently of  (but not necessarily without
regard to) its environmental circumstances. This means that the direc-
ted outcome produced by an autonomous agent is a product of  inter-
actions between two partially independently running stretches of
change – a stretch of  change involving the agent and how it generates
its autonomously produced actions, and a stretch of  change involving
the environmental circumstances under which the agent is operating.
And because independence interactions are involved this means the
directed outcome the agent produces must be a de novo originated
event.
7.3.3 However, there are (at the functional level) deterministic-
ally operating directive systems that have no autonomy because all
their actions depend upon their fixed operating rules, their present in-
ternal condition, and the current environmental circumstances under
which they are operating. If  it is to be established that all directive
systems carry out de novo origination of  their directed outcomes
then it must be shown that this is true for non-autonomous as well as
autonomous directive systems.
7.3.4 To simplify the discussion consider the operation of  a spe-
cific deterministically operating directive system – namely, a simple
thermostatically controlled home central heating system. Such a sys-
tem, when operating correctly and in a suitable environmental situ-
ation, will tend to produce the directed outcome of  a roughly con -
stant temperature in the home. A central heating system is usually de-
signed to be able to produce a range of  different fairly constant tem-
peratures and it will generally have some means for the home-dweller
to easily set an internal condition of  the system (via, say, a dial on the
thermostatic switch of  the system, or by entering a digital value into
an appropriate part of  the system’s controller) that corresponds to
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the temperature in the home that the system will then work to pro-
duce. In engineering control theory such an internal correlate of  the
directed outcome that a directive system is working to produce is
known as its set-point. In less technical discussion it is often referred
to as the goal of  the system but, for reasons just discussed (7.2.9),
this usage shall be avoided and be reserved for when speaking spe-
cifically about purposive systems (see 2.3.8).
7.3.5 A simple thermostatically controlled home central heating
system does not directly match its actions to changing environmental
conditions but acts solely on the difference between the temperature
corresponding to its set-point and the current temperature in the
home. In fact, the system does not take action on the difference
between these two temperatures as such but rather on some condi-
tion within itself  that is correlated with this difference. If  the differ-
ence is negative (i.e. the temperature in the home is less than the set-
point temperature) then this difference results in the switching on of
the heating, providing it is not already on. And if  it is positive (i.e. the
temperature in the home is greater than or equal to the set-point tem-
perature) then this difference results in the heating being switched
off, providing it is not already off. (In practice there is usually a small
spread between the switching-on temperature and the switching-off
temperature to avoid over-frequent cycling of  the system, but this
shall be ignored to simplify the discussion.) Under what conditions
may the roughly constant temperature be taken to be originated by the
entirely automatically produced directive activity of  the system? Be-
fore considering this matter, it is first necessary to establish that the
roughly constant temperature in the home is a directed outcome ac-
cording to the conditions specified earlier.
7.3.6 To be a directed outcome the existence of  the roughly
constant temperature must be such that the heating system (the dir -
ective system concerned) produces actions (turning the heating on
and off) that are so matched to independently arising and/or chan-
ging conditions (e.g. the outside air temperature, the prevailing wind
and sunshine conditions, whether supplementary heating is on or off,
whether windows and external doors are open or shut) that this fairly
constant temperature tends to result. Observation soon leads to the
conclusion that this is indeed the case. It is required that the constant
temperature be maintained in spite of  the environmental circum-
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stance not themselves giving rise to this condition. In general, this is
true – except on those occasions when the outside temperature pretty
well matches the set-point temperature. And it is required that should
some of  the circumstances change in ways that affect the mainten-
ance of  the constant temperature (as will usually occur, for example,
when there is a change in the external temperature, or windows and
external doors are opened or closed, or supplementary heating is
turned on or off), then the system’s actions will be such as to tend to
maintain the fairly constant temperature. Again, within limits, obser -
vation shows this is true for a correctly operating thermostatically
controlled central heating system. Hence, since all the required condi -
tions are met it may be concluded that the roughly constant temperat-
ure is indeed a directed outcome and that the actions of  the heating
system play an essential role in producing this.
7.3.7 Given then that the roughly constant temperature is a dir-
ected outcome, can it be taken to be a directively originated outcome?
Considering the central heating system from a detailed material per-
spective, it would be possible to argue that the slight degree of  inde-
pendence that exists between the operation of  the parts of  the sys -
tem – e.g. between the operation of  its motors, pumps, switches,
valves – means that it does not respond in a perfectly deterministic
way to its inputs and so the roughly constant temperature must be
taken to be originated. But this is not what is meant by asserting that
under independence indeterminism the directed outcomes that are
produced by the directive activity of  directive systems are de novo
originated outcomes. Rather, what is being asserted is that this is true
even when the system, from a functional rather than a material perspect-
ive, is operating deterministically. There is no problem if  all that must
be established is that the roughly constant temperature in the house is
a stale origination because the central heating system – in being an
artefact – is an originated entity, so whatever it does will be originated
according to the definition of  origination that is being used (see
1.2.4). Rather, the question is: How can the roughly constant temper-
ature be a fresh, or de novo, origination given that (functionally) the
central heating system does not run independently of  its environ-
mental circumstances but is organised to respond to them in a fully
(functionally) deterministic way? This question is easily answered:
without the activity of  the central heating system the roughly con-
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stant temperature would not be reliably maintained, so even though it
is responding entirely deterministically to changing environmental
conditions its operation plays an essential role in producing the direc -
ted outcome. But if  this is so then for the directed outcome to be de
novo originated the environmental conditions must change indetermin-
istically. This is almost always the case in which home central heating
systems run because independently varying factors – of  the sort
mentioned above, such as the external temperature, wind and sun-
shine conditions, windows being open or closed – make up the envir-
onmental conditions. But this is not necessarily true in artificially con-
trived situations, as shall now be discussed.
7.3.8 Imagine a scenario in which a laboratory for testing central
heating systems has been constructed that allows researchers to in-
vestigate the performance of  such systems under a variety of  pre-set
programmes of  environmental changes. In such a case the environ-
mental changes would, from a functional perspective, be predeter-
mined, and therefore it would not be correct to say that the activity
of  the central heating system was (de novo) originating the roughly
constant temperatures that it was able to achieve. But that this is so
would only be apparent if  it was known that the environmental con-
ditions were changing deterministically – i.e. according to a pre-de -
termined programme – and although this might be fairly obvious
given a laboratory setup, it is certainly not obvious that it is so in the
real-world environments within which ordinary central heating sys -
tems normally operate. Indeed, under independence indeterminism
(but not absolute determinism) environmental circumstances cannot
change deterministically if  they are composed of  independently vary-
ing factors, as is almost always the case in real-world situations such
as one involving a thermostatically controlled home heating system.
7.3.9 Subject to accepting the assumption of  independence of
change, and because there is nothing special about the examples used,
it may be concluded that in general directive systems do indeed ori-
ginate the directed outcomes their activity tends to produce.
7.4 Natural Directiveness and Directed Origination
7.4.1 Having established the existence of  directed origination
under independence indeterminism, it is important to identify how it
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differs from what shall be referred to as “natural directiveness”.
There are several types of  natural directiveness and to indicate its
nature three specific cases shall be discussed. The first case is that of
the directiveness suggested by Fermat’s principle which states that the
path taken by a ray of  light (or any wave-motion) in passing between
two points will always establish itself  so that it minimizes the time
taken for the propagation to occur. This means that should circum-
stance change that affect the course of  a ray (e.g. the introduction or
removal of  lenses from an optical path), then the ray will change its
course in such a manner that the directed outcome of  minimum
propagation time will be maintained. This is an infallible consequence
of  situations in which Fermat’s principle applies – there is no sense in
which the ‘actions’ involved can fail to produce a minimum propaga-
tion time. Nor is it possible to identify any subsystem – that is, a dir-
ective system – whose presence and correct functioning within the
situation brings the directiveness with it. Rather, the directiveness and
the infallible production of  the associated directed outcome belongs
to the whole situation and cannot be attributed to the presence of  a
specific subsystem within it. The second case is of  the directiveness
suggested by Hamilton’s principle, which states that dynamical phys-
ical systems undergo changes only in ways that either maximize or
minimize an abstract physical quantity known as “action” – a quantity
with the physical dimensions of  energy and time. (Interestingly,
Hamilton’s principle, while being a central concept of  classical mech-
anics, has also found a role in quantum mechanics.) In situations in
which this principle applies, achievement of  the maximization/min-
imization cannot fail to occur. And neither can any subsystem be
identified within the overall system that is responsible for producing
this directed outcome; nor is there any sense in which a malfunction
may occur that destroys the directiveness. The final case is that of  Le
Chatelier’s principle which asserts that if  a chemical system experi -
ences a change in concentration, temperature, volume, or partial pres -
sure, then the equilibrium shifts to counteract the imposed change
and restore a new condition of  equilibrium. This happens infallibly,
and no directive system responsible for the directiveness can be iden-
tified as a subsystem within situations where the principle applies;
and malfunctions that destroy the directiveness are not possible. 
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7.4.2 Natural directiveness differs from the directiveness associ-
ated with directive systems in the ways mentioned in the three ex-
amples just given. Firstly, natural directiveness operates infallibly in
bringing about the relevant directed outcome. Secondly, it belongs to
the whole situation and not to the presence of  a subsystem within it.
And thirdly, there is no sense in which a malfunction may arise that
destroys the directiveness. In sharp contrast, the directiveness of  dir -
ective systems does not possess any of  these features. That is, the dir-
ectiveness cannot guarantee to bring about its associated directed out-
come; the directiveness is always associated with a subsystem (the dir-
ective system) that is in principle separable from the overall system or
situation to which it belongs; and malfunctions may arise that destroy
the directiveness.
7.4.3 With the foregoing discussion of  mainly conceptual issues
related to directed origination in mind, it is appropriate to consider
some of  the ways in which this important kind of  activity is imple-
mented in the biological world and in the realm of  civilization. Al -
though implementation methods will generally be discussed individu-
ally, it should be remembered that very often methods are combined
in the execution of  a particular kind of  directive activity – as they are,
for example, in the case of  a lion chasing an antelope.
7.5 Some Methods of  Directed Origination
7.5.1 Perhaps the most basic method is error-reduction control
(also commonly known as feedback control). This method, in its
simplest form, has already been mentioned when the operation of  a
thermostatically controlled home central heating system was outlined.
It is used widely in the biological, human, and technological realms,
and it is often a part of  more complex methods of  directed origina -
tion.
7.5.2 In carrying out the error-reduction method a directive sys-
tem takes actions that tend to reduce the error, or difference, between
a target value of  some variables (e.g. those defining a set-point, or an
objective) and the current value of  these variables. A directive system
using this method takes action based on the error or difference
between conditions internal to the directive system that are correlated
with the target and actual values rather than on the difference
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between these values as such. The condition representing the actual
value is generally based on the directive system sensing relevant vari -
ables in some way – as, for example, when a heating system uses the
state of  a bimetallic strip or some electronic sensor as a proxy for the
actual temperature in the home. The condition representing the target
value is usually built-in or is set by some external system, sometimes
another directive system – as for example occurs when a home-
dweller adjusts the thermostat of  their heating system. This internal
target condition is correlated with the directed outcome that the op-
eration of  the system works to achieve.
7.5.3 “Bang-bang” error-reduction control is the term used to
describe the method found in central heating systems of  the kind dis-
cussed earlier. It is called bang-bang because the corrective action is
either all on or all off: that is, the corrective action cannot be varied in
strength. Continuously variable error-reduction gives smoother con-
trol and is frequently used. For instance, it is often required that cer -
tain engines or motors maintain a constant output speed even when
the load they are driving varies. For example, a steam engine used to
drive machinery in an old-fashioned textile mill needs to be regulated
so that the speed of  the drive-shaft feeding the various machines
maintains a constant speed in spite of  a varying load. Error reduction
control – often involving quite sophisticated implementation – is also
used in servomechanisms: directive systems for ensuring that heavy
machinery (e.g. an anti-aircraft gun) can accurately track a moving tar-
get, or rapidly achieve a given target condition without overshoot. Er-
ror-reduction control is used within the living realm to ensure the
constancy of  many biological conditions – a constancy that is re-
quired for the effective running of  certain biochemical processes. As
mentioned earlier (2.3.10), homeostasis is the term generally used to
refer to this sort of  biological directive activity. For example, as well
as maintaining core body temperature constant, human homeostasis
includes the regulation of  levels of  blood sugar, calcium, iron, os-
motic pressure of  body fluids, and the pH (i.e. acidity/alkalinity bal -
ance) of  blood plasma.
7.5.4 It is appropriate at this point to introduce and briefly dis -
cuss the meaning of  several terms that are in common use. “Closed-
loop control” includes error-reduction control and exists whenever
the action a directive system takes depends directly or indirectly on
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what previous action it has taken and what effect this has had. In
general, a directive system must be appropriately responsive not only
to relevant disturbances and disruptions, but also to the effects its ac-
tions are producing. There is therefore a need for the system to
“close the loop”, that is for there to be a more or less continual pro-
cess of  performing an action, identifying the effect produced, assess-
ing what to do next, performing a further action, and so on with this
loop only ceasing when success is attained or a decision is made to
abandon the endeavour. In many cases of  error-reduction control
this loop is implemented in a fixed and mechanical way with the
“identifying the effect” step being realised by the system simply using
the current error between target and actual values, and the “assess
what to do next” step being built into how it operates. But in more
sophisticated forms of  directed origination this is often far from be-
ing the case, particularly when the directive system is dealing with un-
familiar circumstances, or trying to work out an appropriate set of  ac-
tions to achieve some goal. And sometimes an agent has to be more
or less creative in trying to identify (or understand) just what the ef -
fect of  their actions has been, and in trying to decide what to do next
to achieve their goal when they are uncertain about how to proceed.
And almost always one of  the options available to such an agent is to
abandon pursuit of  a goal. However, in abandoning a particular en-
deavour, they may still have some higher-level motivation that re-
mains unsatisfied and this may lead them to seek out and pursue an-
other goal aimed at satisfying the motivation. Or, they might give up
their attempts to satisfy the motivation in question and try to learn to
live with their dissatisfaction. These latter points are made to emphas-
ise that the directive activity of  human agents in particular can be ex-
tremely complex and convoluted even though, at a rather abstract
level, what they are engaged in is a fairly basic pattern of  directive
activity.
7.5.5 One of  the weaknesses of  the error reduction method is
that the directive system’s action always depends solely upon an error
existing between the target value and the actual value: the system has
no means to anticipate and so is not able to prepare for, or avoid, on-
coming disturbances, or changes in the target value. “Feed-forward
control” incorporates a simple form of  anticipation in that the direct -
ive system assesses the current situation and on the basis of  what it
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finds it selects an appropriate objective and means of  achieving it.
This may be illustrated with the simple example of  a person using a
domestic washing machine. A modern washing machine generally of-
fers the user several wash programmes, each suitable for producing a
good result given a load consisting of  items all with the same general
characteristics. Typically, a user organises their washing into batches
of  items suitable for being satisfactorily washed together and then se -
lects, and sets going, an appropriate wash programme for the load.
This initial phase is the situation-assessment and action-selection
step. During execution of  the selected wash programme the machine
carries out a predetermined sequence of  actions considered suitable
for achieving a satisfactory wash for the types of  items in the load.
However, an ordinary washing machine does not check the effective-
ness of  its washing actions, meaning it operates blindly in an “open-
loop” manner: closure of  the overall control loop is carried out by
the user after they have removed the washed items from the machine
and examined them to see if  they have been cleaned satisfactorily. At
this point, if  items have not been satisfactorily washed the user may
re-wash them using the same programme or carry out other actions
such as applying a stain removal agent before re-washing – or per-
haps they may decide to simply discard an item as no longer of  use
for its original purpose. However, it might be that at this assessment
stage the user comes to believe the wash has failed to work satisfact-
orily for some other reason, such as a failure to add detergent, or be-
cause of  a malfunction of  the machine. The varied nature of  the hu-
man contribution illustrates how what may start out as a very ordin-
ary activity can end up involving quite complex forms of  directive
activity that sometimes leads to non-trivial decision-making and free-
will processing. For instance, with a malfunctioning washing machine,
a person may be faced with conflict over what to do: either call
someone out to look at the machine – but who may charge for the
visit while also concluding that it is not economical to repair it – or
go straight for buying a new machine.
7.5.6 Although it might seem that feed-forward control would
always work best if  the selected actions were carried out in a closed-
loop way involving monitoring of  their success as they are executed,
this is not always the case. For example, in a game of  golf, a player
typically first assesses the situation they are currently in, and on the
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basis of  this they decide on a particular aim or target for their shot
and on the club to use to achieve this. They then execute the chosen
shot in an open-loop manner. Experienced golfers know that trying
to actually execute a golf-swing using error-reduction control during
the swing is not recommended as it rarely produces good results – in-
deed, the inclination to do this is something that a novice golfer may
have to learn to control. What has just been drawn attention to is a
general feature of  many complex types of  directive activity. That is,
the directive activity involves a manager or supervisor directive sys-
tem that selects targets and organises directive systems to achieve
them, but which does not get involved in the directive activity of
these systems unless it identifies problems that need its attention.
7.5.7 The next common method of  directed origination that
shall be considered is the control of  sequences of  separate directive
activities. However, although sequence control usually makes use of
both feed-forward and error-reduction control, and includes open-
loop and closed-loop activities, it is considered to be a type of  direct -
ive activity in its own right for two main reasons. Firstly, because the
directed outcomes it produces are generally achievable only by satis -
factorily managing and sequencing several subsidiary activities. And
secondly, with more complex forms, because often the sequence will
need to be appropriately adjusted – perhaps with new procedures
needing to be created – to take account of  the particular circum -
stances that obtain. An example from the biological realm will serve
to illustrate a relatively straightforward case of  sequence control.
7.5.8 A bird in building a nest carries out sequence control since
to build a satisfactory nest requires successful fulfilment of  several
subsidiary stages, each of  which involves executing a sequence of  dir -
ective activities. First, an appropriate site for the nest must be found.
This is far from being a blind automatic activity even though the cri-
teria that a bird seeks to satisfy seem to be largely laid down genetic -
ally rather than being mainly acquired through learning or being up to
the bird to decide more or less creatively for themselves. Finding a
suitable nest site entails search activity. (Search is in itself  another
common form of  directive activity, and one that may involve a good
deal of  complex subsidiary activity. However, to avoid an overlong
presentation, it shall not be discussed further even though much
work has been done investigating and devising various search meth-
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ods and strategies). Once a site has been located, the next phase of
directive activity entails building the nest. This usually consists of  a
sequence of  directive activities aimed at achieving a succession of
directed outcomes that together result in a finished nest. For ex-
ample, the first step may consist of  obtaining sticks and twigs to con -
struct the support and basic structure of  the nest; the second step
may involve obtaining smaller twigs to build a bowl-shape within the
basic structure; and the final step may entail lining the bowl with suit -
able materials – possibly of  several layers composed of  such things as
moss, fibres, and mud. All of  these stages require that the bird (or
birds, if  the nest is made by a mating pair) carry out quite complex
directive activity to achieve the directed outcome in question. Should
the nest suffer damage – from a storm, say – then the bird must de-
cide whether to implement a sequence of  directive activities to repair
the nest, or to abandon it and build a new one.
7.5.9 Used by individuals and when working cooperatively, the
above methods – in combination with the use of  knowledge, intelli -
gence, and in the human case with language and symbolic representa-
tions – make possible highly complex forms of  directive activity. Dir-
ected creative origination plays an important role in human life, but a
less important one in animal life. There are many methods that claim
to stimulate or enhance human directed creative origination but, for
lack of  space, these shall not be discussed. A little more about human
creative origination is included in the next chapter in paragraphs
8.4.14/15.
7.6 Executive Controlling Agents
7.6.1 Executive control is the final form of  directive activity
that shall be discussed in this brief  survey, and although relatively
simple forms of  it have been implemented in the technological realm
– a computer operating system is an example – the concern here is
with executive control as it is found in psychological agents, and hu -
mans in particular.
7.6.2 The executive self  is that part of  a psychological agent
that carries out the function of  intelligent executive control. Execut -
ive control is simply one mode of  operation among several found in
animals and humans and it may be displaced or overridden by more
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primitive modes such as those based on instinct, unthinking habit,
and emotion-driven action. The superordinate objective (or prime
directive) of  an executive controller is to successfully organise (e.g.
create, initiate, guide, coordinate, and terminate) directive activity to
satisfactorily attend to a set of  potentially conflicting tasks while do-
ing so with limited resources and powers, with various constraints on
its actions, and in the face of  conflicting priorities and demands. The
executive branch of  a human organisation provides a familiar ex-
ample of  an intelligent executive controller. Its job is to organise dir-
ective activities to successfully carry out the tasks or goals given to it
by the policy-making part of  the organisation (e.g. its board of  direct -
ors or governors) under constraints imposed by this part, by the ca -
pacities and resources of  the organisation, and by the environment
within which the organisation operates. Higher animals, when operat -
ing in their executive mode rather than when operating in another
mode (such as responding purely instinctively), may be understood as
having the superordinate objective of  successfully serving and satisfy -
ing their physiological and other motivations according to (mainly)
genetically given priorities and evaluation criteria while taking into ac-
count environmental and other constraints, including those imposed
by their emotional self.
7.6.3 A bird building a nest provides an example of  animal ex -
ecutive control. Building a nest is one of  the motivations that a bird’s
executive controller (or executive self) must attend to, but a bird also
has other motivations such as obtaining food and water, finding a
mate, rearing its young, defending its territory, and avoiding predat-
ors. Although birds learn about their environment and acquire some
new skills, they are mostly reliant upon genetically given means for
serving and satisfying their motivations. However, with animals oper-
ating in executive controller mode, what is not given genetically is
how they organise their activities to satisfactorily attend to these dif-
ferent motivations given the particular circumstances they find them-
selves in. Rather, this is something they must do by using their intelli -
gence. Generally, the task priorities that a bird (or other kind of
higher animal) operates under when in executive controller mode are
given genetically. So, for example, preserving their life tends to take
priority over other motivations, although this may not always be the
case as when, say, an animal risks their life to protect their young, or
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to obtain food when starving. Similarly, what an animal’s executive
self  takes to be success in serving the animal’s motivations tends to
be given genetically and, for most animals, consists mainly in them
being able to actually satisfy their motivations according to their ge -
netically given priorities. However, sometimes conflict will arise and
the animal, while operating in executive controller mode, will try to
resolve this and may then perhaps engage in some (usually relatively
weak) form of  free-will processing. For example, in searching for
suitable material for its nest a bird may spot horse-hair on a brush in
a stable yard and be motivated to get some for lining its nest. But it
may experience conflict – e.g. fear of  a predator: a cat sleeping
nearby, say – and not have prefigured means for resolving this con -
flict. In such a case it may engage in some mind-brain struggle in de-
ciding what to do: a struggle that, in the case of  animals (and often
humans, too), may involve its taking tentative actions towards first
serving one competing motivation, and then another. For example,
the bird might carefully advance toward the brush, and then get
frightened and retreat. But later it might try approaching the brush
again. And it may be that exactly how the bird ends up resolving this
conflict is not prefigured. However, what is not clear is whether the
non-prefigurement is wholly down to the indeterminacy of  future
events (e.g. the cat awakening and getting up) or also involves some
indeterminacy within the mind-brain of  the bird over what to do.
The assumption made in the present work is that in some higher an-
imals (possibly including birds), and in some situations, resolution of
internal mind-brain conflict about how to act is not solely a matter of
how circumstance change but partly a result of  non-prefigured in-
ternal mind-brain interactions, adjustments, and mutual accommoda-
tions. That is, it is assumed that some free-will processing may take
place.
7.6.4 Intelligent executive control has proved to be a highly suc-
cessful evolutionary development. And with the emergence of  hu -
man persons it seems evolution has scored another success by produ-
cing beings capable of  operating as self-evaluating executive con-
trolling agents – or SEECing agents. The assumption that is being ad-
opted in the present work is that humans express self-evaluating exec-
utive controlling capabilities in three main ways. Firstly, through being
able to create their own methods and priorities for satisfying their ge-
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netically given motivations (and in so doing, partly overriding these
given methods and priorities). Secondly, through being able to adopt
(e.g. from their social group), or create – based on their own experi-
ences (including past successes and failures), on their past learning,
and as a result of  thinking things over for themselves – their own cri-
teria for what they believe does or would make them themselves suc-
cessful executive controllers. And thirdly, by being able to carry out
their own evaluations, according to their own criteria, of  their success
and failure as an executive controller. None of  this means human
persons necessarily wholly disregard their genetically given criteria of
success and failure (e.g. as indicated by pleasure and pain signals), nor
that they shall necessarily wholly disregard the influence of  their
peers and other social and cultural factors. But it does mean that hu-
mans have a degree of  freedom in how they operate as an executive
controller that does not seem to be available to animals or to any
other natural agents. The key to the sort of  self-evaluation being
identified here is the creative capabilities of  human persons – their
capacity to establish for themselves modes of  activity that are not
wholly prefigured by their given nature and nurture. 
7.6.5 One important consequence of  humans having evolved
powers of  self-evaluation is that it allows society (or nurture), rather
than genes (or nature) alone, to influence what priorities and criteria
of  success and failure in conducting their life an individual person
may adopt or create. And this makes societies based on and regulated
by human-devised rules of  acceptable and unacceptable conduct pos-
sible because members of  such a society may be influenced (through
socialisation, teaching, peer pressure, and other societal influences) to
incorporate the values, norms, standards, etc. of  the society into the
criteria they adopt or create for what shall count for them as a satis -
factory way to live their lives. The point is that these criteria need not
be linked directly to pleasure and pain signals or other genetically
given values but may have a more abstract basis – for example, the
sort of  abstract basis that religions make use of  in laying down their
rules for living.
7.6.6 Free-will processing plays a prominent role in the activity
of  a self-evaluating executive controlling agent (a SEECing agent) be-
cause such an agent does not necessarily rely solely on genetically
given or socially conditioned priorities and evaluation methods to
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help them resolve conflicts and indecision. Rather, they are able to
use more elaborate and personally adopted and created priorities and
evaluation criteria. Furthermore, it seems that human persons have
an intrinsic capacity to question and possibly change these priorities
and criteria – a process which in itself  is another source of  conflict
within a person. Further comments on humans as SEECing agents
are made in section 10.7, but the present work is not the place to fully
develop this idea. (Note, viewing humans as self-evaluating executive
controlling agents was introduced by the author in his paper ‘A Cy-
bernetic Analog For Human Behavior’ Elstob, 1976.)
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8 Creative Origination
8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 A good deal has been said about creative origination
already. In this chapter the discussion of  this important concept is
broadened. However, since much of  the chapter does not directly
concern free will but rather tries to establish creative origination more
widely, it is worth re-expressing, but largely holding to one side, the
view adopted in this book about the role creative origination is seen
to plays in the exercise of  free will.
8.1.2 The basic view that has been adopted (see 1.4.14/15) is
that an agent who has free will is able to self-directively originate sat -
isfaction of  their needs and wants. But often this may be done by the
agent using well-established methods (e.g. by using instinctive, ha-
bitual, or fully-learned procedures) and free will is generally under-
stood to require more than this – namely, the capacity to do other-
wise: i.e. for an agent to be able to satisfy their needs and wants in
non-necessitated but self-determined ways. It has been argued that
this requires that an agent carry out a self-directed creative process,
what has been called the free-will process: a process that it is assumed
arises when an agent is experiencing conflict or indecision about what
to do and has no prefigured means for resolving matters. In humans
it has been suggested that the creative origination involved in the
free-will process mainly finds expression in what has been referred to
as the ARCS of  free-will processing: that is, in the creative origination
and modification of alternatives and reasons; in the creatively origin-
ative playing out of  internal conflicts; and in the transformation of
aspects of  a person’s self  (see 1.5.4). Some of  the methods of  creat -
ive origination that are used in the ARCS of  free will processing are
mentioned in this chapters, but a great deal is left unsaid not only be -
cause of  space limitations but because of  a lack of  sufficient know-
ledge and understanding.
8.2 Some Preliminary Points
8.2.1 Although intuitively fairly clear, the notion of  creative ori-
gination is difficult to pin down precisely. The strongest intuition be-
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hind the idea is that whereas most originations are of  types of  things
that are quite strongly prefigured by the nature of  the domain in
which they arise, some others are not and that it is these others that
are thought of  as having been creatively produced. Specifically, what
is being said is that creative origination is involved when what is pro -
duced cannot be explained by the natural laws, constraints, systems,
RENOIRs, and structures that constitute the established nature and
dynamics of  the domain in question. Of  course, according to inde-
pendence indeterminism, no origination (considered as a dated and
located particular) is fully prefigured, so it might seem reasonable to
say that creative origination is involved in the production of  all ori-
ginations. However, if  this were done the notion of creative origina-
tion would become redundant since all origination would count as
creative. Since the vast majority of  originations are type-determined it
might seem that it would be sufficient to say that creatively originative
processes are those processes that produce novel originations – that
is, originations of  a new, non-prefigured, type relative to the domain
concerned. This would cover many cases but it would exclude creat-
ive origination being involved in the resolution of  conflicts where the
types of  possible outcome that may occur are prefigured but the pro-
cess by which any particular outcome is originated is not prefigured –
as, for instance, occurs with predator/prey interactions, competitive
team games, market competition, and warfare. To accommodate such
cases it would be sufficient to say that a creatively originative process
is one that follows a course that is of  a non-prefigured type (relative
to the domain concerned) and which often, but not necessarily, pro -
duces a novel type of  outcome. However, this looser definition may
lead to some originative processes being counted as creatively origin -
ative when they are at best only marginally so.
8.2.2 Chance plays a part in the creative origination of  most
novel entities, but chance alone only very rarely results in the creation
of  a complex entity with significant properties distinctly different
from those of  its parts. Jumbles and relatively haphazard collections
of  objects may be novel entities but unlike a system or a RENOIR
they rarely have any significantly novel properties as the totalities they
are. Chance alone may creatively originate relatively simple systems –
possibly even something as organised as some of  the more complex
building blocks of  life. But without the domain containing directive
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systems able to exploit chance events to create novel entities then the
complexity and significance of  the created entities will be limited. For
example, without a framework of  biological reproduction and natural
or artificial selection in place, chance genetic mutations will not result
in novel advantageous changes within a species; and without a suit-
ably engaged and prepared human person or group, chance events
will not advantageously influence their creative activities.
8.2.3 The first issue to be addressed in this chapter is what sorts
of  things qualify as having been creatively originated. A start is made
by discussing where type-boundaries are to be drawn. If  the types
that are used for describing entities that are originated are too high-
level then little creative origination will be apparent. For example, if  a
new work of  fiction is taken to be merely another instance of  a book
belonging to a familiar genre then it shall not count as being a creat -
ive origination. But on the other hand, if  an overly fine-grained ap -
proach were adopted then almost all products of  human endeavour
would be seen as having been creatively originated even when they
are run of  the mill. To further clarify this issue, and return to an
earlier example, consider the origination of  a bird's nest.
8.2.4 Birds build nests of  a type that is largely fixed by their ge-
netic inheritance. Nests with coarse-grained differences may be read-
ily distinguished. For example, a chaffinch's nest is quite different
from a crow's nest, as the following descriptions from a popular web-
site shows. ‘Chaffinches build a neat cup nest from moss, grass, and
feathers bound with spiders' webs, lined with feathers and wool, and
decorated with lichen and flakes of  bark. The nest is usually in a fork
of  a tree or shrub.’ And the same website says: ‘A Carrion Crow's
nest is built in the fork of  a tree, cliff  edge or even electricity pylon
and is a large construction of  twigs lined with hair and bark.’ (From
www.garden-birds.co.uk). However, nests of  both of  these general
types vary in their specific details, so should such minor variations
mean the nests are of  different types? It is not clear how to answer.
If  they are to be treated as different types then at what point should
the boundary be drawn since treating every nest as a unique type
seems to undermine the reason for introducing the idea of  types?
And taking too general a view may lead to no distinction being made
between nests with consistent differences made by the same species
of  bird but in different types of  environment. What is being con-
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fronted here is a general problem and it is not clear how to resolve it.
In later discussion some suggestions are offered, but these do not
provide a definitive resolution of  this issue.
8.2.5 Closely related to the type-boundary problem is another
one: namely, that creative origination varies in degree or strength. At
the low-end are what shall be referred to as weak forms of  creative
origination – weak in the sense that they produce outcomes of  a pre-
figured general type but which produce novel subtypes. Such origina-
tions are prefigured to the extent that they are produced by estab-
lished type of  structures, systems and RENOIRs, and through types
of  interactions that are more or less common within the domain con-
cerned. But they are novel to the extent that the originations pro-
duced have significant differences and belong to such a large set of
possible originations that it cannot reasonably be said that the emer-
gence of  a particular member of  this set is prefigured. Later, a couple
of  examples of  this kind of  weak creative origination are considered:
the formation of  snowflakes, and the origination of  gametes (e.g.
sperm or egg cells). Another common kind of  low-end creative ori-
gination arises when outcomes of  a familiar and often quite restricted
type are originated by situations involving competitive and conflictual
interaction.
8.2.6 Mid-range creative origination arises when, relative to the
domain concerned, novel types of  systems, RENOIRs, structures,
procedures, and interactions are originated rather than only novel sub-
types. But here again there is the problem of  drawing a line between a
novel type of  entity and a novel subtype. However, rather than trying to
provide rules for doing this, it shall be accepted that mid-range creat -
ive origination covers a broad spectrum, and that at one end it
merges into the low-end and the other into the high-end. Learning
and inventiveness are the mainstays of  mid-range creative origination
in that they are the usual ways by which novel, non-prefigured types
of  entity are produced by agents. Simple and limited forms of  learn -
ing do arise as part of  some kinds of  low-end creative origination –
learning that consists of  tuning the parameters of  some system to
optimise its performance or to allow it to adapt to a changing envir -
onment are examples.
8.2.7 High-end creative origination is understood to be a pro-
cess that is not carried out by individuals alone. Rather it is taken to
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be a group phenomenon, and one of  the defining features of  large
and complex creative realms, of  which the most significant are the
realm of  life and the realm of  civilization. Creative origination in the
latter realm is much more widespread and operates on a much
shorter time-scales than in the former. For instance, creative origina-
tion is constantly at work in the adaptive evolution of  domains within
the realm of  civilization such as those of  politics and government,
media and entertainment, defence and security, education and train-
ing, science, technology, transport, agriculture, commerce and in-
dustry, law and justice, medicine, and in the various fields of  artistic
and cultural endeavour. These domains are characterised by their own
distinctive types of  created entities and the distinctive ways these typ-
ically interact and influence one another. All of  these domains are
strongly reflexively creative in the sense that they creatively renew and
extend themselves and are strongly involved in their own evolution.
And because these domains all belong to the realm of  civilization
they are more or less influenced by one another, and often in creative
ways.
8.2.8 In the following sections more shall be said about the
three broad categories of  creative origination that have just been
mentioned, but much will be left unsaid, not only because of  a lack
of  space but also because at present relatively little is understood
about how creative origination works.
8.3 Low-End Creative Origination
8.3.1 Before continuing it is worth indicating what kinds of  ori-
gination shall not count as being even weakly creative. It has been
said those originations whose type is prefigured in present existence
don't count, unless the course by which they are produced is being
creatively originated. Science is good at identifying processes of  non-
creative origination because its forte is the description of  happenings
that have a repeatable and lawful way of  occurring and running. At
present, science does not recognise the very widespread existence of
macroscopic origination that independence indeterminism says exists.
But even if  it did – and perhaps it will in the future – it would still be
most successful in dealing with types of  happening and phenomena
that are regular, repeatable, and more or less predictable at the type
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level. What science is good at is understanding and explaining depend-
ence interactions, not independence interactions. This means science is
often good at explaining what happens once an independence inter-
action has actually taken place and more or less deterministic interac -
tions and changes ensue. Humans, and animals too, are good at com-
ing to know what types of  prefigured events might happen within
domains with which they are familiar, but they are not good at pre-
dicting specific instances of  independence interaction until their oc-
currence becomes relatively certain – as they often do when the
things involved in the interaction are set on relatively time-determin-
ate courses of  change and seem to be heading towards an interaction.
Unexpected disruptions may occur – such as an earthquake taking
place, a bomb going off  nearby, a malfunction occurring – but since
these generally rarely arise it is found that in practice many happen-
ings run in more or less expected ways even when they entail origina-
tion.
8.3.2 What qualifies something as being a product of  creative
origination is sometimes not obvious, and much of  the difficulty
comes from deciding where to draw type boundaries. If  candidate en-
tities are classified too coarsely then little creative origination will be
apparent, but if  they are drawn too finely then too much shall be
seen. For example, if  all snowflakes are taken to be of  a single type
then no creative origination will be seen, whereas if  each individual
snowflake is taken to be a distinct subtype then a great deal will be
seen. But if  humans and their personal judgements are determining
the type boundaries then the matter becomes rather subjective. One
way of  partially overcoming or avoiding this weakness is to tie differ -
ences in type (and subtype) to there being significant differences in
the objective (rather than subjective) effects that the different types
produce. For example, molecules originated within a chemical reac-
tion are considered to be of  the same chemical type if  the are indi -
vidually indistinguishable with respect to their chemical properties
and behaviours.
8.3.3 Many originative processes have only a single type of  out-
come, and generally such processes are not taken to be creative. For
example: a thermostatically controlled home central heating system
tends to originate the single type of  outcome of  a roughly constant
temperature in the home; organisms tend to grow towards a single
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type of  mature form characteristic of  their species; and chemical re -
actions tend to produce specific types of  product. However, simply
because an originative process produces a single type of  outcome
does not necessarily mean it cannot operate creatively to achieve this.
For instance people, and some animals, are sometimes able to creat-
ively originate a pre-specified type of  outcome when they lack the
skills and knowledge to do so by non-creative means. For example, a
person may need to operate creatively to solve a brain teaser or
puzzle which has a well-defined target condition (trying to solve the
Rubic Cube is an example), or a chimpanzee may have to be creative
in order to break open a nut – a task with a single well-defined target
condition.
8.3.4  Processes that produce a single outcome that is drawn
from a prefigured and relatively small set of  possible outcomes are
generally not considered to be creative processes. For example, ac-
cording to independence indeterminism, where the ball will land for a
particular spin of  a roulette wheel is an originated event, but rather
than there being only one type of  outcome there is a fixed set, and
the design of  the wheel and method used for playing roulette gener-
ally means these outcomes arise with fixed probabilities. For these
reasons roulette is not considered to be a creatively originative pro-
cess. Neither do many similar processes count as being creatively ori-
ginative, such as the throw of  dice, the rotation of  a lottery tumbler,
or the random generation of  numbers by quantum indeterministic
means. Nevertheless, there are some originative processes that might
reasonably be classified as being at least weakly creatively originative
because they are capable of  originating a very large number of  dis -
tinct subtypes, meaning that what particular thing or outcome they
produce on any specific occasion may be regarded as unexpected and
not prefigured. However, to qualify as even a weak form of  creative
origination the subtypes produced must, at least within some con-
texts, have significantly different features. In order to develop these
points two examples shall be considered: the production of  snow-
flakes, and the generation of  gametes.
8.3.5 If  we take snowflakes to be all of  a single type then snow-
flake production will not be seen as a creatively originative process.
However, if  we take a much finer-grained view of  snowflakes – in-
deed, literally a microscopic view – then we shall see that individual
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snowflakes are almost all different. They are not only different be-
cause each ice crystal from which they are composed has a unique 6-
fold symmetric structure but also because, under natural conditions
of  snowflake formation, these crystals often become stuck together
in a variety of  different ways. What is involved in snowflake produc-
tion is outlined in an article in New Scientist which states that ‘[Snow-
flakes] usually form when [through an independence interaction] a
super-cooled water droplet freezes around a speck of  dust to form a
basic six-sided crystal. This crystal grows and becomes more com-
plicated as it steals water vapour from the air and starts to fall [a pro -
cess involving innumerable independence interactions between the
crystal and water vapour molecules in the air]. At -2ºC, simple
hexagon and star shapes form. Between -5 and -10ºC, it's columns.
Then below -15ºC, the six-siders appear again. What's more, each tiny
snow crystal experiences a gamut of  temperatures and humidities as
it falls [experiences that all involve independence interactions], and
often collides with other crystals [more independence interactions]. A
snowflake can consist of  a single crystal, or it can be many thousands
of  these crystals joined together. “Every snowflake that falls to earth
has its own unique history,” says ice physicist John Hallett of  the
Desert Research Institute in Reno, Nevada.’ (Pilcher 2013). Two
things are worth noting. Firstly, as has been indicated with the addi -
tions to the above passage, under independence indeterminism, each
snowflake may be seen to be the product of  many independence in-
teractions and so is taken to be an originated entity. And secondly, it
seems that many of  these independence interactions influence the
precise form that the resulting snowflake will have. Under independ-
ence indeterminism roulette, throwing dice, lottery-tumbling, and
many similar processes are also seen to involve independence interac-
tions in the origination of  their outcomes. However, they produce
only a relatively limited number of  distinct types things or conditions,
whereas with snowflake production the number of  distinct subtypes
produced is extremely large, and it is this that suggests snowflake
production may be taken to be a creatively originative process. How-
ever, it should be regarded as only a weakly creatively originative pro-
cess because, firstly, the process does not entail the origination of  any
new type of  system, process, or procedure, and secondly, because the
enormous variety of  distinct snowflake subtypes that are produced
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do not lead to anything like an equivalent variety of  distinct con-
sequences in the natural world. However, from the human perspect-
ive, a huge variety of  distinct forms of  snowflake ice crystals may be
distinguished.
8.3.6 The second example, one which has a stronger claim to be
a creatively originative process than snowflake production, concerns
the production of  gametes – a highly regulated process known as
meiosis. Individual gametes, unlike individual snowflakes, do not rely
simply upon human powers of  discrimination to give them a distinct
identity. Rather, each gamete, should it participate in the origination
of  a particular individual living organism, expresses its specific iden-
tity in the uniqueness of  that organism. Throughout the following
discussion of  meiosis, independence indeterminism is presumed to
hold and the fairly detailed account that is given aims to make clear
how biological evolution has found a way of  combining several
stages of  chance (i.e. non-directed) origination to make huge genetic
diversity available to the reproductive process – something that
greatly enhances the robustness of  the biological evolutionary pro-
cess and the continuance of  complex life. 
8.3.7 Independence interactions occur during all the key pro-
cesses involved in sexual reproduction: for instance, in mating (or
pollination), in fertilisation (whereby a particular male gamete unites
with a particular female gamete to form a particular zygote), and in
meiosis – the process by which male and female gametes (e.g. sperm
and eggs) are produced. The intracellular independence interactions
involved in meiosis are capable of  randomly originating an enormous
number of  genetically similar but distinct gametes and this contrib-
utes to ensuring that genetic diversity is maintained within the gene
pool of  a species, so helping to ensure that natural selection has
many options available to it. The following discussion relates to hu-
man beings but the basic process is common to many species.
8.3.8 Every somatic (body) cell, and every germ cell in the gon -
ads (i.e. in the testes in males, and in the ovaries in females), contains
22 (unjoined) pairs of  genetically similar but not precisely identical
chromosomes. One of  each pair contains genetic material derived
(via the father’s sperm) from the individual’s paternal ancestry, while
the other contains genetic material derived (via the mother’s egg)
from their maternal ancestry. In females, the 23 rd pair – the sex chro-
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mosomes – consists of  a further two genetically similar chromo-
somes, but in males this 23rd pair consists of  partly dissimilar chro-
mosomes to the extent that the paternally derived chromosome is
much shorter and contains genes that control the development of
male characteristics. The immense genetic diversity that meiosis gen-
erates is achieved in three stages. First, in the crossing over (ex-
change) of  genetic material between paternally and maternally de-
rived chromosomes. Second, in the process of  forming two daughter
cells from a single germ cell. And third, in the splitting of  each of
these daughter cells to produce individual gametes – sperm in males,
eggs in females. These stages involve a large number of  intracellular
independence interactions – interactions between, for instance, chro-
mosomes, DNA, proteins, and the various intracellular structures and
systems (such as microtubles, centromeres, kinetochors, and spindle
apparatus) that carry out the processes concerned.
8.3.9 Meiosis starts with replication of  the 23 pairs of  chromo-
somes in a germ cell. This is a complex process common to all cell
division within humans (and many other organisms) and after it is
complete each original chromosome and its replicate are joined at a
single point – a centromere – to form a pair of  what are known as
sister chromatids. (There are at this point 92 chromatids – i.e. distinct
strands of  DNA – consisting of  23 chromosomal sets each contain-
ing four genetically similar chromatids: two paternally derived, two
maternally derived.) Next, the two pairs of  sister chromatids belong -
ing to each of  the 23 chromosomal sets are moved to the equatorial
plane of  the germ cell and a process called crossing over takes place.
Crossing over involves the maternally and paternally derived sister
chromatids of  a set interweaving and sometimes swapping stretches
of  DNA with one another. Exactly which stretches of  DNA get ex-
changed is a result of  chance independence interactions between the
chromatids concerned and the various proteins and structures that
carry out the interweaving, cutting, and swapping operations.
8.3.10 After crossing over has taken place the paternally and ma-
ternally based sister chromatids in a set are separated from their inter -
weaved state and are moved, randomly, to one side or the other of
the cell. This is another complex process that involves such things as
the spindle apparatus (with microtubles playing an important role in
its operation), kinetochors, and various proteins. Which side (and
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therefore which future daughter cell) gets a paternally derived pair of
sister chromatids and which gets a maternally derived pair depends
upon chance independence interactions occurring in the initial stage
of  the moving process. Once this migration is complete the germ cell
divides to form two daughter cells. Each of  these contains 23 pairs
of  sister chromatids – some being paternally based and the rest ma-
ternally based with the exact mix being a matter of  how the chance
independence interactions just mentioned played out for each of  the
23 sets of  chromatids. Those sister chromatid pairs in which some
crossing over occurred will consist of  dissimilar sisters, whereas those
pairs involving no crossing over will consist of  identical sisters.
8.3.11 The final stage of  meiosis involves the division of  each
daughter cell into two gamete cells each of  which will contain 23 in -
dividual chromosomes. Some of  these chromosomes will be wholly
paternally derived, and some wholly maternally derived but some (be-
cause of  crossing over) will consist of  a mix of  paternally and mater -
nally derived DNA. This final cell division starts with the 23 pairs of
sister chromatids in a daughter cell being moved to the equatorial
plane of  the cell. The sister chromatids are then separated and moved
to opposite sides of  the cell through a process involving chance inde -
pendence interactions similar to that described earlier. This final stage
ends with the division of  each of  the two daughter cells into two sep -
arate gamete cells.
8.3.12 A calculation of  approximately how many genetically dis -
tinct gametes may result from meiosis may be made as follows. The
interweaving process may not always produce a crossing over of
DNA between chromatids but suppose (as an unfounded and purely
illustrative assumption) that on average this happens with 10 of  the
23 chromosomal sets of  sister chromatids. Furthermore, to keep
things as simple a possible, assume that in each of  these 10 sets only
one of  the two paternally derived chromatids exchanges DNA with
only one of  the two maternally derived chromatids, leaving the other
paternally and maternally derived chromatids unchanged. This means
that within the germ cell as a whole 20 (out of  92) chromatids have
their DNA altered through crossing over. It is unclear in how many
different ways an exchange of  DNA between paternally and mater-
nally derived chromatids may occur but it is likely to be a great many.
For this approximate and illustrative calculation, suppose it to be one
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thousand (this is probably a large underestimate). This means that
crossing over among any given set of  10 pairs of  sister chromatids
may result in any one of  100010 (1030) genetically different variants.
But over a million different sets of  10 sister chromatids may be
drawn from the 23 sets available. Taking this into account, and under
the assumptions made, this indicates that after crossing over has
taken place any one of  about 1036 genetically different sets of  92
chromatids may result.
8.3.13 After crossing over has occurred, division of  the germ cell
takes place. As already noted, this involves the chance and random as-
signment of  the paternally and maternally derived sister chromatids
to opposite sides of  the cell prior to its division into two daughter
cells. This random assignment can lead to any one of  2 23 (i.e. about 8
x 106 ) pairs of  genetically different daughter cells being produced.
However, as has been explained and with the assumptions being
made, crossing over changes the genetic makeup of  a germ cell into
any one of  about 1036 genetically different variants, and since any one
of  these variants may lead to about 8 x 10 6 distinct pairs of  daughter
cells the first two stages of  meiosis taken together may produce any
one of  about 1042 different pairs of  such cells.
8.3.14 However, there is more to come because there is still the
final stage of  meiosis to take into account. The division of  each
daughter cell involves the movement of  the sister chromatids to the
equatorial plane, their separation into independent chromatids, and
then the random assignment of  these to opposite sides of  the cell to
form the genetic makeup of  each of  the gametes that result when
this final stage of  cell division is complete. If  no crossing over had
occurred then this division would result in two identical gametes
since each sister chromatid pair would consist of  identical sisters and
it would not make any difference to which side of  the cell (and there -
fore which gamete) a sister chromatid moved. But, with the simplify-
ing assumptions that have been made, on average 10 pairs of  sister
chromatids are involved in crossing over and that therefore 10 pairs
of  sister chromatids (out of  the 23 pairs in total) will have genetically
different sisters. Now each of  these different sisters may be assigned
randomly to one or other of  the gametes, giving 210 (about 1000)
ways in which gametes may be constituted in this final step of  the
process of  meiosis. Taking this additional variation into account, and
189
given the assumptions made, the process of  meiosis will produce
four gametes from a germ cell with each of  these gametes being ran-
domly drawn from a set of  about 1045 possible genetic variants. This
is a truly immense number, and although the main genetic differences
among these is likely to come from the particular mix of  paternal and
maternal contributions, the genetic diversity that comes from cross -
ing over is not necessarily insignificant.
8.3.15 It is worth emphasising that while the function of  meiosis
is to produce genetic diversity among the gametes it produces, the
process itself  is one that depends for its successful execution on a
great deal of  complex and exquisitely coordinated directive activity.
This directive activity ensures that certain specific types of  chance in-
dependence interactions occur at specific stages in the process – it
does not, of  course, at all determine what tokens of  these types the
process will produce.
8.3.16 Is meiosis a creatively originative process? According to
independence indeterminism, it is a process in which any particular
genetically distinct gamete it produces cannot be said to be pre-
figured, or expected, simply because the number of  possibilities is so
vast. However, this would be a valid conclusion only if  taking indi -
vidual gametes to be distinct subtypes was justified. So, can this be
justified? As already noted, the distinctiveness of  a type of  entity may
be identified with the set of  distinctive effects or consequences that
an instance of  such a type of  thing produces within a particular kind
of  context. That is, if  the effects produced by the different instances
are the same then the instances are taken to be of  the same type (or
subtype), and if  different then of  different types. To see how this
works in practice consider some of  the cases considered earlier. On
each spin, roulette results in the ball landing in one of  37 numbered
slots on the wheel (38 slots in American roulette with its double zero)
and from a strictly physical point of  view there is little to distinguish
one outcome from another: namely, a ball at rest within a slot. But
from the point of  view of  players of  roulette there is a good deal of
difference – a difference that shows itself  in the various betting pay-
offs associated with the human-allocated categories or types to which
each slot has been assigned – e.g. its unique number type, its colour
type (red, black, or green), its parity type (odd, even, neither), and its
set type (its membership of  various subsets of  numbers). This sug-
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gests that in a human game-playing context but not in a purely phys-
ical context, the slots come in several (but not a huge number of) dif-
ferent types rather than just one. With snowflakes, again they may be
considered in either a strictly physical context or a human one. In a
strictly physical context snowflakes reveal themselves in how they
pack together to form, say, wet slushy snow or dry fluffy snow. In a
purely physical context the vast variety of  microscopic differences
that exist between snowflakes do not reveal themselves, but to human
observers using microscopes their differences become apparent, and
a huge number of  microscopically different snowflakes seem to be
possible. Gametes considered within a straightforward chemical con-
text – i.e. simply as complex molecular structures – do not reveal
their distinct differences. But within the context of  biological repro-
duction their differences are important because a gamete partly spe-
cifies the particular characteristics of  an individual organism – char -
acteristics that are not purely a matter of  human categorisation. Fur-
thermore, as discussed above, meiosis is capable of  producing an im-
mense variety of  distinct gametes.
8.3.17 Is creative origination involved in the spin of  a roulette
wheel? No, because only a relatively small set of  types of  outcome
are possible. What about snowflake production? Here the decision is
more difficult, but because snowflake production only reveals the de-
tailed differences in the snowflakes it produces to human observers
and not independently of  them it seems reasonable to say that, at
most, it is at the extreme lower end of  creative origination. However,
gamete production through meiosis does seem to just about qualify
as being a creatively originative process because each gamete has a
significant contribution to make to the objective identity of  the living
organism to which it may help to give rise. But meiosis should be
taken to be a very weak form of  creative origination because the sys-
tems and structures that control and realise the processes involved
are a pre-existing part of  the biological domain concerned, and the
processes themselves follow, in overall terms, a prefigured type of
course. Nevertheless, it does seem that gametes, as the particular dis-
tinct entity each is, are not prefigured and so should be regarded as
being creatively produced. 
8.3.18 There are many borderline cases of  weak creative origina-
tion of  the gamete sort in the human and animal worlds. For in-
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stance, when humans produce speech they are being weakly creatively
originative when what they say is not strongly prefigured in the situ -
ation concerned. Speech utterances belong to an indefinitely large set
and so, except in banal conversations, may be taken as newly origin-
ated subtypes in much the same way as individual gametes may be
taken to be newly originated subtypes. Some birds produce quite var-
ied songs but it is questionable whether these carry the huge variety
of  meanings that human speech carries, so the production of  highly
varied birdsong is probably, at most, a borderline case of  weakly cre-
ative origination. Many commonplace directive activities such as tying
shoe laces, putting on clothes, shaving, brushing one's teeth, eating,
and washing the dishes hardly ever count as being even weakly creat-
ive activities, but if  things don't go smoothly then some, usually
weak, creatively originative intervention may be needed to achieve the
desired directed outcome. The same is true of  many commonplace
animal activities. However, although a good deal of  the everyday life
of  humans and higher animals requires little creativity, when an end is
sought for which no well-established method for its pursuit already
exists, humans and higher animals use various methods – including
learning, problem-solving, and the exercise of  intelligence and invent-
iveness – to try to obtain what they want. Such activity is definitely
creatively originative – but much of  it only relatively weakly so.
8.3.19 Although borderline cases may be difficult to deal with, it
is relatively easy to exclude from being counted as creatively originat -
ive the very large number of  randomly originative processes that pro-
duce mere jumbles or haphazard arrangement of  things with little or
no collective, or systemic, identity. For instance, my desktop as I write
this consists of  a relatively jumbled arrangement of  papers, books,
letters, notes, jottings, pens, pencils and a good many other items.
This jumbled arrangement is not a highly complex unity, nor even a
system because it has few significant properties as a whole. Rather,
any properties the desktop does have tend to belong to the individual
items on it, or some subsets of  items (such as groups of  related
sheets of  paper). Certainly, specific states and jumbles of  things may
play an important secondary role in creative origination, but they
don't play a primary role. For example, in searching through a pile of
papers on my desktop I may on some (rare) occasion notice two sep-
arate and unrelated pieces of  text that jointly trigger a new thought.
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However, the processes and interactions that led to the (more or less
random) placing of  these sheets, and my rummaging activity, should
not themselves be regarded as being even weakly creatively originat-
ive. Rather, the primary source of  creative origination lay within my
mind-brain – although the creative process involved was essentially
dependent upon the particular arrangement of  my desktop at the
time, and my more or less chance interaction with it.
8.3.20 Conflictual and/or competitive interaction between pur-
posive agents has been taken to be a creatively originative process
when there if  nothing prefiguring how the interaction will run on any
particular occasion. However, much of  this sort of  interaction should
be taken as only weakly creatively originative when the outcome be -
longs to a small, well-defined set of  types of  possible outcome – as
happens in competitive games, for example.
8.4 Mid-Range Creative Origination
8.4.1 In the space available, only brief  consideration can be
given to this vast topic. Some relevant points shall be made but a
great deal will not be mentioned. Again, independence indeterminism
is presumed to hold and it is assumed that creative origination is
heavily dependent upon independence interactions – both chance
and directed ones – taking place within the mind-brains of  the agents
concerned and between the agents and their environments. Most
forms of  learning and relatively straightforward kinds of  problem-
solving constitute the bulk of  mid-range creative origination and it is
these topics that shall mainly be discussed, although some mention
will be made of  invention.
8.4.2 Trial-and-error learning is the simplest means by which
new or modified skills and procedures may be acquired by an animal
or a human. Edward Thorndike studied this common form of  learn-
ing in the final years of  the 19th century. To take a well-known ex-
ample, in one series of  experiments a hungry cat is placed in a box
from which it can see food outside. The door of  the box can only be
opened if  the cat correctly manipulates a lever. In the first trial, the
cat carries out a great deal of  clawing, biting, and moving about in a
futile attempt to get out of  the box before, more or less fortuitously,
it happens to move the lever and the door opens. On subsequent tri -
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als, although there is no sudden grasping of  the relationship between
moving the lever and the door opening, the time taken before the cat
moves the lever tends to decrease until eventually the cat almost im-
mediately moves it when placed in the box. It is possible to train an-
imals to perform quite elaborate procedures using a form of  trial-
and-error learning known as operant conditioning (also known as in-
strumental learning, and in AI as reinforcement learning). The
method consists in rewarding an animal (or human) when they hap-
pen, more or less by chance initially, to perform a certain action when
placed in a certain situation, or when presented with a certain stimu -
lus. In this way an animal’s behaviour may be shaped in quite complex
ways. For example, pigeons may be trained to get a food reward by
pecking at a particular place when the string of  letters PECK is dis -
played, and by turning when the string TURN is presented. There is
no suggestion that the pigeons understand the meaning of  “peck”
and “turn” – they have simply learned to respond in a particular way
to a particular visual pattern in order to obtain a food reward. Some
hard-line behaviourists – such as B.F. Skinner, who did a great deal of
experimental work on operant conditioning – argue that human beha-
viour is almost entirely a product of  implicit and explicit operant
conditioning that is linked to the often complex and subtle rewards
contained within the social environment of  humans. On this view
there is no place for free will, although it may be argued, as Skinner
does in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Skinner 1971), that a soci-
ety founded on a humanely and strictly organized system of  operant
conditioning would offer humans the most satisfactory kind of  life
that is possible.
8.4.3 Animals do not learn new skills and solve problems by
trial-and-error learning alone, often the process involves some reas-
oning as well. For instance, rodents such as squirrels and rats show
remarkable ingenuity in obtaining food. And some animals (and hu-
mans to a much greater extent) are able to use what is known as in-
sight learning in which relationships and understanding arise seem-
ingly all at once and not slowly through trial and error. For example,
in experiments with birds (e.g. crows, ravens), it has been observed
that some are able to bend a length of  wire to form a hook in order
to remove food from a tube. In recent decades, understanding of  the
range and complexity of  the apparently insightful problem-solving
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that some animals can achieve has grown greatly, but studies into in -
sight learning have their roots in work done over a century ago, and it
is some of  this research that shall be discussed as it illustrates several
important points.
8.4.4 Between 1913 and 1917 Wolfgang Kohler carried out ex-
tensive studies of  the learning and problem-solving behaviour of
captive chimpanzees, and he gave an account of  his work in his book
The Mentality of  Apes (Kohler 1928, 1957). The seven or so chimpan-
zees he studied lived in relatively free conditions in a compound on
Tenerife. Kohler and his assistants observed the activity of  the
chimps in a range of  test situations in which some desired object,
usually fruit, was visible to the animals but placed out of  their easy
reach, or beyond their present skill to retrieve. Kohler found strong
and striking evidence for the more or less sudden development by the
chimps of  procedures by which they could obtain the desired object.
His conclusion was that the suddenness of  the change in behaviour
suggested that the procedures were produced by the use of  insight as
well as trial-and-error learning. In what is known as the single-box ex-
periment, Kohler attached food (such as a banana) to the top of  a
chimpanzee’s cage well out of  the chimp’s reach. However, the food
could be reached if  the chimp first moved a box under the food,
climbed on it, and then jumped up to snatch the food. Only the most
intelligent chimp, Sultan, was able to learn to do this unaided – other
chimps learned how if  they were helped by having the box placed un -
der the food, or if  they observed other chimps using this method.
Kohler went on to investigate a more difficult problem in which a
chimp must place, in a way that is stable and climbable, a second box
on top of  the first before they can reach the food. Some chimps –
those familiar with the solution to the single-box problem – seemed
to be able to acquire the key insight of  “one-box-on-another”, how-
ever none of  them seemed to be able to acquire the additional insight
of  the need for stability and climbability – they only achieved this
knowledge through trial-and-error learning.
8.4.5 Kohler did further experiments on insight learning with
one involving chimps having to use sticks to rake in food placed out-
side their cage beyond their unaided reach. Again, once the skill had
been learned, a chimp placed in a similar situation immediately
looked for a stick, rather than using trial-and-error. However, Sultan
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was the only chimp who was able to go one step further in that he
eventually learned how to join two bamboo sticks together to make a
joined-stick long enough to rake in the food. It is worth giving a
more detailed account of  what happened because it seems to shows
clear signs of  a process of  creative origination taking place within the
mind-brain of  Sultan – a process that seems to involve the non-pre -
figured connecting up of  notions, understandings, memories, etc. that
were previously independent of  one another. (The following account
and the included quotations are from the English translation of
Kohler 1957, pp. 111-114)
8.4.6 Near Sultan were placed two hollow-ended bamboo sticks
– one of  a lesser diameter than the other so that it was possible to in -
sert an end of  this stick firmly into the open end of  the larger dia-
meter one to make a rigid longer stick. Outside the bars of  the en-
closure several bananas were placed too far away to be reached by
either stick alone. Sultan started by trying hard to reach the fruit by
using a single stick, but he eventually gave this up. Kohler tells us that
at this point Sultan made a “bad error” in that he pulled a box from
the back of  the room towards the bars, but he soon realised that this
was a pointless move and he abandoned it. Sultan then immediately
did something which Kohler identified as a “good error”: he pushed
one of  the sticks with the other out towards the fruit. To make con-
tact with the fruit in this way is a tricky thing to achieve, but Sultan
persevered and eventually succeeded, which seemed to give him a
good deal of  satisfaction.
8.4.7 There are several things in this first stage of  the experi-
ment that are characteristic of  most creative origination of  this prob -
lem-solving and insight-based kind. Firstly, it is generally highly mo -
tivated directive activity in that the agent persists with it in spite of
failures – which seems to be strong evidence that the agent has a
clear and valued goal in mind. Secondly, it seems that higher animals
(and humans) generally don't like to give up on a valued goal once
pursuit of  it has commenced – indeed, persistence in pursuit of  a
goal is a mark of  all purposive activity. A third feature of  much of
this sort of  behaviour is that the value the agent attaches to achieving
the goal does not seem to lie solely in the intrinsic worth of  the goal
– e.g. in Sultan's case, having a tasty item of  food to eat – but also in
the satisfaction to be obtained in achieving a difficult end. It seems
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some higher animals, and humans to a very great extent, gain consid-
erable satisfaction in proving their competence to themselves (and of-
ten, at least in the case of  humans, to others as well). 
8.4.8 A fourth important feature of  much complex goal-direc-
ted activity that is illustrated by Sultan's efforts to get the fruit, is that
the agent concerned is able to transfer the value they attach to attain-
ing their ultimate goal to the achievement of  preliminary and inter-
mediate goals. This is what Sultan seemed to be doing when he
worked so persistently in trying to push one stick with another in or-
der to touch the fruit – he seemed to have come to believe that
achieving the sub-goal “Make contact with the fruit” would help him
achieve his ultimate goal of  actually acquiring the fruit. What he had
failed to appreciate is that merely being able to touch the fruit with
the sticks doesn't on its own enable the fruit to be raked in – a rigid
rod capable of  doing this is needed, and this he had not appreciated.
A fifth point worth making is that in trying to achieve a goal when an
agent lacks the skill or knowledge to do so – i.e. when they have to
resort to creative origination – sometimes results in an agent trying a
method they are familiar with for obtaining the sort of  goal in ques -
tion even when the method is inappropriate in the given situation.
This makes some sense since often a solution to a new problem can
be created by modifying, or partly making use of, an existing method.
Indeed, the creative origination of  complex entities rarely starts from
nothing – it almost always builds on systems and procedures that
already exist. Sultan's “bad error”, as Kohler called it, seems to be an
example of  this: Sultan seemed to think that climbing on boxes
would help in some way. However, once he retrieved a box he realised
that this approach wouldn’t help. Humans are able – through using
their powers of  imagination-based reasoning – to dismiss as infeas-
ible many potential approaches to finding a solution to a problem
without having to try them out in practice. Nevertheless, human do
often test ideas out in reality (or in representations of  reality) in an ef-
fort to properly appreciate their strengths and weaknesses. And in do-
ing this, humans often get ideas for new approaches. Higher animals,
lacking the advanced cognitive capabilities of  human persons, mainly
have to try ideas out in practice before they can see their relevance or
usefulness – or indeed, uselessness. Some further points worth making
relate to what happened next.
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8.4.9  To try to help Sultan see how a rigid stick might me con-
structed by pushing one stick into the other, Kohler tried moving his
finger into and out of  the end of  one of  the sticks. But Sultan didn’t
see the significance of  this. This exemplifies another general point –
the sixth mentioned so far – namely, that giving hints and clues to-
wards a solution, or simply having them available in a problem-
solver's environment, is generally not much help unless the agent is in
an appropriately receptive condition, which usually means that they
have almost seen the suggested way forward themselves. Again, this is
something that seems to be a common feature of  the sort of  creative
origination being discussed: creating the new is generally done incre -
mentally rather than wholesale, but with occasionally a vital insight
being created that joins up several previously relatively disconnected
ideas. The occurrence of  such an “ah-ah” moment is apparent in
what Sultan did next. This happened after Sultan had lost interest in
retrieving the out-of-reach fruit, even after the sticks were thrown
through the bars again in order to encourage him to have another try
with them. At this point the experiment had lasted over an hour, and
Kohler had decided that Sultan on his own was never going to under-
stand that he could join the sticks. Kohler therefore decided to leave
the Keeper in charge so that he could attend to other matters, but it is
shortly after this that something really interesting happened. The
Keeper reports on what this was as follows. 
Sultan first of  all squats indifferently on the box, which has
been left standing a little back from the railings; then he gets
up, picks up the two sticks, sits down on the box and plays
carelessly with them. While doing this, it happens that he
finds himself  holding one rod in either hand in such a way
that they lie in a straight line; he pushes the thinner one a little
way into the opening of  the thicker, jumps up and is already
on the run towards the railings, to which he has up to now
half  turned his back, and begins to draw the banana towards
him with the double stick. I call the master: meanwhile one
of  the animal’s rods has fallen out of  the other, as he has
pushed one of  them only a little way into the other;
whereupon he connects them again.
The keepers report covers a period of  barely five minutes. Kohler
then took up observation and reports as follows.
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Sultan is squatting at the bars, holding one stick, and, at its
end, a second bigger one, which is on the point of  falling off.
It does fall, Sultan pulls it to him, and forthwith, with the
greatest assurance, pushes the thinner one on again, so that it
is firmly wedged, and fetches a fruit with the lengthened im-
plement. But the bigger tube selected is a little too big, and so
it slips from the end of  the thinner one several times; each
time Sultan re-joins the tubes immediately by holding the big -
ger one towards himself  in the left hand and the thinner one
in his right hand and a little backwards, and then sliding one
over the other. The proceeding seems to please him im-
mensely; he is very lively, pulls all the fruit, one after the
other, towards the railings, without taking time to eat it, and
when I disconnect the double-stick he puts it together again
at once, and draws any distant object whatever to the bars.
8.4.10 It is worth noting – as a seventh general point – that Sul -
tan's ah-ah moment did not seem to have come entirely out of  the
blue. He had been working with several sticks and knows that he can
reach the fruit with two of  them end-to-end. He had failed to get the
fruit because he didn’t have a rigid stick that was long enough. He
had repeatedly and persistently tried to get the fruit using the sticks
individually and had finally given up. He had been shown that a finger
fits in the end of  a bamboo stick, but had not seen that this suggests
one stick may fit into another. In other words, Sultan was fairly
deeply engaged with the problem and had explored ways of  solving it
prior to having his ah-ah moment. This is almost always true of  ah-
ah moments as they arise in problem-solving and invention. Sultan's
mind-brain was prepared, and, although he voluntarily took a break,
we may assume he was still partially pre-occupied with memories of
his recent endeavours, failures, and successes relating to his fruit-get -
ting efforts. This seems to be typical of  creative origination of  the
sort being described: a prepared mind-brain and one sufficiently oc -
cupied with pursuing some current goal, even if  sub-consciously so,
for the possible emergence of  new connections. Having “explored
the territory” also seems to be a necessary prerequisite: a creative
solution rarely comes to those who have had no engagement with the
problem domain in question. However, there is another point (the
eighth to be made so far), which seems to partially contradict it:
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namely, that often a creative breakthrough comes when an agent has
temporarily disengaged themselves from a problem – or at least dis-
engaged themselves consciously. There are many examples of  this in
the human world. For instance, to take a case from the author’s own
experience, in the early 1970s I was involved in studying how com-
puter engineers identified (and then repaired) faults in mainframe
computer systems and I noticed how frequently a breakthrough came
during a coffee or meal break when an engineer's mind was tempor -
arily disengaged from what they had earlier been working on so in-
tensively. Much of  the sorting and linking that leads to the solving of
a problem (or the resolution of  a conflict within the self) seems to
benefit from being detached from consciousness. Any person who
does crosswords will have experienced how the solution to a clue may
suddenly spring to mind when they are doing something else, or will
be immediately available to their consciousness when they take up the
puzzle after a break. This underlines the well-known fact that much
of  great importance goes on subconsciously or unconsciously. For in-
stance, in his 2015 book Freedom Regained: The Possibility of  Free Will ,
Julian Baggini discusses (pp. 88-92) the importance to an artist or
writer of  allowing their unconscious free rein.
8.4.11 Finally, it is worth re-emphasising that Sultan seemed to be
motivated not merely by the need for food – he was not starving –
but by something less tangible: namely, the need to achieve a goal he
had set for himself, a goal that challenged his abilities, and the
achievement of  which seemed to satisfy a need within him to prove
his own competence. The existence of  this “need for achievement”
motivation seems to underlie Sultan's keenness to rake in all the fruit
rather than just what he required to satisfy his appetite: it seems he
wanted to repeatedly demonstrate to himself  just how clever and cap-
able he is. This need for achievement and success is very strong
within humans, but it seems it may exist to some extent in some an-
imals as well.
8.4.12 In the foregoing discussion little has been said about hu-
man-based mid-range creative origination. The reason for this is that
there is so much human mid-range creative origination that it is diffi -
cult to know what to mention without suggesting that what is dis-
cussed is the most widespread or important. With this proviso in
mind, consider some of  the learning-based creatively originated
200
achievements of  a typical person in the modern world as they live
their life. These achievements include such things as acquiring profi-
ciency in the language and rules of  conduct of  their family and com -
munity; gaining the basic skills of  everyday life (e.g. how to wash and
dress themselves, do simple chores, eat food, operate household
equipment); and in learning how to read and write and do simple
arithmetic. And a typical person learns all sorts of  facts – not just
school facts, but facts about their family, their friends, their home,
their locality, their family's religion, and their nation’s culture and his-
tory. Later in life they carry out much directed learning of  such things
as facts, knowledge, skills and understanding, and they do so at
school, college and university, in their jobs, and in conjunction with
their various hobbies, sports, and projects. And they learn a great
many other things, such as how to drive; how to cook, clean, garden,
sew, decorate; how to play a musical instrument; how to draw and
paint; how to swim, dance, and sing; how to use computers, smart-
phones, etc.; and how to carry out the specialist skills that their job
may require. And a further large and important area of  learning con-
cerns how people come to identify and create the values, goals and
specific objectives that may help them achieve their higher-level ends
and purposes, or help them satisfy unsatisfied motivations such as a
desire for self-actualisation.
8.4.13 In addition to learning – and often as part of  it – human
persons (and some higher animals) also engage in inventiveness. In
the discussion of  Sultan's ah-ah moment some general points were
made about what is typical about such processes of  creative origina-
tion. Many attempts have been made to understand and explain what
is involved in individual human creative origination of  the inventive -
ness or ah-ah sort. Graham Wallas in his book The Art of  Thought
(Wallas 1926) identified five stages. (1) Preparation: exploration and
clarification of  the problem; initial attempts to find a solution; recog -
nition that something new is required; frustration in not being able to
readily solve the problem. (2) Incubation: temporary abandonment
of  conscious pursuit of  the problem; unconscious processing con -
tinuing. (3) Intimation: a feeling that there is a new way forward; a
conscious desire to revisit the problem. (4) Illumination: the ah-ah
breakthrough occurs. (5) Verification: refining and firming up the
new idea; checking it out, and implementing it; revising it as neces-
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sary. Wallace drew upon the work of  others on human problem-solv-
ing and inventiveness (that of  Herman von Helmholtz and Henri
Poincare, in particular), and many other writers have since developed
their own multi-stage models of  the process but, it seems, generally
with little of  great significance being added.
8.4.14 Although the stages that a person typically goes through
during mid-range creative origination are fairly clear, it is much less
clear how novel (i.e. non-prefigured) things are actually originated.
Biological evolution seems to be based on at least three principles
that are also commonly used in human creative origination. These
are: (1) create the new by successive modifications of  the currently
existing; (2) modify copies or fresh versions of  the currently existing,
not the currently existing itself; (3) evaluate the new against certain
criteria and purge those that fail to come up to the mark. However,
unlike biological evolution through natural selection, humans are cap -
able of directed creative origination. Directed creation, apart from re-
quiring intelligence also seems to use at least three further principles,
as follows. (4) Create the new by forming and working with repres-
entations of  the existing, rather than with the existing real things
themselves. (5) Use analysis, as well as chance, to produce new pos -
sibilities. And (6), use representations (e.g. plans, blueprints, simula -
tions) of  new things to guide their actual production. With directed
creative origination these principles may themselves be applied to the
application of  these principles. For instance, these principles may be
used to help creatively originate some of  the evaluation criteria that
are used in a creative endeavour; or they may be used to creatively
originate some of  the representational techniques to be used; or to
creatively originate some of  the analytical methods. It is the ex-
traordinary powers of  directed creative origination that humans indi-
vidually and collectively possess that have contributed greatly to the
emergence and growth of  the realm of  civilization.
8.4.15 One further thing worth pointing out about human direc-
ted creative origination is that people are able to identify and preserve
items that they have either found or created that seem to them to
have value but of  a specific sort that they have not yet been able to
fully recognise or exploit. For example, some novelists keep note-
books containing such things as fragments of  conversations, or sen-
tences, phrases, ideas, or character outlines that come from their per-
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sonal observations and experiences, or have been created by them
and which seem to them to have value but of  a sort they cannot yet
incorporate into a larger creative production. And artists and other
creative workers do much the same thing.
8.5 High-End Creative Origination
8.5.1 Some things have already been said about high-end creat-
ive origination and little shall be added in this final section of  the
chapter because attempting to address it more fully would not be ap -
propriate in this book. The reason why this is so is that it has been as-
sumed that high-end creative origination is something belonging to
groups and not to individuals. For example, biological evolution by
natural selection is a group process not an individual one, although
without individual living organisms there would be no biological evol -
ution. Similarly, in the human world high-end creative origination al -
ways takes place within groups, but again it would not exist without
individual human persons who make up the groups concerned. Of
course, in the human world high-end creative origination has often
been greatly influenced by the significant creative contribution of
particular individuals, but without these contributions being taken up
by others they would not have the widespread impact that marks out
high-end creative origination as being different from what goes on in
the mid-range.
8.5.2 High-end creative origination is a process that itself  cre-
ates many of  the entities that play a key role in realising and sustain -
ing the process in question. For instance, living organism play a key
role in the process of  biological evolution but are themselves a creat -
ive outcome of  this very process. And, as another example, many of
the ideas, skills, and artefacts that were created in the early stages of
the industrial revolution played a key part in the further creative de-
velopment of  that revolution.
8.5.3 The emergence and continuing evolution of  technological
civilisation provides a stunning example of  high-end creative origina -
tion. The industrial revolution – out of  which full-blown technolo-
gical civilisation has emerged – arose less than three hundred years
ago, yet since then it has led to an utterly extraordinary extension to
existence: an extension realised by the hugely powerful, highly reflex-
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ive, and multi-stranded process of  purposively directed creative ori-
gination that is part of  the realm of  technology and human civiliza -
tion as it exists today. This realm differs from the realm of  biology,
upon which it (at present) depends, because it makes use of  purpos -
ively and intelligently directed creative origination rather than solely
the kind of  non-purposive creativity found in biological evolution by
natural selection. Furthermore, the realm of  technological civilization
is characterised by the creation of  artefacts – entities that are construc-
ted using skill and intelligence rather than being grown as living things
are. It seems that with the emergence of  purposively and intelligently
directed creative origination that a new realm of  existence has come
into being – what perhaps may be called the “realm of  the artificial”
– and this seems to be a remarkably important event in the evolution
of  the universe.
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9 Independence Indeterminism: Its Wider 
Significance
9.1 Introduction
9.1.1 Independence indeterminism has significance beyond be-
ing able to help resolve the problem of  free will. After making some
further general comments below, in the second section a critique of
absolute determinism is given which lends support for arguing, in the
third section, that a better case may be made for accepting independ-
ence indeterminism rather than determinism as our default natural-
istic metaphysics. The next five sections are concerned with how in-
dependence indeterminism may help resolve some philosophical dis -
putes other than the problem of  free will. The final section of  the
chapter argues that while independence indeterminism is compatible
with naturalism it is not compatible with physicalism.
9.1.2 It seems clear that independence indeterminism offers a
novel worldview. Some people will readily grasp that it reinforces the
belief  that humans have tremendous powers of  directed origination
and also of  directed creative origination, and that this means that
people can, in some respects, truly make their own future. Further-
more, this new naturalistic metaphysics supplies arguments for the
existence of  these powers that can stand up to traditional criticisms
from scientists and philosophers that such powers cannot possibly
exist. But there are aspects of  independence indeterminism that
many people who would welcome much of  what it says would feel
disturbed by. One of  these aspects is that it sees the universe as lack-
ing full definiteness – something that seems to be simply wrong to
many people. Nevertheless, mainstream physics already accepts that
indefiniteness exists because Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle as-
serts that an irreducible indefiniteness exists between the values of
what are known as conjugate variables. The best known example of
this irreducible indefiniteness is that which exists between the values
of  the momentum of  a particle and its position. This indefiniteness is
not, as is often supposed, a result of  a measurement of  the value of
one variable disturbing the value of  the other variable – rather it is
taken to be an intrinsic feature of  the nature of  the quantum world.
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Mainstream physics also accepts that there cannot be a common mo-
ment of  “now” for the universe, which adds to its indefiniteness. But
since these kinds of  indefiniteness do not belong to the world of
everyday experience they tend not to challenge most people’s belief
in the definiteness of  reality. However, the claim of  independence in -
determinism that independence of  change is extremely common does
apply to the everyday world, and this assumption implies that how in -
dependently changing things jointly change is indefinite – something
which many people may find difficult to accept. And there is a fur-
ther aspect of  independence indeterminism that will disturb some
people: namely, that it does not see the world as a unified whole with
everything having a necessary place within it, but rather it takes the
universe to be a non-unity which is loosely connected with many gaps
within and between causal networks and in which most things get on
with their business quite independently of  what most other things are
doing.
9.1.3 The really positive feature of  independence indeterminism
is that it has a naturalistic place for creative origination. That is, it al -
lows connections (and disconnections) to be originated that are of
types that are not prefigured to come into existence. Hence it has a
place for the creation of  genuine novelty. And with the biological
evolution of  intelligent purposive beings such as human persons it
provides a place also for directed creative origination and the opening
up of  the realm of  civilization and the realm of  the artificial.
9.2 A Critique of  Absolute Determinism
9.2.1 Various accounts of  absolute determinism have been
offered (see section 3.2) but for the purposes of  this critique the ap-
proach adopted by Peter van Inwagen will be considered because it is
particularly explicit and it has already been discussed (see section 3.4).
His account consists of  two (informal) assumptions, or theses, that
shall be referred to as A and B.
Thesis A For every instant of  time, there is a proposition that
expresses the state of  the world at that instant.
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Thesis B I f p and q are any propositions that express the state
of  the world at some instants, then the conjunction
of  p and the laws of  nature entails q.
9.2.2 Thesis A refers to “every instant of  time” and “the state
of  the world” at an instant of  time. “Instant”, used as a noun, means:
1 a particular point in time; the moment which in passing may be
called now. 2 a very brief  portion of  time; moment (Webster’s Diction-
ary 1998). It is unclear in what sense van Inwagen is using the word
instant, but in the literature on determinism an instant is generally
taken to be a point in time in which nothing changes. However, this
notion needs to be examined in more detail.
9.2.3 Treating an instant as a true point in time gives rise to
problems. Perhaps the most notable is how to get change from non-
change: a problem recognized by the ancient Greeks. Zeno of  Elea
(c. 470 BC) in his “Arrow Paradox” argued that at every instant of
time a flying arrow must be at rest in a single definite place, for noth-
ing can change within a true instant of  time. But if  the arrow is mo -
tionless at each instant then how can it change location from instant
to instant and so be flying? Henri Bergson, writing in the early 20th
century, put this point quite bluntly when he wrote: ‘[E]very attempt
to reconstitute change out of  states implies the absurd proposition,
that movement is made of  immobilities.’ (Henri Bergson 1911, p.
325)
9.2.4 However, Bergson rather overstates his point since it is
possible to represent continuous change using immobilities as Newton
and Leibniz, working independently, showed in the 17th century.
What they developed is known as the infinitesimal calculus. Some in-
sight into the approach may be gained by considering one aspect of
the motion of  an arrow: namely, its speed at an instant in time. Aver -
age speed is not a problem: it is simply distance travelled divided by
the time taken. What is a problem is instantaneous speed because an
instant has zero duration and anything – such as distance travelled –
divided by zero is infinity. But of  course an arrow can’t travel any dis -
tance at all in a true instant of  time, so its average speed at an instant
is equal to zero divided by zero – an undefined mathematical quantity.
Yet, intuitively, it seems strange that something – such as the speed
of  an arrow – should have a meaningful value over an extremely
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small duration of  time, but no meaningful value when this small in-
terval finally disappears altogether. The introduction of  the infinites -
imal calculus solved this problem and allowed variables that represent
continuous change to be given a finite value at what is effectively an
infinitesimally small mathematical point. This was done by taking the
value to be that towards which the ratio representing the change ten-
ded as the quantities involved in defining it approached zero. How-
ever, many mathematicians and others remained unconvinced and it
was not until the 19th century with the introduction of  the formal
mathematical concept of  limits that the infinitesimal calculus was put
on fairly sound conceptual and mathematical foundations. But even
so, not all mathematicians have been satisfied and the matter remains
an open topic.
9.2.5 Although many of  the fundamental equations of  physics,
and other sciences, are expressed in terms of  the calculus, discontinu -
ous change cannot be described in these terms. Hence Bergson
would be correct in saying that discontinuous change cannot be recon-
stituted from immobilities. Discontinuous change is common in the
non-living world – for example, the breaking of  a rock, phase trans-
itions (e.g. the transformation of  a substance from solid to liquid to
vapour, and vice versa), and some sub-atomic processes such as the
disintegration of  a nucleus, or the emission of  a photon from an
atom. Discontinuous change is even more common in the biological
realm – for example, cell division, hunting, mating, and nest-building
are all processes containing many discontinuities of  change. And in
the human world discontinuous change is probably more common
than continuous change.
9.2.6 Given the difficulty of  defining an instant in a way that al-
lows all forms of  natural change to be accounted for, it seems that it
is not obvious what is meant by the claim that ‘For every instant of
time, there is a proposition that expresses the state of  the world at
that instant’. It seems that what van Inwagen has in mind is some
sort of  Platonic notion of  what the said proposition is – that it is
something expressing an eternal truth that depends not at all upon
whether means have been devised to actually express this truth.
9.2.7 Consider next the metaphysical status of  van Inwagen’s
thesis B: that ‘If p and q are any propositions that express the state of
the world at some instants, then the conjunction of p and the laws of
208
nature entails q.’ This thesis ensures that, under absolute determin-
ism, there is one history for the universe – one which is fixed at the
beginning of  time, or for eternity if  time has no beginning. But it says
more than this because it asserts that the fixed history of  the universe
consists of  a succession of  instantaneous states of  the entire universe
(total states) that are all linked according to the laws of  nature.
9.2.8 The laws of  nature as they are currently understood all in-
volve sub-states or aspects of  existence; none of  them are laws refer -
ring to the total state of  existence. These human-produced laws ac-
count for some of  the pattern, structure, and order that is apparent in
the world. But there is nothing in van Inwagen’s Thesis B that says
the laws of  nature must be of  this sort: they could, in accordance
with the idea discussed earlier (see section 6.4), consist of  a single list
of  items with each item fully describing each instantaneous total state
of  existence. If  this were the case then there would be no need to in -
corporate instantaneously existing infinitesimals, or something sim-
ilar, in order to fix how a sub-state – such as the position of  an object
– changes from instant to instant. If  the true laws of  nature – not the
human-produced ones – are of  this total-state form then the current
sub-state laws approach of  science is way off  beam. But even if  the
sub-state laws approach is correct science is still very far from having
identified anything like a final set of  laws. Indeed, even without ac -
cepting the metaphysics of  independence indeterminism, quantum
indeterminacy means there can be no set of  laws that completely de -
termines future total states of  the universe. At best, Thesis B is an as-
sumption that is only partially supported by the findings of  current
science.
9.2.9 However, perhaps science is closer to a “Theory of
Everything” than what has just been said. For many years, but with
little widely agreed success so far, physicists have been trying to es -
tablish a unification of  quantum theory and general relativity to pro-
duce a so-called theory of  quantum gravity. But a unified account of
fundamental physics is very far from being a theory of everything, as
the distinguished physicist and cosmologist, Martin Rees makes clear.
The sciences are in a hierarchy of  complexity, from particle
physics, through chemistry and cell biology, to psychology
and ecology. But each of  these sciences is autonomous, in
that it depends on its own set of  concepts that can’t be ana -
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lysed into anything simpler. To understand turbulent flow of
water, a challenging and still unsolved problem, you must
think in terms of  wetness, whirls, eddies, and so forth: analys -
ing the water into atoms doesn’t help – indeed it erases all its
distinctive features. And – to take a different example – what
goes on in a computer could be described in electrical terms,
but that misses the essence, the logic encoded in those signals.
(Rees 1997, pp. 175-176)
9.2.10 It seems that without the emergence of  life – and from
this the emergence of  the human world and the realms of  civilization
and the artificial – the universe would be lacking many distinctive
kinds of  things: things such as the specific living forms that have
evolved, and the particular types of  artefacts that have been pro-
duced by the purposively and intelligently directed creative activity of
humans. Independence indeterminism sees creative origination play-
ing a vital role in the emergence of  many of  the distinctive products
of  these two realms. But even if  independence indeterminism is dis-
missed, as long as the current macro-deterministic and micro-inde-
terministic view of  nature hold sway it is likely to be accepted that
quantum indeterminacies (occurring in the interaction of  nuclear ra-
diation with genes, for example) have played a part in genetic muta-
tion and therefore in influencing the particular course the evolution
of  life has taken. If  this line of  thinking is correct then the belief
central to absolute determinism – that the past history of  the uni-
verse, together with the laws of  nature, completely fixes every detail
of  its future – is seriously undermined.
9.2.11 Are there other accounts of  absolute determinism that
would fare better in the support they are able to gain from scientific
evidence? The most familiar and important thesis of  determinism
that might, at least at first sight, not seem to need to refer to the laws
of  nature and instantaneous states of  the whole universe is that based
on the so-called law of  cause and effect. However, as has already
been argued (see section 3.3), upon examination this thesis has seri-
ous weaknesses. Nevertheless, many writers on free will still rely on
the law of  cause and effect as grounds for asserting the truth of  de -
terminism. For example, Patricia Churchland (see 1.4.12) feels able to
state, apparently as a matter of  fact, that ‘[t]he problem [with the tra-
ditional view of  free will] is that choices are made by brains, and
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brains operate causally’, and this leads her to dismiss the Indifferent
Will and indifferently originative free will as nonsense. However, it is
currently an open scientific question whether brains do operate
wholly causally since there is some evidence (for example, recall the
work of  Peter Tse, section 5.4) that quantum indeterministic events –
which, according to mainstream thinking, are events that do not arise
in a causally deterministic way – play a role in some brain processes.
But, as a few further examples will show, Patricia Churchland is not
alone in simply assuming – as a matter of  fact rather than as an ac-
knowledged metaphysical presupposition – that cause and effect
dominates how people function and think. Richard Oerton, in his
book The Nonsense of  Free Will feels able to assert as an obvious fact
that ‘determinism is causality’. (Oerton 2012, p. 7) And later he ex -
pands on this assertion by writing: ‘Determinism is no more than a
natural process of  cause and effect which works its way towards our
existence, then encompasses our existence and everything we think
and feel and do, and then passes on, after our deaths to other things.’
(p. 14) Tom Clark, who edits the naturalism.org website writes:
‘Judged from a scientific and logical perspective, the belief  that we
stand outside the causal web in any respect is an absurdity, the height
of  human egoism and exceptionalism. [...] Everything is a function
of, and participates in, the causal web; we are no exception.’ And Sam
Harris in his short but influential book Free Will writes: ‘Free will is an
illusion. Our wills are simply not of  our own making. Thoughts and
intentions emerge from background causes of  which we are unaware
and over which we have no control.’ (Harris 2012, p. 5) Given these
strongly-held assumptions it seems that belief  in determinism is not
likely to die out soon even though independence indeterminism is a
more credible metaphysical doctrine, as shall now be argued.
9.3 The Case for Adopting Independence 
Indeterminism
9.3.1 A good deal has been said so far in this book about inde -
pendence indeterminism and examples have been given, and argu-
ments presented that support the view that this is indeed how the
universe works. But it has been acknowledged all along that the thesis
is metaphysical and that at bottom, no matter how reasonable and in
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accordance with common-sense it may be, independence indetermin-
ism cannot be confirmed or denied by empirical or logical means. In
this respect it is no different from the thesis of  absolute determinism.
But where independence indeterminism is different is in the much
greater support it gets from science and common experience than
does absolute determinism.
9.3.2 Recall that the primary assumption of  independence inde-
terminism asserts that stretches of  change that to some extent
run truly independently of  one another are extremely common
in our universe. This assumption is about non-repeatable, one-off
particular dated and located stretches of  change and not about types
of  stretches of  change, and because this is so no experiments can be
done to confirm or deny its validity. But what is remarkable about it
in comparison with the thesis of  absolute determinism, in the form
discussed above, is that it calls upon no abstract concepts like “the
state of  the universe at an instant”, and “the laws of  nature”. The
phrase “stretches of  change” may be unfamiliar, but once explained it
is easy to find examples. Similarly, the idea of  “true independence of
change” is quite intelligible once it is explained what it means. Never -
theless, in discussing whether or not “true independence of  change”
exists, care has been taken (see section 6.3) to say that it is only evid -
ence for type-independence of  change that is available, and not evid -
ence for token-independence of  change – which is what “independ-
ence of  change” refers to.
9.3.3 Quite apart from the truth or falsity of  the assumption of
independence of  change, it is certain that in living their lives and go -
ing about their business people believe that most specific dated and
located stretches of  change run in a way that is truly independent of
how most other specific dated and located stretches of  change run.
That is, they believe that they can ignore almost all of  what the rest
of  the universe is doing when they think about what it is that they
might do. And this belief  in the general independence of  change is
central to science. Science depends upon independent verification of
findings: that is, upon the belief  that it is possible – should any ap -
propriately competent scientists choose to do so – to replicate the es-
sential conditions and procedures leading to given findings and so
confirm (or disconfirm) these for themselves. That is, scientists be-
lieve that as long as they get the relevant conditions right – and they
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see no reason why they are not free to do this as their inclination and
resources allow – they can ignore what else is going on in the uni-
verse. Or put another way, they tacitly assume the truth of  the as-
sumption of  independence of  change. Furthermore, the sub-state
laws of  science – which are the only sort of  laws science has at
present – are based on the tacit assumption of  independence of
change because such laws assert that only the specific aspects of  ex -
istence that figure in a law need to be taken into account in describing
the phenomena concerned. Hence, whether scientists realise it or not,
they are already deeply committed to the assumption of  independ-
ence of  change.
9.3.4 If  a naturalistic metaphysics is based on assumptions that
are simpler, easier to accept, and gain more support from science
than those it competes with then these seem to be reasons enough
for preferring it to its competitors. And since independence inde-
terminism does score over absolute determinism on these counts it
seems it should be preferred to absolute determinism. But there is
another important reason for preferring one naturalistic metaphysics
over another, and this is because it gives rise to fewer irresolvable dis -
putes, or problems. As has been already argued, independence inde -
terminism helps resolve the problem of  free will – a problem that be-
lief  in absolute determinism is largely responsible for producing –
but it also helps resolve a number of  other long-standing disputes, as
shall be discussed in the next five sections. However, before doing
this it is important to recall some points made earlier.
9.3.5 It is generally accepted that when certain groups of  things
are related and interacting with one another in certain ways the group
collectively has properties and behaviours that the things themselves
don’t have, and (usually) don’t have when they are related and inter-
acting in a different way. Such groups are usually understood as being
systems, but thinking of  them as RENOIRs (relatively enduring net-
works of  influence relations) is often helpful when the particular par -
ticipants involved in realising the system may vary and when they are
in loose rather than tight relationships to one another as is frequently
the case when the participants are humans. It is often difficult to ex-
plain exactly why a particular type of  system or RENOIR has the
holistic properties it does have but two general points are worth mak-
ing. Firstly, a system or a RENOIR consists of  a distinctive network
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of  dependencies or influences – a network that links together things
which prior to their inclusion in the system or RENOIR changed
more or less independently of  one another, or were linked together in
other ways. Secondly, these networks possess new causal powers –
that is, they link events together into cause-effect, or input/output,
relationships that in the absence of  the network (or one functionally
equivalent to it) would not exist. For example, a working mobile
phone establishes (among many other things) a cause-effect link
between speech sounds made by its user and correlated radio waves
emitted by the phone – a cause-effect link that does not exist in the
absence of  the phone (or something functionally equivalent), and
which is a cause-effect relationship that the parts of  the phone separ-
ately are unable to realise. Few people deny the truth of  these two
points, but many people believe that the realisation of  all such sys -
tem-level causal links is fully reducible to a sequence – possibly a very
complex sequence – of  simpler cause-effect links, with this reduction
bottoming-out with cause-effect links between simple fundamental
entities.
9.3.6 One of  the major contributions of  independence inde -
terminism is that it challenges this widely held view. It does not deny
that dependency relations or influence relations play a major role in
determining what goes on in the world, but what it does deny is that
such relations account for everything that happens. It denies this be-
cause it sees origination as playing a part as well. Most chance origina-
tions, and many directed ones, are type-determined and so have some
sort of  predictability. However, independence indeterminism accepts
that some originated things (including events) are not prefigured to
occur and are therefore not predictable. Such creatively originated
things, and the processes responsible for producing them, will be
seen to play a major role in helping to resolve the problems discussed
next.
9.4 The Ontological Reductionism Problem
9.4.1 According to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy ontological
reductionism is ‘the belief  that the whole of  reality consists of  a min-
imal number of  entities or substances.’ (Honderich 1995, entry on
‘reductionism’). Mainstream physicists currently believe that the fun-
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damental entities are space-time, energy, and matter with matter con-
sisting of  irreducible fundamental particles and accompanying fields.
However, string theorists, who constitute a strong group of  physi-
cists, argue that rather than irreducible particles there are irreducible
‘strings’ of  energy vibrating in perhaps ten or so dimensions. And, to
add to how unclear scientists currently are about the fundamental
nature of  existence, mainstream cosmologists propose that in addi-
tion to ordinary matter, dark matter and dark energy should also exist
– however, they cannot agree upon the detailed nature of  these sup-
posed additional fundamental aspects of  reality.
9.4.2 A start may be made by addressing the question: What is
meant by “the whole of  reality”? If  reality is taken to be all that exists
at an instantaneous moment then it may be reasonable to see it as
consisting of  a minimal number of  types of  fundamental entity. But,
even on this view not enough is being said because the quantity and
configuration of  the fundamental types of  entity that exist at an in -
stantaneous moment also need to be specified. And it is also neces -
sary to know what sequence of  instantaneous states constitutes the
life-history of  reality. On the basis of  these two considerations, the
thesis of  ontological reductionism as stated in the form given above,
must be dismissed as inadequate.
9.4.3 How may the thesis be more adequately stated? One ap-
proach is to continue with the instantaneous-state view but expand it
according to van Inwagen's thesis of  absolute determinism outlined
in section 3.4. It may then be said that ontological reductionism is
“the belief  that the whole of  reality consists of  a pre-determined se -
quence of  instantaneous total states each composed of  a certain
quantity and configuration of  a minimal number of  types of  entities
or substances, with the instantaneous states of  the sequence determ-
inistically related to one another by a fixed set of  laws of  nature.” Put
in these terms, all change is fully reducible. But if  an alternative view
is adopted, say one in accordance with mainstream science which has
a place for quantum indeterminism and so for de novo originated
events, then not all change will be fully reducible. And if  independ-
ence indeterminism is adopted, then a very great deal of  the change
that is part of  reality will not be fully reducible because it involves in -
dependence interactions which, according to this metaphysics, are de
novo originated events whose occurrence is not reducible. So, from
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the perspective of  independence indeterminism, it may firmly be as-
serted that ontological reductionism is not possible. Of  course, this
only helps to resolve the dispute if  independence indeterminism is
accepted.
9.5 The Problem of  Emergent Properties
9.5.1 Turning again to The Oxford Companion to Philosophy: ‘A
property of  a complex system is said to be “emergent” just in case,
although it arises out of  the properties and relationships character -
ising its simpler constituents, it is neither predictable from, nor redu -
cible to these lower level characteristics.’ (Honderich 1995, entry on
‘emergent properties’.)
9.5.2 Properties that are an additive result of  the properties of
the components of  a system don’t present much of  a reducibility
problem. For example, the mass of  an assembled mobile phone may
readily be understood to be reducible to the sum of  the masses of  its
components. But the phone’s property of  being able to send and re-
ceive voice messages is not one that any of  its components possess
and so the reducibility of  this property is more of  a problem. Never -
theless, it is widely believed that this property may be understood to
be a consequence of  how the phone’s components interact and influ-
ence one another when related in the specific way they are in a work -
ing mobile phone. However, it should be recognised that an appropri-
ate environment (one containing at least an active cellular phone net -
work and users of  it) is essential for the manifestation of  this prop-
erty.
9.5.3 This last point is important. Many properties of  systems –
including abilities, powers, and behaviours – are environmentally de -
pendent and cannot actually exist without the existence of  an appro-
priate system-environment coupling (and this includes systems under-
stood as RENOIRs). Given this fairly obvious fact it seems some-
what surprising that such properties (and abilities, etc.) are taken to
be properties of  the system, rather than properties of  the system to-
gether with an appropriate environment. Perhaps this way of  thinking
is one of  the consequences of  the dominant place that substance,
rather than process, has played in thinking about what is the primary
feature of  existence. But whatever the reason for this view it is un-
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deniable that many properties – particularly those properties seen as
abilities or powers – only gain realisation through an appropriate kind
of  system-environment interaction. For example, the property of  be -
ing able to walk requires that the walking system – a person, say – be
able to interact in a certain way with an appropriate surface; and it is
recognised that not all surfaces support the required form of  interac-
tion: for instance, liquid water and vertical surfaces do not support
human walking. One consequence of  this is that a system may have
potentialities that never get actualised because the system never inter -
acts with an environment that enables the relevant properties to
manifest themselves. For example, a radio set in an environment
without appropriate radio channels to tune into will never manifest its
capacity to emit speech and music. And undoubtedly there are people
with talents that they have never fully expressed, or even expressed at
all, because the conditions that allow these to flourish have never
arisen for them.
9.5.4 Once it is made explicit that interaction with an appropri -
ate environment is essential for the actualisation of  certain properties,
the definition above will need to be modified. Here it is convenient to
re-use the prefix introduced when talking about input/output de-
pendent mind-processes (see 2.5.3). By an IOD-property is meant a
property whose realisation depends upon the system that is said to
possess it being engaged in certain types of  input/output interactions
with an appropriate environment. Using this term, it may then be said
that “An IOD-property of  a complex system is said to be ‘emergent’
just in case, although it arises out of  the properties and relationships
characterising its simpler components and how these interact with
one another and with an appropriate environment, it is a property
that is neither predictable from, nor reducible to these factors.”
9.5.5 It has been argued that processes involving de novo ori -
ginated events are neither wholly predictable nor wholly reducible be -
cause their course is not fully determined by prior conditions and the
laws of  nature. Hence, according to the revised definition just given,
it follows that those IOD-properties of  a system whose input/output
interactions entail de novo originated events will be emergent proper-
ties simply because these events, being de novo originations (e.g. in -
dependence interactions, or quantum indeterministic occurrences),
are not wholly reducible. What this means, for instance, is that the
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colour of  an object should be taken to be an emergent IOD-property
because its colour is realised by independence interactions between
the various sorts of  photons that constitute white light and the elec-
trons, atoms and molecules of  the object. However, because the ori-
ginations (i.e. independence interactions) involved are strongly type-
determined, most people would be reluctant to count such a property
as emergent. It would seem sensible therefore to exclude those prop-
erties whose manifestation involves only type-determined origina-
tions from being classified as emergent properties.
9.5.6 Under independence indeterminism, all that is required for
a closed system to manifest a property that is neither predictable nor
reducible is for the process that expresses this property to involve in -
dependence interactions among the internal parts of  the system. For
example, a lottery tumbler regarded as a closed system with the prop-
erty of  ejecting numbered balls in a random sequence is manifesting a
property that is neither predictable nor reducible because the ejec-
tions are a consequence of  many independence interactions taking
place within it. But again, it seems sensible to exclude those proper -
ties whose realisation depends solely upon type-determined origina -
tions among the component parts of  the system concerned.
9.5.7 Given the decision to exclude many properties from being
classed as emergent that seem to qualify according to the definitions
presented above, how may it be further revised to accommodate this
decision? One obvious way is by requiring that at least some of  the
de novo originations involved in realising the property (or ability,
power or behaviour) be creative originations. The definition would
then state: “A property (behaviour) of  a complex system is said to be
‘emergent’ if  realisation of  it necessarily entails processes of  creative
origination within the system, and/or between the system and its in-
teractions with an appropriate environment.”
9.5.8 Given this revised definition of  what qualifies as an emer-
gent property, consider some possible candidates. An obvious one is
inventiveness. But should it be taken to be an emergent property? In-
ventiveness is not usually thought of  a property but as an ability,
however this distinction shall be ignored and abilities – along with a
powers, and distinctive kinds of  behaviour – will be taken to be prop -
erties. The reason why inventiveness should be regarded as an emer-
gent property according to the definition just developed is because
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manifestation of  this property requires that the entity concerned – a
person say – carry out creative activity and produce created out-
comes. That is, creative origination must be going on not just type-de-
termined origination, and it is this that makes prediction and reducibil-
ity not possible. There are several other kinds of  familiar abilities that
also qualify as being emergent according to the definition. For in-
stance, learning (particularly in its more complex forms) necessarily
involves the creative origination of  such things as skills, knowledge,
and understandings within the learner. And, to give a third example,
the exercise of  free will must be taken to be an emergent property
because, according to the position adopted in this book, the free-will
process necessarily entails creative origination. It may seem surprising
that such familiar human behaviours as inventiveness, learning, and
the exercise of  free will count as emergent properties, but this does
follow according to the reasoning just outlined.
9.6 The Problem of  Irreducible Downward Causation
9.6.1 Closely connected to what has just been discussed is a re-
lated issue that in recent years has attracted much debate – namely,
whether irreducible downward causation exists. Downward causation
in its simplest form is the familiar idea that a system has properties
that its components do not have and which may be such that they in -
fluence the components. Or, put more strongly, there may be cases in
which the whole determines, to some significant extent, what hap-
pens to the parts. Roger Sperry, who among others has drawn atten-
tion to the idea, gave the example of  a wheel rolling down a hill. He
argued that the rollability of  the wheel is a system property – not a
property that any of  its parts have but which belongs only to the
whole wheel – and that this property may determine what happens to
the parts. For example, the wheel's property of  rollability may lead to
its rolling down a hill and so transporting all of  its part to a relatively
distant location – something which its parts alone cannot achieve
(Sperry 1969). However, this sort of  downward causation is open to
being reductively explained (at the type rather than the token level) in
terms of  the way the environment affects the individual parts and
how these affect one another given that they are type-deterministic-
ally related to one another. A more interesting variant of  this concept
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is that of  irreducible downward causation. It is this stronger version
of  the concept that seems to have prompted Donald T Campbell to
introduce the term “downward causation”. (Campbell 1974) Many
people deny that irreducible downward causation exists, while others
believe that it does. What is lacking is a convincing naturalistic ac-
count of  how irreducible downward causation can be possible. How-
ever, before indicating how independence indeterminism may help in
providing such an account it is worth making a brief  detour to con -
sider the work of  Helen Steward who, in her book A Metaphysics for
Freedom, argues that the existence of  irreducible downward causation
would provide a solid basis for libertarian free will.
9.6.2 Steward develops a deeply and carefully argued case for
agency being entirely natural but nonetheless something special in the
world in that she sees the actions that agents give rise to as not being
a necessary consequence solely of  the properties and organisation of
the neurological and other stuff  of  which an agent is constituted.
What it seems she is arguing for is a form of  agent causation. She
writes:
In the phenomenon of  action, I have alleged, we see a situ-
ation in which a complex whole entity – an animal – is able to
produce effects – in the first instance movements of  and
changes in its own body by means of  which it is then able to
bring about further effects in the world. But how can this be?
Surely, movements and changes in the body that are of  a
physical sort are brought about by prior movement and
changes in that same body, movements and changes that are
also of  a physical sort. [...] The question is how on earth a
whole person or animal could manage to have effects on its
own parts in such a way that the causation does not simply re-
duce to causation of  parts on parts? (Seward 2012, p. 243)
How such irreducible causal influence may be realised she sees as a
matter for science, and it is here that the weakness of  her argument
shows itself  because science (with its current metaphysical orienta-
tion) has difficulty accepting irreducible downward causation. What is
required is a new way of  thinking about the world – one that has a
natural place for irreducible downward causation – and independence
indeterminism offers what is needed, as shall now be indicated.
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9.6.3 Irreducible downward causation will exist when a REN-
OIR is engaged in a process of  creatively originating, eliminating, and
modifying those parts of  itself  that are participating in realising such
a process of  creative self-alteration. The biological evolution of  life
by natural selection provides a good example because the evolution
of  new biological species by natural selection is, under independence
indeterminism, understood to involve interactions among extant spe-
cies with these species themselves having been creatively originated
by the process of  biological evolution by natural selection. That is,
the actual species that exist at a given time are understood to play a
key role in the process of  biological evolution and therefore in the
emergence of  new species. Hence, species that have themselves been
creatively originated by the process of  evolution by natural selection
play a key role, going forward, in that very creatively originative pro -
cess itself.
9.6.4 Irreducible downward causation is commonly found in the
realm of  civilization. For instance, it is constantly at work in the evol -
ution of  human societies and in the evolution of  technology because
in both these cases what is creatively produced plays a part in the cre -
ative evolution going forward. But, unlike with evolution by natural
selection, purposively directed creative activity plays a major part in
the creative process within the realm of  civilisation. For example, to
varying degrees, irreducible downward causation is present within the
evolution of  all creative intellectual projects – like the one reported in
this book – in that as ideas and understandings get creatively origin-
ated by the activity of  the project they influence the future creation
by the project of  further ideas and understandings that then them-
selves become part of  the project. There are many other examples of
irreducible downward causation within the realm of  civilisation. For
instance, business firms manifest irreducible downward causation in
that, to a greater of  lesser extent, they creatively originate (e.g. by in-
vention, construction, and selection) many of  the things that get in -
corporated into what they are as a business – things such as the
premises they use, the people they employ, the markets and regions
they operate in, the products and/or services they offer, the relation -
ships they have with their suppliers and customers, and the ways they
organise themselves and operate internally. And these more or less
creatively established parts of  a business play an important role in its
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future creative activity (as well as, of  course, in its non-creative direct-
ive activities).
9.7 Independence Indeterminism and The Mind-Body 
Problem
9.7.1 Some general remarks were made in section 2.5 about how
independence indeterminism may help resolve the mind-body prob-
lem. And from what has been said above and elsewhere it should be
clear that under independence indeterminism mind processes cannot
in general be reduced solely to the prefigured properties and organ-
isation of  the brain and body of  a person. Nevertheless, in spite of
the argument having largely been made for the mind not being redu-
cible to the body, it is worth using the position that has been de-
veloped to provide a critique of  a fairly mainstream view of  the
problem.
9.7.2 Jaegwon Kim, in his short article in The Oxford Companion
to Philosophy, writes as follows.
The mind-body problem is the problem of  giving an account
of  how minds, or mental processes, are related to bodily
states and processes. [...] few philosophers now find the idea
of  minds as immaterial substances coherent or fruitful. There
has been a virtual consensus, one that has held for years, that
the world is essentially physical. [...] According to this physical
monism (or ‘ontological physicalism’), mental states and pro-
cesses are to be construed as states and processes occurring
in certain complex physical systems, such as biological organ-
isms, not as states of  some ghostly immaterial beings. The
principle remaining problem for contemporary philosophy of
mind, therefore, is to explain how the mental character of  an
organism or system is related to its physical nature.
The heart of  contemporary physicalism is the primacy and
priority of  physical properties and the laws that govern them.
The following ‘supervenience thesis’ is one way of  expressing
this idea: once all the physical facts about your body are fixed,
that fixes all the facts about your mental life. That is to say,
what mental properties you instantiate is wholly dependent
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upon the features and characteristics of  your bodily pro-
cesses. (Honderich 1995, entry on ‘The mind-body problem’.)
9.7.3 Independence indeterminism does not accept the super-
venience thesis for two main reasons. The first reason is that it is
widely agreed by scientists that many mind-brain processes run partly
independently of  one another while also having some interaction.
This means that independence interactions are a common feature of
the way the mind-brain operates, which in turn means that it does not
operate as a deterministic system. Hence, it is not the case that ‘once
all the physical facts about your body are fixed, that fixes all the facts
about your mental life’ because the physical facts do not fully fix the
course of  your mental life – a course that, under independence inde-
terminism, is seen to be partly originated. 
9.7.4 The second reason why independence indeterminism does
not accept the supervenience thesis is that much of  a person's mental
life is significantly influenced by independence interactions the per -
son has with their environment – interactions that include those that
take place within social, cultural, linguistic, and symbolic domains in
addition to interactions with the strictly physical world. Furthermore,
many of  these independence interactions are pattern-based rather
than simple physical ones. So, given that independence interactions
are de novo originated occurrences, it is not true that ‘once all the
physical facts about your body are fixed, that fixes all the facts about
your mental life’ because much of  the course of  your mental life is
originated by independence interactions with things outside your
body.
9.7.5 However, if  all originated mind-brain events were type-de-
termined originations then although it would remain true that a per -
son’s mental life was not wholly reducible to facts about their body,
their mental life would nevertheless run in prefigured types of  ways.
However, under independence indeterminism it has been assumed
that some mind-brain activity is creatively originative which means
that, in a strong sense, it is activity that runs a course that is not redu -
cible to facts about the body, or indeed anything else.
9.7.6 Kim’s position and the critique of  it just given are all very
well but it might be thought that what has not been addressed is what
many people would consider to be the central issue of  the mind-body
problem: namely, the problem of  consciousness. The problem of
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consciousness is multifaceted, and although independence indeterm-
inism has something to say about the possible ways in which, as a
process, consciousness may operate, it can say nothing to help resolve
what many people see as the heart of  the problem: namely, how to
reconcile the ineffable nature or conscious subjective experience with
the effable nature of  our understanding of  the natural world. The
reason why it cannot help with this facet of  the problem is that inde-
pendence indeterminism is a metaphysical thesis about the nature of
the effable world – the world as it can be spoken about and explained.
Conscious subjective experience is known to be utterly real to those
who have this experience but nothing spoken about it, and nothing
observed, measured, or probed that relates to it captures what it is
like to actually have this experience. It is therefore a truly ineffable
feature of  existence. Of  course, some people have denied that it is a
real feature of  existence simply because it is ineffable. A little more is
said about consciousness in section 10.2, but this is too large a topic
for it to be discussed extensively in this book.
9.8 The Arrow of  Time
9.8.1 Most of  the fundamental laws of  physics (e.g. Newton's
laws of  motion, Maxwell's equations of  classical electromagnetism,
the equations of  fluid dynamics, and Schrodinger's wave equation of
quantum mechanics) are time-determinate laws and they permit the
changes they describe to occur in reverse. However, it is only rarely
that happenings that are time-reversals of  one another are actually
seen. What is usually seen are happenings that possess an intrinsic
one-way directionality – something that is obvious once the change is
depicted in a movie which is then played in reverse. The difficulty –
the so-called problem of  the arrow of  time – is to explain why most
real-world change has a one-way directionality when physics describes
many basic kinds of  change in a way that permits two-way direction-
ality.
9.8.2 Attempts to resolve this problem often make use of  the
second law of  thermodynamics. This law postulates that within a
closed system (and the universe as a whole is generally taken to be a
closed system in such discussions), any change that occurs produces
either an increase in the total disorder (or entropy) of  the system, or
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no increase at all. What the law forbids is a decrease in the overall en-
tropy of  a closed system. Now it logically follows from this that if  a
change in a closed system involves an increase in entropy then a re-
versal of  this change must involve a decrease – something that would
contravene the second law and so could not occur. This means that
only those changes in a closed system that involve no increase in en-
tropy can be reversed, which generally means that only those changes
that do not involve any disordered dissipation of  energy (which typic-
ally arises in the form of  heat) are reversible. For example, a short
movie of  a pendulum suspended from an almost frictionless mount-
ing and swinging in a vacuum – a setup that involves very little dis-
ordered dissipation of  energy – looks almost exactly the same when
played in reverse as when it is played in the forward direction. How-
ever, most real-world happenings involve some disordered dissipation
of  energy and therefore an increase in entropy, and so are not revers -
ible. Nevertheless, in spite of  the wide acceptance of  the second law
of  thermodynamics, some physicists are still worried why it should be
that when many of  the basic laws of  physics allow reversibility of
change does it so rarely actually occur.
9.8.3 Under independence indeterminism there is a straightfor-
ward answer: namely, that because a de novo originated event (e.g. an
independence interaction, or a quantum indeterministic event) arises
indeterminately it has nothing definite to be reversed into, meaning
that any change involving such events cannot be reversed. Further-
more, since it is assumed that independence interactions are very
common, this means that irreversible change is going to be very com-
mon. However, it should be emphasised that independence indeterm-
inism does not deny the truth of  the time-determinate laws of
change of  physics because these are all sub-state laws and as such
they say nothing about those aspects of  existence that they do not
refer to. Nor do these laws say anything about the occurrence of  fu -
ture interaction among independently running instances of  change
governed by such laws.
9.9 Naturalism Yes, Physicalism No
9.9.1 Independence indeterminism has a significance wider than
discussed in the previous five sections because, while being a natural-
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istic metaphysics, it is incompatible with physicalism. There is no
agreed definition of  naturalism but the belief  on which all versions
are founded is that ‘reality has no place for “supernatural” or other
“spooky” kinds of  entity.’ (Papineau 2016) Physicalism, however,
takes a narrower view and is ‘the thesis that everything is physical, or
as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything su -
pervenes on the physical.’ (Stoljar 2017). Physicalism and materialism
are closely connected theses with physicalism being more general
since physics includes non-material features of  existence such as
fields, forces, and electromagnetic waves. But current physics is in -
complete so there are things yet to be included in physics. This sug-
gests that it is what a “completed” physics says exists that should be
taken as what is physical. Although not entirely satisfactory, this way
of  making clear what is meant by “physical” does a better job than
relying only upon the common intuitive understanding that physical
things are simply concrete or tangible things.
9.9.2 To say that independence indeterminism is compatible
with naturalism but not with physicalism is a very large claim since al -
most all scientists, many philosophers, and a great many other people
believe that the universe is wholly physical – for instance, Jaegwon
Kim in discussing the mind-body problem (see 9.7.2) believes this.
For most such people this belief  is tacit and is so deeply rooted that
for them any argument that denies it seems to be false for no other
reason than it does deny it. Recall the case made in 1.1.10 for
abandoning determinism and replacing it with independence inde -
terminism. In summary, three reasons were given. (1) That belief  in
true independence of  change would be more difficult to abandon
than belief  in absolute determinism. (2) That the assumption of  inde-
pendence of  change, upon which independence indeterminism rests,
is much simpler and better supported by every-day and scientific
evidence than are the assumptions upon which absolute determinism
rests: namely, that existence consists of  a succession of  instantaneous
total states of  the universe deterministically connected one to the
next by immutable laws of  nature. And (3) that independence inde-
terminism helps resolve problems that absolute determinism brings
with it, such as the problem of  free will and the mind-body problem.
Together these three reasons provide strong grounds for taking inde-
pendence indeterminism very seriously indeed. Quite apart from the
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other two, reason (1) on its own really must be countered if  absolute
determinism, or any other form of  determinism that denies inde-
pendence of  change, is to stand as an acceptable naturalistic meta-
physics. However countering (1) is going to be very difficult because,
to reiterate points already made (see 3.6.7, and 9.3.3), not only is in-
dependence of  change tacitly assumed to be true by almost everyone
in their ordinary doings, but it is assumed to be true by scientists be -
cause they believe themselves to be free agents – free to conduct and
repeat observations and experiments as their interests and resources
dictate. Furthermore, current physics only has laws that involve cer -
tain aspects (sub-states) of  existence and not every aspect, and this im-
plies there is independence of  change since those aspects of  exist-
ence not included in a law must change independently of  those that
are, otherwise these other aspects would have to be included in the
law.
9.9.3  However, accepting the assumption of  true independence
of  change means physicalism must be rejected for the following reas -
ons. Firstly, the assumption implies that there is nothing in existence
– either physical or anything else – that determines, links, governs, or
describes how independently running changes are jointly changing
(see 2.1.8). This means there is nothing in existence fixing whether or
not future interaction will occur between such changes, which means
that when such independence interactions do occur they will be de
novo originated events – that is, events whose occurrence was not
fixed by anything in prior existence. Hence, under this assumption,
neither physics nor anything else can wholly account for all aspects
of  existence because the future course of  existence cannot be fully
accounted for, so physicalism must be rejected.
9.9.4 Accepting independence indeterminism means there are
limits to what physics, and more generally science, can achieve. Ac-
cording to this metaphysics science cannot reliably and accurately
predict the occurrence of  future specific independence interactions.
Nevertheless, science is extraordinarily successful in being able to ac-
count for a great deal of  what goes on. According to independence
indeterminism the reason for this is that almost all originations are
type-determined (see 1.2.10, 1.5.1), and that at the type-level science
can describe, explain, and predict much of  the type-determined ori -
gination that takes place. What science cannot do is give reliable pre-
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dictions of  the details of  single dated and located instances of  type-
determined origination. For instance, it cannot predict what specific
oxygen molecules will bind with a particular haemoglobin molecule in
the blood circulating through your lungs. The inability of  science to
predict the occurrence of  specific instances of  type-determined ori -
ginations is generally explained by there not being available full know-
ledge of  what is going on. It is rarely believed that true origination is
involved. But once the assumption of  independence of  change is ac -
cepted then it must also be accepted that independence interactions
are indeterminately occurring events (see 1.1.6) and that predicting
them is not a matter of  lacking knowledge because no such know-
ledge can possibly exist.
9.9.5 If  the evidence was that everything that was originated
was of  a prefigured type then there would be a strong sense in which
physicalism would be valid since the types of  things that could exist in
the future would be prefigured in past and present existence. How-
ever the evidence is that not all originations are prefigured but rather
that some are creatively originated. That this is so may be denied but
it seems difficult to do so with respect to biological evolution and the
realm of  civilisation since science is unable to predict such things as
what new species will emerge in the future and what new human arte-
facts will be produced. Nevertheless, many people will probably con-
tinue to hold that this failure is a consequence of  lacking the neces -
sary knowledge and that were this available then what new species
and what types of  new artefacts were to emerge in the future would
be apparent from examining past and present existence. Without a
better understanding of  how creative origination works it will be dif-
ficult to resolve this disagreement. Nevertheless, independence inde-
terminism holds strongly to the view that non-prefigured origination
– i.e. creative origination – is a real feature of  existence.
9.9.6 If  naturalism is compatible with independence indeterm-
inism and physicalism is not, what role might physics play that this
new metaphysics accepts? It would accept, but have no reason for ex-
cluding other possibilities, that all interactions bottom out in (or su -
pervene upon) interactions among entities that physics recognises as
existing. But, as already argued (see sections 9.5 and 9.6), it would not
accept that all happenings play out in ways that are solely a con -
sequence of  such physical interactions because it sees origination –
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and creative origination in particular – making an essential contribu-
tion to at least some of  what happens in the future: a contribution it
sees as not being reducible solely to change that physics can account
for. This means that under independence indeterminism physics may
continue to be seen to play a very important role in existence, how-
ever not one that can account for the full future of  existence.
9.9.7 It has been argued that creative origination is able to pro-
duce systems that are not prefigured – for instance, new biological
species and new types of  human artefacts. However, many of  these
created systems – particularly human created artefacts such as mobile
phones or automobiles – do not themselves operate creatively and
have system properties open to type-based explanation based on the
physical organisation of  the system’s components. Nevertheless, ac -
cording to independence indeterminism, the organisation underlying
these systems will have been creatively produced and so not be redu-
cible solely to physical interactions and prefigured types of  origina-
tions. What this means is that there are many types of  extant systems
in the living and human realms whose emergence, as the types of
things they are, physics cannot account for. And that this is so high-
lights the limitations of  physicalism in being able to provide a com-
plete account of  the future types of  things that may exist.
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10 Factors In Human Free Will
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 This chapter is included to help understand some of  the
main influences participating in human self-directed origination and
human free-will processing. Much of  the discussion highlights how
different many of  these factors are compared to those found in an -
imals. Part of  this difference appears to be attributable to human per-
sons being more difficult to satisfy than animals because they have a
greater variety of  motivations and emotions, and experience more
complex internal conflicts. Another apparent reason for the differ-
ence is that humans frequently engage in free-will processing to try to
resolve conflict and indecision associated not only with their present
situation but also with recalled, imagined or symbolically represented
situations – something that animals do not appear to do to any great
extent. Furthermore, human persons appear to have a more complex
self  and greater powers of  self-examination, self-evaluation, and cre-
ative modification of  the various parts of  their self  than do animals.
10.1.2 The remainder of  this chapter consists of  six sections. In
each matters are discussed that are of  great range and depth and for
which much remains to be understood, and this means the treatment
given is rudimentary – and sometimes somewhat idiosyncratic. Non-
etheless, it would not be doing justice to explaining free will unless an
attempt was made to identify some of  the factors apparent in the hu-
man condition and way of  being that makes the human manifestation
of  free will so different from what is observed in animals.
10.1.3 The first topic that is addressed is human consciousness
and cognition. A start is made here because the remaining factors
seem only to have the character and place in human life they seem to
have because they are bound up with human cognitive and conscious
processes. The second matter to be discussed is the concept of  the
human self  – a topic that is returned to because of  its central place in
the account of  human free will presented in this book. The third dis -
cussion concerns human lifestructure – something already mentioned
(1.6.4) as playing a key role in the life of  humans and the exercise of
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their free will. In the remaining three sections the human motiva -
tional, emotional, and executive sub-selves are discussed.
10.2 Human Consciousness and Cognition
10.2.1 Consciousness and cognition are dealt with together be-
cause they seem to be inextricably linked. As broad modes of  cognit-
ive activity humans share their basic perceptual, memory, attention,
and learning capabilities with higher animals, although the ways these
are expressed differ to some extent. Higher animals may have forms
of  consciousness that are similar to those of  human persons in some
respects – for example, their consciousness of  their perceptual field
may be similar – but the material upon which animal consciousness
feeds, and the influence it has, seems to be much more limited.
10.2.2 However, regardless of  any similarities there may be
between human and animal consciousness, there is one thing that is
highly relevant to the nature of  the human condition and human free
will, and that apparently greatly distinguishes us from animals, and
this is the ability of  human persons to engage in symbol-based think -
ing and action. Such thinking and action entails interaction with, and
the production of, symbolic structures – structures composed of
such things as utterances, gestures, performances, writing, pictures,
diagrams, physical models, simulations, and mathematical and com-
puter constructions and representations. Among other things, hu-
mans are able to interact with symbolic structures to stimulate
thoughts and feelings about things, happenings, and states of  affairs
that are not currently present to their senses. These may include
thoughts and feelings about past happenings and actions, possible fu-
ture or potential happenings, and things and states of  affairs that
could not, did not, or do not exist in reality. To a considerable extent
humans are able to interact with symbolic structures as if  they were
interacting with something real rather than symbolic – that is, the
symbols as such tend to recede from human consciousness to be re-
placed by what, for them, they represent or mean. Symbolic interac-
tion may stimulate ideas, memories, and imaginings, and it may activ-
ate emotions and motivations. Furthermore, through symbolic inter-
action people may sometimes engage in highly abstract forms of
reasoning and logical analysis. With their capacity for symbolic inter -
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action, humans have open to them worlds or domains quite beyond
the here and now to which animals seem to be largely confined. And
with the aid of  symbolic interaction (mediated by written and spoken
languages, and in many other ways), coupled with other human cap-
abilities (particularly their high intelligence, imagination, creativity,
and capacity for communication and cooperative directive activity),
humans have collectively played the central role in the emergence of
the realm of  civilization.
10.2.3 The human capacity for symbol-based thinking and action
seems to be at the heart of  the difference between human persons
and animals and it seems to be the basis of  their ability to engage in
what may be called “action-free thinking” – that is, thinking that is
not directly tied to present or near-future action in the world. And it
seems that human consciousness plays a major part in this sort of
thinking. Some remarks have already been made about consciousness
(see 9.7.6) and in what follow, given that it is too large a topic to deal
with in much depth, only a few further points are made.
10.2.4 It is often assumed that human consciousness has two ma-
jor features – one essentially private, and one public. (Note: it is being
assumed that human consciousness is objectively real and that hu-
mans may lose it under certain conditions, such as when they are
given a general anaesthetic.) The private feature of  consciousness has
no agreed label, but the terms “conscious subjective experience”
(CSE), and “phenomenal consciousness” are both quite widely used.
Conscious subjective experience is wholly personal and private and so
cannot be shared by others. However, human persons each individu-
ally and completely privately know what it is like to have CSE, even
though no-one can ever share or co-experience another person’s. In
spite of  this, most people accept without question that human per-
sons other than themselves have CSE, and they seem to reach this
conclusion mainly because they recognise that other persons are in
many ways like themselves, and because many words and phrases re-
ferring to aspects of  conscious subjective experience are a familiar
part of  human languages.
10.2.5 The private/public difference between these two features
of  consciousness gives rise to one of  the great questions regarding
consciousness: namely, whether conscious subjective experience, as
such, plays any part in influencing observable behaviour. On one side
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are those who insist that it does, and on the other are those who in -
sist that it doesn’t. Indeed, some who adopt this latter position take
the view that CSE doesn’t exist at all, and that all that exists is the be-
haviour that humans associate with the presence of  CSE. In this
book, and without making a case for it, it is simply assumed that CSE
plays an important role in human life and that it does have a signific-
ant influence on the emergence and evolution of  some observable
human behaviours.
10.2.6 However, in adopting this position it is accepted that com-
plex directive activity may be carried out without the person con-
cerned having conscious subjective experience of  the details of  what
they are doing. Nevertheless, it is also assumed that such behaviour
requires that the individual concerned be able to sense, attend to, and
process information about things and events relevant to the complex
directive activity they are carrying out. There is no English word that
specifically denotes this sensing, attending, information-processing
activity which does not also carry connotations of  there being ac -
companying conscious subjective experience. The word “awareness”
is sometimes used but it is closely connected to definitions of  con -
sciousness: for example, Webster’s Dictionary (1998) defines conscious
as: ‘Immediately aware of; mentally recognising, to some degree and
extent one’s own inner feeling and thought, or their subjective refer-
ence’, and as ‘Mentally alert, well aware of  some object, impression,
or truth’. Sometimes subjective conscious experience is said to be
awareness of  one’s own awareness. But why should a first round of
awareness (that is, of  sensing, or attending, or carrying out informa-
tion-processing) not be accompanied by the special quality of  having
subjective conscious experience, while a second round of  it should?
Ned Block introduced the term “access consciousness” (Block 1995)
to denote those aspects of  consciousness, separate from its phenom-
enal or CSE aspects, that contribute to the carrying out of  activities
of  various sorts. But in using “consciousness” in the term “access
consciousness”, Block is, it would seem, not sufficiently separating
the sensing, attending, information-processing aspect of  conscious-
ness from its subjective conscious experience aspect. What is needed
is a form of  words that makes no reference to “consciousness”, and
to that end the term “situationally sensitive” shall be used when an
agent is merely sensing, attending to, and informationally processing
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aspects of  its situation – or more accurately its circumstances (i.e. its
environment and its own condition) – in order to carry out some dir-
ective activity.
10.2.7 The distinction being made between CSE and situationally
sensitivity may be clarified by considering an occasion when a person
has carried out some familiar task, or a part of  such a task, without
later being able to recall any details of  what they did. To be specific,
consider the complex directive activity involved in safely driving a car.
People who are experienced drivers may sometimes find that they
have driven for some period of  time without being able to recall the
details of  their driving activity. This normally happens when they
have been driving along a familiar route without any unusual incid -
ents arising, and when their phenomenal consciousness has been oc -
cupied with matters other than driving – perhaps, for example, they
may have been absorbed in thinking about some difficult decision or
problem, or with reviewing or evaluating something they had done in
the recent past. What this points to is that carrying out the complex
directive activity of  safely driving a car does not necessarily require
that the directive system involved be making use of  phenomenal con-
sciousness. However, few people would doubt that in order to drive a
car safely through traffic the directive system involved (whether it be
a human driver or a computer-based automatic driving system) needs
to be appropriately situationally sensitive. Once it is accepted that it is
possible for complex human directive activity to be produced without
the person having conscious subjective experience of  what they are
doing, the question arises whether all forms of  human behaviour
might be carried out without there being any accompanying con-
scious subjective experience. That is, could what are known as philo-
sophical zombies exist? Could there exist beings behaviourally and
socially indistinguishable from human persons that have no conscious
subjective experience at all? Whether or not this is possible remains
an open question – an open question that exposes the depth and dif-
ficulty of  the problem of  consciousness, or more broadly speaking,
the mind-body problem.
10.2.8 However, the assumption being made in this book is that
human persons do indeed have conscious subjective experience and
that its presence plays an important role in some of  their activity.
One example of  this role is that a person is only able to recall into
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phenomenal consciousness the details of  carrying out complex dir-
ective activity – for instance, driving – if  they were phenomenally
conscious of  these details when they carried out the activity. Freud
drew attention to this apparent fact when he wrote: ‘[…] it dawns
upon us like a new discovery that only something which has once
been a Cs. [conscious] perception can become conscious [again]’
(Freud 1962, p. 10). Are there other aspects of  human functioning
that seem to require the involvement of  CSE? There seem to be
many, but they all rest on subjective reports of  such influence and
not on objective evidence. For instance, most people believe that at
least some of  what they do is partly a consequence of  their having
phenomenally consciously thought about doing it. Indeed, one im-
portant contribution of  phenomenal consciousness seems to be that
it facilitates the emergence of  creative rather than automatic or
strongly prefigured responses. If  this is so, then it may be that the
special feel – e.g. the experiential richness or qualia-laden nature of
conscious subjective experience – may help stimulate non-prefigured
responses. But on the other hand, there seems to be no reason why
creative activity within the mind-brain should necessarily require con-
scious subjective experience – after all, there is a good deal of  evid -
ence than much of  the connecting-up and disconnecting that creative
activity in the mind-brain entails happens unconsciously – i.e. without
accompanying conscious subjective experience.
10.2.9 As a final point, in case it may be thought that conscious
subjective experience is insignificant in human life, it is worth noting
how few people would see any point in continuing to live faced with
the certain prospect of  living out their future without any subjective
conscious experience at all. In fact some people make a “living will”
in which they ask not to be resuscitated in the event that they are very
unlikely to have any future conscious subjective experience. And the
medical/legal position in some countries is that human life should
not be artificially maintained for people who, on the basis of  multiple
expert opinion, are believed to have no subjective conscious experi -
ence, and no prospect of  having any in the future.
10.2.10 Some cognitive activities that support and link with human
consciousness and play an important part in human life deserve some
mention since they play a part in the exercise of  human free will and
are much more highly developed in humans compared to animals.
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Five broad types of  such human cognitive activities will be discussed:
semanticing, abstracting, imagining, inferencing, and valuing. Only a
little will be said about each since this is not the place to attempt a
fuller discussion. It should be borne in mind that while retaining
some independence of  operation, these cognitive activities, or pro -
cesses, interact with and support one another.
10.2.11 Semanticing. There seems to be no English word for the
cognitive activity of  using (and producing) sign/meaning relation-
ships. Animals have a weak form of  this capability in that they are
able to learn, and make good use of, some kinds of  semantic relation-
ships. Pavlov's famous experiments on the acquisition of  conditioned
responses showed that dogs came to learn that a relationship existed
between their perception of  a bell-ring and food. This is not a natural
causal relationship – like the smell of  meat being causally connected
with the nearby presence of  meat – and this points to the essential
nature of  semanticing: namely, that it is the process of  learning, and
making use of, non-naturally connected relationships between things.
It is this capability, evolved to an extraordinary high level in human
persons, that underpins the human ability to use language and engage
in other forms of  symbolic interaction.
10.2.12 Abstracting. This is the cognitive activity of  using and
creating classes, generalisations, and concepts. Animals certainly do
this to the extent that they are able to respond to new instances of
things in ways related to how they have responded to other instances
of  such types or classes of  things in the past. However, the number
of  distinct classes that they may distinguish seems, relative to hu-
mans, to be quite limited – although animals are often able to make
many fine distinctions within those areas of  life that are important to
them. In contrast, humans are able to distinguish and use a vast num -
ber of  different classes, generalisations and concepts. And it seems
this ability is coupled to their capacity for semanticing and thinking
and communicating in symbolic terms. Humans are also able to use
their abstracting capabilities to create and use classes, generalisations,
and concepts that are based on classes, generalisations, and concepts
themselves rather than on sensory information alone.
10.2.13 Imagining. This term is used to denote the mind-brain
activity resulting in the spontaneous emergence, or the intentional
summoning, of  phenomenally conscious content without sensory
236
perception necessarily being directly involved. It draws strongly upon
memory recall, but in its highly developed human form is not restric-
ted to this since things may be imagined that have never been experi -
enced by the person, may never have existed, or may be impossible in
reality. Human imagination is often stimulated by sensory perception,
but in a creative way so that what is imagined is not, for the person
concerned, a prefigured consequence of  what is sensed and per-
ceived. Semanticing often accompanies human imaginative activity –
as occurs, for example, when imagining what is written about in a
novel. What comes into conscious subjective experience through ima-
gining may lead to further imaginings, or to other cognitive activity, or
more or less directly to motor action as in creative art activity (e.g.
painting, sculpture, dance, or music).
10.2.14 Inferencing. In its simpler forms this cognitive process is
carried out by higher animals, but in its more complex forms it seems
to be confined solely to human persons. Typically, animals use infer-
encing when their current perceptions, coupled with relevant know-
ledge and experience, lead them to believe something exists (or has
existed, or may exist in the future) which is not perceptually present.
Being able to do this has great survival value. Inferencing becomes
more powerful when it can be chained: that is with one inference be-
ing the basis for a second inference, and so on. Inferencing may be
seen as a process in which the production of  fresh content within the
mind-brain is produced through making use of  three types of  links
between existing content: those links with a natural basis (e.g. cause-
and-effect, or contiguity); those with an abstract basis (e.g. shared
class membership, conceptual connection, or similarity of  some sort);
and those with a logical basis (e.g. inductive or deductive). However,
semanticing – i.e. the going from perception of  a sign (or sign struc-
ture) to a meaning, and vice versa – is not included because semantic
relationships do not require any natural, abstract, or logical relation-
ship between the sign and the meaning. Also, imagining will not be
taken to be a mode of  inferencing – even though inferencing often
plays a part in imagining – because again what is imagined need not
have a natural, abstract, or logical link to what already exists in the
mind-brain. Intuiting is a further means by which new mind-brain
content may be obtained from existing content and it seems to in-
volve both imagining and inferencing.
237
10.2.15 Valuing. This is a form of  mind-brain activity that is car-
ried out by animals but which humans have greatly developed and ex-
tended into a form of  cognitive activity in its own right. In its basic
form – the form humans share with animals – valuing is strongly
linked to the emotional self, and the responses the emotional self  has
learned (or has received as part of  its genetic inheritance) to associate
with the perception of  certain objects and situations. In animals, val -
ues seem largely to have a physiological and instinctive basis whereas
with humans many have an abstract basis – as, for example, do some
of  the values associated with religious beliefs. Many of  a person’s ab-
stract values come from their socialisation, but some may be more
strongly self-created – for example, being based on personal experi-
ence and thought, and their own efforts to find a set of  values with
which they can deeply identify. Much human valuing uses codified
and often institutionally-based values such as those made explicit in
laws and regulations, or codes of  practice, or that exist implicitly
within the culture and ethos of  a particular organisation or group.
However it may be that some external and less personal values come
to influence an individual in such a way that they so internalise and
absorb them that they become part of  their own personal value sys-
tem.
10.2.16 It is assumed that the cognitive activities just outlined – to-
gether with the basic cognitive capabilities of  sensory perception, at -
tention, memory and learning, and coupled with the special form of
human consciousness – help humans carry out many complex kinds
of  mind-brain activity. These include (but are not confined to) the
human ability to cogitate, consider, contemplate, reflect, and under -
stand; to analyse and explain; to review, and to plan; to evaluate and
judge; to problem-solve, to innovate, invent and create; to deliberate,
choose and decide; to make and follow instructions for executing
complex directive activities; and to carry out calculations and formal
manipulations within symbolic domains. Furthermore, it is assumed
in the present work that a persons’s processes of  cognition coupled
with their situational sensitivity and phenomenal consciousness, play
a fundamental role in their social interactions, in conversing, in carry-
ing out their ordinary daily activities; in the evaluation, re-evaluation,
construction, re-construction, and maintenance of  their lifestructure;
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and in the operation of  their motivational, emotional, and executive
selves.
10.3 Some Further Comments about the Human Self
10.3.1 It has already been assumed (see section 1.6) that a human
person is a human being who has undergone socialisation, and that
the human self  is primarily composed of  motivational, emotional,
and executive selves – parts that are assumed to coexist and interact
with other distinguishable aspect of  the self, such as a person’s situ -
ational sensitivity, phenomenal consciousness, cognitive processes,
and their lifestructure. However, these assumptions are not univer-
sally accepted and so in this section some other views are considered
and related to those adopted in the present work.
10.3.2 Ulrich Neisser, a founder of  cognitive psychology, sug-
gests that humans have five kinds of  what he calls self-knowledge
(Neisser 1988). Self-knowledge may be thought of  as the knowledge
a person has upon which their sense of  selfhood – or being an indi-
vidual – is founded. The ecological self is a person’s knowledge – usually
expressing itself  through situational sensitivity and/or phenomenal
consciousness – of  being in a particular place and environment and
of  being engaged in particular activity. It is what largely disappears
when, generally on rare occasions, a person loses their bearings or be -
comes temporarily disoriented. It seems humans share this kind of
knowledge of  their selfhood with higher animals, and possibly with
quite lowly ones as well. The interpersonal self is a person’s knowledge
of  how they see themselves as a participant in social situations and
interactions. A person’s phenomenal consciousness of  having a self
seems to depend greatly upon them having, at least during their early
years, interpersonal interaction with other humans. Indeed, feral chil-
dren generally lack the sense of  self  that children of  the same age
brought up in normal human society possess (Steeves 2003). A per-
son’s interpersonal self  takes somewhat different forms depending
upon who they are interacting with. For example, typically a person is
one kind of  interpersonal self  in social interaction with their close
family members, a somewhat different interpersonal self  among their
friends, and yet different kinds of  interpersonal self  in various sorts
of  formal social interactions. Many people, using their knowledge of
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their interpersonal self, engage in phenomenally conscious reflection
upon, and evaluation of, their various presentations of  it and as a res -
ult sometimes wish to change some aspects of  how they present
themselves socially. For instance, a person may wish to become more
assertive, or more at ease meeting new people, or a better listener. A
person’s temporally extended self is the sense of  selfhood they have that
comes from being situationally sensitive to and/or phenomenally
conscious of  being an individual with a particular history and a par -
ticular expected future. A person’s private self is the sense of  their self-
hood that they acquire when they engage in phenomenally conscious
reflection about their conscious subjective experiences. This seems to
take a little while to emerge since it appears that young children do
not have powers of  phenomenally conscious introspection. Finally, a
person’s conceptual self is the person they come to believe they are
based upon what significant others (e.g. parents, teachers, friends,
partners) have said they are, and upon ideas that they have picked up
from various sources – for example, from popular psychology, or
from personality tests they have taken. The concepts that a person
develops of  themselves may not be as others see them – indeed,
some people are somewhat blind to the person others take them to
be.
10.3.3 The various aspects of  the human self  that have been
mentioned – both those adopted in this book and those that Neisser
distinguishes – should not be thought of  as being wholly distinct
since they appear to co-exist and interact with one another. Although
each person only knows about these various aspects of  their self
through phenomenally conscious thinking about them, it should not
be thought that their operation necessarily requires the involvement
of  phenomenal consciousness because these various aspects of  a per-
son’s self  seem to run mostly subconsciously or unconsciously. Nev-
ertheless, if  a person does become phenomenally conscious of  some
of  the aspects of  their self, then this may have a significant influence
upon how they operate and behave. For example, on occasions a per -
son may become phenomenally conscious of  some aspect of  their
personal history – such as a past failure to deal successfully with the
kind of  situation they are now in – and this may lead to an emotional
response, such as heightened anxiety or embarrassment, which then
affects their behaviour. Or, to give another example, on some occa -
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sion a person may become phenomenally conscious of  a character
trait that they believe they possess, and this may then influence how
they conduct ourselves.
10.3.4 Interactions among aspects of  a person’s self  seem to be a
more or less constant feature of  human wakeful existence. For in-
stance, a person’s knowledge of  their ecological self  tends to con-
stantly give them a sense of  place, time, and present ongoings which
may have some influence on their activity and decision-making. A
person’s knowledge of  their interpersonal self  will, while they are in a
particular sort of  social situation, often have an influence upon the
operation of  their motivational, emotional, and executive sub-selves.
And their awareness of  being a temporally extended self  with a past
history and desired future may have an influence on the operation of
their executive self.
10.3.5 There are many aspects of  the human self  that have not
been mentioned. Perhaps the most important of  these are human
personality traits. Many theories and accounts of  human personality
have been proposed, but no consensus currently exists. However,
there does seem to be quite widespread agreement among psycholo-
gists that there are five principle groups of  personality traits – the so-
called “Big Five” – which may be summarised as follows.
Openness
A tendency to value the aesthetic, intellectual, and imaginative side of
life; a willingness to engage with the unconventional, the novel, and
the complex; a tendency towards creativity and heightened curiosity; a
tendency to be in touch with one’s feelings.
Conscientiousness
A tendency towards self-discipline, fulfilling duties and commitments,
and working to achieve things; a tendency towards perfectionism and
compulsive working; a preference for planned rather than spontan-
eous activity; a tendency to avoid trouble and disruption.
Extraversion
A tendency to seek the company of  others and the stimulation they
may provide; a tendency towards positive, enthusiastic, and energetic
engagement with the social world, and towards excitement in general.
Intraversion, or low extraversion, is a tendency towards relative disen-
gagement from the social world; towards a low-key, ordered and quiet
way of  life; and towards inner living.
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Agreeableness
A tendency towards compassion, concern, and caring for others; to-
wards generosity, helpfulness, cooperation and compromise; towards
seeing the good side of  human nature, and towards accepting human
frailties.
Neuroticism
A tendency towards emotional instability and moodiness; towards the
experiencing of  negative emotions and moods (e.g. anger, hostility,
anxiety, depression); towards interpreting situations and people as
threatening or unfriendly; and a vulnerability to stress and an inability
to cope calmly with minor problems and irritations.
10.3.6 A person's personality traits appear to have a strong ge-
netic basis. To what extent a person's early life experiences and social -
isation shape them is not certain, but some change does generally oc-
cur, and may continue throughout a person's life. Not all people are
happy with their personality traits. Indeed, there is a thriving self-help
industry that offers various means by which it is claimed a person
may change some features of  their personality and some of  their
traits and habits and acquire new ones.
10.3.7 Not mentioned explicitly in the above list of  personality
traits (but possibly subsumed under conscientiousness) is will-power.
Will-power may be understood to be the capacity an agent to per -
severe in the pursuit of  a goal or the completion of  a task when
faced with setbacks, difficulties, competing and/or opposing motiva-
tions, and unpleasant emotions. Possessing strong will-power is
something that the executive self  may come to greatly value, and
strengthening it may itself  become a goal of  the executive self. But
will-power may well have a genetic basis meaning that some individu-
als are much more able to develop strong will-power than are others.
Quite clearly, the strength of  a person’s will-power plays an important
role in their free-will processing since it acts to support the continued
pursuit of  those goals and actions favoured by the executive self
when there exist motivations and emotions that oppose their contin-
ued pursuit.
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10.4 Human Lifestructure
10.4.1 Humans are social beings. Indeed, it has been assumed
that without appropriate socialisation there would not be human per -
sons but only human beings. This is not to deny the animal side of
people; it is said to emphasise that people are not simply animals. Hu-
man socialisation takes place within an immediate family group, or
some appropriate surrogate for such a group, and generally within a
particular community and culture. But, particularly in the developed
world of  today, the life of  many people is not confined to the com -
munity and culture within which they grew up. Indeed, nowadays
many people have open to them an immense range of  possible ways
of  living their lives, and in what follows it is assumed that it is such
persons that are being discussed rather than those with little freedom
and opportunity to fashion a lifestructure largely of  their own cre -
ation.
10.4.2 The term lifestructure was introduced early on (see 1.6.4)
to name the highly complex world within which a human person's
self-evaluating executive self  works and lives. It could have been said
that a person's lifestructure simple is the world in which they live, and
to some extent this is true. But this has not been done because the
aim is to emphasise that it is both more than and less than this. It is
more because a person’s lifestructure includes the person's own take
on the world and so encompasses all the idiosyncratic ways in which
they have come to interpret it. Furthermore, a person's lifestructure
includes things that belong to the person rather than their external
world as such. And a person's lifestructure is also taken to be less than
the world they live in because their idiosyncratic take on it leaves out
much that they are not responsive to (i.e. neither situationally sensit -
ive to nor phenomenally conscious of), or that in reality is different to
how they think it is.
10.4.3 A person's lifestructure includes their social, cultural, eco-
nomic, and political environment; their lifestyle, and the familiar
routines of  their life; their diet, eating habits, and food preferences;
their partner, family, friends (and enemies), colleagues, and acquaint-
ances; their home; their employment and/or other similar activity;
their material possessions, financial assets, and their liabilities; their
standing, status, and position within the various social groups they
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belong to; their interests including such things as their sporting and
similar activities, hobbies, and leisure pursuits generally; their physical
and psychological attributes and condition, including physical disabil -
ities, compulsions, addictions and dependencies; their qualifications,
skills, knowledge, and life experiences; their established values, life-
hopes, projects, plans, goals and intentions; and their perceived du-
ties, commitments, obligations, and responsibilities.
10.4.4 As an infant and child a person has relatively little control
over much of  their lifestructure. For instance, they are largely unable
to choose where they live, what family they belong to, the culture they
grow up in, and the opportunities made available to them for such
things as travel, play, sports, and entertainment. However, there are
some aspects of  their lifestructure that a child often does have some
control over: for example, such things as whom they make friends
with, what leisure activities and entertainments they indulge in, and
what foods they like. As a child they soon realise that their lifestruc-
ture makes many demands on them, and that parts of  it limit and
control much of  what happens in their lives. And yet abandoning, or
radically altering, the given aspects of  their lifestructure seems not to
be possible – although running away is always an option, but one that
is only rarely pursued in earnest. As they grow up children demand,
and are often freely given, more control over their lifestructure. For
example, they will often be able to decide what subjects to specialise
in at school and college, how to spend much of  their leisure time,
what to wear, and who to have as their boyfriend or girlfriend. As ad-
olescents approach adulthood proper they tend to have greater and
greater control over their lifestructure, although some aspects of  it
may still remain beyond their full control.
10.4.5 Some people, more or less constantly throughout their
lives or only at certain periods, have a chaotic lifestructure – that is a
life with little structure at all. But the great majority of  people have a
lifestructure which does have a good deal of  complex structure and
continuity to it. For example, consider the content and structure of  a
typical working-age adult's lifestructure in the modern developed
world. It will often have several relatively distinct parts, such as a
close live-in relationship with a partner and/or family, a home life, a
working life, a leisure life, an extended-family life, a friendship life,
and a community life. In addition, a typical adult is likely to have a
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large array of  possessions – some personal such as clothing, some
jointly owned with a partner and/or immediate family. Many of  these
possessions will be material objects of  one sort or another – a home,
furniture, a car, a mobile phone, a computer, TV, books, music, and
so on. Others will be less tangible: such as having a page on one or
more social network sites, and membership of  clubs, societies, or so-
cial groups of  various sorts; or such as having savings and spendable
money, loans and overdrafts; and of  course a multitude of  other
things like citizen rights, educational qualifications, skills, knowledge,
and particular life experiences. Other less tangible possessions will in-
clude such things as their personal standing – for instance: in their
family, among their friends, at work, within their community, and
within the clubs and groups they belong to, and at their place of  wor -
ship. Additionally, a typical adult in modern society will likely have
more or less ready access to a great number of  different services –
for example: banking services, household utilities (e.g. electricity, wa -
ter, sewerage, heating fuel, mobile and landline phone connections,
internet access, insurance, security services), shops, restaurants,
cinemas, theatres, travel services, and many, many others. But there is
more. Typically, an adult will have their own specific obligations, re-
sponsibilities, duties, and commitments. And they will have their own
values and standards of  conduct that they have either acquired
through their socialisation or through their own creative origination
and which their executive self  will normally feel constrained by and
obliged to respect. And not to be forgotten, because this area is a ma-
jor part of  a person's lifestructure, are their life-hopes, ideals, long-
ings, ambitions and projects, and their current goals and objectives.
And, unfortunately, a typical person will usually have their own par-
ticular dissatisfactions, and perhaps their own feeling of  entrapment
– a feeling of  not being free, or being unable to find true fulfilment
in their lives, of  being unable to reach self-actualisation.
10.4.6 Attention is being drawn to the concept of  a person's life-
structure to help make sense of  human free will, and in particular to
help explain the very great difference between human and animal free
will. Animals – social animals in particular – have lifestructures, but
they are very much simpler than those that modern humans typically
possess. Furthermore, the means by which animals may change their
lifestructures are relatively limited and are mostly given genetically.
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This is not the case with modern humans. Their capacity for creative
origination, coupled with the tremendous range of  resources, oppor -
tunities, and forms of  lifestructure that seem to be available to many
modern humans gives them an apparent freedom to change their life -
structure that goes far beyond what is available to any other living be-
ings.
10.4.7 Human lifestructures – as the large and enormously com-
plex things they typically are – have received relatively little scientific
study, but their influence upon and place within people’s lives has
long been addressed within literature of  all sorts, and within the per -
forming arts. However, one piece of  scientific work needs to be men -
tioned because the researchers involved recognise the concept of  life-
structure in a similar way to how it has just been presented but with
the difference that they were mainly interested in how a person’s life
structure changes over time, which is not a primary concern when us -
ing the concept in relation to the issue of  human free-will.
10.4.8 The research was carried out by Daniel J. Levinson and his
colleagues and was reported in their book The Seasons of  a Man’s Life
(Levinson et al. 1978) Levinson had found that there was very little
scientific discussion and research about the overall structure of  a per-
son’s life and the major transitions that typically occur within it and
so he set about establishing a research programme to investigate this
aspect of  the human condition. In the book Levinson et al. introduce
and discuss at length the notion of  a person’s “life structure” – a
concept that Levinson and his colleagues found gave coherence to
their understanding of  adult life as it is lived as a whole and how it
changes through the years. The primary aim of  the project was ‘to
create a developmental perspective on adulthood in men’. The project proper
commenced in the late 1960s and ended in the mid 1970s. Some fur -
ther work followed including that involving the lives of  women. The
initial investigation was of  40 men aged between 35 and 45 drawn
from four occupational categories (industrial workers, business exec-
utives, university biologists, and novelists) who were living in North
America. The study is therefore of  specific sociocultural, and quite
severely age-restricted, groups of  men only and may be criticised for
being too narrow to draw general conclusions.
10.4.9 Levinson et al. describe their conception of  ‘The Indi-
vidual Life Structure’ as a tool for analysing the fabric of  a person's
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life. They consider that a person's life structure has three aspects: the
sociocultural world in which they live, the satisfied and non-satisfied
parts of  their self, and the person's participation in the world. Re -
garding a person's self  and their life structure they say: 
The self  includes a complex patterning of  wishes, conflicts,
anxieties and ways of  resolving and controlling them. It in -
cludes fantasies, moral values and ideals, talents and skills,
character traits, modes of  feeling, thought and action. Part of
the self  is conscious; much is unconscious; and we must con-
sider both parts. Important aspects of  the self, initially
formed in the pre-adult era, continue to influence a man’s life
in adulthood. We have to see how the person draws upon the
self, or ignores it, in his everyday life. The self  is an intrinsic
element of  the life structure and not a separate entity. (p. 43)
10.4.10 Levinson et al. recognize the deep and non-straightfor-
ward nature of  many of  the choices a person makes about their life
structure – choices, for example, concerning ‘work, family, friend-
ships and love relationships of  various kinds, where to live, leisure,
involvement in religious, political and community life, immediate and
long-term goals.’ (p. 43) They see these sorts of  choices (i.e. what is
chosen) as constituting the primary components of  a person’s life
structure and note that ‘The components are not features of  the self,
such as motives and abilities, nor are they features of  the world, such
as institutions, groups and objects. [...] every choice is saturated by
both self  and world. To choose something means to have a relation-
ship with it. The relationship becomes a vehicle for living out certain
aspects of  the self  and engaging in certain modes of  participation in
the world.’ (pp. 43-44) They suggest that at any given time one or two
components (rarely three or more) of  a person’s life structure have a
central place and strongly influence the way the person leads their life
and the choices they make at that time. For example, a man who has
been totally committed to work may start detaching himself  from it
and come to involve himself  more in family and/or community life.
10.4.11 After discussing a major finding of  the study – that the
transformation of  the subjects’ life structures over time followed a
similar pattern – Levinson et al. move on to talk about life structures
in more general terms, noting that they are satisfactory according to
the degree to which they are viable in society and appropriately serve
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the self, which means that life structures involve both society and a
person themselves. The researchers recognise ‘that often a person's
life structure in only fairly satisfactory – typically, it works pretty well
in the world, but does not wholly satisfy the person themselves [...]’
and that it ‘is never all of  a piece. It contains some mixture of  order
and disorder, unity and diversity, integration and fragmentation. It is
always flawed in some respects. It contains contradictions and gaps
which can be modified only by basic changes in the structure itself.’
(p. 54)
10.4.12 It is evident that a person’s lifestructure has a very great
influence on their doings. But their lifestructure only influences a per-
son’s actions through its relationship to and the affects it has upon
other aspects of  their self  – specifically, from the viewpoint adopted
in this book, upon their motivational, emotional and executive selves.
So it is to further discussion of  these aspects of  a person that the last
three sections of  this chapter are addressed.
10.5 The Motivational Self
10.5.1 The dictionary definition of  a motivation is that it is ‘a
causative factor; incentive; drive.’ A broad psychological characteriza -
tion is given in the following extract from a textbook on motivation
theory and research:
When the hypothetical man on the street asks, “What motiv-
ates behaviour?” he is asking to have identified one or a com -
bination of  three kinds of  things: (1) an environmental determin-
ant which precipitated the behaviour in question [...]; (2) the
internal urge, wish, feeling, emotion, drive, instinct, want, desire, de -
mand, purpose, interest, aspiration, plan, need, or motive which gave
rise to the action; or (3) the incentive, goal, or object value, which
attracted or repelled the organism. (Cofer and Appley 1964, p.
5)
10.5.2 Of  the three kinds of  motivating factors identified above,
members of  the first and third groups are external while members of
the second are internal. External factors only produce the effects they
do because of  the internal condition and nature of  the person con-
cerned, and in particular because these external factors stimulate or
influence (via the person’s mind-brain processes of  perception, situ-
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ational sensitivity, phenomenal consciousness, etc.) one or more of
those factors that belong to the second group – factors that shall be
referred to as the person’s “motivations”. For instance, according to
this view, when a person is forced to do something under a threat of
death they do it because those of  their activated motivations that sup-
port compliance outweigh those that oppose compliance. Similarly,
when a person responds in a particular way to an incentive – money,
for example – they only do so because perception of  the incentive ac-
tivates mind-brain processes that stimulate motivations in the second
group that then generate the response. There are human motivations
in addition to those listed in (2) above. These include but are not re -
stricted to life-hopes, ambitions, ends, goals, objectives, intentions,
concerns, obligations, duties, commitments, responsibilities, aver-
sions, and dislikes.
10.5.3 At any time there are active motivations, and latent or in-
active ones. It is assumed that each of  a person’s motivations is sup-
ported by particular mind-brain sensitivities that, in conjunction with
prevailing stimuli and mind-brain conditions and activity, may result
in (some strength of) activation of  the motivation. It is also assumed
that an active motivation operates directively in the sense of  being an
initiator, supporter, sustainer, shaper, inhibitor, or destroyer of  a per-
son’s contemplated or actual doings.
10.5.4 Unlike animals, human persons have many motivations
that are not common to the species as a whole but are specific to the
individual. These person-specific motivations include such things as
an individual’s particular responsibilities, duties, obligations and com-
mitments; their personal ideals, and life-hopes; their various interests
and concerns; and their particular current endeavours, projects, plans,
goals, objectives, and intentions. However, there are several motiva-
tions – essentially biologically inherited ones – that it appears most
humans possess. These motivations include the need for air, food and
water, relief  from bodily pain, for satisfaction of  sexual arousal, and
for self-preservation. But it seems other very commonly occurring
types of  human motivations – such as the need for esteem, and the
need for creative expression – require human socialisation for their
full emergence.
10.5.5 A view that has a long history is that all human behaviour
is ultimately reducible to the influence of  two fundamental motiva-
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tions: the maximization of  pleasure and the minimization of  pain.
Superficially, this view may appear to have a good deal of  validity, but
on closer examination it turns out to be rather inadequate. Firstly, it
fails to easily explain why humans carry out a great deal of  routine
behaviour that does not directly involve either pleasure or pain.
Secondly, because pleasure and pain come in a range of  incommen-
surable kinds, it is difficult to see how maximisation and minimisation
could actually work. For instance, how does one maximise across
such different pleasures as those obtained from consuming delicious
food, from solving a difficult problem, from communing with nature,
or from having sex? And thirdly, this simple view fails to account for
the manifest complexity of  human motivational life. Given these
weaknesses it is not surprising that many writers and researchers have
attempted to give more complex accounts.
10.5.6 Early on in the history of  psychology William James
offered the following list of  human motivations.
Saving – the desire to hoard.
Construction – the desire to build and achieve.
Curiosity – the desire to explore and learn.
Exhibition – the desire for attention.
Family – the desire to raise our children.
Hunting – the desire to find food.
Order – the desire for cleanliness and organization.
Play – the desire for fun.
Sex – the desire to reproduce.
Shame – the desire to avoid being singled out.
Pain – the desire to avoid aversive sensation.
Herd – the desire for social contact.
Vengeance – the desire for aggression.
(This list is given in Reiss 2000, pp. 7-8)
10.5.7 Later, William McDougall in his book An Introduction to So-
cial Psychology (McDougall 1908/1924) proposed that the basic human
conative instincts are those of: Acquisition, Construction, Curiosity,
Flight, Pugnacity, Reproduction, Repulsion, Subjection, Self-display,
Gregariousness, and Parental care. He accepted that subgroups of
these may be active concurrently and so humans may have a large
variety of  complex influences on thought and action.
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10.5.8 Henry Murray, drawing upon James’s and McDougall’s
work, developed a sophisticated “need theory” in which he proposed
– based on scientific research and observation – that humans have
twelve physiological (or “viscerogenic”) needs, and twenty-seven non-
physiological (or “psychogenic”) needs (Murray 1938). Murray took
the human physiological needs to be for Air, Water, Food, Sex, Lacta -
tion, Urination, Defecation, Sensuous gratification, Rest and sleep,
and the need to avoid and extricate oneself  from Danger, Unpleasant
stimuli, and excessive Heat and cold. His list of  psychogenic needs is
as follows.
Abasement – the need to punish oneself, or accept punishment from
another.
Achievement – the need to succeed, to win, to overcome challenges.
Acquisition – the need to obtain resources and possessions.
Affiliation – the need for social acceptance, group membership, be-
longingness.
Aggression – the urge to fight or use force to defend, or to gain ad-
vantage.
Autonomy – the need for self-determination, for freedom of  action.
Blameavoidance – the need to avoid blame or being singled-out.
Construction – the need to produce, build, and create.
Contravariance – the need to be unique, special, to be treated as an
individual.
Counteraction – the need to defend and protect one’s honour, dig-
nity, respect.
Defendance – the need to justify one’s actions, beliefs, and affili -
ations.
Deference – the need to follow a leader, to serve, to submit to power
and authority.
Dominance – the need for power, for control over others, for the
submission of  others.
Exhibition – the need to be noticed, to be given attention.
Exposition – the need to be listened to, to be a source of  informa-
tion, to teach.
Harmavoidance – the need to avoid pain or injury.
Infavoidance – the need to avoid failure, shame, loss of  status.
Nurturance – the need to nurture kin and helpless humans or anim-
als.
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Order – the need to organize, systematise, plan, and maintain an
ordered life. 
Play – the need for recreation, for entertainment, for carefree activity
of  all sorts.
Recognition – the need for social status, for respect.
Rejection – the need to create outsiders, the need for a “them” versus
“us.”
Sentience – the need to have aesthetic and sensuous experiences.
Sex – the need for sexual relationships and gratification of  sexual
arousal.
Similance – the need to empathise.
Succorance – the need for help when in distress; the need for protec -
tion.
Understanding – the need to analyse and explain.
10.5.9 Some of  these psychogenic motivations may be under-
stood to be partly or even wholly a product of  a person's self-evaluat -
ing executive self  as it grapples with how to satisfy and secure future
satisfaction of  the person's inherited or socially induced motivations
and the many varied and changing motivations (such as ambitions,
projects, goals) that it itself  has established within the motivational
self  of  the person.
10.5.10 According to Murray, needs have an unconscious as well
as a conscious presence. He accepted that needs vary in their “prepo-
tency”, or relative power to command attention when activated. He
took it that needs interact with one another in complex ways, includ -
ing conflictual, competitive, and cooperative interaction, and that a
person’s doings are often devised by their executive self  to serve
more than one need while avoiding emotional disturbance and ex -
cessive opposition from other needs.
10.5.11 A more recent list of  human needs and desires has been
developed by Steven Reiss and his co-worker Susan Havercamp. The
extensive research they conducted resulted in the following list of  16
basic human desires. 
Power – the desire to influence others.
Independence – the desire for self-reliance.
Curiosity – the desire for knowledge.
Acceptance – the desire for inclusion.
Order – the desire for organization.
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Saving – the desire to collect things.
Honor – the desire to be loyal to one’s parents and heritage.
Idealism – the desire for social justice.
Social Contact – the desire for companionship.
Family – the desire to raise one’s own children.
Status – the desire for social standing.
Vengeance – the desire to get even.
Romance – the desire for sex and beauty.
Eating – the desire to consume food.
Physical Activity – the desire for exercise of  muscles.
Tranquility – the desire for emotional calm. (Reiss 2000, pp. 17-18).
According to Reiss, these Basic Desires are actually families of  related
desires – for example, he takes the need for achievement to belong to
the family of  Power desires. Most of  the desires he identifies are rel -
atively unrelated to one another (although there are correlations, such
as people with a strong desire for Power tend to have strong desire
for Status). Reiss’s list does not include physiological motivations be -
cause he is interested only in those desires that make a person the in -
dividual they are. Importantly, Reiss believes that people vary with re -
spect to how significant these Basic Desires generally are for them,
and he suggests that ‘No two people have exactly the same potential
for a particular desire’ (p. 22), which, on his view, tends to accentuate
the individuality of  human persons.
10.5.12 Abraham Maslow argues against attempting to produce an
atomistic list of  human motivations and suggests that the funda-
mental human needs form a hierarchy in which the most prepotent
needs – (the physiological needs) are at the base and the least prepo-
tent (the self-actualisation needs) are at the apex. (Maslow
1954/1970, pp. 25-26) Maslow explains his idea of  prepotency as fol -
lows.
What this means specifically, is that in the human being who
is missing everything in life in an extreme fashion, it is most
likely that the major motivation would be the physiological
needs rather than any others. A person who is lacking food,
safety, love, and esteem would most probably hunger for food
more strongly than for anything else. (pp. 36-37) 
Maslow’s hierarchy of  fundamental human needs, ranked from most
prepotent to the least, is as follows. 
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The Physiological needs – e.g. the need for food, water, warmth, sex.
The Safety needs – the need for ‘security; stability; dependency; protec-
tion; freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos; need for structure,
law, limits; strength in the protector, and so on.’ (p. 39)
The Belongingness and Love needs – marked, for instance, by missing one’s
friends, sweetheart, partner, children, etc.; and by hungering for a
place in one’s group or family.
The Esteem needs – the need for self-esteem, including the desire for
achievement, adequacy, competence, and independence; the need for
esteem from others, including the desire for attention, recognition,
respect, dignity; the desire for prestige, status, fame and glory; the de-
sire for influence, dominance, and power.
The need for Self-Actualization – the desire for self-fulfilment, the desire
‘to become actualized in what [one] is potentially. [...] to become
more and more what one idiosyncratically is, to become everything
that one is capable of  becoming’. (Maslow, p. 46) Maslow refers to
these sets of  needs as “fundamental” or “basic” but it is not clear if
he believes they are all genetically given or just very commonly exist-
ing among socialised humans.
10.5.13 Before discussing the emotional self  it is worth drawing
attention to a set of  human motivations that have not been men-
tioned because they are rarely explicitly included in lists of  human
needs. There does not seem to be a single word by which to refer to
them collectively so the term “comfort motivations” shall be used.
These motivations, or desires, are for comfort and pleasure in order
to relieve, or displace from conscious subjective experience, such
things as pain, distress, depression, anxiety, miserableness, and a sense
of  failure and inadequacy. Comfort motivations include urges and de-
sires for such things as alcohol, drugs, sex, thrills, comfort-eating, and
for engagement in such escapist activities as relaxed socialising,
watching TV, or playing computer and other games.
10.6 The Emotional Self
10.6.1 The term “emotional self ” shall be used to refer to the
collection of  “affective dispositions” that an individual human person
possesses. Included in the use of  this term are the various mind-brain
systems by which affective dispositions become activated and influen-
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tial in the thought and behaviour of  a person. There is no widely ac -
cepted taxonomy of  human affective dispositions although there is a
general view that there are different kinds. However, in the following
discussion, four major types are distinguished: emotions, sentiments,
moods, and body/mind conditions.
10.6.2 Affective dispositions – and this is why they are dispositions
– mostly lie dormant within human persons, but they may become
activated and when they do they shall be referred to as affective states.
Most affective states have a presence in phenomenal consciousness
but not all do – e.g. some mood states, and some body/mind states to
which a person has become habituated do not. The word “feeling” is
often used to refer to the particular quality within phenomenal con-
sciousness that is associated with an affective state and in the present
discussion the word shall be used in this rather restricted sense.
10.6.3 Emotions are affective dispositions that when activated
are accompanied by more or less marked physiological and psycholo-
gical changes that are mostly governed by primitive and autonomous
parts of  the mind-brain. Emotional states are sometimes accompan-
ied by, or stimulate, an urge to act in a particular manner and to this
extent they have links to a person's motivational self. Physiological ef-
fects induced by emotional states include changes to glandular secre-
tions, breathing-rate, heart-rate, posture, and facial expression. Psy-
chological changes include the disruption of  rational and evaluative
thinking, heightened alertness, and narrowing of  attentional focus.
10.6.4 Webster’s Dictionary (1998) tells us that a sentiment is ‘A
mental attitude or response to a person, object, or idea conditioned
entirely by feeling instead of  reason.’ Sentiments generally produce
much milder feelings than emotions. Since sentiments are tied to ob-
jects they tend not to be innate although the feelings their activation
arouse, if  any, are usually of  an innate type – and usually of  an emo -
tional type. Many of  a person’s sentiments will have been acquired as
a result of  having had one or more emotionally-charged direct en-
counters with instances of  the type of  thing in question. However
people also acquire their sentiments through their socialisation and
many culturally specific sentiments are acquired in this way and not
through direct experience. Another way people establish sentiments is
through generalisation: they propagate the sentiments they have
about one type of  thing to a much larger group of  things – for ex -
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ample, a person may have had a bad experience eating a curry in their
childhood and in consequence decide that they don’t like any ‘foreign’
food.
10.6.5 A mood state or condition differs from an emotion or a
sentiment in that it is an affective state that is much more enduring.
Indeed, a mood may become more or less detached from what ini -
tially activated it and become partially self-reinforcing. A mood col -
ours a person’s mind-brain activity in distinctive ways – for example, a
person in a cheerful mood will tend to be mentally active and re -
spond to situations and events in a positive and optimistic way,
whereas a person in a depressed mood will tend to be mentally pass -
ive and respond in a negative and pessimistic manner. A mood also
tends to make a person more likely than normal to produce particular
sorts of  emotionally-based responses – for example, a person who is
in an ill-tempered or irritable mood is more likely to produce angry
outbursts than someone in a placid or forgiving mood.
10.6.6 Body/mind states almost always have a more or less spe-
cific internal bodily (rather than mind-brain) source, and putting
“body” before “mind” in “body/mind” is intended to emphasise this.
Body/mind affective states include pain, hunger, thirst, nausea,
bloatedness, sleepiness, fatigue, and various sorts of  bodily unease
such as those arising from postural discomfort, a full bladder, or an
itch.
10.6.7 Emotions may be focused or unfocused – for example, a
person may feel “anxious about the job interview tomorrow” or
simply feel anxious in a non-focused way as when experiencing float -
ing anxiety. Sentiments are always focused on some object or kind of
thing. Moods are generally unfocused affective state, although they
sometimes may have a consciously identifiable apparent cause. So, for
instance, a person may just feel depressed and not know why, or, feel
depressed for a specific reason, such as being depressed about their
money problems. Body/mind affective states may be focused, as, for
example, when a person has a pain in their foot, or unfocused as
when they are feeling out of  sorts.
10.6.8 Some activated emotions tend to encourage impulsive ac-
tion, although some, such as extreme fear, tend to completely freeze
or disable action. Strongly-felt emotions often disrupt the normal op-
eration of  a person's executive self, and sometimes in ways that may
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lead them to make decisions that in a non-emotional state they would
not make. Moods, since they are generally non-focused affective
states, tend to be pervasive in their influence and tend to colour, neg -
atively or positively, a person’s whole outlook on the world and their
doings within it. Body/mind affective states usually activate specific
motivations which in turn tend to stimulate the performance of  spe-
cific actions – such as scratching an itch, or finding a suitable place to
urinate – aimed at relieving the physiological condition that is activat-
ing the body-mind affective state. Note however that the executive
self  may, to some extent at least, be able to control the execution of
such actions, such as when a person tries to hold-off  urinating until a
more appropriate time, or (under medical advice, say) tries not to
scratch an itchy patch of  skin.
10.6.9 Since affective states often activate particular motivations,
it might be thought that affective states in general do this, but this is
only true in part. Some emotions do generally activate (or are co-ac-
tivated with) specific sorts of  motivation – for example, rage often
stimulates a desire to lash out at something. But many emotions, sen -
timents, and moods do not produce specific motivations. For ex-
ample, the emotion of  feeling happy cannot be identified with the de-
sire to carry out a particular action but, for instance, it may encourage
a person to “let their hair down” and behave in ways that they may
not usually allow themselves to do. Similarly, sentiments don’t neces-
sarily stimulate specific actions – for example, a negative sentiment
towards a particular politician (activated, perhaps, by a news item)
may not stimulate a person to take any particular action at the time,
but it may reinforce this negative sentiment and give it increased in-
fluence in the self's production of  some later action, such as how the
person votes. And, to give an example relating to mood, being in a
depressed mood may not necessarily produce specific types of  motiv-
ations although it may well influence what motivations may become
activated and the choices a person makes about what to do.
10.6.10 It is unclear whether humans share a set of  basic types of
emotion – or indeed, what exactly basic means within this context. A
good many writers have proposed lists. For example, Paul Eckman, a
major contemporary figure in the field, argues that all human emo-
tions are basic because there are no compound emotions – i.e. no
emotions composed of  a two or more elemental emotions – and be -
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cause all emotions ‘evolved for their adaptive value in dealing with
fundamental life tasks.’ (Eckman 1994). Fundamental life tasks in-
clude such things as fighting, falling in love, escaping predators, and
coping with loss. Eckman does however recognise that human emo-
tions form clusters, and that there may be only a few types of  these,
for instance: Happiness, Sadness, Fear, Anger, Surprise, Disgust.
Robert Plutchik, another notable figure in the field, suggested there
are eight basic emotions: anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, anti -
cipation, trust, joy. But, unlike Eckman, he argued that a person may
experience more than one basic emotion at a time so giving rise to a
very large number of  possible affective states (Plutchik 1991). But
quite apart from whether or not there are basic emotions, there are
certainly many words – in English at least – that refer to emotions or
other affective states.
10.6.11 Affective states and the emotional self  play an important
part in the choice of  a person’s doings, and in influencing their execu-
tion. Given the physiological accompaniments of  emotions and some
other affective states, it seems that the emotional self  has a long evol -
utionary history – certainly much longer than that of  the executive
self. It seems reasonable to assume that lower animals simply have
two sub-selves: a motivational self  mainly populated with genetically
given motivations (e.g drives, and instincts), and an emotional self.
However, higher animals do seem to have an executive self, but one
that appears to be nothing like as complex as that possessed by hu-
man persons.
10.7 The Human Executive Self
10.7.1 The many special abilities of  the mature human executive
self  have more or less been taken for granted so far, but it is worth
listing some of  them to indicate what a powerful and important part
of  a person it is.
Control – of  behaviour and of  some automatic and emotional re-
sponses and urges; powers of  self-control, of  anger management; the
ability to suppress socially deviant or inappropriate behaviour; the
ability to produce behaviour acceptable within given social condi-
tions.
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Directed or intentional learning – of  skills, facts, knowledge, ideas, theor-
ies and ways of  behaving.
Perseverance – the ability to continue with a task in spite of  failures, fa -
tigue, and lack of  immediate reward or easy or early success.
Concentration – the ability to maintain situational sensitivity to, and
phenomenal consciousness of, specific matters and doings; the ability
to block out distractions and irrelevant sensory input; and the ability
to overcome the urge to attend to competing motivations.
Foresight – the ability to anticipate near-term occurrences; the ability
to ‘read’ the likely mental condition of  others (i.e. to have a so-called
“theory of  mind”); the ability to predict the conditions and con -
sequences likely to be associated with pursuing present doings and fu-
ture goals and plans.
Rational decision-making – the ability to bring facts, reason and logic
into play when carrying out decision-making; the ability to suppress
or counteract the influence of  emotions, moods, prejudices, and irra-
tional motivations in decision-making.
Inventiveness, problem-solving and creative thinking – the ability to apply
these forms of  creativity in a directed way to a wide range of  situ -
ations and endeavours.
Planning – the ability to carry out short- medium- and long-term plan-
ning and scheduling, and the evaluation and updating or alteration of
plans in the light of  anticipated and actual outcomes and changed cir -
cumstances and motivations.
Monitoring – of  all sorts of  things, happenings, and activities. For ex-
ample, of  one's actions, of  one's success or failure in achieving ob -
jectives, of  environmental circumstances, of  the behaviour of  indi-
viduals and groups, of  the level and availability of  resources, of  one’s
bodily condition, and of  one's thoughts and mind-brain state.
Meta-cognition – the ability to monitor and assess one's own self, in -
cluding one’s executive self, in order to learn about it and through
this learning become, for example, a better learner, decision-maker,
planner, thinker, group or team-members, and more in control of
one's emotions and impulses.
Evaluation – of  many sorts of  things and activities: for example, of
current circumstances, of  anticipated and actual outcomes, of  per-
sonal performance, of  how others have treated one, of  one's life-
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structure, of  one's aspirations, plans and hopes, and of  one's values,
views, knowledge and beliefs.
Judgement – for instance of  what is true or false, satisfactory or unsat-
isfactory, right or wrong, good or bad, prudent or imprudent, better
or worse, trustworthy or untrustworthy, safe or dangerous.
Flexibility – the ability to adapt to or cope with upsets, disruptions,
and changes of  circumstance.
10.7.2 These abilities draw upon the special cognitive capabilities
and form of  consciousness that human person’s possess. They rarely
operate in isolation since they not only interact among themselves but
their execution takes place within the context of  the influence of  a
person’s motivational and emotional selves. Much of  this interaction
is not type-determined or prefigured and so, according to independ-
ence indeterminism, should be taken to be more or less creatively ori-
ginative.
10.7.3 The idea of  the executive self  has been linked to Freud's
concept of  the ego (see 1.6.2), but a connection may be made to
more recent work by linking the idea to Albert Bandura's “Agentic
Perspective” in which he sees ‘The capacity to exercise control over
the nature and quality of  one's life [as] the essence of  humanness.’
(Bandura 2001). He argues that this capacity depends mainly upon
four core features of  human agency, what he terms intentionality, fore-
thought, self-reactiveness, and self-reflectiveness. He sees all of  these features
as necessarily involving situational sensitivity and phenomenal con-
sciousness. In Bandura’s terms, to have intentionality is to have a pro -
active commitment to bring about certain consciously held ends or
purposes; it is to possess ‘considerable self-direction in the face of
competing influences’. Bandura sees ‘the power to originate actions
for given purposes [as] the key feature of  human agency’. He sees
Forethought as underpinning this power since it allows a person to
imagine, consider, and evaluate different futures; to choose among al-
ternative goals; and to plan and guide action to achieve what they de-
cide upon. Self-reactiveness is the ability of  a person to be an effect -
ive self-motivator and self-regulator with respect to the pursuit and
achievement of  their intentions. Many human intentions have a more
or less far-future payoff  which requires that intermediate goals be
identified and achieved if  this payoff  is to be realised. Often these in -
termediate goals will not have much rewarding payoff  in their own
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right – indeed, their pursuit may sometimes require that a person’s ex-
ecutive self  deny satisfaction to other motivations, and/or that the
person undertake unpleasant activities. The final core feature of  hu-
man agency that Bandura identifies is self-reflectiveness. He writes:
‘People are not only agents of  action but self-examiners of  their own
functioning. […] Through reflective self-consciousness, people evalu-
ate their motivations, values, and the meaning of  their life pursuits. It
is at this higher level of  self-reflectiveness that individuals address
conflicts in motivational inducements and choose to act in favor of
one over another. Verification of  the soundness of  one's thinking
also relies heavily on self-reflective means’. Bandura draws attention
to the importance of  ‘perceived self-efficacy’ – the beliefs a person
holds about their ability, or inability, to achieve particular ends and
purposes, He sees these beliefs as playing a pivotal role in shaping the
course of  a person's life and how they deal with setbacks.
10.7.4 A similar view to Bandura's, and which is also largely in
line with the idea of  the human executive self  as presented here, is
voiced by Roy Baumeister, Brandon Schmeichel, and Kathleen Vohs
in their paper ‘Self-Regulation and the Executive Function: The Self
as Controlling Agent’ (2007). The authors believe that self-regulation
– ‘the self  altering its own responses or inner states’ – can only be
properly appreciated within a broader psychological context: that of
the human self  as a whole. They believe there are three basic features
of  the self. ‘The first is reflexive awareness: Consciousness can be
directed toward its source, so that just as people become aware of
and learn about the world, they can also become aware of  and learn
about themselves.’ The second is as a ‘tool for connecting with oth-
ers’ and in so doing gaining increased reflexive self-awareness. And
‘the third aspect of  the self  may be called its executive function,
though it is also called the “agent” or “agentic aspect”’ (p. 518) In ad-
dition to these three basic features, the authors argue that a proper
appreciation of  the human self  requires that humans possess free will
(at least of  a sort that allows them to do as reason rather than passion
dictates); and also that, uniquely among all natural beings that we
know of, we recognise humans to be ‘cultural animals’.
10.7.5 In section 7.6 the idea of  human persons operating most
of  the time as self-evaluating executive controlling agents – or SEE-
Cing agents – was introduced. It was remarked (7.6.2) that ‘The su -
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perordinate objective (or prime directive) of  an executive controller is
to successfully organise (e.g. create, initiate, guide, coordinate, and
terminate) directive activity to satisfactorily attend to a set of  poten-
tially conflicting tasks while doing so with limited resources and
powers, with various constraints on its actions, and in the face of
conflicting priorities and demands.’ And later in the same section it
was suggested that human persons may be understood to operate
much of  the time as self-evaluating executive controllers: self-evaluat-
ing in that, firstly, they can create their own methods and priorities
for satisfying their genetically given motivations and their own self-
created ends and purposes; secondly, that they can create their own
criteria for what they believe makes them successful executive con-
trollers; and thirdly, that they can carry out their own evaluation of
their success/failure as executive controllers. A person’s motivational
self  and their emotional self  provide important feedback to the exec-
utive self  on how it is performing. So, for instance, active motivations
will signal their current level of  satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the
executive self; as too will be signalled the condition of  their active af-
fective states. But although a person operating in self-evaluating exec-
utive controlling mode is likely to be phenomenally conscious of  this
feedback, in being self-evaluating they do not have to respond to it if
the criteria they have adopted for what they consider counts as suc-
cess as an executive controller takes priority. So, for instance, if  a per -
son believes that pursuing some goal is important enough then they
may be able to withstand strong influences directed at not pursuing
the goal or not continuing its pursuit. For example, to succeed in car -
rying out a very dangerous mountain climb a person may need to
overcome resistance from within themselves such as pain and fatigue,
fear, and the feeling that they are doing something extremely fool-
hardy that threatens other things that are very important in their life
such as their family.
10.7.6 Given that animals do not voluntarily undertake life-
threatening endeavours of  the sort just mentioned, it must be asked
why humans do. Part of  the answer seems to be that they do so to
satisfy their esteem needs – for example, to prove their competence
and bravery to themselves (and to others); to be able to excel in some
area; to gain status and respect. But it also seems that they – the per -
son they are in the guise of  their executive self  – may do so to prove
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to themselves their own capability and mastery as an executive con-
troller able to achieve very difficult ends even when the pursuit of
these is strongly opposed by other parts of  their self.
10.7.7 The criteria a person holds for what counts as success
seem to be a result of  many influences. For example, influences from
their socialisation, from their family and schooling, from the various
peer groups they belong to, from media and cultural sources, from
their own personal experiences, and from their own study and think-
ing. Some of  the criteria may have been more or less uncritically (or
even unknowingly) absorbed and therefore be only minimally of  a
person’s own creation. But others – such things as their own specific
ideals and life-hopes, some of  their own standards and values, and
their distinctive interests, hobbies, and projects – may be more
strongly of  their own creation.
10.7.8 In trying to manage how to satisfy a person’s criteria for
successful living – and achieve the associated projects and goals. they
have adopted, or seek to adopt – a person’s executive self  is likely to
have to pay most of  its attention to managing and altering the per-
son’s lifestructure. For example, in striving to satisfy a person’s esteem
needs the executive self, working under the influences and constraints
of  the person’s motivational and emotional selves, may come to ad-
opt particular goals – career goals, say – whose pursuit will then have
considerable influence on their lifestructure. However, it should not
be thought that particular needs or motivations will always stimulate
efforts on the part of  a person’s executive self  to satisfy them be-
cause one strategy it may adopt – a strategy that makes sense from
the perspective of  the executive self ’s need to establish and maintain
its perceived competence as an executive controller – is to deny the
importance of  certain needs, such as esteem needs. In achieving such
denial not only does the executive self  make its task easier but it gains
a sense of  power in being able to deny service to demands made of
it. Thus, although taking on the world and trying to control it is one
way by which a person’s executive self  may believe it is capable of
satisfying the person’s motivations, another way is for it to try to
change the desires of  the person so that they do not desire things
that cannot be readily obtained or whose pursuit leads to unsatisfact-
ory consequences. This, in part, is where the human possession of
higher-order desires (see section 5.7) comes in: that is, a person’s ex -
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ecutive self  seems to have the capacity to establish and pursue desires
to desire differently.
10.7.9 In making some brief  comments about how the nature of
the human executive self  may be understood, it is worth recalling the
quotation from Levinson et al. (see 10.4.11), namely ‘that often a per-
son's life structure in only fairly satisfactory – typically, it works pretty
well in the world, but does not wholly satisfy the person themselves
[...]’ and that it ‘is never all of  a piece. It contains some mixture of
order and disorder, unity and diversity, integration and fragmentation.
It is always flawed in some respects. It contains contradictions and
gaps which can be modified only by basic changes in the structure it-
self.’ This suggests that for some people (perhaps many) their execut-
ive self  does not achieve full success, and this points to what seems
to be a common feature of  (at least modern) human life: namely that
human persons are continual seekers, often seeking something more
satisfactory than what they presently have. Or, in failing to find full
satisfaction according to their own criteria and self-evaluations, indul -
ging in activities to block dissatisfactions, perceived failings, fears,
doubts, anxieties, and inadequacies through drink and drugs, or
through engaging in various escapist or comfort-seeking activities.
10.7.10 The executive self  is almost always a key participant in a
person’s free-will processing activity. Not only is the executive self  a
focus of  much conflict but, in conjunction with human phenomenal
consciousness and the cognitive capacities that persons possess, it
plays a major part in the creative activity associated with the ARCS of
free-will processing (see 1.5.4). However, a person’s executive self  is
rarely the only participant in their free-will processing – their motiva-
tional and emotional selves usually also play important roles, and
sometimes the interests of  these other participants win out. When
this happens, the executive part of  the person – the part that seems
to be most clearly identified with the “I” of  first-personhood – may
feel that its freedom or power has been overridden. But although
such a feeling may well arise, this should not be taken to mean that a
person has lost their free will because the other parts of  their self
also contribute to who they are as a person. What is being raised here
are issues of  human freedom – issues that deserve wider discussion,
something which is done in the next and final chapter.
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11 How Free Are We?
11.1 Introduction
11.1.1 Independence indeterminism tells us that we human per-
sons have freedoms that we cannot possibly have under absolute de-
terminism, nor under macroscopic determinism with micro-inde-
terminism. But the question remains: How free are we? In the light
of  the position that has been developed in this book, and the many
points that have been discussed, in this final chapter various aspects
of  this question are addressed. A start is made by asking a slightly dif-
ferent question: How free am I? and by considering what the “I” of
this question may refer to. Next, some points aimed at clarifying the
general concept of  freedom are discussed. This leads on to a return
to one of  the central issues of  the free-will debate, namely: Could we
have done otherwise than what we actually did? After this the ques-
tion: To what extent are we able to live a self-created life? is con-
sidered. Next to be discussed is the question: Are we free enough to
be moral agents? And the book ends by asking: Is the free will we
have argued for worth having?
11.2 How Free Am I?
11.2.1 From one point of  view it might be taken that the “we”
of  the question “How free are we?” stands for humans as a species
but this invites an overly general answer. To expose a more subjective
and individual perspective, it is useful to consider the related ques-
tion: How free am I? and ask what or who the “I” refers to. The “I”
could be referring to the whole human person who asks the question.
But the “I” might be referring to some part of  the person, and quite
often this seems to be the case. For example, suppose that while dis-
cussing with a friend how a meeting had gone a person says: “I was
trying really hard to keep my cool, but Bob was setting out to rile me
and I finally lost it.” In uttering this sentence does the person mean
the “I” to refer to their whole self. Logically this doesn't make much
sense since it seems it was a part of  the person (their executive self)
that was trying to keep control of  another part of  the person (their
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emotional self). Consider another example: suppose someone says
“What I would really like to do is quit my job and become a full-time
artist.” Again, logically speaking, the “I” cannot refer to the whole
person because if  the whole person would really like to quit their job
then the whole person would indeed quit it. A more accurate but
long-winded statement of  their predicament would be for them to
say something like: “Part of  me longs for me to give up my job, but
other parts of  me resist this and at present they are the parts that win
the struggle that is going on within me.” Expressed like this it may
then be asked: What is the part that longs to become a full-time
artist? It seems it is an unsatisfied motivation – a life-hope, perhaps –
and is part of  the person's motivational self. However, if  it is asked
where this motivation came from it seems likely that the person's
emotional and executive selves will have played an important role in
its creation. Consider one further example, the sentence: “I didn't
really want to go to the party, but I felt I had to.” The various refer -
ences of  the word “I” in this sentence may be unpacked as follows:
“I [at least one part of  me] didn't really want to go to the party, but I
[a different part, or parts, of  me] felt I [me, the whole person] had to
[go to the party].” 
11.2.2 If  it is accepted that in asking themselves How free am I?
the “I” may refer to parts of  a person’s self  rather than their whole
self, then the three example sentences above may be restated to make
this clear. So the first sentence – “I was trying really hard to keep my
cool, but Bob was setting out to rile me and I finally lost it” – may be
restated as “My executive self  was trying really hard to control my
emotional self  from expressing my temper but Bob was setting out to
rile me and my executive self  finally lost control of  my emotional
self.” And if  the person were to ask themselves “How free was I?”
with respect to this incident it is not clear how they should answer.
Assume they were free from undue constraint, coercion, compulsion,
and control so other aspects of  their freedom may be considered. As
things turned out, their executive self  was not free enough to get its
way since it lost out to the person's emotional self, so their answer to
the question “How free was I” when “I” refers to their executive self
must be “not free enough”. But on the other hand, if  they take the
“I” of  the question to refer to their emotional self  (or rather the an -
ger part of  it) then their answer would be “free enough”. Analysing
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the second sentence – “What I would really like to do is quit my job
and become a full-time artist.” – in a similar way gives the person two
“How free am I?” questions to answer: “How free am I to satisfy my
motivation to become a full-time artist?” and “How free am I to res-
ist becoming a full-time artist?” Given that the person has not actu -
ally become a full-time artist, their answer to the first of  these ques -
tions must be “not free enough”, and to the second, “free enough”.
With respect to the third sentence – “I didn't really want to go to the
party, but I felt I had to.” – the person again has two questions:
“How free was that part of  me that didn’t want to go to the party?” –
with the answer: “not free enough”; and to the question “How free
was the part that wanted (i.e. felt duty-bound) to go to the party?” the
answer is “free enough”.
11.2.3 In this book free will has been taken to be the ability of  an
agent to self-directively originate satisfaction of  their motivations,
and to self-creatively resolve – through free-will processing – conflicts
within their self  about what to choose or what to do. But the capacity
to exercise free will is only part of  the more general concept of  free-
dom, and in answering the question “How free are we?” some con-
sideration should be given to this broader concept.
11.3 The Concept of  Freedom
11.3.1 Two related but relatively distinct concepts are often dis-
tinguished. One of  them is known variously as negative liberty, negat-
ive freedom, or freedom from; and the other as positive liberty, posit-
ive freedom, or freedom to. Isaiah Berlin, mainly talking of  political
or social freedoms, sees negative liberty as involved in the answer to
the question ‘What is the area within which the subject – a person or
group of  persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to
do or be, without interference by other persons’. And he sees the
concept of  positive liberty as being involved in the answer to the
question ‘What, or who, is the source of  control or interference that
can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?’ (Berlin
2002, p.169) One interpretation of  positive freedom is that it is the
freedom to act according to one’s own free will, or for a group to act
according, say, to what the majority wants. However, it may be that
the chooser – the individual or the group – may be influenced in
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‘bad’ ways: by irrational beliefs or base desires, for example. And it
may therefore be argued that positive freedom actually entails some-
thing more: namely, having the power to override such bad influences
by ‘good’ ones. But who or what determines the ‘good’ influences?
Are they to be decided by a higher authority who ensures – through
education, conditioning, brainwashing, or whatever – that individuals
and groups possess them in such measure that they cannot be over-
ridden. Or are they to be determined by the individual or group by
their own processes – through creative self-determination, say? Ex-
actly what constitutes positive liberty is therefore not an easy matter
to decide because the question arises: What influences a person when
they are creatively controlling and directing their own life? Is it biolo-
gically-based motivations, societal conditioning, peer pressure? Or do
human persons have a way of  truly transcending such influences?
The view that is adopted in this book is that human persons have a
considerable capacity for creative self-determination but that they re -
main influenced – directly and indirectly – by factors not of  their
own making, and that they can never completely transcend these in-
fluences.
11.3.2 Early on (see 1.4.7) attention was drawn to the freedoms
necessary for voluntary action – namely, being able to choose and act
free from undue constraint, coercion, compulsion, and control. To be
free in this sense is to possess negative freedom. But possessing neg-
ative freedom does not necessarily mean that a person may enjoy a
full measure of  positive freedom. As Maslow points out (see 10.5.12),
if  a person’s most prepotent needs remain unsatisfied – for instance,
if  their needs for food, warmth, and security of  existence remain un-
satisfied – then they shall likely spend most of  their time working to
satisfy these and shall have little opportunity to enjoy the satisfactions
that may be had from attending to their less prepotent needs. With
this in mind, it would be reasonable to add freedom from extreme
poverty and insecurity of  existence to what is required in order to
possess negative freedom.
11.3.3 Many (but by no means all) persons in the modern world
are able to live much of  their life free from undue constraint, coer -
cion, compulsion, and control, and also free from poverty and insec-
urity of  existence. Indeed, some people have most of  the wide-ran-
ging freedoms enshrined in such aspirational statements as the Uni-
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versal Declaration of  Human Rights. Additionally, some people have
sufficient disposable income and free time to be able to pursue many
projects and interests that are not open to those who lack these re -
sources. Nevertheless, although some people may have all of  these
freedoms, they may be severely limited in what they may do because
they suffer from serious disability or illness. However, considering
only those persons who have full negative freedom in the sense just
outlined, does this mean that they have full freedom? Clearly not if
they lack positive freedom.
11.3.4 The power to “make our own fate” is at the heart of  what
positive freedom is about, and it has been argued that independence
indeterminism offers a thoroughly naturalistic way of  understanding
how human persons are such that to some significant extent many of
them may achieve this. Furthermore, as just noted, many people in
the modern world have more or less full negative freedom, and so it
might seem that they have a very full measure of  positive freedom.
However, human persons do not have ultimate freedom because they
cannot completely detach themselves from their genetic inheritance,
nor from the influences of  their early socialisation, and nor from
other influences not of  their own making. And having available a
huge variety of  things that a person may possibly do does not mean
that they are free to do these things because many of  their contem -
plated doings, although desired by certain parts of  their self, will be
unacceptable to other parts. Hence, doubts remain about just how
much positive freedom humans actually have even if  they have a
good measure of  negative freedom. This issue will be returned to
shortly (see section 11.5) but first one of  the central questions in the
free-will debate deserves to be further discussed.
11.4 Could We Have Done Otherwise?
11.4.1 In Chapter 1 (see 1.4.13) a distinction between indiffer-
ently originative free will and self-originative free will was made and it
was stated that it was the latter sort that would concern us in this
book. There are two reasons for not trying to explain indifferently-
originative free will: firstly, because there is little scientific (or even
every-day) evidence that humans actually possess an Indifferent Will,
and secondly because what comes at all close to it tends to be classi-
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fied as a kind of  mindlessness – as, for example, when a person says
“I really don’t know what came over me”. However, there is one as-
pect of  the Indifferent Will that has played an important part in the
history of  the free-will debate and this is that it gives its possessor the
power to choose to do something completely uninfluenced by any
factors external to their Indifferent Will. An agent who possesses and
uses such a power seems to have a special form of  responsibility for
what they then do because nothing at all other than this wholly inde-
pendently operating part of  themselves is responsible for their ac-
tions. But one consequence of  the infinite regress argument (see sec-
tion 5.5) is that no natural agent can be the sole and completely inde-
pendent creator of  their Indifferent Will, and so they cannot be held
ultimately responsible for what it does.
11.4.2 It has earlier been suggested (see 1.4.14) that if  a psycho-
logical agent is self-directively and creatively originating their choices
and doings then, because anything that is creatively originated is not
wholly prefigured, they could (in a significant rather than a marginal
sense) have chosen otherwise. But this point requires more discussion
because there are two senses of  the word “could” and only one sense
is being used – and it is not necessarily the sense that is generally
meant when discussing positive freedom, moral responsibility, and
similar matters. 
11.4.3 Formally, “could” is the past tense of  “can” which means
“to be able to”. However, it is also used as an auxiliary verb with sev -
eral meanings – in particular it is used to express possibility as, for ex -
ample, in the sentences “It could be you!” (an advertising slogan used
to launch the UK National Lottery in the 1990s), and “There could
be a recession next year”. By making use of  this possibility interpreta-
tion the claim that “free will means that, in a given situation, an agent
could have done otherwise than what they actually did do” becomes
the claim that “free will means that, in a given situation, an agent
might have done otherwise than what they actually did do.” This latter
claim is more readily realisable than the former because the agent
need not possess the ability to do otherwise; minimally, all that is re-
quired is that the processes that produce their action (or inaction) run
indeterministically.
11.4.4 But is the “ability” meaning important when talking about
whether an agent “could have done otherwise”? It seems that it may
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be, since, for instance, it does not appear that a quantum indetermin-
istic process has the ability to “do otherwise” even though such a pro-
cess might have turned out otherwise than it did. Like many common
words that people generally have little difficult in using, the word abil -
ity is a tricky one to define. Dictionaries say ability is the ‘state of  be-
ing able; physical, mental, legal, or financial power to do.’ And that
able means ‘having adequate power; competent; qualified.’ Synonyms
for ability include ‘aptitude, capability, capacity, cleverness, compet-
ency, dexterity, expertness, faculty, power, qualification, readiness,
skill, talent’. Clearly, ability is a concept that is strongly connected
with human persons and human life, but it is also recognised that it
has non-human and indeed non-biological meanings.
11.4.5 Whether or not it is correct to say that the free-will pro-
cess as it is understood according to independence indeterminism
means that an agent engaged in such a process has the ability to do
otherwise, may be an open question. But as a creatively originative
process it is necessarily one that might have turned out differently
from how it actually did because its outcome is not prefigured. And
since there seems nothing particularly odd about saying that human
persons have the ability to carry out free-will processing, it doesn't
seem unreasonable to say that they do indeed have the ability to do
otherwise. And this is the position that is being adopted in the
present work. Nevertheless, the extent to which a person (or more
generally, a psychological agent) may “do otherwise” seems to vary a
great deal. Indeed, some forms of  being able to “do otherwise” are
so weak that they cannot reasonably be counted as involving the exer-
cise of  free will at all. This point needs a little more discussion.
11.4.6 Often what a person actually does in a decision situation is
fairly predictable – except for fine details – and when this is the case
it would seem there is no significant sense in which they could have
done otherwise. However care must be taken, as the following incid-
ent from the author's own experience indicates. I was once talking to
some friends about free will and I related an episode that had oc-
curred a short while earlier on holiday when I had been faced with
choosing an ice-cream from a stall offering many enticing varieties
and I had experienced indecision about what to choose. When I told
my friends that, after a good deal of  deliberation, I ended up choos -
ing vanilla they burst out laughing saying “we knew that’s what you
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would choose, Mike.” This outcome was obvious to them because
they knew of  my non-adventurous nature in such matters, and they
were not at all surprised that I had ended up acting “true to form”.
Indeed, examples like this seem to provide good ammunition for
those who seek to establish that our experience of  exercising our free
will is nothing but an illusion – as, for instance, Wegner (see section
5.2) has argued. But care must be taken. I believe I certainly was in a
condition of  genuine indecision and this being the case, under inde -
pendence indeterminism, it was possible for me, in that specific situ -
ation, to have acted “out of  character”. In fact, prior to this occasion
and in similar situations I had occasionally acted out of  character in
that I had made ‘adventurous’ choices regarding food, so it seems it
was not impossible that I might have done so in the situation in ques-
tion.
11.4.7 Under independence indeterminism, and using the ac-
count of  the factors that tend to influence the human free-will pro-
cess that were discussed in the previous chapter, it should not be dif-
ficult to explain what was probably going on within me when I was in
a condition of  indecision over what ice-cream variety to choose. It
seems that what was involved was a relatively weak form of  creative
origination involving interaction among conflicting and competing
motivations – motivations stimulated within me by the situation, and
by the process of  deliberation itself. In saying that the process was
creative in the situation concerned is to say that there was nothing
within me – no existing ‘machinery’, or routines, or pre-established
rules – that type-determined the course of  the decision-making pro-
cess taking place. Rather, various aspects of  my self  – for example, a
motivation to be more adventurous, a motivation to not look a fool
by taking too long to make a decision, my emotional self  producing
increasing embarrassment because of  my indecision, and my execut-
ive self  trying to work out what to do to best handle the situation –
interacted in a mildly creatively originative fashion and eventually the
action of  choosing vanilla was produced. It has earlier been argued
(see 1.5.7) that such creatively originative interaction is a feature of  all
conflictual or competitive processes when there is no machinery or
set of  rules in place that type-determines the way the interaction will
proceed and what the outcome will be. And this may be so even
when it is apparent what the outcome is likely (but not certain) to be.
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11.4.8 Such creative decision-making is to be contrasted with the
great deal of  more or less automatic decision-making which humans
continually carry out. Such automatic decision-making occurs, for ex-
ample, when a person is driving, or navigating their way through a
crowd when walking about, or dealing with routine matters at work,
or carrying out some activity which is very familiar to them, or doing
innumerable other everyday things. The decision-making is automatic
when a person has in place well-developed routines for deciding
between the alternatives that arise, and nothing occurs that de-rails
the smooth execution of  these routines. However, when such de-
cision-making does not go smoothly some sort of  creative activity is
required – albeit usually of  a relatively weak form. But if  such a weak
form of  creativity fails to overcome the problem the person may re-
sort to stronger forms, and even possibly to carrying out full-blown
free-will processing to work out what to do.
11.4.9 However, under independence indeterminism and given
the apparent nature of  human persons it would be incorrect to say
that when humans are operating automatically they “could not have
done otherwise” because humans are not automata: indeed, many
mind-brain processes not connected with a person’s automatic per-
formances may be active within them at the same time, and these
may, in a non-prefigured way, interrupt their automatic activity and
lead them to “do otherwise” than automatic execution of  the process
would allow. For example, while driving in a more or less automatic
fashion something not to do with a person’s driving may enter their
phenomenal consciousness and prompt them to break into the auto-
matic process. For instance, they may suddenly remember that they
failed to make a certain phone call before they left which they decide
requires, say, that they stop the car and make the call before continu-
ing their journey. What this means is that, in general, a person may be
able to “do otherwise” even when they are apparently operating auto-
matically.
11.4.10 There is another way in which, even when a person is op -
erating more or less automatically, they could (might) have done oth-
erwise: namely, that they might make an error in performing an ac-
tion. Although making an error, or of  things not working out as ex-
pected, usually has a negative value it should not be thought that this
is always so because sometimes, by making use of  their creative cap-
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abilities, errors and unexpected outcomes can be useful to a person.
For instance, there are several examples of  important advances in sci-
ence being initiated by a researcher questioning why something unex-
pected happened rather than just ignoring it as something having
gone wrong – Henri Becquerel's discovery of  radioactivity, and Alex-
ander Fleming's discovery of  penicillin are notable examples. And to
show that this can be so in much more mundane cases it is worth
mentioning an incident that occurred to the author. Many years ago, I
was trying to explain to my aunt and some of  my cousins how my
struggle to find a naturalistic explanation of  free will was going. Hav -
ing got myself  into quite deep water, and in trying to make clear what
I was getting at, I made a slip and used the words “independence in -
teraction” instead of  “independence indeterminacy”. I recognised I
had made a slip – because at that time the phrase “independence in-
teraction” had not consciously occurred to me and so was not at all
part of  my vocabulary – and I corrected it and did not think more
about it at the time. However, on the drive home this slip came back
into my phenomenal consciousness and I began to think that actually
the phrase “independence interaction” was very useful since I needed
a term for referring to interactions between things that, prior to their
interaction, had been running (at least in some ways) independently
of  one another. The slip I made does not seem to have been a pure
accident. Rather, it seems that my speech production system – a sys-
tem that runs fairly automatically most of  the time – in working to
translate my thoughts into speech came up with “independence inter-
action” as a reasonable way of  linguistically expressing what was not
yet a fully formed idea in my phenomenally conscious thinking. If
this was so then the slip was not actually really a slip at all but an un -
consciously operating part of  my mind-brain producing something
that later, in a phenomenally conscious way, I recognised as having
considerable value. Errors of  this sort that stimulate creatively origin-
ative processes in a person’s mind-brain are not uncommon when
someone is learning new things or thinking things out for the first
time or when engaged in some other creative activity, and they
provide further evidence that a person’s mind-brain is, among other
things, a richly creative domain.
11.4.11 There is another point that needs to be addressed, which
is whether human persons can only “do otherwise” because of  the
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indeterminacy of  events in their environment. One of  the important
features of  the traditional idea of  free will is that the Indifferent Will
may make an undetermined choice at any moment. That is, it may
“do otherwise” at any instant in time and not via a process – i.e.
something necessarily spread out in time. Self-originative free will, on
the other hand, is understood to be a process, and although the final
product of  this process – a decision being reached, or an action being
taken – may apparently arise suddenly it is not something that is pro-
duced in an instant but over some period of  time, sometimes a
lengthy, and possibly very lengthy, period of  time. During a period of
free-will processing external events may arise that may influence the
course of  the originative process involved, and it might be argued
that a person is only able to “do otherwise” because of  such events.
Although such environmental independence interactions are an im-
portant source of  originative occurrences during free-will processing
they are not the sole source because many independence interactions
within and between various parts of  the self  and the mind-brain of
the person concerned will be taking place as well, and although many
of  these will be chance interactions not all of  them will be because
some will be a consequence of  the person’s self-directed creative
activity.
11.4.12 It has just been emphasised that exercising self-originative
free will is understood to be a process. When this process is very
short-lived there is generally not much time for a lot of  creative
change to take place and the creative activity seems mainly to be con-
fined to creative interaction between conflicting or competing parts
of  the self. But when a free-will process takes place over a long
period creative origination may take place in all the four areas of  the
ARCS of  the human free-will process. For instance, alternatives that
were initially under consideration and strongly supported by reasons
may get completely overthrown and replaced by their opposites. This
may be illustrated by an incident that arose during the author’s work
on the present project – a project that has been going on for many
years and which has involved a great deal of  free-will processing.
11.4.13 Several years ago I was trying to find out what I had on
some old 5.25-inch floppy discs relating to my thinking on free will.
The first file I managed to recover contained the following piece of
writing.
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19th September 1993
Consider a Meccano set and a person locked in a room using
the Meccano set to make constructions. Is the future of  the
contents of  the room determined? We might readily agree
that every construction (and all the learning and change to the
person) is derived from what was in the room at the start. In
other words we are probably happy with the assumption that
the room contains the source of  everything that subsequently
happens within it. Yet we could still feel uncertain that what
actually happened in the room was determined at the start. I
want to show why this uncertainty is well grounded and in-
deed develop a system of  ideas which will make it seem ut-
terly reasonable that the future of  the room is not determ-
ined.
I think this example puts my problem very clearly.
In accepting that what happens in the room is in some sense
derived from what the room contains at the start we are limit-
ing the space of  all possible futures for the room. This may
be an effectively infinite space but it is certainly not a com -
pletely unconstrained space. We can go further than this and
allow that all change that takes place to be fully determined in
the sense discussed above [and not included in this extract,
but in line with Laplace’s account (see 3.2.6)]. Is it still the
case that the future of  the room is not determined? I want to
argue that it is.
Let me be clear about what I am not claiming. I am not claim-
ing that the future that actually came about contains instances
of  indeterminism and that because of  this it was not determ -
ined at the start. I want to assume, although it may not be
true of  the world in light of  our understanding of  quantum
indeterminacy, that the future that actually occurs in the room
is fully determined when looked back [at] as a sequence of
events. This follows from our assumption that every event
(i.e. change) is determined.
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I seem to have so restricted things that my argument cannot
be won. I leave myself  a difficult argument to construct but I
think, in setting the conditions as I have, that I have avoided
most of  the grounds that the determinists have for rejecting
previous arguments for an open future. What I have done is
give the determinists most of  their fundamental assumptions,
assumptions that are very well supported by our experience
of  the world.
How will my argument go? The key idea is to question what
is in the room at the start and to argue that this is insufficient
to determine the full future of  the room. This seems to be a
nonsense since I am accepting that everything in all the pos -
sible futures of  the room is contained within the room at the
start. Surely it must follow that the room at the start does
contain sufficient to determine the full future of  the room
given that this future must belong in the space of  all possible
futures. My argument rests on a vital distinction. I want to
distinguish between what is in real existence in the room at
the start from what is in the room but not in real existence.
This non-real contents of  the room, its potential, not being
real is not properly in the room at the start. Yet, because
some of  this potential will be actualised and become the fu -
ture that occurs, it is proper to say that all that may be derived
from the room is contained within it, even though much of
this contents is not real within the room at the start. But this
argument seems to be playing with the idea of  real and non-
real; this distinction must be justified before we can go any
further.
11.4.14 A few points are worth making. First, it should be clear
that in 1993 I was strongly wedded to determinism and simply could
not bring myself  to abandon its basic assumptions. Indeed, I had
much earlier been pleased that the computer simulation model of  po-
lice detective decision-making that I produced as part of  my PhD re -
search (Elstob 1975) was 100 per cent deterministic with no random
or statistical “fudge factors”. Second, and in opposition to my strong
attachment to determinism, it seems that I was also convinced that
there must be a way forward that would provide a means of  escape
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from the devastating consequences determinism has for the possibil-
ity of  free will. In other words, there was a good deal of  conflict
within my mind-brain. Third, and what is perhaps most interesting
about this piece of  writing, was that I was trying to see “possibility”
or “potential” – what later I came to refer to as passive existents, or
“no-things” – as somehow existing in but not being a real part of  the
room until this possibility became actualised through the special
powers of  a person or similarly creative agent. This half-formed idea
later crystallised into the notion of  indeterminately changing joint-
change (see 2.1.8). Fourth, the present work makes clear that I did
eventually resolve the conflicts within my thinking and that I did re -
lease myself  from the grip that determinism had over me – which il -
lustrates that creative origination can not only produce what is not
prefigured but can produce outcomes whose emergence was posit-
ively opposed by some of  the things that existed. Finally, it is worth
saying that absolute determinists would deny that my efforts over the
years have involved any creative origination at all. Rather, they would
insist that although I was still very largely a determinist in 1993, the
world (including my mind-brain) at that time was set upon an entirely
fixed course that would eventually lead to my abandoning that view
and to my producing the present work. Of  course independence in-
determinists do not accept this view and would insist that I have in -
deed been involved in a long creative process whose outcome was
neither predetermined nor prefigured. And so independence inde-
terminists come up with a very definite “No” in answer to the ques-
tion “Is the future of  the contents of  the room determined?” be -
cause they accept that the person in the room may carry out self-dir-
ected creative origination in producing some of  their Meccano con-
structions.
11.5 The Self-Created Life
11.5.1 To be able to self-directively create important aspects of
their life is one of  the greatest freedoms that humans possess and it
is understood to come with the capability of  human persons to carry
out creative origination – a capability, it seems, that humans have in
far greater measure than any other natural beings (or artificial entities)
that we know of. Higher animals are able to live a self-originated life
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to the extent that they are able to originate satisfaction of  their mo-
tivations. However, their motivations tend to be fairly directly related
to their species-specific needs and drives, and most of  the time they
engage in largely genetically-determined (and so relatively type-de-
termined) directive activities to satisfy them. They engage in creative
origination to the extent that they are able to learn and to carry out
problem-solving but what they do not appear to do is create the sort
of  elaborate and distinctly individual lifestructures that are common
among humans.
11.5.2 Although many humans do actively work to create a life-
structure that they may rightly claim is their own, not all people are
able to do so. Indeed, in some societies even today the structure of  a
person's life is largely set for them by their family and community.
For instance, what work they do, where and in what conditions they
live, their economic conditions, their social position, and who they
might marry are all largely decided by others according to long-estab -
lished traditions. There have always been rebels – in the sense of
those who go against what family and community expect of  them –
but it is only in relatively recent times that it has been common for
many individuals to largely be in charge of  creating the major features
of  their lifestructure. This freedom is not an unalloyed blessing as it
often brings with it much angst – for instance: the angst of  inde -
cision, the angst of  forestalled hopes, the angst of  dissatisfaction
with their lot, the angst of  possibly losing what they already have, and
the angst of  envy.
11.5.3 Before going further, something needs to be said about
the nature of  the creative origination involved in “making our own
future” since very often what people originate does not seem to be
particularly novel from an external perspective. Creative origination is
understood to arises when the types of  outcomes and/or things that
are originated are not prefigured within the domain concerned. For a
person, the domain is themselves and their own lifestructure – not
the human race at large, nor even their family and community, except
to the extent that these constitute parts of  their lifestructure. Many
things are largely prefigured in a human being's life such as their over-
all biological development and ageing, their basic needs and drives,
and that they will (almost certainly) undergo socialisation and become
a human person. Some things are partially prefigured in that they are
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concomitants of  their socialisation – things such as their language,
how to conduct themselves socially, and certain values and beliefs.
These things may change as the person lives their life, but initially
they are givens. But other aspects of  a person's lifestructure are not
prefigured. It is these non-prefigured aspects that may be creatively
originated and they include such things as the friends a person makes,
the special interests they develop, what leisure pursuits appeal to
them, and what aspirations and life-hopes they form. As a person
grows up, and providing they have the necessary negative freedoms,
more aspects of  their lifestructure becomes open to them to choose
– things such as the job or work they do, where they live, and who
they share their life with. However, even though there may be a range
of  options open to them this does not mean they are necessarily free
from external influences in what they choose. Society at large, family,
friends, and many other external factors – TV, movies, books, advert-
ising, for instance – may influence what they choose and what they
seek to become, and what they want to change about themselves and
their current lifestructure. This means that although each person may
originate things of  a type not prefigured within themselves, and so
will carry out creative origination of  these things relative to them-
selves, much of  what they create will, relative to society at large, be of
a more or less familiar general type and so, relative to this larger do -
main, may not be regarded as having been creatively originated. It is
for this reason that most lifestructures do not, from the outside, seem
to be particularly novel.
11.5.4 Although many people in the modern world have suffi-
cient negative freedom to create their lifestructure according to their
own preferences not all of  them do. This doesn't mean that such
people don't have any choices, but rather that they have only a
severely restricted range of  choices. But being restricted in this way is
sometimes a sort of  freedom in its own right: a freedom from inde-
cision; a freedom from the pain of  having, through exercising their
self-originative free will, made bad decisions; and a freedom to blame
others for their lack of  satisfaction and fulfilment.
11.5.5 Given that independence indeterminism allows people,
under the directive influence of  their self, not only to originate many
aspects of  their life, but to creatively originate some of  them, it must
be asked to what extent people are free of  external influences and
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biologically inherited givens in doing this? That is, are human persons
ultimately products of  nature and nurture alone? If  they are, then no
matter how creative they may be in responding to the influence of
nature and nurture, these factors will be the real drivers of  a person's
life and it shall have to be accepted that humans have much less free-
dom than otherwise might be thought. But are humans indeed ulti-
mately products of  nature and nurture alone? Determinism says they
must be, indeed they must be a necessary consequence of  conditions
existing long before they were born. Independence indeterminism
gives a very different answer because, while acknowledging the influ-
ence of  nature and nurture, it sees a person’s life as being influenced
as well by partly self-created criteria for what for them makes for a
successful life.
11.5.6 There is no English word that stands for the self-directed
striving of  a person to create and fulfil their own criteria for a suc-
cessful life but the little-used word “nisus” may be pressed into ser-
vice. The Oxford English Dictionary tell us nisus is a noun of  action
meaning ‘effort, endeavour, impulse’, and Webster's Dictionary (1998)
says it means ‘The exercise of  power in acting or attempting to act;
an effort, endeavor, or exertion.’ But in looking for a suitable word I
had the additional motive of  wanting one that starts with the letter
“n” so that it would be possible to state, in a memorable way, that un -
der independence indeterminism there are three (not two) major
sources of  influence on the life of  each person: namely nature, nur -
ture, and nisus. The introduction this third major source of  influence
immediately changes the basis of  many of  the discussions that
presently take place about whether nature of  nurture is the dominant
factor in a forming a person's life.
11.5.7 It is all very well to say that a person’s nisus is an import -
ant influence on their path through life but do people, even under in -
dependence indeterminism, have the capability to create some of
their own criteria for success and so some of  their own motivations?
If  they don’t have this capability – if  all their motivations are ulti -
mately derived from biological and socially determined givens – then
they have a severely limited ability to shape their lives according to
their own self-created criteria since any shaping shall be done to serve
(biological and social) criteria not of  their own making. However, in
understanding human persons to be operating most of  the time as
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self-evaluating executive controlling agents – SEECing agents – it
seems that they do have some freedom to shape their lives in ways
that are not ultimately dictated by their nature and nurture. The key
here is the human capability for self-evaluation. With this capability
humans are, in significant ways, able to escape from both their nature
and nurture to create for themselves motivations – e.g. values, ideals,
life-hopes, projects, ends and purposes – that derive from their own
self-created and self-adopted criteria for what they believe counts as
success in their lives. And with the power of  the executive self  to
override or sideline the demands of  a person’s biological and socially
determined motivations, it seems humans, in some significant meas-
ure at least, do have just such a freedom.
11.6 Are We Free Enough to be Morally Responsible 
Agents?
11.6.1 The free-will debate has long been concerned with
whether humans are sufficiently free to be ultimately responsible for
their actions. The infinite regress argument (see section 5.5) suggests
that they can never be totally free from influences not of  their own
creation and so cannot be ultimately responsible. It might seem that
possession of  an Indifferent Will would make humans ultimately re -
sponsible because it is not influenced by anything external to itself.
However, humans do not choose to possess their Indifferent Will (if
indeed they have one), and its fundamental indifference to influences
makes it insensitive to moral sanctions. Given that nothing can make
natural beings such as humans ultimately responsible, and given that,
by and large, people do believe themselves to be fully-fledged moral
agents, a lesser basis needs to be sought for them having this belief.
11.6.2 It is very widely accepted – by compatibilists as well as
most other participants in the free-will debate – that a person cannot
be held morally responsible for an action if  they could not have done
otherwise. This is the so-called Principle of  Alternate Possibilities
(PAP) and it has already been discussed at some length (see sections
5.8 to 5.10). Under absolute determinism the whole history – past,
present, and future – of  the universe is fixed, which means no agent
could have done otherwise than they did. This does not mean that
codes of  conduct cannot exist in such a universe, nor that measures
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to encourage their adoption must be ineffectual since such things
might be part of  the way the predetermined history of  the universe
unfolds. This means that absolute determinism is incompatible with
the Principle of  Alternative Possibilities in spite of  arguments to the
contrary (see section 5.9).
11.6.3 It has been argued that under independence indetermin-
ism agents who carry out free-will processing may be taken to be in-
volved in self-directed creative origination in producing their choices
and doings, and in consequence could (might) – in a strong sense –
have done otherwise than they did (see section 11.4). This means that
when so operating such agents qualify as moral agents to the extent
that alternative possibilities of  a significant sort are genuinely open to
them. However, there is a problem: to possess moral agency is to
possess a special ability – what may be referred to as “moral intelli -
gence”. That is, the agent must be able to use the abstract ideas of
right and wrong, and other moral concepts, to figure out what would
count as morally correct conduct in situations with which they are
unfamiliar. At present (since no machines with moral intelligence
have been built) it is only human persons of  sound mind and of  suf -
ficient maturity that are thought to have this ability. Animals are gen-
erally thought not to have it. And although it is usually recognised
that most young human children have the inherent capability to ac -
quire moral intelligence, it is generally acknowledged that until they
grow up and have sufficiently developed this ability they should not
be counted as full moral agents. Certainly, animals, young children,
and to a limited extent some machines, can learn to respond in the
‘right’ way to certain types of  situation, but they do so without an ap -
propriate appreciation of  the moral rightness of  what they are doing.
So, for example, a dog may be trained not to steal food from the
table, but it cannot understand the abstract concept: “It is wrong to
steal”. And the same is true for a very young child.
11.6.4 With these two conditions – alternative possibilities and
moral intelligence – assumed to be satisfied, does it follow that a per-
son is morally responsible for their actions? It seems that it is gener -
ally believed that they are. And this is believed in spite of  it being ac -
cepted that often some relevant features of  the person’s self  that led
them to act as they did may not be of  their own creation. However,
people and human societies do often excuse a person of  moral re-
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sponsibility when they believe that an “objective attitude” towards
them should be adopted and, in Peter Strawson’s words, be treated as
‘psychologically abnormal – or as morally undeveloped’ (see 5.6.2).
11.6.5 Is there much more to say about moral agency under inde-
pendence indeterminism? Not really. Providing they believe that they
could have done otherwise (in the ways that have been discussed)
then most people would probably be prepared to face the music for
what they have actually done. It may be that a person’s moral code
does not accord with that of  the society they are in, but then most
people would accept that there is little they can do other than leave
and find a community with codes more in line with what they believe.
The required possession of  moral intelligence presents few diffi-
culties, other than a need for a better understanding of  what mind-
brain capacities it rests upon and how these may be developed ad-
equately within members of  a community. Rather, the difficulty with
the possession of  moral agency only comes to the fore when people
really do believe that they and other humans have no capability to
“do otherwise”. And although the extent to which a society is morally
justified in using particular punishments in an attempt to enforce its
laws and codes of  conduct does raise important and difficult ques-
tions, it is not an issue directly related to whether humans are moral
agents.
11.7 Is the Free Will That Has Been Argued For Worth 
Having?
11.7.1 It might be thought that the kind of  self-originative free
will that independence indeterminism makes possible offers a very in-
complete sort of  freedom because human persons cannot fully es-
cape the nature that evolution has created for them. If  a naturalistic
metaphysics existed that was able to explain that humans possessed
indifferently originative free will, would such a freedom be more
worth having? In one sense it might be because it would be a kind of
freedom that transcends the influences that biological and social
factors impose on a person. But is this the sort of  freedom people
really want? It seems not because, as mentioned earlier (see 1.4.11),
few people would wish for such an alien-seeming freedom – a free-
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dom that might lead them to say such things as “I don't know what
came over me”, or “I hardly felt it was me making the choice”.
11.7.2 Is there a sort of  free will that most people would see as
better than either of  these two alternatives? And if  so, what might it
be like? One possibility would be a sort of  free will in which a per -
son’s executive self  had complete rather than only limited power to
override their emotional and motivational selves. Would this sort of
free will be preferred? Probably not, as long as a person’s motiva-
tional and emotional selves remained active because the continual
non-satisfaction of  these parts of  their being would not be compat-
ible with them living a fulfilled life. What about a sort of  free will that
enabled a person to choose and act in the world in such a way that
they could live a life of  unbroken happiness? If  such a free will was
possible there seems to be little to be said against it, but – putting
aside an artificially induced state of  happiness – at present such a
form of  free will is not available to us. Indeed, the best that seems
available to us is the sort of  self-originative free will that has been de -
scribed in this book. But perhaps all that can be claimed for it is that
this sort of  free will seems more worth wanting than that which de-
terminism is able to offer.
11.7.3 However, is free will worth wanting at all? Might human
persons be better off  without free will? In this book it has been ar -
gued that free will is, among other things, a means by which a psycho-
logical agent is able, through self-directed creative means, to resolve
conflicts and indecisions within themselves when they have no pre-
figured means for doing so. All of  us know that such difficult-to-re-
solve conflict and indecision is rarely a happy experience. Might,
then, life be better if  our nature was such that the internal conflicts
and indecisions that arose within us could, rather like animals, always
be resolved by prefigured means? We must all answer these questions
for ourselves.
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